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Summary 
 
The absence of a powerful uniform legal authority, to enforce international law and 
international agreements, has placed reciprocity in a pivotal position in inter-State relations 
and the extent to which States rely on reciprocity. This thesis examines the significance of 
reciprocity and the extent to which reciprocity manifests itself in international law, more 
specifically is this manifestation a foundation of international law or whether international 
law creates reciprocity. The present work argues how reciprocity in international law is a 
multifaceted concept. On the one side it is a principal tool incentivising States away from 
wrongful acts, and to abide by their obligations; alternatively it is a tool for establishing the 
right to a reciprocal response. Thus the study sets out to explore how international law shapes 
the international community’s interactions and how, in turn, these interactions shape 
international law.  
 
Considering the important role that the rule of law plays in the context of international law, 
the thesis aims to provide an in-depth analysis of the rule of law particularly in its 
relationship with international law. This analysis will provide a useful discussion on the 
interactions between the rule of law and reciprocity. 
 
The United Nations was established to enhance co-operation amongst the international 
community with the goal of maintaining international peace and security. This thesis will 
explore the role of reciprocity in international law on enhancing international commitment 
and international co-operation. The significance of this lies in reciprocal and ‘remedial’ 
options in international law that maintain States’ commitment to international obligations 
which in turn develops friendly relations and international co-operation.  
 
This thesis will aim to contribute to scholarly works to bridge the existing gap in 
interdisciplinary studies exploring the connection between reciprocity, co-operation and the 
rule of law in the realm of international law.  
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Introduction 
 
The term reciprocity is multi-faceted and has different meanings in different contexts. 
Reciprocity plays a prominent role in a de-centralised system of public international law (IL) 
where there is no overruling legal authority to establish, adjudicate or to enforce all 
international rules. The clearest general definition of reciprocity is ‘returning like behaviour 
with like’.1 Reflecting more a specialist legal definition, reciprocity is defined as, ‘the mutual 
concession of advantages or privileges for purposes of commercial or diplomatic relations’.2 
This specialist legal definition suggests that reciprocity in international relations (IR) would 
create an environment where States help and support each other under a reciprocal 
relationship, for a particular short or long-term advantage, through the means of balance in 
their rights, duties and interests. This specialist definition sets a theme for this thesis in order 
to explore inter-State relations and their collective international co-operation within the 
framework of IL.  
 
This thesis explores how reciprocity manifests itself in different areas of IL, and asks whether 
reciprocity is a foundation of IL, or whether IL creates reciprocity. In simpler terms, is 
reciprocity a cause or effect in IL? This requires an understanding of what reciprocity is and 
its role within IL. Reciprocity is intertwined with IL and this will be evident from the 
discussion of reciprocity as an underlying principle of IL as well as its manifestation and 
significance in different IL sources. References to reciprocity in IL rule-making, IL sources 
and its enforcement mechanisms are at times either direct or indirect but the role they play 
can be equally significant. The significance of reciprocity in different stages of IL will be 
examined, encompassing 1) the role of reciprocity in IL sources and in the development and 
creation of IL rules, 2) the role of reciprocity in IL rules themselves and how IL requires 
obedience and compliance, 3) reciprocity as an alternative enforcement mechanism, and 4) 
reciprocity as a tool for enhancing co-operation amongst States.  
 
With wider technological and economic inter-connections amongst the international 
community, there is a growing recognition of the importance of a global society of States and 
                                                          
1 Francesco Parisi and Nita Ghei, The Role of Reciprocity in International Law, Cornell International Law 
Journal, Vol. 36, Issue. 1, 2003, p. 94. 
2 Bryan A. Garner (ed.), Black’s Law Dictionary, 2004, p. 1298. 
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their interdependence. This interdependence brings about greater interactions and has 
contributed to the creation of reciprocal inter-State relations. As with any society, IR needs a 
framework and collection of rules for the conduct and behaviours of States which is provided 
by IL. Traditional IL revolved around bilateral relations, covering limited subjects such as 
diplomatic relations, law of war, treaties, and law of the sea. Contemporary IL has grown to 
encompass larger variety of issues for multilateral relations including space law, international 
nuclear energy, and intellectual property rights, whilst enhancing to cover areas such as 
Human Rights law (HR) which are outside inter-State relations. Contemporary IL is the result 
of an increasing need for closer inter-State links and their interdependency, coupled with the 
international community’s resolve to put an end to the individualistic ambitions that led to the 
World Wars.  
 
The creation of the United Nations (UN) was a milestone in uniting the world through an 
international legal framework. Establishing the UN was an important part of the international 
concerted effort on pursuing international justice, peace and security, whilst promoting 
respect for international obligations and duties as set out by IL. As a backdrop to this effort, 
consideration of the nature and format of inter-State relations was needed, resulting in the 
uniqueness of IL. This uniqueness is in that States are the law-makers, law-breakers, and law-
enforcers with particular contrast to national legal systems where the legislator, judiciary and 
administrator are distinct authorities and agencies. In IL, States, who are its primary subjects, 
formulate its rules and have the autonomy to choose the nature of obligation and duties set 
upon them. It is important to examine sources of IL to ascertain how these rules are created, 
changed and enhanced in the absence of a centralised legislative institution. Particular focus 
will be placed on the role and significance of reciprocity within these sources as well as how 
the role of reciprocity evolves and the rules of IL crystallise.  
 
Reciprocity in IL can be best described as a creator of balance between the interests and 
actions of States. In effect, it creates a balance between the rights, duties and obligations of 
States where States can have a sense of balance and fairness in their respective duties and 
obligations but also with respect to their rights. Reciprocity plays a pivotal role in balancing 
interests of States, since inter-State negotiations include a degree of equalising gains and 
advantages in the light of the various interests of each State. In addition reciprocity has 
become a strong tool in targeting State behaviour by incentivising and encouraging them 
12 
 
towards compliance and away from wrong-doing. Throughout this thesis it will be explored 
how the mere existence and applicability of reciprocity in IL helps protect the right of States 
as well as diverting them away from thinking about their own personal interests only, since 
pursuit of their own agenda provides others with the opportunity to take reciprocal measures. 
In this thesis, it will be evident how reciprocity has many functions least of all in how it 
confines the rights being claimed by States since the equal rights will be made available to all 
States, also it influences how States go about proclaiming their rights and responding to the 
rights claimed by others. Under the principle of reciprocity States are likely to be cautious in 
what rights they claim given that others will have the same benefits and advantages, thus they 
are likely to only claim rights that they are willing to share with others as publicly available 
rights. As suggested by Baker, reciprocity can operate as a ‘powerful constraining factor on 
the activities of states’.3 Given the consensual nature of IL, and the importance of the 
‘consent’ of States in every aspect of IL, one might presume that no State is willing to submit 
itself to any obligations, or that States’ commitment and obedience to IL rules are guaranteed, 
and deviation is minimal. Neither of these situations are the case. Indeed States do submit 
themselves to international duties and obligations and at times breaches of agreements and 
obligations do occur, but they are fewer than might be imagined. When assessing States’ 
conduct in general, it can be seen that the agreements and obligations are upheld in a manner 
that is not always in pursuit of maximising self-gain. The presence of reciprocity in IL is the 
contributing factor that influences State behaviours and why States follow through with their 
agreements and abide by their legal obligations rather than pursuing their individualistic self-
interest.  
 
IL relies upon key principles of equality, ‘consent’, balance of right and duties, and good 
faith within its framework for the establishment of a working legal order. The presence of 
these principles in IL will be examined together with how they are reflected within IL 
sources. Reciprocity is directly attributed and akin to the principle of balance of rights and 
duties and this relationship will be analysed throughout this thesis. Reciprocity is at the heart 
of rule-making, rule-changing and its enforcement as well as within the rules themselves. 
Linked together with the principle of equality, they bring about a sense of fairness and 
balance in State interactions. Reciprocity is more obviously applicable in bilateral agreements 
                                                          
3 J Craig Baker, International Law and International Relations, 2000, p. 31.  
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in line with direct reciprocal relationship and responses;4 given how it directly creates 
specific obligations for the parties involved. However it does also manifest itself significantly 
in multilateral agreements and obligations. This thesis explores the nature and types of States 
obligations and relations ranging from bilateral, bilaterlisable multilateral,5 non-bilaterlisable 
multilateral and obligations erga omnes. The study then proceeds to explore the nature of 
possible reciprocal relationships in different contexts. It will be discussed how reciprocity 
manifests itself differently in relation to different obligations and relations particularly how 
reciprocity seems to take step back when protection of fundamental rights, human dignity or 
moral values are at play. It is important to iterate that these duties and obligations set for the 
protection of fundamental rights are essential elements in IL and reciprocal response to 
breaches of these responsibilities are not permissible.     
 
The absence of an overruling legal authority to adjudicate and enforce legal rules undermines 
IL given its many constraints revolving around how States wish to maintain their right and 
control on parameters of their international obligations and duties. This notion is carried into 
IL enforcement where States do not have to surrender themselves to the authority of the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ),6 the main judicial organ under IL,7 because States’ 
‘consent’ is essential for the jurisdiction of the Court.8 Moreover, the UN Security Council 
(UNSC),9 as the prominent enforcer of IL, is predominantly more concerned with 
maintaining peace and security.10 IL is based on a linear and horizontal format, lacking a 
governing and supreme legislator or enforcer. As such in this thesis some of the existing 
enforcement mechanisms of IL, categorised as central and non-centralised enforcement 
systems will be analysed. The thesis evaluates the effectiveness, weaknesses and limitations 
of these enforcement mechanisms. The effectiveness of IL is reliant on its enforcement 
mechanisms and how States are encouraged to comply and commit to their duties and 
                                                          
4 Michael Byers, Custom, Power, the Power of Rules, 1999, p. 89. 
5 This is the form of multilateral relations that is “as a bundle of interwoven bilateral relationships” and can 
bring bilateral obligations and responsibility between States. This terminology is referred to by Linos-Alexander 
Sicilianos, the Classification of Obligations and the Multilateral Dimension of the Relations of International 
Responsibility, European Journal of International Law, Vol. 13, No. 5, 2002, p. 1133. 
6 International Court of Justice is established by the United Nations’ Charter and its Statute is annexed to the 
Charter, Article 1of the Statute sets out that the Court ‘shall function in accordance with the provisions’ of the 
Statute.   
7 Charter of the United Nations was signed on 26 June 1945 and entered into force on 24 October 1945, Article 
92.  
8 The Statute of the International Court of Justice, Article 36(2).  
9 Supra note 7, Chapter V.  
10 Ibid, Article 24.  
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obligations. This is where reciprocity strongly manifests itself in IL in its role as an 
alternative enforcement mechanism. 
 
If IL is primarily based on the ‘will’ and ‘consent’ of States, the challenge for the 
international community is how to preserve IL from international politics (IP), and from 
political interests of States. The thesis examines the relationship between these two 
disciplines. The role played by the rule of law in bridging these two disciplines will be 
subject to an in-depth analysis. Particular regard is given to how the rule of law and its 
constitutive elements provide a sense of stability to reciprocal relations of States by ensuring 
IL is not subject to arbitrary will of States. This leads the thesis to analyse the importance of 
valid interpretation of IL rules. A case study on the US ‘war on terror’ is presented in order to 
gain an understanding of why it is important for IL rules to be interpreted within the 
parameters set by IL.    
  
Reciprocity plays a pivotal role in modern inter-State relations which has been a significant 
contributor to international co-operation.11 Undoubtedly reciprocity is helpful in the 
negotiation and bargaining between States in their interactions to achieve co-operation and 
‘policy coordination’. The international community has reached the understanding that long-
term international peace and security requires co-operation but the challenge remains as to 
how best to secure and maintain this peaceful co-existence and co-operation. Interdependency 
of States is a contributing factor for encouraging and enhancing reciprocity in a positive 
format so as to expand international co-operation in the current globalisation era.12 
 
Aims and Focus of the Study  
 
The thesis aims to explore the various roles and significance of reciprocity within the 
framework of IL. The research objectives are, firstly to identify how reciprocity manifests 
itself in different areas of IL; secondly whether reciprocity is a foundation of IL, or does IL 
create reciprocity. This objective will be achieved by addressing questions such as: What is 
the status and significance of reciprocity within IL? What is the role of reciprocity in IL? Is 
reciprocity a legal principle and/or a right in IL? How does the role of reciprocity evolve as 
                                                          
11 Supra note 4, p. 89. 
12 Supra note 3, p. 31. 
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legal rules crystallise? What is the nature of reciprocity in different relations encompassing 
bilateral, multilateral and erga omnes relations? How beneficial is reciprocity to IL in 
enhancing commitment of States to international rules? How does reciprocity support and aid 
enforcement of IL rules. In achieving the thesis aims and objectives and answering the central 
research question both IL system and reciprocity need to be explored in order to evaluate the 
role and nature of the latter within the former.  
 
Analysis of reciprocity is fascinating, since it is an ill-defined concept. Firstly reciprocity is a 
tool balancing the rights of States whilst incentivising States away from wrongful acts and 
towards abiding by their obligations; alternatively it is a tool for a reciprocal response to a 
wrongful act or minimising unfair advantage. States play a fundamental role in creating 
customary international law (CIL) as well as choosing the content of their obligations and 
duties in line with the law of treaties.13 The perception of IL creates a paradox when IL is 
compared to national legal systems as to how the subjects of a legal system could be heavily 
involved in its formulation and enforcement. In national legal systems, the subjects are not 
able to create a law or limit their own obligations towards any law. 
 
Reciprocity is an important factor that is attributed to limiting the pursuit of self-interest by 
States, thus this poses the questions that how can reciprocity play a role which affects States’ 
behaviour? Is this effect required to be just positive or negative? This leads the study to 
examine the uniqueness of IL, its nature and sources, following which the thesis considers the 
inextricable link between IL and IP. There have been many debates on the ineffectiveness 
and lack of independence of IL from IP,14 since States and their political interests are at the 
forefront of IL. This notion has been challenged by many who have argued that IL, 
underpinned by the rule of law, is independent in its own remit,15 and arguably since at 
national level the discussion is about the ‘rule of law, not men’, therefore at international 
level discussion must focus on the ‘rule of law, not States’ .16  
 
                                                          
13 Please see Chapter Two for further detail. 
14 Martti Koskenniemi, The Politics of International Law, European Journal of International Law, Vol. 1, No. 1, 
1990, p. 9. 
15 Emmanuel Voyiakis, International Law and the Objectivity of Value, Leiden Journal of International Law, 
Vol. 22, Issue 1, 2009; and Dencho Georgiev, Politics or Rule of Law: Deconstruction and Legitimacy in 
International Law, European Journal of International Law, Vol. 4, No. 1, 1993.  
16 Robert E. Goodin, Towards an International Rule of Law: Distinguishing International Law-Breakers 
from Would-Be Law-Makers, Journal of Ethics, Vol. 9, No. 1-2, 2005, p.227. 
16 
 
The importance of the discussion on the rule of law revolves around the constituting 
factors of the legal system; hence it is based upon the values and principles of the 
international community. Essentially, not only is the rule of law the driving factor of IL, but 
also it is the dividing and distinguishing line between IL and IP in inter-State relations. 
Effectively, this study is interdisciplinary research which aims to bridge IP and IL through 
the rule of law. As it stands, even if States are involved in the formulation of IL, it does 
not necessarily suggest that the parameters of the rule of law are changeable by States. 
There is a clear argument that the rule of law sets the parameters against ‘arbitrary power’ 
rather than dictating absolute independence or distance between States’ practices and 
interests.17 Thus, the rule of law brings about a sense of stability and balance in reciprocal 
relationship that exists in inter-State relations by ensuring the ‘will’ of States are durable and 
not individualistic to their own objectives. 
 
After considering the rule of law in general terms, the study proceeds to analyse the place of 
the rule of law in IL. This is further examined by considering well-founded methods for the 
valid and correct interpretations of international rules under the guidelines provided under IL. 
Rule of law is examined as the underlying foundation of IL and as such it is important to gain 
an understanding of the relationship between reciprocity and rule of law within the context of 
IL, particularly the role of reciprocity in the guidelines provided by IL for the interpretation 
of its rules.  
 
The idealism in equality rights of States and a non-hierarchical structure have resulted in an 
absence of a uniform overarching legal authority to mandate the obedience of States to their 
international duties and obligations. The thesis takes into consideration some of the existing 
enforcement mechanisms of IL, which will be categorised as centralised and non-centralised 
enforcement systems. The thesis evaluates the effectiveness, weaknesses and limitations of 
these enforcement mechanisms. The effectiveness of IL is reliant on its enforcement 
mechanisms and how States are encouraged to comply and commit to their duties and 
obligations. The enforcement mechanisms must be able to deal with non-compliance and 
serving justice effectively, and particularly to support the injured parties. As a result of the 
                                                          
17 Dencho Georgiev, Politics or Rule of Law: Deconstruction and Legitimacy in International Law, European 
Journal of International Law, Vol. 4, No. 1, 1993, pp. 2-3.  
17 
 
absence of a uniform legal authority to enforce IL and its agreements, reciprocity strongly 
manifests itself in IL,18 and can be seen as a strong alternative.  
 
The objectives and focus of the thesis is further articulated below when explaining the 
structure of the thesis. 
 
Structure of the Thesis  
 
To conduct a systematic analysis of the aforementioned points, the research is structured in 
the following Chapters: 
 
Chapter One: The concept of reciprocity in general terms is introduced by exploring the role 
and significance of reciprocity in a wider context, considering its impact on sociological, 
anthropological, historical and IR fields. This approach allows the study to contextualise 
reciprocity within ordinary human interactions in connection with inter-State relationships. 
The international community is a collection of complex relations amongst different actors and 
understanding the concept of reciprocity through anthropological, social and historical 
frameworks helps to gain an understanding of the journey to the present system of 
international relations. This Chapter provides the understanding of the significance and 
concept of reciprocity in interactions in general which serves as an introduction for 
reciprocity in IL.  
 
Chapter Two: IL provides a collection of rules and a framework for the conduct of States, 
established for the international community. This Chapter aims to explore the unique nature 
and sources of IL to ascertain how it is created, changed and enhanced in the absence of a 
centralised legislative institution. Particular attention is paid to the role of reciprocity in how 
IL rules are developed. It is important to gain an understanding on the sources in detail 
together with exploring the status and role of reciprocity within the sources, coupled with 
how the role of reciprocity differs from one source to another.  
 
                                                          
18 Please see Chapter Four for further detail. 
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The present work seeks to explore the theoretical, as well as the practical, application of the 
elements constituting the sources. Emphasis will firstly be placed on the role of reciprocity in 
the law of treaties and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) since it 
underpins all treaties. The Chapter continues to explore the role of States’ conduct in 
formulation of CIL and its constitutive elements (State practice and opinio juris). It is 
additionally important to engage with the debate of what is State practice. Furthermore, the 
doctrine of opinio juris and the paradox surrounding this doctrine in scholarly work 
challenging its necessity and helpfulness will be examined. This inter-link between States and 
formulation of IL will demonstrate a link between IL and IP leading the study to explore the 
relationship between these two disciplines. The questions that come to mind are: Is IL 
independent from IP, and if not, to what degree are they dependent on each other? The 
relationship between IP and IL has been subject of many scholarly works,19 dividing the 
scholarly community over the power, usefulness and necessity of IL and the appropriateness 
of the influence of IP.  
 
Chapter Three: Having analysed the role of reciprocity in IL sources, this Chapter explores 
the role of reciprocity in the contents of IL rules and how IL requires obedience and 
compliance to its rules. This Chapter delves into the study of the principles and values, 
regarded as the rule of law, which strengthen the rules of IL and the obedience of States. The 
effectiveness and applicability of these laws are led from the legal values and principles 
generally accepted by the international community, and the laws are the tools through which 
these principles are thus promoted and enhanced. Regardless of which source of IL is under 
discussion, the fundamental constituting factor is that all of the sources are underpinned by 
the application of the rule of law. The questions to ask are: what constitutes the rule of law, 
and what is its relationship with IL? Answering these questions will encompass the 
examination of the constituting essential factors of the rule of law, which are legality and/or 
reason, consistency or uniformity, legitimacy, and justice. The focus of discussion is how 
these factors must co-exist within a legal system, for example a law that is based on 
legitimacy cannot be acceptable if it is not based on justice, or vice versa. The analysis of the 
rule of law in IL has received less attention than it deserves, considering that it underpins the 
                                                          
19 Namely, Martti Koskenniemi, supra note 14, p. 9; Malcolm N. Shaw, International Law, 2008, p. 11; Oscar 
Schachter, International Law in Theory and Practice, 1991, pp. 9-15; and Dencho Georgiev, supra note 17, pp. 
2-3.  
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framework that brings about a legal order through qualities such as rights, duties and 
justice.20  
 
This work continues to explore the dividing line between valid and invalid interpretation of 
IL based on specific guidelines provided within IL, namely jus cogens rules, obligations erga 
omnes, the principle of pacta sunt servanda, including the notion of ‘good faith’. This 
facilitates the examination of reciprocity in principles provided for the interpretation of IL 
rules. This section continues to explore the role and nature of reciprocity in erga omnes 
relations and its difference to bilateral and multilateral relations. The study then proceeds to 
examine the role of reciprocity and its relation to morality in IL relating to HR, International 
Humanitarian Law (IHL) and jus cogens. Does morality operate in conjunction with 
reciprocity or does it provide an alternative to reciprocity as a basis for HR and humanitarian 
aspects of IL?  
 
In emphasising the importance of valid interpretation of IL, the Chapter uses the US ‘war on 
terror’ as a case study on the Bush Administration’s interpretation and practices of torture-
related laws. This examination demonstrates how interpretation of IL rules require an 
understanding and appreciation of the internationally shared values and principles, whilst 
highlighting a weakness in the enforcement of these values in the international legal 
system where the US has been able to circumvent IL with little effort and fear of 
repercussion. The reason for the weight given to such approaches is based on the US power 
as a permanent member in the UNSC with veto power, and particularly after it became a 
unipolar power in the international arena. The selected examples identify some contradictions 
and double standards between the US theoretical and practical approaches towards the rule of 
law and the application of IL. There are some changes in programmes and foreign policy 
between President Obama compared to President Bush. For instance, the reports outline the 
efforts undertaken by President Obama to close the Guantanamo Bay prison stating that 
‘Guantanamo is not necessary to keep America safe...’ however, practically the Congress has 
blocked his efforts.21 
 
                                                          
20 Denis J. Galligan, Law in Modern Society, 2007, pp. 253-254. 
21 BBC News, Barack Obama says Guantanamo Bay prison must close, 30 April 2013, at:  
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-22358351.  
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Chapter Four: Having discussed the IL sources and the rule of law it is important to shift the 
focus to the enforcement of IL and the role of reciprocity in securing continuous commitment 
and adherence to these rules. IL enforcement operates through centralised and non-centralised 
mechanisms where the former operates through the UN enforcement bodies and the latter 
through reciprocal remedial options set to encourage compliance and commitment of States 
of the wrong-doers, namely in the form of self-defence and counter-measure. The de-
centralised system of IL places reciprocity in a pivotal position as an alternative enforcement 
tool, particularly in today’s world where there are challenges to global co-operation. The 
motives of States are undoubtedly linked to their political interests, therefore reciprocity 
operates as a lever against self-gain and provides a level of control and limitations for States 
to pursue their individualistic interests and force their ‘will’ upon the international 
community. In this respect, reciprocity brings about a balance of interests and advantages 
between States whilst acting as a tool to encourage states away from wrong-doing.  
 
The UN has tasked the UNSC to maintain international peace and security, with unlimited 
power to examine and establish whether a State’s action constitutes a ‘threat to the peace, 
breach of the peace, or act of aggression’,22 authorising it to decide upon the necessary 
actions. This is problematic since the UNSC is a political rather than a legal organ. In this 
Chapter the potential influence and interests of the permanent members of the UNSC (P-5) 
and the legality of some of their actions and decisions is evaluated. A further challenge is the 
working relationship between the UNSC and the ICJ, as the UN’s main judicial organ,23 and 
particularly taking into account the different practical IL interpretations adopted by these two 
organs. The Chapter examines the relationship between the UNSC’s actions and the rule of 
law by taking into account the constitutive elements of the rule of law as well as exploring 
the effectiveness of the current legal enforcement mechanisms.  
 
Reciprocity manifests itself significantly in international trade relations, which is evident 
when looking at the World Trade Organisation (WTO) agreements and its dispute settlement 
system. The WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) is the body responsible for resolving 
disputes between States but similar to other areas of IL, encouragement is made for States to 
reach agreements and compromises on their own before bringing their case to the DSB. In 
                                                          
22 Supra note 7, Article 39.  
23 Ibid, Article 92; and supra note 8, Article 1.  
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this section, the working of the WTO and DSB is examined given the role of reciprocity in 
the framework of international trading system.  
 
Throughout this Chapter the effectiveness, limitations and weaknesses of the existing IL 
enforcement mechanisms will be evaluated through both theoretical and practical analysis of 
interrelated cases. 
 
Chapter Five: The Chapter examines co-operation and non-co-operation as forms of 
reciprocity.  Keohane suggests that co-operation is achieved when actions of different States 
or institutions come together in unity through negotiation.24 In this context, each State moves 
away from its original position through negotiation or bargaining to reach a common and 
coordinated policy. This is eloquently phrased by Keohane as ‘intergovernmental cooperation 
takes place when the policies actually followed by one government are regarded by its 
partners as facilitating realization of their own objectives, as the result of a process of policy 
coordination’.25 Reciprocity, as a creator of balance between rights and duties, undoubtedly 
plays a pivotal role in the negotiation and bargaining in order to gain ‘policy coordination’, 
since inter-State negotiations include a degree of equalising gains and advantages in the light 
of the various interests of each State. 
  
The emphasis is placed firstly on the factors that States must satisfy in complying with IL; 
and secondly, on those elements that facilitate co-operation between States and the reasons 
States choose to co-operate. Given the emphasis placed on maintaining international peace 
and security, particularly the effect of co-operation on long term stability, this leads the study 
to explore: 1) What is the role of IL in bringing about international co-operation? 2) How 
does reciprocity take a role in inducing States to co-operate? 3) What are the advantages and 
disadvantages of co-operation? 4) Why do States choose to deviate from co-operative 
objectives? To answer these questions, several factors concerning a co-operative environment 
and possible obstacles facing the international community, is scrutinised. The study considers 
the importance of co-operation in bringing about long-term advantages in politics, economic 
gains, peace, security and stability, based on the lessons learned throughout the evolution of 
international co-operation.  Given the inextricable link between IL and IP in IR, the Chapter 
                                                          
24 Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy, 2005, p. 51.  
25 Ibid, pp. 18 and 51-52. 
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assesses the role of co-operation in each of these disciplines, by focusing on different schools 
of thought in IR. This analysis enables this study to tackle the above questions in relation to 
the reasons for States’ co-operation, and their benefits and drawbacks for States, which may 
lead to specific barriers to co-operation.  
 
Final Conclusions: The thesis at this stage presents the main conclusion for the findings, 
suggestions and recommendations of this work, highlighting the role of reciprocity and its 
significance in IL. 
 
Research Methodology 
 
This research takes into consideration both theoretical and practical approaches (legal cases), 
which need to be interpreted using qualitative methods. It will primarily rely on valid and 
logical deduction from the laws and their legal interpretations. The primary sources are 
international conventions and inter-related international rules relating to the aim of the 
research. The importance of the use of the primary sources is to gain an understanding of the 
closely associated source materials, relevant to the thesis, namely the Charter of the United 
Nations (UN Charter), the VCLT or the ICJ Statute. Given the role played by States in 
creation of a large number of the primary sources, it also provides insight into the mind-set of 
States, their values and objectives. When examining the sources of IL, the focus of the thesis 
will be on the role of reciprocity within the primary sources of IL since reciprocity manifests 
itself strongly in the primary sources.26 The thesis does not look at the subsidiary sources 
since they do not create reciprocity and they are not based upon reciprocity.27  
 
                                                          
26 Primary sources of international law, according to the International Court of Justice Statute, encompass treaty 
laws, customary international law and the general principle of law. 
27 Judicial decisions and teaching of publicists are referred to as subsidiary sources of international law 
suggesting that they do not have law-making ability unlike customary international law or treaty laws. The 
limitation placed on the usage of judicial decisions is driven from Article 59 of the International Court of Justice 
Statute, relating to the provisions that the Court’s ruling ‘has no binding force except between the parties and in 
respect of that particular case’. Similarly the scholarly community does play a vital role by scrutinising 
international law as well as providing the international community with a set of coherent and reasonable 
approaches towards international rules through providing arguments and counter-arguments for the primary 
sources and the judgements, through comprehensive and comparative analysis. However, in the same spirit to 
the judicial decisions, interpretation and reasoning provided by the teaching of publicists do not create 
reciprocity and are not based on reciprocity. 
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The primary sources are often broad and general and can be open to various interpretations. 
This is where the relevance and importance of the secondary sources surface, providing 
arguments and counter-arguments for the primary sources, enabling a comprehensive and 
comparative analysis for this thesis. Therefore, the secondary sources include scholarly 
writings and their interpretations. In addition to these theoretical approaches a review of the 
practical cases, relevant to the subject of this thesis, have also been undertaken, examining 
the analysis and interpretation provided by the rulings. Given the emphasis placed on States 
in this work, the research assesses the factors underlying States’ conduct and the effect of 
their decision-making on IL. The research looks into debates and the extent to which 
reciprocity manifests itself in IL, as well as reviewing practical cases relevant to this subject.  
 
When looking at previous judgement and cases in IL, there is a little attention paid to 
examining and assessing the role and significance of reciprocity within IL, demonstrating 
insufficient focus or direct contribution made to this important topic. IL development would 
have benefitted from attention on reciprocity and its application within IL in judgment of the 
cases as this would have been crucial in order to tie the theoretical and practical approaches 
to better assess the role of reciprocity in IL. Equally, even though there are many scholarly 
works on different areas of this thesis, there are however, limitations on interdisciplinary 
connection which constitutes the objective of this research. The primary gap revolves around 
the limited in-depth analysis of the role of reciprocity in IL relating to co-operation. In 
general, there is a gap in legal scholarly contribution on the role of co-operation in promoting 
international peace and security, considering this is suggested as one of the UN’s missions.28 
The scholarly works on co-operation tend to be more focused on IR and its effect on factors 
such as economy or trade, rather than maintaining and promoting international peace. The 
thesis aims to broaden its scope to bridge the gap by highlighting the role of IL on promoting 
co-operation through reciprocity, resulting in minimising conflicts and ensuing international 
peace and security.  
 
There are debates around the effectiveness and dependency of IL to IP, but few have debated 
the role of the rule of law as a bridge for the rightful place of IL in not submitting to the 
changing and arbitrary ‘will’ of States. The UN states that, with the support of its organs, 
promoting the rule of law is at the heart of its mission and establishing rule of law is a 
                                                          
28 Supra note 7, Article 1.  
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prerequisite for ‘durable peace’.29 There is, however, no specific account given as to what 
rule of law is and what it represents. Additionally there is a lack of scholarly debate defining 
the rule of law and how it should be promoted by the UN. More importantly, there is an 
existing gap in what constitutes the rule of law and how legality and/or reason, consistency or 
uniformity, legitimacy and justice form its integral parts. Also there is a lack of literature on 
the place of rule of law within IL, which makes this research particularly relevant. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
29 United Nations and the Rule of Law, for further information please see: http://www.un.org/en/ruleoflaw/.  
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Chapter One: Principle of Reciprocity in General Context 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Reciprocity is a multifaceted term and is evident in many forms of interactions whether it is 
about two individuals, communities, organizations or States. This Chapter begins by 
providing a general definition of the term reciprocity, and exploring its manifestation in the 
social, anthropological, historical and IR fields. This approach allows the study to 
contextualise reciprocity within ordinary human interactions in connection with inter-State 
relationships. This is important since it provides the backdrop against which reciprocity is 
used within IL or international negotiations.  
 
Members of a community, in general, share similar beliefs, commitments and values which 
become determinant norms in that community, operating as a unifying force impacting the 
common values of that community. These norms form a bond within the community and 
have a direct impact on what is deemed as acceptable behaviours and actions. Additionally a 
community operates on the basis of interactions and relationships between its members given 
the need for a level of co-existence and interdependency. These interactions are governed by 
the acceptable norms of that society which create parameters for the interactions of people 
and this is where reciprocity takes a role and helps to shape the nature of such interactions. 
The role of reciprocity in relationships amongst members of a community emanates because 
they need each other thus creating a sense of dependency. Social interactions bring about a 
sense of civility that is based on peaceful co-existence and reciprocal reactions. People tend 
to treat like with like and treat unkindness with unkindness, but at times may refrain from 
reacting towards unkindness because they may need each other in future. This level of co-
existence and interdependency has transpired and grown within the international community. 
There are many reasons for this interdependency within the international community which is 
discussed in this thesis but least of all this stems from the need for peaceful co-existence 
based on the lessons learnt from the past relations and experiences, as well as the level of 
growth than can be achieved from a collective approach and co-operation. 
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2. The Role of Reciprocity in General Context 
 
As mentioned reciprocity takes many forms and means different things in different contexts. 
The general definition of reciprocity is, ‘a situation in which two people, countries,…, 
provide the same help or advantages to each other’.30 When considering a specialist legal 
definition, reciprocity is defined as ‘the mutual concession of advantages or privileges for 
purposes of commercial or diplomatic relations’.31 This definition provides an explanation for 
the interdependency and inter-connection of States in order to maximise their individual gains 
either commercially or diplomatically. In today’s world the international community is no 
longer a number of individual countries who can afford to work independently and instead 
their international relations are very important to each country’s operations, security, stability 
and growth. The commercial growth or the safety of foreign diplomats as examples come 
from mutual co-operation and negotiations and cannot be achieved without mutual reciprocal 
agreements and respect. This theme is evident throughout this thesis where the evolution of 
inter-State relations is discussed. 
 
The above definitions indicate that reciprocity relates to inter-relationships where people or 
States help and support each other for a particular short or long-term advantage. This mutual 
consideration is also referred to by the International Law Commission (ILC) where 
reciprocity is defined by them as sharing specific rights between States; that is to say when 
one State benefits from a right then others must share the same right.32 Effectively, 
reciprocity is about reciprocal treatment without any given restrictions or obligations, taking 
into consideration balancing of rights where mutual benefits are to be gained and no-one 
should be unfairly advantaged or disadvantaged. As will be elaborated throughout this thesis, 
reciprocity plays an important role in establishing and maintaining a sense of balance 
between the interests, rights, duties and obligations for the international community. 
Reciprocity is particularly relevant when there are no legal obligations but rather moral or 
social obligations. Given the notion that moral or social obligations exists prior to the 
creation of most legal obligations, therefore this would suggest that reciprocity is stronger in 
the law-making process and takes a weaker position once laws are established. This is equally 
                                                          
30 Sally Wehmeier et al. (eds.), Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary, 2006, p. 1215.  
31 Supra note 2, p. 1298. 
32 Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1976, Vol. II, Part Two, Report of the Commission to the 
General Assembly on the work of its twenty-eighth session, A/CN.4/SER.A/1976/Add.l, p. 12.  
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applicable when discussing social interactions or international relations. Even though there is 
more at stake at an international level, nonetheless, moral and social aspects play an 
important role in international interactions or negotiations and must not be ignored.  
 
Reciprocity surfaces in many aspects of human relationships in both negative and positive 
forms. Retaliation to an injustice, reciprocated kindness, gift exchanges are only some of the 
instances where reciprocity is seen in social interactions. Reciprocity is considered a 
fundamental concept that plays a dominant role in most aspects of social life, resulting from a 
social expectation that suggests individuals will react to each other in a similar manner; for 
example, offering advantages for advantages. Reciprocity is generally defined and known as 
a principle of interaction classified into positive and negative. The former involves 
responding positively to a positive action, like returning a kindness with kindness. The latter 
involves an adverse reaction to a negative action. Reciprocity, in this regard, is equally 
evident at an international level and this can be seen in political and economic negotiations as 
well as legal negotiations leading to the formulation of international treaties. The legal, 
political and economic relationships between States are strongly affected and influenced by 
the power of reciprocity. These aspects of international relations are significantly based on 
the concept of give and take, mutual advantages and a strong element of cost-benefit. 
 
The international community is a collection of individuals connected to States, who share 
similar attributes and values since cultures and humans are coming closer together in their 
thinking, acting/reacting to situations both emotionally and rationally, influenced by 
technological advancement and closer global inter-link. Therefore the study of the role of 
reciprocity in inter-State relations is enhanced and benefits from understanding 
anthropological, social and historical perspectives. Hence the study sets out to develop the 
understanding of reciprocity within the international context, by investigating the role of 
reciprocity in smaller communities through anthropological, social and historical frameworks 
which would help gain an understanding of the evolution of IR which has led the 
international community to its current juncture. The following analysis individually addresses 
the existence of reciprocity in all of these fields. This is not to say that reciprocity is limited 
to these fields only, but these subjects are the focal points in this analysis due to the light they 
cast on interactions within a community of people or States, however large or small. 
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2.1. Reciprocity in Anthropological and Social Fields 
 
The significance of anthropology is in its outlook of the world, enabling an understanding of 
cultures, promoting cross-cultural communications and interactions. Human beings belong to 
societies with intertwined lives. When looking at human relations and interactions, the 
interdependence of its members is the single most important factor that can be observed. It 
could be argued that reciprocity provides the basis of a civil society, whilst playing a vital 
role in achieving peace and harmony in communities.33 In social human interactions, the 
norms or customs play a leading role in determining how to behave or react.  
 
The emphasis of the role of reciprocity is stressed in Kolm’s discussion on how the mutual 
respect of all society members is required to achieve a ‘free, peaceful and efficient’ 
stability.34 The scholar further emphasises mutual respect by indicating that people will 
respect if they feel respected. He has broadened the scope of the impact for mutual respect to 
markets and organizations by suggesting this is the reason why basic trust, honesty and 
fairness are reciprocated.35 Reciprocity can be evident in various social situations and 
communities, ranging from a small community such as a family, to the international arena. 
State social welfare and donations to charities are examples of altruistic behaviours stemming 
from wanting to be helpful towards others and feeling a sense of moral obligations towards 
others. As Malinowski suggested, everyone has a duty and an obligation to one another, 
bringing about ‘conformity with the norm’ and reciprocity means the duty that people feel 
towards each other.36  
 
On another point, Gouldner refers to Parsons’ study of reciprocity and indicates the study has 
enabled reciprocity to be differentiated from various other concepts. However, Gouldner is 
partially critical of Parsons’ study of reciprocity and considers this to be incomplete, since 
Parsons neglects to consider a dividing line between concepts of ‘complementary’ and 
reciprocity. In Gouldner’s view, the former refers to ‘one’s right as another’s obligations, 
vice versa’ and in comparison, however, reciprocity suggests that each person ‘has rights and 
                                                          
33 Gerald A. Cory, The Consilient Brain: the Bioneurological Basis of Economics, Society, and Politics, 2004, p. 
160. 
34 Serge-Christophe Kolm, Reciprocity: An Economics of Social Relations-Federico Caffe Lectures, 2008, p. 1. 
35 Ibid, p. 1. 
36 Alvin W. Gouldner, The Norm of Reciprocity: A preliminary Statement, American Sociological Review, Vol. 
25, No. 2, 1960, p. 169. 
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duties’.37 Gouldner believed in ‘generalized norm of reciprocity’ which outlines the 
obligations one feels on repaying the gift or favour.38 The scholar presumes that if one 
person’s requirements are not fulfilled by the other’s reaction then this will have an impact on 
the stability and the balance of the relationship. Through looking at a broader scope, it can 
also be seen how social stability is dependent on reciprocity which is termed very aptly by 
Gouldner as the ‘mutually contingent exchange of gratifications’.39  
 
A similar trend is visible in Fuller’s observation where he regards reciprocity as the 
‘mediating principle’ linking exchange and duties, both moral and legal.40 An interesting 
example of moral duty is given in the duty of voting in democratic elections where 
individuals have a moral duty/obligation to participate in voting even if there is no specific 
legal obligation in place.41 This essentially is an exchange of promises between the citizens of 
the country to ensure the right people and right policies govern their country. However the 
follow through of exchange of promises and duties is generally stronger with the presence of 
reciprocity, suggesting that where there is possibility of reciprocity, promises are better 
fulfilled and duties are better observed. The suggestion is that societies bond better with 
reciprocity,42 where self-interest gives way to mutually beneficial exchange of promises and 
duties, particularly in societies with inter-links and interdependencies. In this context, the 
power of reciprocity is in creating a sense of balance and equality between rights and duties 
of individuals, irrespective of their personal power, economic strength or influence; as such 
everyone can be deemed equal in relation to the execution of their promise and duties and 
unfair advantages and imbalance of interests are minimised.43  
 
Reciprocity, though, is not always positive and there is a counter-side to wanting to do good 
and be helpful, based on revenge or retaliation to a negative action. Kolm differentiates 
positive and negative reciprocity by suggesting that, in as much as a return gift is to 
encourage future giving, retaliation is an act to deter future harm.44 Narotzky and Moreno 
                                                          
37 Ibid, pp. 167-169; also for further information please see Talcott Parsons and Edward A. Shils (eds.), Towards 
a General Theory of Action, 1962, pp. 190-191. 
38 Supra note 36, p. 170. 
39 Ibid, pp. 172-178. 
40 Lon L. Fuller, The Morality of Law, 1969, p. 19. 
41 Ibid, p. 19. 
42 Ibid, p. 20. 
43 Ibid, pp. 22-23. 
44 Supra note 34, pp. 89-90. 
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offer a different perspective by expressing that the difference between positive and negative 
reciprocity is in the break of morality in social relations.45 The scholars regard morality as a 
factor that differentiates reciprocity from an exchange, in the sense that through both positive 
and negative reciprocity morality is upheld and is shared in any relations.46 This is an 
interesting view that bonds morality with reciprocity, in the sense that for upholding morality 
the balance between the parties must be maintained which is achieved through reciprocity.  
 
On another point, Kolm develops this discussion through his analysis that reciprocity in a 
positive manner is sequential, whereas negative reciprocity is ‘one shot’.47 In other words, 
reciprocity in a positive form is an encouragement for future repetition of actions, whereas 
negative reciprocity is intended to be a one-off retribution act to discourage a repeat of 
negative action. These discussions are particularly relevant when discussing the role of 
reciprocity in IL as deterrence for disobedience and encouragement for compliance and the 
respective remedial reciprocal measures allowable in IL. These approaches lead the 
discussion to evaluate the reasons for the existence of reciprocity in this framework, and how 
it is initiated. Arguably reciprocal actions result from judgement, sentiments and attitudes 
which are all rooted in the nature of the relationships and experiences, thus determining the 
positivity or negativity of the reaction to an action. An example of this is in Kolm’s 
statement, describing reciprocity as a ‘basic force of interaction that maintains a…society’,48 
and the basis of this force is seen in values shared by people originating from wanting to be 
liked, doing the right thing, mutual respect, compassion, moral obligation, fairness and a 
sense of balance.49 Kolm considers moral conduct or obligation as the motives behind 
reciprocity stemming from liking or wanting to be liked, compassion, social standing 
amongst wider society, and in some cases personal self-interest.50  
 
Academic literatures on the motivation behind reciprocal actions suggest that different 
terminologies are used to describe it but in essence, motives are categorised into three 
following areas of propriety, stimulated (induced) liking, and self-interest.51 The first motive 
                                                          
45 Susana Narotzky and Paz Moreno, Reciprocity's Dark Side: Negative Reciprocity, Morality and Social 
Reproduction, Anthropological Theory, Vol. 2, No. 281, 2002, p. 301. 
46 Ibid, p. 301. 
47 Supra note 34, pp. 89-90. 
48 Ibid, p. 17. 
49 Ibid, p. 17. 
50 Ibid, pp. 54-55. 
51 Ibid, p. 97. 
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stems from wanting to belong and bringing about a sense of balance and fairness. This motive 
is ignited when there is a positive sentiment towards returning a gift or a favour as well as a 
negative form of retaliation and revenge. The second motive stems from liking or wanting to 
be liked. If someone gives a gift or does a favour, the sentiments are rooted in liking the 
person and/or wanting to be liked by them. Also often, social standing and how you are 
perceived in your community or by society plays a vital role in judging how to reciprocate or 
act. The third motive is self-explanatory which addresses self-interest in either giving or 
receiving which will be part of a series of exchanges depending on the nature of the 
relationship.52 
 
Once a gift, kindness or a favour is returned, scholars argue on what the return value should 
be. An explicit agreement amongst scholars exists that the value of the return gift should be 
in line with the original that has been received.53 Gouldner refers to two types of equivalence 
as ‘tit for tat’ and ‘tat for tat’, where the former is about identical exchange in value but not in 
type, yet the latter is an identical exchange in both type and value.54 Either way the idea is 
about establishing a balance in the gift exchange. It is often accepted that a poorer person 
returns a gift in line with what they can afford which does not take anything away from the 
sense of balance between the giver and the receiver.55 Gouldner expressed the point that the 
debt we each feel to one another is based on the history of our interactions and the obligation 
this has created. This obligation thus brings about the ‘generalized norm of reciprocity’.56 
 
Looking at cultural similarities and diversities, a common observing feature relating to the 
concept of reciprocity is how each culture has its own norms, yet similarities which cannot be 
ignored. For instance, in any culture when a gift is given it is reciprocated in one form or 
another. Mauss’ vast ethnographic study demonstrated how extensive the culture of gift-
giving and receiving is by asking ‘what power resides in the object given that causes its 
                                                          
52 Ibid, pp. 97-100; and Serge-Christophe Kolm, Reciprocity: Its Scope, Rationales, and Consequences, 
 (eds.) Serge-Christophe Kolm, and Jean Mercier Ythier, Handbook of the Economics of Giving, Altruism and 
Reciprocity: Foundations, 2006, pp. 440-441. 
53 George C. Homans, ‘Social Behaviours Exchange’, American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 63, No. 6, 1958; 
Georg Simmel, The Sociology of Georg Simmel, (trans. and ed.) Kurt H. Wolff, 1950; Bronislaw Malinowski, 
Crime and Custom in Savage Society, 1932; and supra note 36, p. 169.   
54 Supra note 36, pp. 171-172. 
55 Geoffrey MacCormack, Reciprocity, Man New Series, Vol. 11, No. 1, 1976, p. 94. 
56 Supra note 36, p. 171. 
32 
 
recipient to pay it back’.57 Answering this question drew the focus to the value of gift-giving 
and its material concept. Gift-giving was regarded by the scholar as a socially binding factor 
in people’s relationships, exceeding the value of the gift, and thus he claimed that gifts are 
never ‘free’ since a gift that was not returned would not bring about the same social binding 
factor as gift exchange.58 His assessment demonstrates how the reciprocal gift exchange 
connects people spiritually and awakens a sense of honour between the giver and the 
receiver.59  
 
Mauss has classified three actions of ‘giving, receiving and reciprocating’ as the obligations 
of gift exchange. Giving indicates the beginning of a social interaction, receiving indicates 
that the social interaction is not being turned down by refusing to accept, and finally, 
reciprocating indicates the generosity and the honour one feels.60 Lebra has the same 
approach emphasising that these terminologies are more relevant in relation to reciprocity 
rather than terminology of ‘selling, buying or paying’ given that reciprocity is in contrast to 
market exchanges.61 It needs to be stressed that Mauss’ generalization of gift exchange 
obligations is not shared by all scholars, questioning the accuracy of this generalization. The 
criticism targets Mauss’ supposition that such obligations are characteristics of all societies.62 
Additionally Levi-Strauss, Sahlins and Lebra have each connected sociability to reciprocity 
and have argued that the reason for giving, receiving and reciprocation relates to wanting to 
be sociable by giving, wanting to be sociable by not refusing, and finally wanting to be 
sociable by reciprocating.63 In a broader context, this can be likened to what the countries 
perceive as their international standing or status so acting in a way for wanting to be regarded 
as a State of such standing, whether positive or negative.  
 
Sahlins has led the way for categorising reciprocity in three forms which are; ‘generalized 
reciprocity, balanced reciprocity and negative reciprocity’.64 The generalized reciprocity is 
described as giving or returning a gift or a favour on the basis of wanting to be liked or liking 
                                                          
57 Marcel Mauss, The Gift, The Form and Reason for Exchange in Archaic Societies, 1990, pp. 8-18. 
58 Ibid, pp. 8-18. 
59 Ibid, pp. 8-18. 
60 Ibid, pp. 13-18.  
61 Takie Sugiyama Lebra, An Alternative Approach to Reciprocity, American Anthropologist, Vol. 77, No. 3, 
1975, p. 550. 
62 Supra note 55, p. 97. 
63 Supra note 61, p. 550. 
64 Marshall Sahlins, Tribesmen, 1968, pp. 82-84; and Marshall Sahlins, On the Sociology of Primitive 
Exchange, (ed.) M. Banton, The Relevance of Models for Social Anthropology, 1965, pp. 147-149.  
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the receiver through generosity; encompassing a closer knit community or group such as 
family members where a specific return is not expected. The balanced reciprocity is described 
as returning a gift or a favour with the intention of restoring a balance; based on an informal 
timeline or framework.65 Negative reciprocity is described when individuals try to maximise 
their own gain. Sahlins further classifies three characteristics of the ‘kinship proximity, 
solidarity and generosity’ which he claims exists in all three of the different forms of 
reciprocity on a varying level.66 The intensity of the degree of these characteristics depends 
on how far out the concentric circles you travel, starting with family, extended family, tribe, 
country and so on, which MacCormack refers to as ‘degree of personal relationship’.67 
Despite the general acceptance of Sahlins’ model amongst anthropologists, scholars namely 
Lebra, have referred to its shortcomings using the examples that generosity is often seen 
amongst strangers in charitable situations who may never come across each other again, or 
another example that theft happens amongst kinsmen.68     
 
A prominent anthropological significance of reciprocity is in its universal applicability since 
numerous evidences of reciprocity exist when looking at different societies and cultural 
norms. Scholars have recognised and attributed application of reciprocity as cross-cultural 
and universal.69 Accordingly the requirement of the norm of reciprocity is that people should 
help and not hurt those who have helped them; which incidentally is evident in an ‘all value 
systems’ as a basic requirement.70 This leads the discussion to moral reciprocity based on the 
universally recognised maxim of the human tendency which is wanting to act or reciprocate 
both positive and negative actions based on the assessment of morality or immorality of the 
action.71 That is to say, the assessment of an action and its respective return will be based on 
the moral values underlined by what individuals will do based on what they wish to have 
                                                          
65 Marshall Sahlins, Tribesmen, 1968, pp. 82-84; and Marshall Sahlins, On the Sociology of Primitive 
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70 Supra note 36, p. 171.  
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returned or reciprocated. This is what distinguished a mere exchange from a morally based 
reciprocal action. There are two underlying factors that require attention here. Firstly what 
derives the decision that an action or behaviour is right/moral or wrong/immoral? Secondly 
how is the response to the original action calculated or assessed? To understand these issues, 
it is important to understand the value system of people, societies and communities but also 
to understand the principles applied in assessing actions or behaviours. Essentially attention 
must be paid to what is considered in a society as moral and immoral actions/behaviours and 
how positive and negative responses would look like. It is universally acknowledged that one 
should return kindness with kindness but how should one return unkindness? How can 
communities avoid unkind or immoral actions or behaviours? This is where the universal 
principle of reciprocity is credited to bring about a sense of stability to societies.  
 
There does, however, remain the issue of the judgement of the morality of the 
action/behaviour and its right reciprocal response. This is where the principle of utility plays 
an important role which underpins how right and wrong can be assessed in relation to its 
moral status. In essence this principle dictates that a right action, behaviour or rule is right 
when it provides maximum happiness to majority of people and in most of the time; similarly 
a wrong action, behaviour or rule is wrong when it provides least pleasure but instead pains 
most people and in most of the time.72 People are likely to do the right thing, behave in right 
ways or feel the right obligations based on their value system underpinned by morality even 
if it is more costly; for example people choose to not deal in stolen goods, to contribute to 
charities, respect elders, and so on. Altruism is not a legal requirement but since it based on 
the social value system of every community, it is observed by the majority. Similarly one 
does not treat those who have bestowed kindness unkindly but would treat them with the 
same kindness they have shown. Those who do not observe or respect the society’s moral 
value system are often isolated or shunned as a form of punishment. In short, reciprocity acts 
as creator of obligations towards right behaviours or actions but also as a punishment tool. 
Reciprocity restores the sense of balance between individuals where kind action is returned 
with kindness but also acts towards punishment or deterrence for any future unkind or 
immoral actions since this is likely to be reciprocated. An important point to note is that these 
are tools that are at the disposal of a society or community, which is not necessarily part of 
                                                          
72 For a comprehensive analysis on this theory please see Jeremy Bentham, The Principles of Morals and 
Legislation, 1789. 
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the legal code but is put into action to encourage right actions and behaviours based on the 
norms and values of that society. Even though the principle of utility is more concerned with 
rules and legal principles, it is nonetheless useful as a principle to understand right and wrong 
actions/behaviours. The detailed analysis of this principle is a vast subject in its own right and 
is outside the scope of this thesis, however, suffice to say that this principle provides a useful 
tool in assessing the right/wrong of actions/behaviours in the framework of morality.   
 
The varying degrees of reciprocity across cultures have been the subject of much scholarly 
research, for instance a case study by Johnson which analyses Japanese culture has identified 
the strong reciprocity norm that exists within that culture, for example their belief in ‘I will 
treat you kindly and you will do the same with me’.73 However using another cultural 
example, Gouldner identified that in American culture, the norm of reciprocity is less 
dominant.74 Does this have an impact when diverse cultures meet and interact in the 
international arena? 
 
The discussion on the role of reciprocity norms in the social and anthropological fields has 
highlighted that a prominent significance of reciprocity is linked to its universal applicability. 
In this case, a pertinent question would be, whether these norms would be respected and 
followed if the stakes are too high for one or more of the parties involved. Would a hungry 
destitute individual feel and obey the same social and cultural refrains as a wealthy 
individual? Considering the universal application of reciprocity, placing the role of 
reciprocity in State-relations in a more global approach as an example, the question now 
becomes whether States would break reciprocal obligations if the stakes were too high? Such 
questions have been the subject of experiments designed by Diekmann where he assesses the 
degree of reciprocity and the role that stakes have in the equation. The conclusion reached by 
Diekmann on his experiments demonstrates that stakes indeed play a role in the level of 
altruistic reciprocity. His experiments allowed the importance of reciprocity to be highlighted 
in daily life, and illustrated the ‘power of reciprocity’.75  
  
Having addressed the significance of reciprocity in sociology and anthropology, and in cross-
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74 Supra note 36, p. 171. 
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cultural norms, it can be seen that many similarities exist between individuals’ relations in 
small communities compared to international relations. States, similar to individuals, in 
general are willing to accept obligations and duties that are within a reciprocal framework, in 
the sense that others would consider themselves similarly obligated. Similar to the social or 
anthropological analysis of human interactions, this form of reciprocal framework tends to 
provide a form of rules that are based on and promote stability and longevity. The 
motivations, risks, and rewards of relations are within the same sphere, even though the 
interdependencies might be somewhat different. As such, universal reciprocity norms provide 
the basis for interactions both nationally and internationally. The understanding of reciprocity 
in our cultures, customs and beliefs enable us to better connect with one another and bridge 
our global dividing gaps. If we lived in perfect societies with equal stakes at risk, aiming for 
positive reciprocity in all instances would be possible. However given the imperfect world 
and the varying stakes involved, altruistic reciprocity is undoubtedly and continuously tested. 
 
2.2. Reciprocity in Historical and International Relations Fields  
 
This section provides an analysis of the evolution of reciprocity through co-operation. The 
evolution of co-operation is examined in-depth in Chapter Five, hence in the interest of 
avoiding unnecessary repetition, the study in this section presents its objective concisely. The 
history of the world is filled with animosity, tribal or religious feuds and wars. The basis of 
this is rooted in self-interest, lack of co-operation and inability to co-exist peacefully. In light 
of the aim of this study, the questions that need to be addressed are how does reciprocity 
manifest itself throughout the history of States’ interactions, and what is the significance of 
reciprocity in this context? Has the expansion of the interdependencies of States had an 
impact in the evolution of international co-operation leading to a more reciprocal relation 
between States? 
 
The evolution of mankind shows how human beings’ view was limited to self-preservation 
and self-growth. Human beings were faced with inevitable growing interactions with each 
other, which led to the necessity of an expansion of their reciprocal relations and this 
requirement manifested itself through the need to give and receive. Reviewing world history 
provides numerous examples that demonstrate the extent to which States’ perceptions were 
limited to maximising self-gain  resulting in many wars and conflicts, and needless to say the 
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infliction of long-term damaging consequences. This is to say that negative reciprocity is 
more evident in States’ history than its positive form. In this section, the post Westphalia 
European history is used to provide an example for the gradual evolutionary process of a shift 
in interactions towards positive reciprocity through co-operation.76 The example of the 
European historical review of the evolution of reciprocity, the development of thinking and 
vision towards promotion of rights, solidarity and co-operation by means of reciprocity can 
be observed. European States recognised the underlying requirement to stand united, not only 
to minimise their loss, but also to achieve, growth, progress and peace.  
 
The modern concept of international State system and relations have been attributed to the 
Peace of Westphalia which has contributed to much change and achievements in Europe, one 
of which was the move towards the recognition of nation’s sovereignty referred to in history 
as ‘Westphalian Sovereignty’.77 This is recognised as the turning point in history for 
establishment of contemporary international States systems.78 Furthermore, the Westphalia 
treaty is a demonstration of a shift towards positive reciprocity in Europe, when the principle 
of ‘benefit of the other’ was enforced through this agreement.79 One important point to note 
in this treaty was the significant formation of ‘a real family of nations’.80 The idea of positive 
reciprocity through this evolutionary process led the European nations to reach a collective 
attitude away from individualism.81  
 
The next strong movement, following the Napoleonic Wars in 1815, was for the European 
nations to establish and maintain peace. There was an acceptance that peace can only be 
achieved through collective security and co-operation between States.82 This vision of co-
operation amongst States was further enhanced by the creation of the Inter-Parliamentary 
                                                          
76 This evolutionary process is evident in influential factors that led to agreement such as Treaty of Westphalia 
(1648), Treaty of Tilsit (1807), Chaumont Treaty (1814), Versailles Peace Treaty (1919), Treaty of Trianon 
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wanting to shift towards reciprocal exchange and to move away from self-view and to a more collective vision. 
77 Leo Gross, The Peace of Westphalia, 1648-1948, The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 42, No. 1, 
1948, p. 20; and Malcolm N. Shaw, International Law, 2008, p. 26. 
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Union in 1899, with the particular aim of increasing peace and co-operation.83 The 
continuation of the evolutionary process directed States towards the importance of IR and this 
movement gained momentum particularly over the last century. Despite the efforts towards 
maintaining peace and co-operation between States, World War I broke out amongst the great 
powers of the world, which ended with the Paris Peace Conference in 1919.84 In Chapter 
Five, it will be discussed how the League of Nations was founded on the backdrop of the 
Paris Peace Conference, with clear objectives which included preventing war, promoting 
collective security and settlement of disputes. The world found itself in the grip of another 
devastating war, World War II, in 1938 lasting till 1945. Following this war, the urgency of 
structured relations emerged with the aim of regulating and developing States’ conduct. The 
creation of the UN, the Council of Europe, the European Economic Community and the 
European Union,85 were the pivotal steps taken towards this goal and objective. The UN was 
established to ‘save succeeding generations from scourge of war’, ‘to reaffirm faith in the 
fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person’ and ‘to promote 
social progress and better standards of life’.86 This also captured the importance of the moral 
aspect of human rights and value of humanity which has led to the creation of legal rules 
outlining and protecting fundamental rights.  
  
The evolutionary process discussed, demonstrates the belief within the international 
community in maintaining and promoting positive reciprocity through co-operation across the 
wider group of States.87 IR and reciprocity is still undergoing evolution, and even though 
steps have taken place to promote co-operation, the international community has a long way 
to go to see the benefit from the power of positive reciprocity at an international level.  
 
                                                          
83 The Inter-Parliamentary Union is the international organization of Parliaments, established in 1889, with the 
focal point for world-wide parliamentary dialogue and works for peace and co-operation among peoples and for 
the firm establishment of representative democracy, for further information please see: 
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European Economic Community which was created in 1957 following the treaty of Rome, for further 
information please see http://europa.eu/about-eu/eu-history/index_en.htm, and 
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/institutional_affairs/treaties/treaties_eec_en.htm.    
86 Supra note 7, Preamble.  
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3. Conclusion 
 
This Chapter looked at reciprocity in general context from the social, anthropological, 
historical and IR perspectives. Reciprocity was introduced as a multifaceted term and its 
presence is evident within many forms of interactions, be it about two individuals, 
communities, organizations or States. Reciprocity surfaces in many aspects of social 
relationships in both negative and positive formats, an example of the former is in retaliation 
to an injustice and an example of the latter in reciprocated kindness. In effect, reciprocity in a 
positive form is an encouragement for further repetition of actions, whereas negative 
reciprocity is intended to be a one-off retribution act to discourage any repeat of negative 
action. 
 
Reciprocity plays a role in creating a balance for expectations and obligations based on 
morally acceptable norms, thus indicating how individuals will react to each other in a similar 
manner. This is best seen in Malinowski’s reasoning that everyone has a duty and an 
obligation to one another, bringing about ‘conformity with the norm’ and reciprocity means 
the duty that people feel towards one another. There is, however, the issue of morality of the 
action/behaviour, its true judgement and the valid right reciprocal response. The principle of 
utility was discussed for the role it plays underpinning how rights and wrongs can be assessed 
in relation to their moral status. In essence, this principle dictates that a right action, 
behaviour or rule is right when it provides maximum happiness to most of people and in most 
of the time; similarly a wrong action, behaviour or rule is wrong when it provides least 
happiness but instead pain to the most people and most of the time.  
 
The understanding of social interactions provides a platform to understand the inter-State 
relations given how the international community is a collection of individuals connected to 
States. The international community is faced with inevitable growing interactions amongst 
States, which has led to the necessity of an expansion of their reciprocal relations and this 
requirement manifested itself through the need to give and receive. Mankind has become 
inter-connected and shares similar attributes and values since cultures and humans are 
coming closer together in their thinking, acting/reacting to situations both emotionally and 
rationally, influenced by technological advancement and closer global inter-link. In today’s 
world the international community is no longer a number of individual countries who can 
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afford to work independently and instead their international relations are very important to 
each country’s operations and growth. Their growing interdependencies gives rise to greater 
reciprocal interactions and these interactions bring them together through a number of diverse 
issues. The commercial growth, environmental concerns, fight against transnational terrorism 
and crime, and the safety of foreign diplomats comes from mutual co-operation and 
negotiations and cannot be achieved without mutual reciprocal agreements and obligations. 
Retrospectively, this growth cannot be achieved without international peace and stability. 
IR’s evolution demonstrates the vision for change and the belief within the international 
community that co-operation and positive reciprocity is a key to maintaining and promoting 
long-term peace and stability. The international community faces continuous challenges and 
has a long way to go to see the benefit from the power of positive reciprocity at an 
international level but concrete steps have already been taken to achieve this goal.  
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Chapter Two: Reciprocity in Nature and Sources of International    
Law 
 
1. Introduction 
 
IL in its contemporary format is the result of an increase in the need for closer links between 
States, coupled with the international community’s attempt to put an end to the individualistic 
ambitions that led to the two World Wars whilst uniting the international community through 
an international legal framework. Thus, the creation of the UN was a considerable effort on 
pursuing international justice, peace and security, as well as promoting respect for the 
obligations and duties of States, as applicable to them, by IL.88 
 
IL provides a collection of rules and a framework for the conduct of States whether the rules 
are written or unwritten, under the form of treaties and customary law. This Chapter focuses 
on the reasons why IL is required, by exploring its nature, characteristics and sources 
particularly with the aim of exploring the role of reciprocity within IL. Given the difference 
in the formation of laws between IL and national legal systems, the study will focus on the 
sources of IL as embedded in the Statute of the ICJ,89 commonly acknowledged as a 
comprehensive statement on the sources.90 The study examines the theoretical, as well as the 
practical application of the elements constituting IL sources. There are other possible sources 
not referred to in the ICJ Statute, namely ‘soft law’ where there is effective impact on 
reciprocal obligations and soft enforcement in matters such as environmental treaties and 
issues, however this thesis will concentrate on the Statute, since ‘soft law’ is an extensive 
subject and it is outside the scope of this research. Also ‘soft law’ does not carry a strict 
legally binding nature, and does not impose enforceable obligations on States, however, 
throughout the thesis there are references made to ‘soft law’, when it becomes relevant.91 
 
                                                          
88 Supra note 7, Preamble.  
89 Supra note 8, Article 38(1).  
90 Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, 2008, p. 5.  
91 Please see Chapter Four for information on the United Nations General Assembly Resolutions as an example 
of soft law; for further information please see Alan Boyle, Soft Law in International Law Making, (ed.) Malcom 
D. Evans, International Law, 2010, pp. 122-138 and Peter Malanczuk, Akehurst’s Modern introduction to 
international law, 1997, pp. 54-55. 
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The Chapter will also consider an evaluation of the unique character of IL and how it aims to 
set out universal rules for sovereign States which have the autonomy and the authority to 
apply their own policies. Subsequently, to gain a better understanding of the formulation of 
IL, a comparative differentiation between IL and national law is considered, particularly 
regarding the way these two legal systems are formed, governed and enforced. The 
substantive differences is evident in how IL is set through international treaties, together with 
customary rules based on States’ conduct, which have thus become accepted norms for States 
to follow. IL is based on a consensual framework where States’ ‘consent’ plays a pivotal role 
in the legal system. The uniqueness of IL is vitally important to understanding the role of 
reciprocity in IL, since it is this uniqueness that renders itself greatly for the manifestation of 
reciprocity in IL. This analysis provides the foundation for this thesis, particularly when 
assessing the role of reciprocity in the different sources of IL. 
  
Particular attention is given to CIL given its evolving and flexible nature, and how in contrast 
to treaties, it is open to creation and change through States’ practices. According to the ICJ 
Statute, CIL is ‘international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law’, thus 
the emphasis is placed on ‘evidence’, ‘custom’ and ‘general practice’. This is where the 
doctrine of opinio juris manifests itself as a constitutive element of CIL. There is a common 
paradox surrounding opinio juris in scholarly works, where some challenge its necessity and 
helpfulness, as discussed in this Chapter. The evolving and flexible nature of CIL gives rise 
to an interesting analysis of the role of reciprocity in this area of IL. This is to say that the 
study, in this section, shows how the inter-link between opinio juris and reciprocity not only 
encourages States towards fulfilling their legal obligations, but it also discourages or 
minimises unfair advantages. Reciprocity takes a different role in CIL and treaty law which is 
discussed when looking at each source in turn.    
 
The above analysis highlights the consensual nature of IL to emphasise the extent to which 
the ‘will’ and ‘consent’ of States play a pivotal role in two of the primary sources, treaties 
and CIL, where States are involved in treaty negotiation, signing and ratification of treaties as 
well as how CIL rules are the result of State practice. This inter-link between State practice 
and IL leads this work to explore the relationship between IL and IP in the context of the 
reciprocal framework of international legal system. It is, therefore, relevant to clarify how the 
two disciplines function. Is IL independent from IP? To what degree are they dependent on 
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each other and how does this dependence influence reciprocity in inter-State relations? The 
aim of the study at this stage is to reflect on the scholarly debates on this subject, to ascertain 
the inextricable connection between the two disciplines, as discussed later in this Chapter. 
The importance of this exploration clarifies the nature of direct interactions that underline the 
theme of this thesis, and the role and significance of reciprocity in IL. 
 
2. Nature of International Law 
 
Contemporary IL, which is the subject of this thesis, has grown and encompasses a larger 
variety of issues based on multilateral and international interconnection. New laws, including 
international space law governing outer space,92 international nuclear energy,93 HR, 
environment, international trade and intellectual property rights94 provide examples of the 
need for a move from traditional IL to its contemporary form. The twentieth century has 
witnessed major developments and changes in the world in many areas, particularly transport, 
technology, communications, weaponry and media. The contemporary world has linked 
States economically, technologically and politically more so than ever before, and has 
required them to work more closely together. This dynamic change in State relations has had 
a profound effect on IL, requiring it to expand into new areas. At the early stages of modern 
IL, States were the only subjects in its remit;95 however, with the development of the 
international community and its activities, there has been a clear need to include other factors 
and entities within its function. Other players have gained the attention of the international 
community and thus laws such as HR laws were introduced.96 It is important to note that 
despite these new players entering the arena, States still remain the primary focus and subject 
of IL.       
 
                                                          
92 International Space Law is the body of international law applicable to and governing space-related activities 
encompassing the rules, principles and standards of international law, for further information please see 
http://www.oosa.unvienna.org/oosa/SpaceLaw/index.html. 
93 International Atomic Energy Agency aims at ensuring nuclear verification and security, safety and technology 
transfer, for further information please see http://www.iaea.org/About/. 
94 The World Intellectual Property Organization aims to develop international intellectual property system, for 
further information please see http://www.wipo.int/about-wipo/en/what_is_wipo.html. 
95 L. Oppenheim, International Law: A Treatise, Vol. 1 (Peace), 2006, p. 17; as suggested by Oppenheim ‘since 
the law of nations is based on the common consent of individual States, and not of individual human beings, 
States solely and exclusively are the subject of international law’. 
96 International Human Rights Law is the result of the increase in the human rights movement and the adoption 
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights by General Assembly through resolution A/RES/217(III) on 10 
December 1948.  
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IL is divided into private and public. The first relates to elements within the domestic law of 
States relating to particular disputes between individuals and/or organizations where an 
element of foreign law is involved.97 By contrast the primary subject of the latter is inter-
State relations and issues involving States, as well as regulation of the function of 
international institutions,98 and this area constitutes the focus of this thesis.  
 
The closer connections and interactions between States required the development of a 
framework in which States should operate. As with any community, law is the most 
important provider of such a framework, and in the international arena, IL aims to provide 
States with a framework that sets out parameters for their rights and duties. IL established the 
legal principles and guidelines for States’ conduct which they are obligated to follow, obey 
and adhere to.99 Additionally IL encompasses the rules for international organizations in their 
relations with each other, States and individuals, together with the obligations on States for 
individuals’ human rights.100  
 
States are defined as collections of individuals who act in authority on behalf of a nation, and 
as such have a legal personality.101 Contemporary IL aims to address the common concerns 
of the international community on matters that affect more than one State. Clearly, the aims 
and interests of each State differ from another, primarily driven from their distinct 
geographical, cultural, economic, and political parameters. IL aims to bring about uniformity 
and reciprocal respect and co-operation amongst the international community. The 
international community has gained the vision that on subject matters such as humanitarian 
issues, terrorism, nuclear ambition, and world trade, a universal approach and acceptance of 
uniform norms are essential. Infringement of such universal norms has a wider effect and 
needs to be dealt with through a united front by the international community as a whole.102  
                                                          
97 Martin Dixon and Robert McCorquodale, Cases and Materials on International Law, 2000, p. 4.  
98 Malcolm N. Shaw, International Law, 2008, pp. 1-2.   
99 Ibid, p.1.  
100 Joseph Gabriel Starke, Introduction to International Law, 1989, p. 3.  
101 In international law a State is an entity which has a permanent population, a defined territory and a legitimate 
government, with capacity to engage in formal relations with other States, the Montevideo Convention on 
Rights and Duties of States, signed 26 December 1933, entered into force 26 December 1934, Article 1, 
Organization of American States, Law and Treaty Series, No. 37. 
102 In the aftermath of World War II, the international community reached the understanding that international 
unity was essential for achieving international peace. As such the Charter’s Preamble stipulates the agreement of 
the international community to unite their strength to maintain international peace and security. Additionally in 
the Preamble, there is a direct reference to determination of the international community to reaffirm faith in 
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IL serves to bring about a sense of order, based on stable and uniform norms which are 
considered to benefit the international community by avoiding costly wars and conflicts, and 
endorses mutual respect and co-operation through reciprocity; an instance of this is in the 
‘Declaration on Principles of IL concerning Friendly Relation and Co-operation among 
States…’.103 This declaration sets out the parameters and principles that are important to the 
international community which will bring about co-existence and co-operation leading to 
peace, justice and prosperity at international level. Taking into consideration the principle of 
utility,104 the rightness of IL is in its ability to establish rules not only to bring about a sense 
of order in international relations but also to enhance the benefit for all States by encouraging 
the right behaviours and conduct that will benefit the international community as a whole. 
That is to say, for the IL system to be a success then it must operate in a manner that 
facilitates the right process for the creation of rules, the correct method of governing for the 
required rules and the correct enforcement mechanism to encourage adherence to the rules. In 
de-centralised system of IL, how is this to be achieved? 
 
The key aims of IL are to establish and maintain the balance between the rights and duties of 
States. Drawing from the Jeremy Bentham’s utilitarian argument, this goal is achieved 
through promoting and establishing rules and duties where States should not harm or create 
injury to other States since retrospectively this will lead to harming themselves in return; and 
similarly encouraging and incentivising States to do the greatest good possible to other States 
insofar as their own interests are not at risk.105 IL retrospectively also establishes legal rights 
and legitimate expectation for States that they should not expect to be injured by other States 
and that they are likely to receive the greatest good possible so long as that is not detrimental 
to other States. This theme of utility general is applicable in war and peace times but at the 
times of war it changes its focus on setting rules which ensure adequate protection that 
minimise harm.  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
fundamental human rights, namely clear steps taken to universal ban of acts constituting genocide and torture, 
Charter of the United Nations was signed on 26 June 1945 and entered into force on 24 October 1945.  
103 General Assembly Resolution 2625(XXV), Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning 
Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, 25th 
Session, 24 October 1970, A/RES/2625(XXV); and Jonathan I. Charney, Universal International Law, The 
American Journal of International Law, Vol. 87, No. 4, 1993, p.532. 
104 For further information on the Principle of Utility please see Jeremy Bentham, An introduction to the 
principles of morals and legislation, Volume 1, 1823, p. 3; and Jeremy Bentham, The Principles of 
International Law, Essay I: the Objects of International Law, 1789. 
105 This is based on utilitarian argument presented by Jeremy Bentham for the Objects of International Law, 
Jeremy Bentham, The Principles of International Law, Essay I: the Objects of International Law, 1789.  
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Given the distinction between IL from national laws, particularly in the way it is legislated, 
governed and enforced, it can be observed how the national law of civil societies are passed 
by a legislative body and are upheld by national institutions; disputes are addressed through a 
series of hierarchical Courts ascending in authority which provide States with a legal 
enforcement system. IL is formed differently and not set through a legislative body.106 The 
following section discusses how IL is formed through international treaties as well as through 
CIL based on States’ conduct which, then, becomes accepted norms for States to follow. As 
for enforcement of IL, although the ICJ is empowered by the UN Charter,107 this Court is 
limited to dealing with disputes in cases where both parties have agreed on the jurisdiction of 
the Court, and it is unable to ensure its judgement is complied with.108 In sharp contrast to 
national law a further characteristic difference of IL can be observed where, in cases of non-
compliance, the responsibility of responsive action falls onto other States. These issues 
highlight the significance of reciprocity and the extent to which it lends itself as a necessary 
tool to encourage the right behaviours and actions by each State for the benefit of the 
international community whilst minimising self-interest or self-gain. As will be discussed in 
Chapter Four, IL allows reciprocal action by a State to act aggressively in the form of self-
defence in response to a wrongful act by another State.109 This form of reciprocal response is 
not permissible within the framework of national law and will even be deemed as a vigilante 
action. 
 
The dynamic of IL and its uniqueness is due to the desire for setting out universal rules for 
sovereign States which have the autonomy and the authority to apply their own policies.110 
Given this autonomy, IL cannot and does not act as the world supremacy to prescribe and 
impose a set of internal rules. Thus ‘consent’ of States plays an important role in the creation, 
acceptance and the fulfilment of IL. In the acceptance of the autonomy and sovereignty of 
States, IL has made States’ ‘consent’ a central element in the law-making process, by 
                                                          
106 Supra note 98, pp. 2-3.  
107 Supra note 7, Chapter XIV.  
108 This weakness and limitation of the ICJ will be analysed in Chapter Four when examining international law 
enforcement mechanisms. 
109 Supra note 7, Article 51 clearly stipulates the ‘inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an 
armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations’.  
110 Jonathan I. Charney, Universal International Law, The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 87, No. 
4, 1993, p. 530. 
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allowing them to be exempt from certain obligations.111 A clear example of this can be seen 
in the VCLT where the right to place a reservation exists when treaties are being ratified or 
accepted, unless a treaty specifically forbids any reservation or such defeats the purpose of 
the treaty.112 These measures function as encouragement for States to be seen as law-abiding 
and to forego short-term gains, since their long-term advantage is better served by belonging 
to the international community.113  
 
The promotion of peace and co-operation in IL benefits the international community as a 
whole; hence the international community has an interest in encouraging the existence of IL, 
as well as complying with its rules. Examples of such encouragements can be seen in the 
incentive for States to provide political and legal immunity to foreign diplomats that 
eventually led to the formation of the Law of Diplomatic Relations.114 The emphasis on the 
element of ‘consent’ in the formulation of IL is an interesting subject, since it demonstrates a 
direct involvement of States which are simultaneously the primary subject of IL. This direct 
connection between law makers and their subject should encourage obedience, and in return 
discourage breach of the international rules. Furthermore, compliance with IL is encouraged 
through the contemporary IL system where non-compliance is confronted with the threat of 
worldwide condemnation, isolation, sanctions and penalties imposed by the international 
community.115 Each State possesses an international legal personality and enjoys privileges 
and rights but simultaneously that legal personality specifies obligations and duties to the 
international community.116  
                                                          
111 There are numerous references to the importance of consent in international law, particularly when 
discussing how States must provide their consent to accepting obligations. For example International Court of 
Justice made a direct reference to the necessity of consent in treaty relations, Genocide Case, Reservations to the 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, ICJ Reports, Advisory Opinion, 1951, 
p. 21; and Ibid. 
112 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties adopted on 22 May 1969, entered into force on 27 January 1980, 
United Nations - Treaty Series, Vol. 1155, No. 18232, Article 21; since the adoption of the Convention, the 
International Law Commission has undertaken efforts to review and develop the treaty reservation practice there 
have been further Guide to Practice on reservations to treaties, Yearbook of the International Law 
Commission, 2011, Vol. II, Report of the Commission to the General Assembly on the work of its sixty 
third session, A/66/10, Chapter IV.  
113 Supra note 110, p. 532.  
114 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations adopted on 18 April 1961, entered into force on 24 April 1964, 
United Nations - Treaty Series, Vol. 500, No. 7310.  
115 Example of such cases is the strong sanctions against the Islamic Republic of Iran and diplomatic routes in 
bringing them back to the discussion table. Please see Chapters Four for further debates on this subject. 
116 Reparation for injuries suffered in the service of the United Nations, ICJ Reports, Advisory Opinion, 1949, 
pp. 177-180; Hahn articulates the link between the presence of international personality with international 
obligations stating that ‘the proof of the presence of an international personality…appears to be identical with 
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3. Sources of International Law 
 
The creation of IL laws is driven from a de-centralized legal system.117 This does not mean 
that IL does not possess a clearly identifiable, recognisable or enforceable legal structure. The 
sources of IL provide the legal framework for the international community, and it is thus the 
focus of this section to ascertain how IL is created and enhanced without a centralised 
legislative institution. This leads the thesis to explore the role and significance of reciprocity 
within each of the sources of IL. 
 
The prominent authority for these sources is outlined in Article 38(1) of the ICJ Statute: 118  
 
a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly recognized by 
the contesting states; 
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; 
         c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; 
d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly 
qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.119 
 
Although the role of the Statute was to set the rules governing the work of the ICJ, the above 
Article is commonly acknowledged as a comprehensive statement on IL sources.120 
Subsequently, the legally binding rules for the sources identified by this Article are the 
conventions known as treaties, customary law, ‘general principles of law’ (which are 
considered as primary sources), as well as judicial decisions and scholarly literature which 
are regarded as subsidiary sources. The ILC, by reflecting on Article 24 of the Statute of the 
Commission, expands the scope of CIL by encompassing the judicial decisions as an 
extension of customary law, in contrast to the ICJ Statute which separates this from CIL and 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
the proof of international rights and obligations incumbent on the entity’, Hugo J. Hahn, Euratom: 
The Conception of an International Personality, Harvard Law Review, Vol. 71, No. 6, 1958, p. 1045.  
117 Peter Malanczuk, Akehurst’s Modern introduction to international law, 1997, p. 35. 
118 Supra note 8, with reference to Article 38(1) compared to Article 38 of the Statute of its predecessor 
Permanent Court of International Justice, the inclusion of the clause indicating that ‘whose function is to decide 
in accordance with international law such disputes as are submitted to it’ is highlighted.  
119 Supra note 8, Article 59 states: ‘The decision of the Court has no binding force except between the parties 
and in respect of that particular case’. The primary focus of this thesis will be to analyse the role of reciprocity 
within the primary sources of IL which are considered as treaty law, customary international law and the general 
principles of law. 
120 Supra note 90, p. 5.  
49 
 
regards it as subsidiary source.121 
 
3.1. International Treaty Law 
 
The first IL source is ‘international conventions’, or more commonly referred to as treaties. 
Treaties are in written format and documented so they tend to function as direct sources of 
reference and therefore, by their very nature, act as formalised and evident sources.122 
Treaties are often categorised in two forms of ‘law-making’ and ‘treaty-contract’, where the 
former has law-making character given its multinational nature, encompassing a large group 
of States,123 and the latter, however, is between small groups of States, covering limited 
subject-matters.124 Law-making treaties bring obligations for States to abide by and in 
essence, such treaties address the collective conduct towards a particular issue addressed by 
the treaty. In this work the focus will be on ‘law-making’ treaties since the objective is to 
ascertain the sources for obligations on States. There are numerous examples of law-making 
treaties discussed throughout this thesis, which have increased in number since World War II 
and the establishment of the UN, and subsequently the creation of the ILC,125 which was 
tasked with progressive development and codification of IL. 
 
Treaties are contractual agreements between the parties either in a bilateral or multilateral 
context set to codify and govern the rights and obligations of the parties. Reciprocity plays a 
vital role by providing States with a negotiation tool in their bilateral and multilateral inter-
State relations. The negotiations of States begin at the very early stage of their interactions 
and continue into different stages relating to treaties, such as what treaties should be drafted, 
what provisions are contained within these treaties, as well as in the signing and/or 
ratification stage of a treaty. IL does not operate as a role of majority, and as sovereign States 
each State must give ‘consent’ to the provisions of the treaties. There is a great deal of 
reciprocity involved in building consensus amongst the international community in order to 
                                                          
121 Yearbook of the International Law Commission , 1950, Vol. II, Documents of the second session 
including the report of the Commission, A/CN. 4/SER.A/1950/Add.1, p. 368, para. 30.  
122 Hugh Thirlway, The Sources of International Law, (ed.) Malcom D. Evans, International Law, 2010; and 
Supra note 98, p. 93.  
123 Yearbook of the International Law Commission , 2011, Vol. II, Report of the Commission to the 
General Assembly on the work of its sixty third session, A/66/10, p. 202. 
124 Rebecca M. M. Wallace, International Law, 2002, p. 19; and supra note 98, p. 97.  
125 The International Law Commission was established by General Assembly Resolution 174 (II), 2nd Session, 
21 November 1947, A/RES/174(II). 
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engage States to sign and ratify treaties. The best example of consensus building can be seen 
in relation to environmental or climate change matters. Often it is seen how a preliminary 
treaty is introduced as to gain consensus that a problem does exist which requires attention 
without necessarily enforcing extensive obligations upon States.126 There are subsequently 
additional treaties that delve into the problem and provisions needed relating to this subject. It 
does not follow that States that sign the original treaty automatically must come forward and 
sign the additional treaties but there is an element of unofficial or unwritten obligations upon 
them to give ‘consent’ for the provisions that are created to help with the original problem 
accepted by them already. Additionally this is where peer-pressure and inducements come to 
play a role in increasing consensus and incentivising as many States as possible to accept the 
treaties.127 This is where reciprocal give and take plays a prominent role from the early stages 
of treaty negotiation to its conclusion. The reciprocal give and takes can be in many forms 
such as providing additional funding or economic support to developing countries, easing of 
political tension, and/or provision of access to technology by more technologically advanced 
States.  
 
The framework for treaty law is provided by the VCLT,128 which underpins all treaties and as 
such provides the underlying factors that are to be considered when analysing, interpreting 
and applying all treaties as it provides the framework for ‘nature and characteristics’ of 
international treaties.129 The adoption of the VCLT brought about the conceptualisation of 
many existing customary international rules in a treaty format. The VCLT defines treaty as, 
‘an international agreement concluded between States in written form and governed, by 
international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related 
instruments and whatever its particular designation’.130 In other words, a treaty sets out the 
legally binding rules under IL for how the contracting parties are obliged to conduct based on 
the context and the nature of their agreement. Not only do treaties provide rules of conduct, 
they also provide them with guidance as to how other contracting parties will act; 
                                                          
126 Abram Chayes, Antonia Handler Chayes, The New Sovereignty: Compliance with International Regulatory 
Agreements, pp. 5-8 and15-17.  
127 There are other internal and international bodies and institutions that exert pressure upon States such as non-
governmental organisations, institutions and economic or political powerful countries but these do not form part 
of the scope for this thesis.   
128 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties adopted on 22 May 1969, entered into force on 27 January 1980. 
129 Supra note 98, p. 903; for significance of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties see Malgosia 
Fitzmaurice, The Practical Working of the Law of Treaties, (ed.) Malcom D. Evans, International Law, 2010, 
pp. 173-175; and supra note 117, pp. 130-131.  
130 Supra note 128, Article 2(1a).  
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furthermore, in cases of non-compliance, treaties can provide the reciprocal steps available to 
the contracting parties.131  
 
The VCLT is observed to stipulate and include the existing customary rules which regulate 
and govern the treaty making. Reciprocity is evident in many aspects of the VCLT and as this 
treaty underpins all treaties, it can be concluded that reciprocity is observed in the law of 
treaties. Indeed this view can be seen in Simma’s observation that ‘international law provided 
a reciprocity-based framework for legal transactions in the form of treaties’.132 Indeed it can 
be observed how treaties set about the parameters of bilateral and multilateral agreements 
between States in a contractual and reciprocal framework outlining how the contract must be 
conducted by all parties, what are the rights and obligations of the parties and what can be 
done in case the agreement is not followed through or is not fulfilled either partially or fully. 
Such a view is expanded by Greig when discussing the role of reciprocity in treaty law in the 
level of deviation permissible from treaty obligations in response to a breach by the other 
party.133 This is in response to the role of treaties as legal instruments for setting the 
obligations for States, as well as balancing the rights and obligations as set out in the 
provisions of each treaty, which is achievable through the principle of reciprocity.134 The 
rules apply to all equally from the outset but if one State wishes to restrict its obligations, 
duties or demanding more rights, then reciprocity manifests itself in equalising and balancing 
the rights and duties of the parties. 
 
The underlying principles of treaty law as set out in the VCLT are in recognition of principles 
of ‘free consent’, ‘good faith’, ‘pacta sunt servanda’,135 as well as ‘rebus sic stantibus’,136 
and ‘denunciation or withdrawal’ from a treaty.137 According to the VCLT, a State expresses 
                                                          
131 Hugh Thirlway, The Sources of International Law, (ed.) Malcom D. Evans, International Law, 2010, pp. 99-
100.   
132 Bruno Simma, From Bilateralism to Community Interest in International Law, Recueil des Cours de 
l’Académie de Droit International, Vol. 250, 1994, p. 229. 
133 D. W. Greig, Reciprocity, Proportionality, and the Law of Treaties, Virginia Journal of International Law, 
Vol.34, No. 2, 1994, p. 301.  
134 Ibid, p. 327.  
135 The principle of ‘pacta sunt servanda’ and ‘good faith’ are underlying parameters for how international law 
must be interpreted and applied. See Chapter Two and Three for further detail. 
136 This principle states that ‘agreements are concluded with the implied condition that they are binding only as 
long as there are no major changes in the circumstances’; supra note 2, p. 1295.  
137 Supra note 128, Article 60.  
52 
 
its ‘consent’ to a treaty through its ‘ratification’, ‘acceptance’, ‘approval’ and ‘accession’.138 
Furthermore, a State is able to insert ‘reservations’ into particular elements within the treaty, 
which will exempt them from those provisions.139 On reflection, this reiterates the point made 
earlier regarding the ability of States to choose or limit their international obligations under 
treaty law.  This is reflective of the strongest evidence of reciprocity in the VCLT where the 
conditions for ‘reservation’ of treaties are defined.140 In multilateral treaties it would not be 
feasible to achieve an absolute ‘consent’ for the provisions of the treaties by all States, thus 
the VCLT aims to bring about a situation where ‘will’ and ‘consent’ of States is preserved 
without a tedious and long stretched out voting process, yet maximum participation and 
inclusion of States in the treaties are achieved.141 Reservations enable States to limit their 
obligations but still be part of the treaty. States assess what the terms of the treaties mean to 
them and adopt the terms to their own best advantage. Therefore, a question is raised as to 
whether States commonly place reservations to limit their obligations? Evidently, States do 
not always resort to placing reservation on every article in a treaty which might not be in their 
best interest. As will become evident, the main reason for this is due to the presence of 
reciprocity in the treaty law, where any reservation placed will limit the duty of others in 
relation to the reserving State whilst any advantage sought through reservation is also made 
available to the non-reserving States.142 Hence States tend to assess carefully what 
reservations they are likely to place given how this will be reciprocally available to others. 
 
Under the VCLT, the right to place a reservation exists when the treaties are being ratified, 
unless a treaty specifically does not allow any reservation or such reservation defeats the 
purpose of the treaty.143 An example of the former type of treaty forbidding the use of 
                                                          
138 Ibid, Article 2(1b) and Articles 11-18 provide the framework for expression of consent by a State conveyed 
through its signature, accession and ratification.  
139 Ibid, Article 2(1d) states that ‘reservation’ ‘means a unilateral statement, however phrased or named, made 
by a State, when signing, ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to a treaty, whereby it purports to exclude 
or to modify the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty in their application to that State’; Articles 19-23 
of the Convention provide the conditions for a state to place a reservation before ratification of a treaty. 
140 Ibid, Articles 19-21; this form of reciprocity, where the obligation is limited as a result of non-commitment 
of a State, is referred to as obligational reciprocity by Sean Watts, Reciprocity and the Law of War, Harvard 
International Law Journal, Vol. 50, No. 2, 2009, pp. 371 and 374.   
141 General Assembly Meeting, Sixty-sixth General Assembly Session, Sixth Committee Meeting, GA/L/3422, 
the representative of Bangladesh commented on how reservations promote ‘the goal of maximum participation 
of the States in the multilateral treaties’; also see Francesco Parisi and Catherine Sevcenko  , Treaty Reservations 
and the Economics of Article 21 (1) of the Vienna Convention, Berkeley Journal of International Law, Vol. 21, 
Issue 1, 2003, p. 25. 
142 Supra 128, Article 21. 
143 Ibid, Article 26. 
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reservation can be seen in the World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty,144 
and an example of the latter where the use of reservations defeats the purpose of the treaty 
can be observed in the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination.145 However, the important point to note is that the options available to States 
are shared and reciprocal in nature. If reservations can be placed, then every State can do so. 
If reservation cannot be placed then no State is able to place a reservation. Equally the rights 
of non-reserving States are not undermined when a reserving State chooses to limit its own 
obligations by placing a restriction through reservation, since this reduced obligation is made 
available to all non-reserving States in relation to the reserving State. This strongly 
demonstrates the reciprocal nature of treaty law. An important point to note is that there are 
treaties that either allow reservations or stay silent on this subject;146 however, as has been 
stipulated in the general comment of the UN Human Rights Committee (UNHRC), ‘the 
absence of a prohibition on reservations does not mean that any reservation is permitted’.147  
 
Furthermore, the ICJ has emphasised that the intention and object of the treaty must be 
paramount when placing reservations, thus reservations that violate and defeat the purpose 
and intention of the treaty must not be permissible.148 This view was further emphasised by 
the UNHRC stating ‘reservations that offend peremptory norms would not be compatible 
with the object and purpose of the Covenant’.149 This is a fundamental issue when discussing 
the protection of HR and fundamental rights of individuals, and to this effect, the UNHRC 
                                                          
144 The World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty, WO033EN, Adopted on 20 December 1996, 
under its Article 22 no reservation is admissible on this treaty. 
145 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Adopted by General 
Assembly resolution 2106 (XX) of 21 December 1965 and entered into force 4 January 1969, under its Article 
20(2) ‘a reservation incompatible with the object and purpose of this Convention shall not be permitted’.   
146 For example the Geneva Convention on the High Seas has not made any reference to the ability of States 
placing reservations on its provisions, United Nations - Treaty Series, Vol. 450, signed 29 April 1958, entered 
into force 30 September 1962. 
147 The Committee refers to Article 19(3) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, by asserting that 
‘where a reservation is not prohibited by the treaty or falls within the specified permitted categories, a State may 
make a reservation provided it is not incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty.  Even though, 
unlike some other human rights treaties, the Covenant does not incorporate a specific reference to the object and 
purpose test, that test governs the matter  of interpretation and acceptability of reservations’; The United Nations 
Human Rights Committee General Comment on International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, General 
Comment No. 24, Issues Relating to Reservations Made upon Ratification or Accession to the Covenant or the 
Optional Protocols thereto, or in Relation to Declarations under Article 41 of the Covenant, 4 November 1994, 
para. 6, CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.6. 
148 The Genocide Case, Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide, ICJ Reports, Advisory Opinion, 1951, pp. 23-24.  
149 The United Nations Human Rights Committee General Comment on International Covenant of Civil and 
Political Rights, General Comment No. 24, Issues Relating to Reservations Made upon Ratification or 
Accession to the Covenant or the Optional Protocols thereto, or in Relation to Declarations under Article 41 of 
the Covenant, 4 November 1994, CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.6, para. 8.  
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continues to assert that ‘although treaties that are mere exchanges of obligations between 
States allow them to reserve inter se application of rules of general IL, it is otherwise in HR 
treaties, which are for the benefit of persons within their jurisdiction’.150 Therefore it is 
important to conclude that mere ability to place a reservation is not an automatic right, if it is 
likely to infringe the fundamental rights or HR that the treaty aims to preserve. The ILC 
efforts on reservation practices on treaties has been significant particularly highlighting that 
reservations placed on non-reciprocal obligations do not impact on the obligations of other 
parties.151 Effectively the nature of the obligations dictate whether or not reciprocity is 
permissible even if reservations are placed.  
 
A practical example of this is seen in the ICJ’s advisory opinion with regards to reservations 
to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Genocide 
Convention), mentioned earlier, where placing a reservation would contradict and jeopardise 
the key purpose of the treaty.152 The ICJ’s reasoning was that since ‘the principles underlying 
the Convention are principles which are recognized by civilized nations as binding on States, 
even without any conventional obligation’.153 The ICJ iterated the importance of the object of 
such conventions which re rooted in ‘purely humanitarian and civilizing purpose’; whereby 
the aim is to ‘endorse the most elementary principles of morality’.154 The ICJ cited that such 
obligations are binding on all States, even without this convention, since the principles at 
stake are recognised by the international community to be undignified, and there is an 
obligation to eradicate such acts. The notion of ‘civilized nation’ and their accepted ‘general 
principles’ are important sources of IL, and as such the principles accepted by the 
international community, should be disseminated as binding obligations, without any specific 
treaty or convention. The recent development by the ILC has gone further, by suggesting that 
‘the object and purpose of the treaty is to be determined in good faith’,155 and thus in further 
support of the fundamental rights, ‘a State…may not formulate a reservation to a treaty 
                                                          
150 Ibid, the Committee’s comment clearly states that ‘a State may not reserve the right to engage in slavery, to 
torture, to subject persons to cruel inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, to arbitrarily deprive persons 
of their lives, to arbitrarily arrest and detain persons, to deny freedom of thought, conscience and religion, to 
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advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred, to deny to persons of marriageable age the right  to marry, or to 
deny to minorities the right to enjoy their own culture, profess their own religion, or use their own language’. 
151 Supra note 123, para. 4.2.5. 
152 Supra note 148, pp. 23-24. 
153 Ibid, p. 23.  
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provision concerning rights from which no derogation is permissible under any 
circumstances’.156 This new development, in essence, aims to delimit the use of reservations 
in cases where the international community has demonstrated its resolve to protect and 
uphold HR, in particular fundamental rights. 
 
As discussed briefly earlier, Article 21(1a) in the VCLT establishes and highlights how the 
reservation ‘modifies for the reserving State in its relations with that other party the 
provisions of the treaty to which the reservation relates to the extent of the reservation’, and it 
continues in Article 21(1b) to clarify how the reservation ‘modifies those provisions to the 
same extent for that other party in its relations with the reserving State’.157 Reservation to this 
effect is to limit the scope of the treaty by the specific reservation placed between the parties 
in the treaty. This limitation of a reservation was also referred to in the Legality of the Use of 
Force case where the ICJ stipulated that, ‘the said reservation had the effect of excluding that 
Article from the provisions of the Convention in force between the Parties’.158 Such 
reciprocal exchanges of rights and obligations in view of reservations are further cemented in 
the ILC’s recent work.159 In effect, the reservations provide reciprocal entitlement and set 
obligations to all parties.  
 
The VCLT in Article 20(4c) signifies the element of ‘consent’ in the reciprocal impact of a 
reservation, asserting that ‘an act expressing a State’s ‘consent’ to be bound by the treaty and 
containing a reservation is effective as soon as at least one other contracting State has 
accepted the reservation’.160 Consequently, the binding reciprocity in placing a reservation 
originates from the element of ‘consent’ expressed by the reserving State. It is worth 
highlighting that every State has a right to object to reservations placed by other States,161 and 
‘may oppose the entry into force of the treaty as between itself and the author of the 
reservation’.162 The effect of a severe objection would mean that the objecting State can 
oppose the entirety of the treaty obligations between itself and the reserving State, or 
alternatively allow the treaty to exist but limit its obligation to the reserving State in line with 
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the reservation. Interestingly, there is little evidence of objection to reservations excluding a 
State from a treaty in its entirety but the usual practical approach to an objection is that the 
reserving State is part of the treaty but its obligations exclude the reserving obligations. 
Examples of such objections can be seen in the case of nine States raised objections to the US 
reservations for Article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR), claiming that the US approach is against the object and purpose of the treaty.163 
Also similar objections were protested by some States against the US reservations on the 
Genocide Convention.164 The basis of the US reservations was to emphasise the need for the 
US to give prior ‘consent’ for the dispute referred to the ICJ, as well as limiting the 
obligations of the US to its own constitution,165 by suggesting that the national constitution 
overrides the international legal obligation as was ruled in the US Supreme Case Reid v. 
Covert.166 The objections of States revolve around the limitations of international obligations 
on this subject sought by the US, particularly suggesting limitations on the ICJ’s power to 
deal with disputes.  
 
The reciprocal entitlement given in the VCLT to non-reserving States clearly identifies how a 
reservation stipulated by a State brings similar advantages of the reservation to other States in 
their relation to dealings with the reserving State. As mentioned by Bilder, placing a 
reservation acts to reduce the potential future risk from international obligations faced by the 
reserving State and enables deviation from the full treaty obligations.167 It has been argued 
that through this process, reserving States do not gain an unfair advantage and there will be a 
balance in obligations and duties, signifying that the process is heavily based on reciprocity. 
Essentially, reservations amend the treaty between reserving States and others, where the 
reserving State, by excluding itself from a specific obligation, releases others from a similar 
obligation. This is referred to as ‘induced reciprocity’ by Parisi, suggesting a similarity to 
                                                          
163 Germany, Italy, Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Spain, Norway, Portugal, and Sweden have objected to 
the United States reservations; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, United Nations -Treaty 
Series, Vol. 999, p. 171, and Vol. 1057, p. 407. 
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reciprocity defined by Keohane as ‘specific reciprocity’.168 Parisi correctly maintains that 
Article 21(1b) demonstrates the constraints necessary to bring about automatic and ‘induced 
reciprocity’ where no State benefits from ‘unilateral defection’.169 This will prevent States 
from finding themselves in a prisoner’s dilemma situation and are likely to maintain a 
balance of rights and duties, dependent on specifics of a treaty, go as far as creating a 
situation where a non-reserving State has no obligation towards a reserving State; thus any 
obligation in treaty toward a reserving State is automatically lifted once the State places a 
reservation.170 In other words, placing a reservation, and its result in bringing about a form of 
reciprocity constraint, produces a tit-for-tat strategy without directly resulting in an 
overwhelming retaliation by non-reserving States.171 The main advantages, therefore, for the 
inclusion of the reservation right is that many States can be part of the treaties but are able to 
exclude themselves from certain elements that are objectionable to them. However, the 
principle of reciprocity is preserved by retrospective exclusion of the obligation by the non-
reserving State towards the reserving State.172  
 
The second principle of treaty law, ‘good faith’, combined with the third principle ‘pacta sunt 
servanda’, dictate the obligations on member States as to how a treaty must be applied, 
observed and interpreted. ‘Good faith’ requires States to fulfil their obligation on the basis of 
honesty, sincerity, reasonableness and fairness,173 similarly ‘pacta sunt servanda’ requires 
States to perform and fulfil their obligations. States have agreed to fulfil international 
obligations in ‘good faith’ under the Declaration on Principles of International Law 
concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation,174 under which ‘good faith’ is regarded as 
one of the underlying principles of IL. The instilling of the notion of ‘good faith’ and ‘pacta 
sunt servanda’ in the treaty law establishes a sense of obligation upon States that they must 
perform their duties in line with the provision of their agreement. This way the balance in the 
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obligations and the duties will be preserved as long as the agreements are upheld and 
interpreted based on ‘good faith’. The non-fulfilment of the obligations or misinterpretation 
of the terms of the treaty will undoubtedly disturb the balance in the agreement between the 
parties and is likely to lead to unfair advantage. The presence of these two principles, in the 
VCLT, is yet again strong evidence of the presence of reciprocity in treaty law; the aim is to 
direct contracting parties to follow through with their obligations, and additionally to ensure 
the provisions of these agreements are always interpreted in ‘good faith’ as to preserve the 
balance between the right and duties of the parties involved. 
 
Given the role of ‘consent’ in acceptance of the terms of the treaties by States, once a State 
has given ‘consent’ to an obligation or a duty, treated as equal amongst the community of 
nations is it totally unexpected for the international community to put faith and trust in the 
fulfilment of its international legal duties and not to be confronted with wrong-doing or non-
fulfilment? Is accepting the rule through ‘consent’ by States not a form of promise which 
creates binding obligations? Therefore ‘good faith’ and ‘pacta sunt servanda’ is vital in the 
application and delivery of obligations and duties of States. Similarly the existence of these 
principles in IL will provide a sense of expectation by other States on how their counterparts 
will perform their obligations and duties, thus creating a sense of reciprocal balance of rights 
and duties amongst States. Further evidence of this can be seen in the principle of estoppel 
where States cannot deny their obligations based on previously accepted duties and 
obligations. Estoppel is regarded as a general principle of IL and plays a vital role.175 Whilst 
the principle of ‘pacta sunt servanda’ looks at whether obligations have been fulfilled 
appropriately, Estoppel looks at the nature of conducts that would have led a State to the 
understanding and the reliance that the wrong-doing or non-obedient State has an obligation 
that has not been fulfilled.176 
 
A common issue facing the legal community is how the laws are to be interpreted. The 
principles of ‘good faith’ and ‘pacta sunt servanda’ provide the necessary tools to ensure 
States do not interpret the rules exclusively to their own benefit and interest. There are 
many examples within the VCLT demonstrating these framework and obligation on States; 
namely stressing how every ‘treaty in force is binding…and must be performed…in good 
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faith’.177 Equally a ‘party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for 
its failure to perform’;178 and ‘A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with 
the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of 
its object and purpose’.179 Moreover, the commentaries on the Draft Articles to the VCLT 
gave an insight into how various interpretations of the treaty texts would be possible.180 
The principle of ‘pacta sunt servanda’, therefore, was considered essential as an 
established guideline for interpreting treaty laws. The significance of the inclusion of this 
principle is twofold. Firstly, the VCLT is recognised as the codification of existing CIL 
already in practice; and secondly, the rules within the VCLT underpin all other treaties. 
  
In addition to the theoretical approach to a valid interpretation, assessing the collective 
approach to the interpretation of the rules by the ICJ and its predecessor, the Permanent 
Court of International Justice (PCIJ), provides practical insight. Previously, the PCIJ in the 
Polish Postal Service in Danzig case made a clear statement that, ‘words must be interpreted 
in the sense which they would normally have in their context, unless such interpretation 
would lead to something unreasonable or absurd’.181 Observations on the history of the ICJ 
indicate a number of cases that have made references to ‘good faith’, namely in the Nuclear 
Test case,182 and in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases.183 In the latter case, the ICJ relied 
upon ‘good faith’ to express the opinion that States must partake in useful and helpful 
negotiations and should not be providing limitations for self-serving purposes, and that States 
should provide scope for change from their own position for the overall good.184 This balance 
of interests is what is sought by the principle of reciprocity. 
 
The prerequisite of ‘good faith’ in treaty laws provides the basis for the application of 
reciprocity, particularly where the terms of treaties provide the withholding or retraction of 
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the obligation upon the breach of the other party.185 An example of this can be seen in 
Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project case between Slovakia and Hungary, where Hungary was not 
allowed to abandon its obligation under the existing 1977 treaty between the two States and 
the ICJ ruled that the two States must engage in negotiations in ‘good faith’.186 Furthermore, 
if no settlement was reached, Hungary should compensate Slovakia for abandonment of the 
project.187 In other words, if parties to a treaty have interrelated obligations as part of the 
treaty, then one State can withhold or retract from its obligation if the other State has not 
fulfilled its obligation. The importance of ‘good faith’ in relation to the principle of 
reciprocity lies in the notion that respect and fairness in interpretation and application of 
treaties is paramount. This notion instils the obligation on States to abide by the spirit 
intended by the treaty and avoid gaining unfair advantage by misinterpretation. 
  
Therefore, the valid interpretation of IL is of greatest importance. The rules of IL, like other 
legal systems, are open to interpretation and valid interpretation of these rules, particularly in 
relation to the correct intended duty and obligation is the cornerstone of IL. As suggested by 
Judge Bedjaoui ‘good faith is a fundamental principle of IL, without which all IL would 
collapse’.188 The ICJ in the Competence of the Assembly Regarding Admission to the United 
Nations reiterated the principle of valid interpretation by stating that ‘the first duty of a 
tribunal which is called upon to interpret and apply the provisions of a treaty, is to endeavour 
to give effect to them in their natural and ordinary meaning in the context in which they 
occur’.189 The importance of these principles is to ensure consistency and uniformity of 
approach by States to the provisions of IL as well as to reduce self-benefitting interpretation 
and application in different instances to gain unfair advantage. The significance of this is how 
a group of States have been brought together, under a treaty, and agree to be bound by its 
rules. Thus, States must apply uniform laws that are reflective of a co-operative approach to 
avoid inconsistent interpretation or application.  
 
The fourth principle of treaty law, ‘rebus sic stantibus’, refers to the conditions allowing for a 
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treaty to be terminated based on exceptional circumstances. An emphasis in the VCLT is 
given to create and maintain peace and co-operation between States.190 However, there are 
instances where a ‘material breach’191 in agreements occurs and allowances have been made 
in the VCLT for ‘the other parties by unanimous agreement to suspend the operation of the 
treaty in whole or in part or to terminate’ either between the breaching party and other parties 
or between all parties.192 The VCLT permits termination or suspension of a treaty either 
through mutual ‘consent’, ‘material breach’ by one of the parties, and/or through 
‘fundamental change of circumstances’.193 An example of such circumstances is provided by 
Brownlie, where a change occurs when a State party to a military and political alliance has a 
change of government which is no longer compatible with the provisions of the alliance.194 In 
these circumstances, the termination or suspension of the treaty is feasible and justifiably 
acceptable.  
 
The role of reciprocity with respect to ‘material breach’ is twofold. On the one hand, it has an 
influential role in encouraging States to fulfil their agreed obligations and to fully observe the 
provisions of the treaty. On the other hand, it has another important role and impact whereby 
allowing a State to terminate or suspend certain provisions or in extreme cases to be able to 
affect the entire treaty, therefore allowing the obligation to be removed from the party which 
has been subject to ‘material breach’ by another State. Both of these roles are in essence vital 
to maintain and support the balance between the rights and duties of States which are party to 
a treaty and to enhance compliance with international agreements as well as minimising 
unfair advantage being gained by one party over others. 
 
The right of the party to terminate or suspend its obligations relies once again on a State 
acting against the rules of the agreement, in trying to achieve unfair advantage. This right to 
the injured party is granted under the VCLT; however, there is a lack of clarity on the 
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‘precise’ situations where a State can act unilaterally and in defiance when involved in 
multilateral agreements.195  
 
Given the multilateral features of contemporary IL, it could be argued that the measures 
permitted can be enhanced to encompass other interrelated treaties between States. That is to 
say, it is conceivable that several treaties with similar obligations are entered to by many 
States, and as such a ‘material breach’ in one treaty can lead to the suspension of another 
similarly linked treaty. Even though the practice of such notion has been rare, it is important 
to consider the widespread applicability of reciprocity in dealing with breach of obligations. 
Furthermore upon termination or suspension of a treaty, following a ‘material breach’, the 
VCLT releases States from their treaty obligation towards each other during the period of the 
suspension of the treaty.196 The terms of a ‘material breach’ and suspension of a treaty as 
provided under Article 60 of the VCLT is often interpreted to reflect the same treaty and not 
to encompass other treaties. The ILC in its scrutiny of scholars’ work concerning this Article 
placed an emphasis on the existence and manifestation of reciprocity in relation to an 
unlawful act and its consequent justified reaction.197 This view of reciprocity in IL, 
particularly under the law of treaties, is considered as a tit-for-tat policy where the terms of a 
treaty allow a State to be punished if and when it has deviated from co-operation, but their 
punishment is not so severe as to never induce future and long-term co-operation between the 
parties.198 This is indeed reflective of the subtle notion in Article 72(2) where the parties to a 
treaty are obliged to ‘refrain from acts’ that are likely to block the continuation or resumption 
of the operation of the treaty.199 This in effect gives rise to reciprocity being used in both as a 
balance of interest as well as an incentivising tool for States to come back to the agreement 
and fulfil their original obligations and duties.  
 
Osiel is of the view that States must have the ability to retaliate against a breach by other 
States, which in turn, should encourage them to respect and abide by the agreements.200 This 
view is shared by Hathaway suggesting that allowing retaliation in this form plays a vital role 
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in influencing the behaviours of States in adhering to international agreements.201 Similarly 
Greig holds the view that States should have the ability to limit their obligation in response to 
a breach of a similar obligation by another State, however, the scholar has concerns about the 
notion of proportionality towards the reaction to a breach.202 Greig introduces reciprocity as a 
principle for determination of obligations and proportionality as a principle for the measure 
of reciprocal ‘remedies’ for the breach in obligations.203  
 
The fifth principle of treaty law, ‘denunciation or withdrawal’ from a treaty sets out the 
obligations where States cannot simply terminate or denounce a treaty unless termination is 
stipulated within the treaty.204 This outlines the principle within the Convention for 
maintaining rather than ending a treaty, hence the VCLT has tried to limit the possibility of 
withdrawal of obligations by States. Similar to the fourth principle, ‘rebus sic stantibus’, 
through the fifth principle, the VCLT aims to create and maintain peace and co-operation 
between States,205 by encouraging the continuation of agreements and to ensure one party 
does not gain an unfair advantage by terminating an agreement that would have been 
mutually beneficial to all parties. This balance of interest is preserved through the principle of 
reciprocity where one party is not given the right to break away from an existing agreement 
that would have come about through the ‘consent’ and mutual agreement of parties. By 
ensuring the continuation of agreements, an unfair advantage is limited and mutual benefit of 
the parties as set out at the beginning of the agreement is maintained. Accordingly, the issue 
of non-fulfilment of obligations is covered within the treaty laws collectively by asserting the 
necessary measures for seeking the ‘remedial’ approach in case of deviation from obligations 
either through ‘material breach’ or ‘denunciation or withdrawal’ from a treaty. In such 
circumstances there are many ‘remedial’ options available to protect the affected parties. 
Firstly the VCLT provides for immediate end to the provisions of the treaty where there is a 
‘material breach’ by one State and the affected State is able to deem the agreement has come 
to an end, and is no longer bound by the obligations in the treaty.206 Secondly, the affected 
party is able to deem the agreement as valid if the other party is simply terminating or 
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denouncing a treaty which will place the affected party at a disadvantage. Both of these 
options are on the basis of the principle of reciprocity which is based on maintaining the 
balance of interest and minimise unfair advantage by any one party. 
 
The role of reciprocity in treaty law takes different shapes and forms as the treaty law 
crystalises from its outset of negotiation, consensus building and continuing in its role where 
it encourages States to take into consideration the reciprocal responses to their actions when 
inserting a reservation, their general approach to the obligations under the treaties, 
particularly the consequences of a potential breach of their obligations. The significance of 
reciprocity in treaty law is how the provisions of the treaties are able to incentivise and 
encourage compliance and obedience as well as allowing for reciprocal reaction to breaches 
in agreements, but the adopted approach is in such a way that it does not destroy possibility 
of returning back to the terms of the original agreements. 
 
3.2. Customary International Law    
 
Norms and customs, which can be defined as the standard behaviours in any society,207 
develop over time, and are likely to be in existence for a while before they become the formal 
and official law of that society. Such norms range from values shared within the society and 
conduct deemed acceptable by the majority.208 These norms are often unspoken or unwritten 
rules, but their non-formalisation does not make them any less valuable to the society; and 
these customs are likely to be respected long before official laws are passed and 
established.209 Over the last few centuries, as societies have matured, so have their values, 
and norms which were once common are no longer seen as acceptable.210 This evolution of 
norms is evident when observing how historically acceptable practices of racism, slavery or 
colonisation have now become unacceptable.211 The study of reciprocity in general context 
through social and anthropological provided the platform to analyse the role of reciprocity 
within inter-state relations which operates within a similar context. The norms shared and 
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reciprocated amongst the international community have been in place as international 
customs, and have become formalised and documented through treaties. That is to say, 
treaties are not the introductions of the acceptable customs and norms of conduct, but rather 
are a method of formalising the pre-established and acceptable norms.212  
 
According to the ICJ Statute, CIL is ‘international custom, as evidence of a general practice 
accepted as law’. Thus the emphasis is placed on ‘evidence’, ‘custom’ and ‘general practice’. 
It is important to note that ‘consent’ of all States is not required to create a custom, rather the 
creation of CIL begins with a State engaging in a specific practice, followed by reactions to 
this practice by other States; the response to the practice thus formulates a rule. In CIL the 
reaction of States plays an important role in evidence of their ‘consent’. Equally if other 
States have partaken in the same conduct as another State, it can be understood that they are 
in agreement to the appropriateness of the original conduct. A conduct available for one State 
is immediately made available to other States. This is where reciprocity significantly 
manifests itself in CIL. A State is aware that its actions can be replicated by others and any 
benefits sought from such conducts are made available and shared by others. This is central to 
the role of reciprocity on CIL. The challenge is hence in identifying what constitute a CIL 
rule and what actions/conducts are to be considered as CIL.  
 
The constituting elements of CIL were best articulated by the ICJ in the North Sea 
Continental Shelf cases,213 as firstly generally accepted practices of States, and secondly 
opinio juris sive necessitatis commonly referred to as opinio juris.214 The ICJ referred to 
these elements in the creation of CIL, citing that firstly, ‘not only must the acts concerned 
amount to a settled practice, but they must also be such, or be carried out in such a way, as to 
be evidence of a belief that this practice is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of 
law requiring it’ and this needs to be accompanied by ‘the need for such a belief, i.e., the 
existence of a subjective element, [which] is implicit in the very notion of the opinio 
juris…’.215 In essence, the presence of opinio juris in CIL is a significant indication that 
States are encouraged and expected to pursue conduct that has a legally binding obligation 
based upon previous conduct of States. The presence of opinio juris in CIL signifies that 
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States’ conduct must be in line with their legal obligations, therefore it is to infer that States 
are obliged and encouraged to adopt practices that are in line with internationally accepted 
rules and norms. The inter-link between this notion and the presence of reciprocity in CIL is 
where adopting conducts based on legal obligations, brings about and maintains a sense of 
balance between legal rights and duties of States as well as minimising unfair advantages. 
This balance is achieved through encouraging compliance and obedience of States to their 
legal obligations and duties whilst protecting their rights against such conducts that might 
lead to unfair gains.  
 
A feature of customary law which distinguishes it greatly from treaty law is its degree of 
flexibility.216 From an international legal point of view, customary law, unlike treaty law, 
does not have any central decision makers or specific fixed processes, hence the analysis of 
the two necessary elements constituting CIL rules is vitally important in order to understand 
the role of reciprocity within CIL. 
 
3.2.1. State Practice 
 
The importance of State practice in formulation of CIL suggests that any interpretation and/or 
act by a State can have direct implications for future conduct and interpretation of other 
States. Therefore, what constitutes State practice? Does every practice constitute a rule of 
CIL? Is the internal conduct of States also included in State practice? 
 
The doctrine of State practice in formation of laws is not a new concept and is not exclusive 
to IL. As far back as ancient Greek times, common practices were deemed as customary rules 
in war and peace.217 In certain countries which follow the common law system, such as 
England, the formation and application of the law is based primarily on customary law 
according to customs and past practices.218 Custom in the international arena is conduct by 
States based on their understanding of acceptable and legal conduct and it is this custom that 
is shared between States. In general it is worth identifying that a State has sufficient 
documentations providing evidence of its international dealings, such as interviews and 
speeches, for example by heads of States, diplomatic communications, or statements made by 
                                                          
216 Supra note 1, p. 121.  
217 Supra note 100, p.36.   
218 Supra note 98, p. 166.  
67 
 
the representatives of governments, such as the Foreign Office.219 All of these give an insight 
into a State’s practice. In addition, the ILC has opted to include the national Courts’ ruling as 
an indication and evidence of a State practice,220 indicating that State practice is not limited to 
the international conduct of a State relating to its foreign affairs. Ott articulated that CIL is 
formed through ‘gradually combining effect of the practice of a number of States with regard 
to a particular legal problem or situation’.221 D’Amato reflects on the flexible nature of CIL 
observing that: 
 
Custom is a dynamic process of law-creation, yet it is also a restraint on illegal dynamism. The theory 
of custom must provide for change and adaptation in customary law, yet it must also establish enough 
stability so that it can exert a pressure on decision-makers to refrain from certain contemplated action 
that would violate customary rules.222 
 
D’Amato’s viewpoint describes custom as a ‘dynamic’ yet flexible formation of norms which 
gives rise to the growth and evolution of the rules of IL, in line with the change in dynamics 
of the international community. This flexibility is important in IL given its nature and 
structure. Akehurst raises an interesting question as to how many States are required for a 
uniform practice to constitute CIL, and whether all States are to be deemed equal when 
considering a majority of State practice. The scholar asks whether a practice can fail to 
become a CIL, if as few as one State opposes its creation. In answering the questions, the 
scholar reflects on the findings of the PCIJ in the Lotus case,223 citing that, ‘the rules of 
law…emanates from their own free will has expressed in conventions or by usages generally 
accepted as expressing principles of law’.224 The importance of States’ ‘consent’ on their 
acceptance of legal obligations and duties is paramount in IL but ‘consent’ in CIL takes a 
different form than treaty law where States can formally sign and ratify treaties. The notion of 
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‘consent’ indicates that States are legally bound to CIL not necessarily through their own 
practices and customs, but more in relation to not opposing these conducts by contrasting 
practices.225 States are unlikely to give ‘consent’ to any CIL rule that is likely to hinder the 
balance of their rights and duties or provide unfair advantages to one or more States. This is 
where reciprocity also plays a role through ‘consent’ of States in order to maintain the 
balance of rights and duties for all parties. 
 
It is important to note that the usage of a practice does not warrant it to form a custom, 
ultimately becoming a rule for the international community.226 The underlying issue is the 
ability to distinguish between the usage of a practice and a custom which can lead to an 
accepted international customary rule. This distinction has been widely debated theoretically 
and practically both by the Courts and the scholarly community.227 The Asylum case, 
provided a milestone in how custom can be recognised, when the ICJ indicated that custom is 
established when ‘it has become binding on the other Party’.228 In Brierly’s reasoning, 
custom is an established practice recognised by other States as ‘obligatory’ practice.229 This 
distinction is not easy, yet it is essential in determining CIL. The significance of the 
distinction lies in the primary differentiating factor between usage and custom, where usage 
does not carry a legal significance.230 The common factor that is deduced, illustrates that the 
essential distinction between usages of an act as opposed to a State practice, which can form 
a rule of CIL, is identifiable through consistent, uniform and regular conducts employed by 
many States in response to a specific situation.  
 
The Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries case,231 provides an insight into how the existence of a 
custom was not accepted by the ICJ, where the Court was dismissive of a practice in relation 
to territorial water as general rule of IL since the practice was not considered as ‘uniform or 
universal’ practice.232 In other words, the ICJ ruled that there was a lack of uniformity in 
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practice; hence the mere practice by one State does not create CIL.233 The ICJ ruling in this 
case, and indeed its reasoning for reaching its judgement, has received criticism from the 
scholarly community.234 A school of thought has suggested that absolute uniformity across all 
nations is not a requisite for establishing custom but major uniformity is required,235 equally, 
a majority is sufficient even if some of them were ‘indifferent’ to the practice of these 
customs.236 It is not easy to comprehend how absolute universality and uniformity of a 
practice can exist in the international community, as large as it is. This notion of majority is 
understandable since not every State will have an interest in every international practice, for 
example a State without a sea coast is unlikely to be interested in issues surrounding 
coastlines or fishery rules, and the notion of majority rule of interested parties is likely to be 
more practical. Nonetheless, the importance of the role of ‘consent’ in IL must not be 
forgotten.  
 
The Asylum case demonstrated a practical approach to the issue of custom in a dispute 
between Colombia and Peru relating to granting political asylum to an anti-government 
movement leader.237 The ICJ explicitly recognised the presence of customary norms as being 
‘local or special’ in their nature.238 A similar observation is drawn from the ICJ’s ruling in the 
Right of Passage case,239 where a rule of customary law was claimed based on existing 
established practice between the two States, enabling Portuguese personnel to pass through 
Indian Territory and to gain access to Portuguese territory.240  The ICJ based its judgement on 
the existing evidence of a custom in accordance with geographical and historical specifics of 
the region, thus upholding Portugal’s claim with the exception of the movement of military 
personnel.241 Contrary to the above examples, not every action taken by a State forms a rule 
of CIL. For example, could actions taken by the US during the ‘war on terror’, involving 
long-term detentions and torturous acts relating to foreign national suspects, be considered as 
a custom? The reality is that these approaches demonstrated inconsistent and non-uniform 
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practices which cannot form a CIL rule, as will be discussed in the next Chapter. The need 
for consistency and uniformity of a practice follows a similar theme suggested by D’Amato 
indicating that every State’s conduct cannot count as a rule of CIL; State conduct must be 
evaluated not only as the ‘material’ nature of conduct, but equally in line with the 
‘characterization’ of the ‘qualitative or psychological component’ of the conduct,242 which is 
discussed later in this Chapter. The specific notion behind a practice with regards to whether 
a State believed itself legally bound to behave in such manner is a fundamental factor. 
Whether a State’s conduct stems from assumption of a legal obligation or individualistic 
sense of morality is a key factor in assessing the difference between usage and a legally 
binding obligation under the rule of CIL.243  
 
A further condition that must be present in the formation of CIL is proof of evidence for State 
practice. As mentioned earlier, evidence of State practice is directly attributed to States’ 
‘consent’ to that practice in the sense that, through evidence of State practice, acceptance of 
obligations and duties by States is not subjective and their ‘consent’ is evident through their 
conducts and practices. Scholars have argued about the nature of State practice and factors 
which provide evidence of practices that led to the creation of CIL.244 D’Amato holds the 
view that a claim does not represent an act ‘although they may articulate a legal norm, cannot 
constitute the material component of custom’.245 The scholar believed that what States do 
outweighs their claim and that their statements are likely to be contradictory to their 
conduct.246 Akehurst opposes this view claiming that statements made are in fact evidence of 
a State’s custom, and as such it is ‘artificial to distinguish between what a State does and 
what it says’.247  
 
The golden rule of CIL is that once a conduct is available for one State, it is immediately 
made available to others. Byers expands on this concept by suggesting that any rights 
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obtained by one State are also to be provided to all others.248 In the course of reasoning, 
Byers introduces reciprocity as one of the four principles of CIL, amongst other principles 
such as jurisdiction and personality as well as legitimate expectation, and he views 
reciprocity as:  
 
by ensuring that any state claiming a right under general customary international law accords the 
same rights to all other states, the principle of reciprocity qualifies the application of power in at 
least three ways: first, in respect of what states claim, and, how they go about making such claims; 
secondly in respect to how states respond to the claims of other states; and, thirdly, in respect of how 
states go about persistently objecting to emerging or newly developed customary rules with which 
they disagree.249  
 
This is where reciprocity plays an important role in the acceptance of a conduct as a 
customary law based on its legal merit as well as creating a balance of interests between 
States. In essence, reciprocity operates as a creator of balance between the rights and duties 
of States in CIL, in a platform where a right claimed by one State through their actions or 
conduct is immediately made available to all others. Equally if there is an obligations being 
demanded or set upon States then similar obligations are to be carried by others too. This 
reiterates the role of reciprocity in maintaining the balance of interest and equality amongst 
States in relation to their international legal obligations and duties whilst ensuing in efforts to 
minimise unfair advantage sought by one State. This will have alternative effect where the 
presence of reciprocity limits the pursuit of every action/conduct by States because sharing 
benefits from such action/conduct might be detrimental to their interests. For instance, a State 
might be discouraged from pursuing a conduct, based on the knowledge that this conduct is 
available to other States and if this conduct is reciprocally carried out by others, their national 
or international interests may be endangered. Effectively the presence of reciprocity in CIL 
also plays a deterrent role for States to follow every conduct that they might deem beneficial 
to them with the consideration of its reciprocal effect. Given the flexible and non-central 
processes for CIL rule making, reciprocity operates significantly as regulator for arbitrary 
conduct of States as well as providing States with the opportunity of protesting or objecting 
to the creation of rules that are unfair or create an imbalance.  
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The very nature of the evolution of IL through customary law indicates specific attention that 
must be given by States in their conduct and interpretation of law. This is where the doctrine 
of opinio juris manifests itself, and the focus of the following analysis will reflect on this 
doctrine. 
 
3.2.2. Opinio Juris    
 
Opinio juris is a widely debated subject amongst the scholarly community.250 Opinio juris is 
opinion that constitutes an act as a necessary rule of law.251  Essentially, it indicates a legally 
binding obligation that emanates from previous conduct of States, so it is undoubtedly inter-
linked with State practice and cannot be entirely separated. In other words, States follow a 
specific route or conduct that they believe is legally binding upon them, hence the doctrine of 
opinio juris indicates a belief that States behave in a manner in which they are legally 
obligated.252 As previously mentioned, the connection between opinio juris and the presence 
of reciprocity in CIL lies in creating and maintaining a form of balance between legal rights 
and duties of States whilst also minimising any unfair advantages being sought by States. 
This balance is achieved through encouraging compliance and obedience of States to their 
legal obligations and duties whilst protecting their rights against such conducts that might 
lead to unfair gains.  
 
The importance of ‘consent’ and the vital role it plays in acceptance and obedience of IL has 
been previously discussed. It must be reiterated that the ‘consent’ of all or even majority of 
States cannot be achieved without compromise, and it is likely to be the result of evaluation 
of advantages and disadvantages of any proposal, or as previously mentioned as mutual 
concession of advantages. Indeed, Parisi and Ghei appropriately discuss that this compromise 
of ‘gains and concessions’ fits within a framework of reciprocity.253 Elias similarly looks at 
opinio juris where he argues that opinio juris is a form of ‘consent’, in the sense that when a 
State initiates an action the reaction of other States by permitting or agreeing with that action 
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creates a customary rule through opinio juris.254 Watts likewise provides a view of the role of 
reciprocity in State practice, arguing that a custom is created through ‘consistent State 
practice exercised out of a sense of legal obligation’, and as such consistent practice and the 
sense of legal obligation must be driven from prior practice of one or more States.255 
Therefore it can be argued that custom is created through reciprocal conduct based on 
reciprocating the conduct of other States, where the belief of legal obligation (opinio juris) is 
accompanied when prior conduct has created a legal norm.256 That is to say, a State’s conduct 
is the result of reciprocating previous conduct of one or more States. Interestingly, Barker and 
Osiel go further by suggesting that opinio juris can also be deducted from the silence adopted 
by States.257 Osiel, in support of his argument, uses the example where most States and the 
Human Rights Watch declined to condemn the targeted killings of Al-Qaeda leaders and 
members in Yemen in 2002.258  
 
As a matter of fact, the scholars’ arguments suggest that the ‘consent’ of States is likely to be 
highly affected or influenced by reciprocity, particularly in assessing their own interests. 
Accordingly, the formulation of CIL provides a platform for the limitation of pursuit of 
interest by one State because the ‘consent’ of other States for the acceptability of the conduct 
becomes an essential element. This limitation is based on the principle of reciprocity since 
the ‘consent’ of States will not be achieved if they regard a new rule to be against their 
reciprocal rights and interests. Furthermore, as mentioned before, States are cautious of 
following a path of conduct which might place them at a disadvantage due to reactions by 
others. Hence, it can be seen how reciprocity plays a role in shaping CIL when States are 
reacting to another State's actions. 
 
A vital aspect of reciprocity, in this context, relates to how States assess their reaction to the 
original conduct of other States. The assessment evaluates the effect of such actions on their 
own interests, and the potential unfair advantage that could be gained, for example, by the 
conduct of other States. Once a rule is established, then the doctrine of opinio juris relating to 
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the legality of future similar and reciprocal conduct comes into effect. Thus, new customary 
rules are driven from uniform, consistent and general practice accompanied by opinio juris. It 
is therefore important to address where the belief for legality of an action which is based on 
reciprocating previous conduct comes from. How can opinio juris be proven? Is there a need 
for how the belief of legal obligation (opinio juris) is to be identified and be proven? Who 
has the burden of the proof, is it the Courts or States themselves? How do States decide that a 
practice is in line with CIL rules? Furthermore, how can States believe in the legality of 
actions where their own actions could be the start of the creation of CIL rule?       
 
3.2.2.1. How Can Opinio Juris be Proven and is This Proof Necessary?  
 
Opinio juris can be identified in the outlook and responsive approach of States to a situation 
as evident in the ICJ’s approach in the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries case,259 where the Court 
addressed the idea of State practice relating to the government’s attitude towards opinio 
juris.260 In practical application, the International Courts’ reflection on opinio juris in the 
high profile cases, the Nicaragua case, the Lotus case, the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries case, 
the Asylum case and the Right of Passage over Indian Territory case provide the best general 
application on this doctrine. On the one hand, the Courts have requested the proof of opinio 
juris, and on the other hand, occasionally they have been content with the existence of opinio 
juris.261 This resulted in disparity between whether there is an onus on parties to prove the 
existence of opinio juris, or if the burden of request for the proof is with the Court. The 
confusion has expanded to whether even there is a need for proof of opinio juris and, more 
often than not, the Courts have required the proof for the existence of opinio juris. 
Notwithstanding the burden of proof, it is important to understand that proof for the existence 
of opinio juris is in reflection of how States behave and take actions based upon the belief 
that their conduct is based upon reciprocating previous conducts as well as evidence of their 
‘consent’ to these conducts.  
 
The argument often presented against opinio juris is in the difficulty of proving the belief that 
a State was acting in line with an obligation. In arguing to prove opinio juris, and effectively 
proving how States’ conduct was in line with reciprocating previous conduct, two factors 
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need to be addressed; firstly dealing with the issue that States are unlike human beings and 
incapable of sharing states of mind or beliefs, and secondly exploring the application of 
opinio juris by the ICJ. The first issue encompasses the challenge that, since opinio juris 
requires ‘state of mind’, this notion may seem difficult to apply to States as non-human 
forms.262  Nonetheless, it must be noted that States have a legal personality and are subjected 
to IL in the same way as individuals are under national laws. Hence, States are presumed to 
have a ‘will’, and subsequently, the ‘state of mind’ and ‘belief’, in this context, is applicable 
to States.263 In reality the State officials responsible for the running of its social, political, 
legal and economic affairs do have a ‘state of mind’ and in their capacity take decisions and 
act on behalf of States.264 As stated by Cheng, choosing to deny the acceptance of ‘beliefs’ 
and ‘state of mind’ would mean entering a philosophical ‘chestnut’265 in relation to 
ascertaining factors such as ‘intentions of parties’ relating to national law, since there is an 
element of presumption when applying such notions. It is too simplistic to hide behind the 
non-human form of States since every action taken by officials is in their responsible 
capacity, and equally must be based on certain motives, be it legal obligation or otherwise.  
An analogy could be in comparing States to corporations, where a company does not possess 
a ‘state of mind’, but its board of directors or responsible individuals running the company 
are accountable for the conduct of the company.      
 
Moving onto the second factor relating to the application of opinio juris, the Nicaragua case 
provides an example of how the ICJ set out to ascertain the existence of opinio juris.266 In 
that case, the attitude and voting behaviour of States involved towards the UN General 
Assembly (GA) played an important role in leading the Court to assess the existence of 
opinio juris.267 The level of flexibility in the formation of CIL and the fact that absolute 
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agreement of all States is not a prerequisite in forming CIL have previously been discussed. 
Therefore, even though the majority vote in the GA cannot be taken as evidence of opinio 
juris for all States, the individual State’s voting attitude can be viewed as evidence of opinio 
juris as articulated by the ICJ.268 The Courts have adopted different approaches to the 
application of opinio juris in various cases. In the Lotus case, the Court agreed with France’s 
assertion that CIL included a rule which removed any jurisdiction by Turkey over the French 
ship Lotus on the grounds that there was no evidence available to the Court, which 
demonstrated the belief of such jurisdiction by States as was presented by France.269  
 
Alternatively, in the Asylum case, the ICJ asked for the parties to prove the existence of 
opinio juris if States were to rely on this.270 Even though the Court dismissed the existence of 
a custom in this case, the ICJ reaffirmed the acceptability of a local customary norm by 
highlighting international custom ‘as evidence of a general practice accepted as law’,271 
which has played a vital role in assessing a practice as CIL. The North Sea Continental Shelf 
cases is another example where customary norms were not accepted by the Court,272 despite 
the opposing view expressed by Judge Lachs stating that ‘the general  practice  of  States 
should  be  recognised  as prima facie evidence that it is accepted as law’.273 In most other 
cases, though, the ICJ maintains the view that opinio juris is in existence where the practice is 
uniform and general, or alternatively has refrained from making a reference to opinio juris, 
namely in the Corfu Channel case, where the Court cites that the conduct of States is 
‘generally recognized  and in accordance with international custom’.274 Through this analysis 
it is demonstrated how opinio juris can be proved both theoretically and practically. Each 
case provides a unique perspective on the view of the belief for why States’ conduct was 
deemed to be based on reciprocating previous conduct or demonstration of their ‘consent’ to 
the conduct, whether rational or otherwise.  
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Although the cases brought before the Courts show different approaches towards establishing 
opinio juris when accepting CIL, as precisely emphasised by Mendelson,275 this should not 
be taken as devaluing the importance of opinio juris. In other words, it should not be 
presumed that non-emphasis on proof of opinio juris does not mean opinio juris is 
disregarded. This approach targets the opposing claims made by a school of thought such as 
Kelsen and Guggenheim for the denial of any necessity of opinio juris; according to them 
this is the reason why the Courts did not give too much credit to opinio juris.276 However, the 
view held by Mendelson that the approach to opinio juris is not uniform is a valid one. 
D’Amato has suggested that the Courts have never actually proven opinio juris,277 however 
this statement seems incomplete when considering cases looking at establishing practice as a 
rule of CIL.  
 
3.2.2.2. How Important, Necessary and Helpful is Opinio Juris? 
 
When discussing opinio juris, a pertinent question is: how do States know how to behave 
when CIL is created through their own conduct? Similarly, how do they know they are acting 
legally, if opinio juris indicates the belief that States behave in the manner which is believed 
by them to be in line with their legal obligation?278 This has led to a paradox surrounding the 
doctrine of opinio juris leading many to deem it unnecessary, unhelpful and void. The North 
Sea Continental Shelf cases demonstrate an important practical approach for opinio juris 
where the ICJ stated that, ‘Not only must the acts concerned amount to a settled practice, but 
they must also be such, or be carried out in such a way, as to be evidence of a belief that this 
practice is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it’.279 This is a 
strong notion for the necessity for the belief of the legality of a conduct. However, the 
problem is viewed as ‘How can custom create law if its psychological component requires 
action in conscious accordance with law pre-existing the action?’280  
 
                                                          
275 Maurice Mendelson, The Formation of Customary International Law, Recueil des Cours – Collected Courses 
of the Hague Academy of International Law (Rdc), Vol. 272, 1998, pp. 285-289.  
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277 Supra note 245, p. 52. 
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To break away from the paradox surrounding opinio juris, it is important to understand not 
only what States do, but also to understand the reasons behind their conduct, or to understand 
the ‘psychological’ element in the formulation of CIL. Akehurst suggests that opinio juris is 
the ‘psychological’ element as the ‘conviction felt by states’ that a particular conduct is 
required by IL,281 and this view is shared by Cheng.282 This notion suggests that IL rules are 
based on outlining duties for States, but the framework and nature of IL is much more aligned 
to outlining the permissive rather than directive rules enabling States to act in a specific 
manner.283 Subsequently, the evaluation of the necessity of the ‘psychological element’ 
(referred to as opinio juris) further helps to clarify how State practice alone is not enough and 
hence the role of opinio juris is important. The conduct of State officials gives rise to the 
‘psychological element’ or the ‘state of mind’ of a State.  
 
It is also important to be mindful that the primary focus of IL is about how States behave 
towards other States, and as such, the actions and reactions of States hold equal value when 
assessing the ‘psychological element’ of States. Brownlie contradicts the claims made by 
scholars that the ‘psychological element’ surrounding opinio juris is an unimportant factor for 
the creation of new CIL.284 Brownlie convincingly argued for opinio juris as the ‘necessary 
ingredient’ in the formulation of CIL by stating that, ‘the sense of legal obligation, as 
opposed to motives of courtesy, fairness, or morality, is real enough, and the practice of 
States recognizes a distinction between obligation and usage’.285 ‘The essential problem is 
surely one of proof and especially the incidence of the burden of proof’.286 Brownlie’s view is 
similar to Akehurst’s view who believes that the obligatory character of an act can be 
assessed in line with the protest or condemnation of other States whose rights have been 
affected by this act.287  
 
Elias draws a similar conclusion that positive reaction of States to a State’s conduct 
demonstrates ‘consent’, hence there is opinio juris in connection with the new practice, and 
as such opinio juris is ‘indistinguishable’ from the concepts of ‘will’ and ‘consent’ of 
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States.288 Mullerson shares Akenhurst’s view, by building on Virally’s suggestion that, 
‘custom derives its authority directly from ‘will’ of states: it is, in fact, tacit agreement’.289 
Brownlie’s claim that silence or no actions against a State practice suggests that this is 
demonstrative of agreement.290 Osiel builds on these arguments by creating a strong link 
between reciprocity as reflected in State practice, claiming that, ‘state practice must be 
accompanied by widespread opinio juris – the consistent legal opinion of relevant states - 
endorsing such practices as lawful’.291 A shared factor in scholars’ views is the importance 
and the necessity of opinio juris in defining CIL, as well as demonstrating the similarities 
between opinio juris, ‘consent’ and ‘will’ of States. It must be underlined how opinio juris is 
conditioned by the ‘will’ of States and without some form of ‘consent’ the formation of CIL 
would not be achieved. This is where reciprocity as a tool to balance the rights and duties of 
States manifests itself, where States can contest against conducts that create a risk to rights of 
States and thus challenge the formation of such conduct as a CIL rule.  
 
Akehurst’s differentiation is valid where he draws a distinction between obligatory rules 
where proof is gained from the duty imposed on a State by the view held by other States, in 
comparison to permissive rules that do not need others to declare illegality of another States’ 
conduct.292 The Lotus case provides a useful practical approach for the distinction between 
permissive rules and obligatory rules where the PCIJ ruled in favour of Turkey for putting on 
trial the French captain responsible for the accident. Despite the French claim that there was 
an obligatory rule not permitting Turkey to prosecute the French captain, Turkey successfully 
argued that even if most States in Turkey’s position had not exercised their jurisdiction, there 
was no reason to believe that this was due to a legal obligation.293 The traditional discussion 
on opinio juris is less linked to law-making features, and more aligned to providing a 
distinction between legally binding (obligatory rules) and norms that are driven from inter-
State courtesies, otherwise referred to as comity. This outlook was developed since it was 
considered that practice alone does not make law. The importance of opinio juris for the 
belief that the conduct results from a defined legal obligation thus renders it a necessary 
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element. A widely used example is the custom of diplomatic correspondences using white 
paper and how, despite this common practice, there is no legal obligation for States to use 
white paper.294 This form of practice, therefore, is reciprocal but not based on a legal 
requirement which is a form of comity. Brownlie refers to the Oppenheim definition which 
describes comity as, ‘the rules of politeness, convenience and goodwill observed by states in 
their mutual inter-course without being legally bound by them’.295 As articulated by Starke, 
deviation from comity may result in reciprocity from other States but is unlikely to result in 
legal repercussions.296 This suggests that reciprocity in the form of comity,297 between States 
is not limited to obligatory conduct under CIL.  
 
It is important to be mindful that custom is created through reciprocal conduct based on 
reciprocating the conduct of other States, where the belief of legal obligation (opinio juris) is 
accompanied where prior conduct has created a legal norm. As mentioned, the presence of 
opinio juris is a strong directive for States to comply and follow conduct that they are legally 
obligated to do so and to encourage them to abide by IL rules. State practice alone would not 
create encouragement for compliance of IL rules and this encouragement is needed given the 
nature of IL, particularly the flexible nature and non-central rule making processes of CIL. 
The balance of rights and duties of States is at risk where each State could follow the conduct 
they choose based only on State practice so long as it is consistent and uniform, but this 
conduct may not be in line with a legal obligation.  
 
The argument for opinio juris as an unnecessary factor in the formation of CIL is somehow 
linked to the point that the PCIJ and the ICJ have not asserted the necessity of opinio juris in 
the cases presented to them. Dissenting opinion made by Judge Sørensen in the North Sea 
Continental Shelf cases, indicates that, ‘the practice of States…may be taken as sufficient 
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evidence of the existence of any necessary opinio juris’.298 On the other hand, it is argued that 
the Courts have also not deemed it unnecessary or asked for its abandonment. Any claim for 
abandonment of opinio juris is contradictory to practice.299 Conflicting evidence to this view 
is seen in the view adopted by the ICJ in the Nicaragua case, where the Court set out to 
‘satisfy itself that the existence of the rule in the opinio juris of States is confirmed by 
practice’.300 Far from its abandonment, the ICJ in this case required the practice to 
demonstrate opinio juris. A similar argument is presented by Elias, referring to the ICJ 
judgements, claiming that the traditional view of opinio juris, mentioned above as separation 
of obligatory and comity, is not an entirely valid one and opinio juris ‘has a part to play in 
law-creation’.301 Taking into consideration the above discussions, the pertinent observation is 
that State practice alone is not enough to establish new rules of CIL, and if opinio juris is 
considered irrelevant, then the role played by opinio juris should be replaced.302 As examined 
above, the issue with the doctrine of opinio juris is with the notion that a State’s action is 
already part of the law before it can constitute a new law under CIL. Several suggestions 
have been provided for alternative options to this view of opinio juris, and the most plausible 
is where opinio juris intersects in the formulation of customary law.303 Elias suggests that 
involvement of opinio juris in the creation of CIL should be ‘postponed’ to a later stage than 
the view held traditionally, insofar as other States at some point during the creation of new 
customary law must, ‘accept, acquiesce in or recognise’ the new practice as legal.304 In short, 
opinio juris is the same as the notion of States’ ‘consent’ relating to the creation of CIL. The 
requirement of the element of ‘consent’ or the existence of it in formulation of CIL is not new 
and exclusive.  
 
Having seen the arguments for and against opinio juris, including the arguments for its 
abandonment, it is clear that without opinio juris, the formation of CIL is incomplete. There 
is a great risk for the adequate safeguard necessary to ensure legality of the conducts of States 
or their belief of their conduct on the basis of legal obligations. This safeguard is fundamental 
for maintaining and encouraging States’ compliance with IL rules and the continual balance 
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of rights and duties of States through the application of reciprocity. Even taking into account 
the suggested approaches for its potential replacement does not provide a satisfactory 
alternative. Furthermore opinio juris indicates the belief of the legality of an action and as 
such there is a strong link between opinio juris and ‘consent’ of States. The element of 
‘consent’ plays a fundamental role in the formulation of IL and ‘consent’ cannot be achieved 
without compromise. This is where reciprocity plays an important role in the acceptance of a 
conduct as a customary law based on its legal merit as well as creating a balance of interests 
between States. It can be concluded that opinio juris fulfils an important, necessary and 
helpful role in the formulation and acceptance of CIL, which cannot be easily disregarded.  
 
3.3. The General Principles of Law  
 
The inclusion of the general principles of law in the sources of IL has created a great deal of 
debate amongst the scholarly community and this debate revolves around what the ‘general 
principle of law’ entails, since some argue that it means general principles of IL, and others 
suggest it means general principles of national laws.305 Akehurst argues for the need for this 
distinction and how both these national and international legal principles cannot be 
encompassed by ‘general principles of law’.306 Whilst Cassese suggests that IL principles are 
already included within the sources, through treaties and CIL,307 however, the treaty law 
covers either specific matters between contracting parties and CIL is gradually created and 
‘cannot address all interests and concerns of States’.308 It has been suggested that the 
insertion of the general principle of law into the sources was to avoid situations where the 
treaties and CIL had no solution for an issue presented to the Courts, otherwise known as non 
liquet situation; hence without this source the Courts may be unable to address such cases.309 
In addition a further functionality for the ‘general principles of law’ is to enable the Courts to 
address possible conflicting interpretations of a treaty or a customary rule.310 
 
Lord Phillimore, co-author of Article 38, indicated that the intention for the inclusion was to 
encompass the rules generally accepted within the national legal systems, namely ‘good 
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faith’, principle of res judicata (‘prevention of repetitive litigation for the same parties for the 
same subject’), nemo judex in causa sua (‘no man should be judge in his own case’).311 This 
conveys a valid reasoning for the inclusion of the ‘general principles of law’ as IL sources. 
The general principles of national legal system encompass values and principles that are 
shared by the international community. These legal values and principles are regarded as the 
rule of law and the fundamental basis of legal systems.312 IL and national legal systems aim 
to bring about justice, equality and fairness amongst their subjects. In IL, balance of interest 
of States requires that equality and fairness is maintained and States should be prevented 
from succeeding in claiming or pursuing undue advantage. The unique nature of IL demands 
a framework that is not entirely based on central governing law-making or law-enforcing but 
there is a need to draw from the vast number of recognised principles to establish a 
framework for its development and evolvement.  
 
IL relies upon key principles such as ‘consent’, equality, balance of right and duties, and 
good faith within its framework for the establishment of a working legal order. Effectiveness 
of IL is reliant on equality of rights amongst States and no State must be deemed above 
others. ‘Consent’ also plays a vital role in preserving the right of States on the obligations and 
duties accepted by them. This is where reciprocity plays a fundamental role to support and 
enhance the reciprocal relations between States in order to maintain the equality and fairness 
through protecting the balance of interests between States. In addition the principle of 
reciprocity is the key to creating a balance between rights and obligations since a State will 
have knowledge of the fact that by requesting a right, the same right will be granted to other 
States and non-fulfilment of an obligation will also have consequences in a form of tit-for-tat. 
It is clear to see how reciprocity can be the consequence of principle of equality.313 In IL, 
reciprocity plays a vital role in bringing about the acceptability and respect for international 
customs and principles shared by the international community by limiting unfair advantage, 
balancing interests and obligations and encouraging co-operation. Justice, equality and 
fairness are achievable through reciprocated conduct, respect and customs.314  
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From a different view, a school of thought believes that ‘general principles of law’ as a 
source is unnecessary and adds nothing to IL,315 particularly if it has not already been set as 
either treaty or CIL. Their reasoning is that the fundamental principles of IL, such as peaceful 
co-existence, are already established in treaty and customary law.316 Opposite views affirm 
‘general principles of law’ as a separate source of IL stemming from national laws of States 
that relate and apply within the international arena.317 The practical approaches towards this 
source appear to support the latter arguments, albeit with limited scope, since the approach 
adopted by the PCIJ and the ICJ with regards to this IL source has been unclear as to whether 
they include national law.318 In the Barcelona Traction case, the ICJ stressed the need to 
include municipal law in its judgement,319 which was similar to the view of the advisory 
opinion expressed in the case of South-West Africa stating that: 
 
The way in which international law borrows from this source is not by means of importing private law 
institutions ‘lock, stock and barrel’, ready-made and fully equipped with a set of rules. It would be 
difficult to reconcile such a process with the application of ‘the general principles of law’. …the true 
view of the duty of international tribunals…is to regard any features or terminology which are 
reminiscent of the rules and institutions of private law as an indication of policy and principles rather 
than as directly importing these rules and institutions.320  
 
Further support was provided on the inclusion of national legal principles within the ‘general 
principles of law’, suggesting that other principles will also need to be included: 
 
To restrict the meaning to private law principles or principles of procedural law seems from the 
viewpoint of literal interpretation untenable. So far as the ‘general principles of law’ are not qualified, 
the ‘law’ must be understood to embrace all branches of law, including municipal law, public law, 
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constitutional and administrative law, private law, commercial law, substantive and procedural law, 
etc.321  
 
Having seen the theoretical and practical approach towards ‘general principles of law’, it can 
be observed how the inclusion of the principles of national law as a source of IL is logical 
and valuable. As Akehurst points out, the national law of States share similar values and 
principles,322 and its absolute exclusion may not be practical. As will be discussed in the 
following Chapter, laws are the tools through which legal principles are promoted. There is a 
link between national and international legal values and principles such as justice, equality 
and fairness, with the difference that the principles in national legal systems are more clearly 
defined and stipulated. The effectiveness and applicability of IL is reliant on acceptability and 
respect for international values and principles that are generally accepted by the international 
community. Contemporary IL is still a new subject and it would benefit from the inclusion of 
nationally accepted ‘general principles of law’. However, this must not be taken that these 
principles are to apply in an identical manner in national and international legal systems. As 
discussed, these two legal systems are different in nature and application so it is conceivable 
that applications of principles would be different. For example, the principle of estoppel in IL 
takes a different form than in domestic legal systems but IL benefits from using the inclusion 
of this principle in a modified concept.323 
 
4. Is International Law Independent from International Politics?  
 
Examining the nature and sources of IL elaborated the pivotal role played by States in IL. 
The roles of ‘will’ and ‘consent’ of States have a direct impact on how IL is shaped. This has 
led many to question the independency of IL from IP since politics of any State is directly 
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driven from its ‘will’, interest and ‘state of mind’, coupled with their vision for short or long-
term gains.324  
 
Historically, IL and IP have been regarded as two entirely separate subject-matters, and this 
differentiation becomes clear when the detail of each discipline is explored. IL provides a 
collection of rules and a framework for the conduct of States, established for the international 
community, whether it be written or unwritten rules, treaty or custom. However, IP is the 
study of the behaviour of States and what motivates their behaviours.325 This separation has 
become, however, less clear in recent decades. In ideal democratic national systems, judiciary 
and politicians are kept apart, and the influence of politicians in the enforcement of law is 
minimal. This entire separation in IL, however, is not enforced or insisted upon.326 The 
uniqueness of IL indicates how States are both law-makers through their conduct, or by 
signing and ratifying treaties, as well the primary subject of IL. Furthermore, through the 
ability to place reservation on treaties or the ability to accept jurisdiction of the ICJ,327 States 
are able to forego the obligation intended by law. Schachter questions the concept of IL as 
‘real law’ by asking, ‘Can it be ‘real law’ when those subject to it need not submit to it and 
may reject its obligatory requirement’?328 Therefore, the challenge for the international 
community is how to preserve IL from IP. Shaw refers to the ‘inextricable bond’ between 
these two disciplines by suggesting that ‘there can never be a complete separation’ between 
them.329 Similarly Schachter discusses the strong impact of the ‘will’ and ‘consent’ of States 
on various parts of IL,330 indirectly challenging an absolute possible separation.  
 
The study in this section attempts to evaluate the extent to which IL and its rules have been 
influenced by IP. This analysis paves the way for the continuous discussion, throughout this 
thesis, of the role of States in the creation, interpretation and enforcement of IL. The 
following questions help to clarify how the two disciplines are set to function. Is IL 
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independent from IP? To what degree are they dependent on each other? The aim is to reflect 
on the scholarly debates on this subject-matter to ascertain inextricable connections between 
the two disciplines.331 The importance of this exploration clarifies the nature of direct 
interactions that are involved in the theme of this thesis. It is clear that there cannot be a sharp 
dividing line, and the term ‘inextricable link’ is often used to describe the connection.  Even 
though each of the two disciplines can be individually examined, the influence of one on 
another is increasingly observable. The challenge remains as to whether this connection is a 
positive effect or a negative influence on IL and the international community as a whole.  
 
A legal system by its very nature must be independent from all external influences 
(particularly political influences), if it is to serve its community. Any influence rooted in self-
gain and self-interest is ill-viewed and is likely to damage its credibility or even its 
legitimacy; thus political influence may not make the law totally unworkable rather it does 
not meet the integral parts of the rule of law which are justice, legitimacy, coherency, 
uniformity and legality.332 Given that the foundation of IL is in sovereign rights of States, any 
self-gaining political influence is likely to damage the right of others and will not be 
welcomed. Reus-Smit, in conceptualising the connection between IL and IP, has succinctly 
grouped the different views of IR scholars into three distinct categories as follows; the first 
group, referred to as realists, view politics as ‘struggle for material power’ and view IL as 
either ‘irrelevant’ or a ‘reflection of prevailing balance of power’; the second group, referred 
to as rationalists, view politics as ‘strategic game’ to maximise their interest and in turn view 
IL as ‘functional rules’ to promote and solve co-operation issues; the third group, referred to 
as constructivists, regard politics as ‘form of action’ and IL as ‘normative structure’.333 This 
grouping helps to conceptualise the scholarly outlook, but fails to fully capture the true nature 
of IL and the true impact of IP. 
 
Referring back to Schachter’s question, can IL be ‘real law’; it is worth re-emphasising how 
the basis of IL is in ‘will’ of States driven from their ‘consent’, otherwise known as 
‘voluntarism’. The notion of ‘voluntarism’ is not only a theoretical concept but also is 
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practically applied,334 and is embedded in the sovereign right of every State.335 The notion of 
‘voluntarism’ and the significance of ‘will’ and ‘consent’ are observed in every aspect of IL, 
which is why IL is regarded as a voluntary or consensual legal system. Contemporary IL has 
its roots in the framework of the UN, thus the first demonstration of ‘will’ and ‘consent’ of 
States is in their steps taken towards joining the UN as a member.336 The UN membership 
does not mean that States are governed by a superior authority since they have the ability to 
limit or withdraw from international obligations they do not ‘consent’ to. Strong evidence for 
this, as was examined earlier, is where States provide ‘consent’ to a treaty through their 
‘ratification’, ‘acceptance’, ‘approval’ and ‘accession’ of a treaty, as well as the rights of 
States to place reservations on elements within treaties. Similarly new CIL rules are not 
achieved without the ‘consent’ of States. This was eloquently stated in the Barcelona 
Traction case, highlighting that ‘a body of rules could only have developed with the consent 
of those concerned’.337 Once again this demonstrates that in practical approaches, ‘consent’ 
of States continues to play a crucial role.  Despite an overwhelming growth in the argument 
that there is a shift from ‘voluntarism’ to majority rule in IL, since there has been an 
overwhelming move towards formulation of CIL through the majority of States’ practices, 
the notion of individual State ‘consent’ has not been reduced.338 In fact the opposite seems to 
be the view in Koskenniemi’s suggestion that the success of IL rules is in pursuing 
‘individual autonomy’ but within a communal environment.339 Equally, the approach adopted 
in the Barcelona Traction case is in affirmation of the ‘voluntarism’ concept. 
 
Having observed the importance of ‘will’ and ‘consent’ of States, the dependency and co-
existence of IL and IP must be examined. As discussed earlier, States are unlike human 
beings and incapable of sharing ‘state of minds’ or ‘beliefs’, however the politicians and 
officials of a State are responsible for the running of the social, political, legal and economic 
affairs of that State expressing the ‘will’ and ‘consent’ through their decisions and actions. 
This inter-link between IL and IP is best examined by addressing the influence of politics on 
                                                          
334 Supra note 223, p. 18, in the Lotus Case the PCIJ stated ‘The rules of law binding upon a state therefore 
emanate from their own will expressed in conventions or by usages generally accepted as expressing principles 
of law’.  
335 Supra note 110, p.530. 
336 Supra note 7, Article 2, each State upon joining the United Nations accepts the obligations set out in the 
Charter.    
337 Supra note 319, para. 89.  
338 Gaetano Arangio-Ruiz, Voluntarism Versus Majority Rule, (eds.) Antonio Cassese and Joseph H. H. Weiler, 
Change and Stability in International Law-Making, 1988, p.102.  
339 Supra note 14, p.28.  
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creation of legal rules. At the heart of the national law-making process, politicians and 
lawyers in the parliaments of most States have the right to vote for a bill to pass; this is where 
they assert their political influence on the creation of laws. Prior to voting, however, there are 
on-going debates, arguments and counter-arguments. Each party undoubtedly aims to argue 
its own case and present its own interest. Essentially, the law that is passed is the result of 
debates amongst politicians, but nonetheless the people of that society are bound by these 
laws. Alternatively, in the international arena, State’s ‘will’ stems from its interest, be it 
political, economic or otherwise, and the negotiation and representatives of its ‘will’ and 
‘consent’ has these interests in mind. In certain cases the values being protected may stem 
from outside individualistic interest by attempting to protect and present international values. 
A pertinent example is the current austerity measures adopted across Europe which are 
deemed beneficial for States and not necessarily acceptable for their citizens. Obviously the 
conclusion is the existence of a link between IL and IP regardless of positive or negative 
impact.  
 
It would be useful to view the position of lawyers or legal advisors on the law-making 
process and the extent to which their work is influenced by political factors. Following the 
establishment of the UN and subsequent tasking of the ILC with progressive development 
and codification of IL,340 this became their predominate objective.341 Therefore, analysing the 
influence of IP in their workings is important. For instance, the ILC recommendations were 
amended based on the influence of States during the drafting of the Article on State 
Responsibility by the ILC where former Article 19 regarded certain activity as criminal, and 
States engaging in such activities were to be identified as ‘criminal States’. Despite sound 
and logical reasoning for the inclusion of the recommendation for treatment of State ‘crimes’ 
and ‘delicts’ in the draft articles, the commission was unable to enforce this into the final 
draft due to lack of consensus and pressure from States.342  
 
                                                          
340 Supra note 125.  
341 Supra note 8, the Statute in Article 1(1) states: ‘The International Law Commission shall have for its object 
the promotion of the progressive development of international law and its codification’, International Law 
Commission Statute proclaims their role is to promote and develop international law and they are not tasked 
with creating new laws, and its role is to draft treaties and recommendations which require consultations by 
states for their adaptations. 
342 Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1998, Vol. II, Report of the Commission to the General 
Assembly on the work of its fiftieth session, A/CN.4/SER.A/1998/Add.l (Part 2), para. 331.   
90 
 
From another angle, Koskenniemi has argued for the dependency of IL and politics, since IL 
relies on its context from political principles and as such their inter-link is a necessary one.343 
If this argument is to be accepted then the question would be whether IL is without objectives 
of its own. The scholar suggests that independence of IL from IP is based on the analysis of 
IL’s objective on two fronts of ‘concreteness’ and ‘normativity’.344 Koskenniemi discusses 
that to assess this independence both of these characteristics must be determined. The former 
is to evaluate the distance between IL and what is perceived ‘theories of natural justice’, and 
the latter is by evaluating the distance between IL and ‘will’, ‘behaviour’ and/or ‘interest’ of 
States. The existence of ‘concreteness’ factor is required, since that would remove the legal 
subjectivity by concrete elements, and the ‘normativity’ factor provides objectivity on the 
independency of the law from the ‘political preferences’ applicable to a State, even if that 
State opposes that law. Koskenniemi draws on the two common criticisms of IL which are: 1) 
political nature and IP dependence; and, 2) political nature based on a utopian idealistic 
foundation. In summary these criticisms concentrate on the parameters of ‘non-existence of 
legislative machineries’ and ‘compulsory adjudication’ as well as ‘enforcement 
procedures’.345 These criticisms are accepted by the scholar as valid and although it 
highlights the flexible nature of IL, it provides a ‘façade’ for political interests and power, 
together with emphasising the idealistic and moralistic basis of IL. This argument leads the 
scholar to conclude that, since the formation and application of IL is such that it is made by 
its subject and applied onto them, in turn, the argument for the absolute ‘concreteness’ and 
‘normativity’ of IL overlaps and demonstrates the bond between IL and ‘States' political 
views’.346            
 
Koskenniemi’s conclusion was not however deemed acceptable and complete by Georgiev. 
In his critical assessment of Koskenniemi’s observation, Georgiev argues that if IL is man-
made – not deemed as natural law- then it is infused with the ‘will’ and ‘interest’ of States, 
however, the objectivity of IL should not be seen in its separation from IP but in its ‘validity’ 
which is removed from any political view or interest.347 Georgiev argues for a rightful place 
for IL despite its limitations, particularly, when IL is clearly preferred to subjective rule of 
                                                          
343 Supra note 14, pp. 7-8.  
344 Ibid, p. 7.  
345 Ibid, pp. 8-9.  
346 Ibid.  
347 Supra note 17, pp. 4-5.  
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law with no ‘obligation and restraint’.348 The scholar asserts that international rule of law can 
and does encompass political views and interests given the influence of ‘will’ and values of 
States in the formation of IL. Similar admissions to an inter-link are made by Akehurst, 
however, these views are coupled with the assertions that special attention must be made to 
the different nature of IL in comparison to national legal systems and therefore terms such as 
IL is a ‘primitive legal system’ are not appropriate.349 The fundamental factor is that, 
although, political positions are involved in the creation of laws, thereafter they re-form into 
separate existences. Even though political interest and ‘will’ of States may change, the legal 
rules originally set cannot change through a shift in political views.350  
 
Undoubtedly the backdrop of IL is unique and unlike national legal systems, so this renders 
itself in differences that make direct comparisons difficult or even impossible at times. 
Regardless of this, IL’s effectiveness is reliant on a certain degree of separation from IP, 
insofar as its execution and enforcement are concerned. It is conceivable how the formulation 
and obligations of IL are closely linked to States’ political interests but that link must be 
reduced in relation to IL enforcement, if international justice, peace and security are to be 
secured. Georgiev provides a useful argument that the current IL system is better preferred to 
a subjective rule, but the question is whether the international community only has to choose 
from these two alternatives. 
 
It must be noted that the discussion above is not an exhaustive analysis of the inter-link 
between IP and IL. The study will return to this inter-link at later stages, and indeed this 
subject is reverted to throughout this thesis. It must be reiterated that the objective of this 
thesis is neither to support nor reject and question the complete independence of IL from IP. 
Admittedly though, the uniqueness of IL requires the examination of the extent to which IL is 
influenced by IP. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
348  Ibid, p. 4.  
349 Supra note 117, p. 5. 
350 Supra note 17, pp. 4-5.  
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5. Conclusion 
 
This Chapter examined the nature and sources of IL, as provided in the ICJ Statute. Each 
source and the role of reciprocity within them were addressed, highlighting the significance 
of reciprocity in creating a balance of right and duties for States by minimising unfair 
advantage. It was seen how reciprocity is embedded in every aspect of the treaty law and CIL 
with shapes and degrees but nonetheless playing an essential role. A particular example is in 
the VCLT and how reciprocity helps to shape the international agreements and States’ 
obligations in a reciprocal manner whereby balance between the rights and duties is 
maintained. Since the VCLT underpins all treaties, the strong presence of reciprocity in the 
VCLT illustrates how every aspect of treaty law is thus strongly influenced by reciprocity.  
Similar influence of reciprocity is evident in CIL where a conduct of a State gives others the 
similar right and other States can equally benefit from the same right. This has led Byers to 
convincingly regard the principle of reciprocity as one of the four key principles in CIL,351 
essentially suggesting that an ‘element of quit pro quo’ in reciprocity is evidence of this 
principle in this source of IL.352 As such this provides the basis for concluding that IL 
operates under a reciprocal framework, in order to protect the rights, duties and obligations of 
States thus minimising unfair advantage and protecting their equality, without compromising 
their sovereignty rights and their right of ‘consent’ as embedded within its sources. 
 
Treaties were examined in view of the underlying principles of ‘consent’, ‘good faith’, pacta 
sunt servanda, rebus sic stantibus, and denunciation or withdrawal. CIL was studied by 
exploring its constitutive elements: opinio juris and State practice. General principles of law 
were analysed applying a comparison with national legal systems. The system of IL relies 
upon key principles of equality, ‘consent’, balance of rights and duties, and ‘good faith’ 
within its framework for the establishment of a working legal order. These principles are 
embedded in IL and are reflected within its sources. They are its underlying factors and no IL 
rule can exist if it is in conflict with these principles. Direct and indirect references to these 
principles are evident throughout the IL system and they help shape IL rules and operation. 
Given the magnitude of their influence in IL, it is feasible to suggest that they indeed are the 
very essence of IL sources and rules where no rule is valid without them and every source, 
                                                          
351 Supra note 4, p. 10. 
352 Ibid, p. 89. 
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particularly the primary sources of IL, operate under these principles. Therefore it can be 
concluded that these principles are the driving factor behind IL system and they are integrated 
parts of the sources of IL. Effectiveness of IL is reliant on equality of rights amongst States 
and the rights and interests of no State must be deemed above others. ‘Consent’ also plays a 
vital role in preserving the rights of States on the obligations and duties accepted by them. 
Similarly the principles of ‘good faith’ and pacta sunt servanda require States to uphold and 
fulfil their obligations encompassing all previously consented obligations. The principle of 
reciprocity, particularly, is important to ensure not only the balance of rights and duties but 
also to minimise unfair advantage by exercising ‘consent’ towards accepting IL rules, thus 
leading to preserving equality amongst States. Protection of this equality is essential for all 
States to feel universal participation that they belong to a family of nations and no State is 
deemed to have more rights than themselves. Indeed respecting the principle of equal rights is 
clearly referred to by the UN as one of the necessary factors for achieving friendly 
relations.353  
 
The non-fulfilment of the obligations is evidence of a breach and is likely to affect the 
balance of rights and duties. Remedy for this imbalance is sought through the principle of 
reciprocity since a State will be aware of the fact that by requesting a right, the same right 
will be granted to other States, and non-fulfilment of an obligation will also have 
consequences in a form of tit-for-tat. It is therefore clear to see how reciprocity can be the 
consequence of the principle of equality. Evidently, this is how reciprocity is an underlying 
element in relational aspects of the sources of IL operating to influence and focus on State 
practice and behaviours. Thus reciprocity is an essential tool in balancing the rights and 
duties of States by encouraging States to perform and fulfil their obligations as well as 
discouraging them from wrong-doings. It should not be inconceivable that when a State has 
given ‘consent’ to an obligation or a duty, treated as equal amongst the community of 
nations, it is therefore expected to fulfil that obligation and other States can have legitimate 
expectation and faith in the fulfilment of such obligations. Additionally it must be expected 
that any wrong-doing or non-fulfilment is likely to be confronted, or as a minimum, any 
unfair advantage sought to be restricted or shared. Significance of reciprocity was evidenced 
for instance, in how through placing a reservation States can limit their own obligations but 
equal right is given to other contracting parties since a reservation stipulated by a State brings 
                                                          
353 Supra note 7, Article 1(2). 
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similar advantages to others in their relation to dealings with the reserving State. Equally if a 
State wishes to gain an unfair advantage by withdrawing or terminating an agreement, this 
right is revoked if one party tries to break away from an existing agreement based on mutual 
‘consent’ and agreement of parties. By ensuring the continuation of agreements, an unfair 
advantage is limited and mutual benefit of the parties as set out at the beginning of the 
agreement is maintained. 
 
It could be argued that by accepting the UN Charter and IL rules, States declare themselves to 
be bound by the rules and principles constituting IL. That would suggest that they follow 
through with their agreement (pacta sunt servanda) and that they perform their international 
duties and obligations on the basis of ‘good faith’, in line with their agreements. This would 
apply equally to obligations set under treaty laws or CIL. On this basis States with similar 
duties and obligations can be affected when one State does not fulfil its obligations since this 
non-fulfilment of obligations could have adverse or at times detrimental effect on another 
State that was relying on the fulfilment of such obligations. Given the nature of the mutual 
dependency of States, it is not beyond imagination that non-fulfilment by one State may have 
a direct and devastating effect on another State’s economy, welfare or security. The 
significance of reciprocity is in the Hobbesian nature of IL where compliance is encouraged 
throughout its framework and non-obedience may not lead to any advantages due to 
reciprocal entitlement of States.    
 
IL aims to bridge the inequality that exists in IP through a legal framework. The focus of IP is 
on the political power of States which is driven from their size, economic strength, 
technological or military advancement and so on. IL seeks to distance itself from such 
influences and instead relies on legality, justice and fairness in governing the inter-State 
relation. In reality the power and strength of States does play a role in their interactions but IL 
promotes and encompasses principles that aim to create a balance between the rights and 
duties of States where one State’s interests does not undermine the others’ interests. IL 
principles such as principle of equality of rights of States outline the equivalent rights 
attributed to each State regardless of their power. The role of reciprocity in IL is fundamental 
in bringing diverse group of States with varying powers and strengths into a level playing 
field where their legal rights and duties are equal and this legal equality is maintained in 
relation to their interactions. Without reciprocity, how else could IL bring States with diverse 
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sizes, natural resources, population, economic strength, and/or technological advancements to 
a similar level and grant them equal legal rights and duties. Hegemony and unilateral 
influence is less in IL than can be seen in IP since the international community values and 
norms are actively promoted through advancement of IL, with peer pressure as well as 
institutions established to regulate and monitor the protection of international norms. 
Nonetheless hegemony and unilateral power does provide IL with a challenge since IL’s 
infrastructure promotes and depends on equality amongst States, at least based upon their 
legal rights and duties.354  
 
Through the theoretical and practical analysis, the Chapter highlighted the role played by 
States in the formation, application and enforcement of IL, particularly, the influence of their 
‘will’ and ‘consent’. Bearing in mind the original purpose of contemporary IL in bringing 
international justice, peace, and security by uniting the international community,355 it is 
important to be reminded of the reason for the importance of ‘will’ and ‘consent’ of States in 
IL. Despite the good intentions, however, the direct involvement of States in IL has created a 
climate of ambiguity surrounding the independence of IL. The potential risk of political 
interests overshadowing IL has thrown doubts over the power of IL. Even though a link 
between these two disciplines is rooted in IL, the effectiveness of IL is reliant on a certain 
degree of separation from IP, insofar as its execution and enforcement is concerned. One 
thing that remains clear from the analysis of the present Chapter is the infusion of political 
interests in IL and the inextricable link between IL and IP. The analysis of the rule of law in 
the following Chapter will help establish the dividing line and separation that exists between 
IL and IP, where the rule of law as the driving factor of IL acts in capacity of a distinguishing 
factor between IL and IP.   
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
354 Nico Krisch, International Law in Times of Hegemony: Unequal Power and the Shaping of the International 
Legal Order, The European Journal of International Law, Vol. 16, No. 3, 2005, pp. 407-408 
355 Supra note 7, Preamble.  
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Chapter Three: Reciprocity, Rule of Law and International Law 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
Having analysed IL sources, this Chapter provides an examination of the rule of law as the 
cornerstone of these sources. The analysis in the previous Chapter provided an insight into 
how IL is formulated and the role played by reciprocity in its primary sources. The 
effectiveness and applicability of these laws lend themselves to the legal values and 
principles that are generally accepted by the international community. The legitimacy and 
acceptability of IL is dependent on the protection and enhancement of the underlying IL 
principles such as the principle of equality of States and their sovereignty rights, both through 
the process of the creation of laws as well as the contents of the law themselves. The laws are 
the tools through which these legal principles are thus promoted and enhanced and it is 
important for the spirit and the intent of law is not lost in its interpretation and application.  
 
The concept of the rule of law is not unique to IL,356 and possesses equal weight in the 
national legal systems of all democratic nations. Regardless of which source of IL is under 
discussion, the fundamental constituting factor is that all of the sources are underpinned by 
the application of the rule of law. Therefore, what is the rule of law? Answering this question 
leads the study to analyse the subject matter, to provide an examination of what constitutes 
the rule of law, and how it can be identified and established. Additionally it is important to 
gain an insight into who is able to determine the content and direction of the rule of law as 
well as its purpose at a national and, more importantly, at an international level. In short, this 
Chapter sets out to investigate how the rule of law is considered and understood as a 
framework that brings about a legal order for its subjects through qualities such as rights, 
duties and justice.357 This is particularly important in inter-State relations where there is a 
strong element of de-centralised and flexibility in acceptance of all legal obligations. It will 
be seen how the rule of law is not subjective or dependent on the arbitrary ‘will’ of States. 
                                                          
356 The significance of the rule of law is stipulated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights preamble; for 
further emphasis on the importance and promotion of the rule of law for ‘the development of international law 
and of relations among States’ see, supra note 174; the rule of law is rooted as an underlying concept in the 
Charter, supra note 7, for further information on the UN rule of law programs please see United Nations rule of 
law programs, at: http://www.un.org/en/ruleoflaw/ and http://www.unrol.org/article.aspx?article_id=3. 
357 Supra note 20, pp. 253-254. 
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The rule of law provides a firm basis which is essential for the durability of the reciprocal 
inter-State relations. The rule of law creates stability so that ‘will’ of States is not short-lived 
and is based on deep-rooted values. This is an essential requirement for the successful 
operation of IL. It is worth highlighting that this analytical approach to the rule of law has 
received much less attention than it has deserved. 
 
An analogy that could be used to explain the concept of the rule of law is an example of a 
neighbourhood, where on the outside all the houses look the same, but inside every possible 
detail could be completely different. So even though all parties are bound by the same 
parameters, such as where to obtain materials, builders and so on, still the outcome can be 
vastly different. Could this mean that having the principle in place is wrong?  Does it suggest 
that those who are less capable of fully utilising it should be deemed wrong? Whatever 
criterion is used should not simply be dismissed because it does not achieve the same 
outcomes for different scenarios. This is not the fault of the principle, but rather a 
manifestation of the details derived. The analogy shows how even the most mundane of tasks 
can be made complex, simply by questioning its details. Hence, disagreements would always 
arise over different uses of terminology. The rule of law, on the other hand, can still be 
specific if we stick to the reason for its existence. Human nature would want any issue 
resolved as soon, simply and fairly as possible - only the guilty would want to prolong 
proceedings, biding their time to find a way to get what is not for them. So elaborating on 
what is due to the subject of the rule of law, and not simply accepting without question, will 
ensure a greater cohesion for all involved. However, addressing the issue of the rule of law 
does not apply only to parties directly involved in particular scenarios. This is to say that, 
third parties could also be affected by the actions of others, and addressing their concerns is 
just as important. Principles have been derived to try and address what needs to be done, but 
even if they were applied successfully, this still does not satisfy the criteria of addressing the 
rule of law.  
 
Following the examination of the rule of law, the study will shift to explore why the rule of 
law is needed and its role in the context of IL, followed by examining the constituent factors 
that are necessary when defining and determining the rule of law. The general application of 
the rule of law is used for further clarification, specifically in the context of IL. The 
examination brings the focus to an exploration of the validity of the rules of IL despite the 
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claims of the direct influence of politics on IL. This will be achieved by arguing for the 
separate existence of the rules of IL, regardless of the importance and influence of States’ 
‘consent’ in the formulation of the rules. This will then lead the focus of the Chapter to the 
fundamental question of locating the dividing line between valid and invalid interpretation of 
international rules and the role of reciprocity in IL guidelines for interpretation of its rules. 
The study seeks to explore the role of reciprocity in the contents of IL rules, how IL requires 
obedience and compliance to its rules and the role of reciprocity in bringing about obedience 
and compliance for IL. This section provides the framework for the discussion on the most 
important established guidelines provided by IL for interpretation and application of its rules. 
These are based on jus cogens rules, obligations erga omnes, the principle of pacta sunt 
servanda and the notion of ‘good faith’. International obligations are created under different 
type of relations ranging from bilateral, bilaterlisable multilateral, non-bilaterlisable 
multilateral and erga omnes and these are examined in the context of multilateral agreements 
and obligations, whilst exploring the nature and type of reciprocity within these obligations 
and relations. It will be examined whether reciprocity can play a role in jus cogens rules or 
obligations erga omnes where the aim is to protect fundamental rights. This examination 
leads the study to look at different areas of IL such as HR and IHL and the role of reciprocity 
within these areas.  
 
Reflecting back to the analysis of the rule of law within the context of IL a question that 
comes to mind is whether it would be possible to formulate or define an overall notion of the 
term rule of law that would be flexible enough to absorb many different amendments to its 
attributes, and yet remain rigid enough to not lose the purpose of its intended meaning. 
Placing the outcome of the analysis of the rule of law in the context of IL, the study delves 
into examining a case study which has encompassed the most fundamental areas of IL. The 
case study concentrates on the recent treatment of the detainees held outside the US, 
namely in Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay. The analysis is further enhanced by inquiring 
into the consequence of such approaches towards the rule of law and IL rules on other States’ 
conduct, as well as on the instability and insecurity which have arisen in the international 
arena, between States, and moreover, their effect on IL. Further to this point, the analysis of 
the integral parts of the rule of law is used when assessing the enforcement mechanisms of 
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IL, given the emphasis placed on the rule of law by the international community and IL.358 
By exploring the rule of law in this Chapter as well as the role and significance of reciprocity 
in IL throughout this thesis, this work seeks to further clarify the relationship between the 
rule of law in the context of IL and reciprocity. 
 
2. What Constitutes the Rule of Law? 
 
To discuss the concept of the rule of law, it is vitally important to understand the meaning of 
the rule of law in general, and its constituent elements relating to reciprocity. Defining the 
rule of law is difficult, due to the questions of who can or should define and determine its 
content, and how they should do so. There is an underlying agreement as to certain attributes 
that define and underpin the rule of law at national and international levels, and why in some 
cases the overall context varies considerably.  
 
Humans commonly adopt the learning approach of knowing something by defining it first 
and then not changing the original consensus, rather than exploration and personally trying to 
decide for themselves what it is. Could this attitude then be different for the rule of law? We 
have learned that a useful method for determining meaning of the language is the subject’s 
usage. If something is regularly used then its importance is generally considered trivial, 
because it is taken for granted. However, if that same thing is scrutinised then defining it 
would determine the outcome of something as important as a Court case; therefore the 
mundane becomes essential. Equally, parties in a Court case may rely on alternative or 
ambiguous definitions, to attain the verdict in their favour. Hence without an existing 
definition in the context of the rule of law, how can there be a consensus or common ground? 
When trying to ascertain the definition of the rule of law, it is thus reasonable to assume the 
approach would determine how its implications are used. There are different ways in which 
communities would define their perception towards the application of the rule of law, but 
limiting the rule of law to a narrow group would still be a futile approach, since they would 
                                                          
358 According to the United Nations World Summit Outcome, it was recognised by Member States that there is a 
need for ‘universal adherence to and implementation of the rule of law at both the national and international 
levels’ and they reaffirmed their commitment to ‘an international order based on the rule of law and 
international law’; General Assembly Resolution, World Summit Outcome, 24 October 2005, A/RES/60/1, para. 
134.  
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still have disagreements amongst themselves. Surely ‘One man’s terrorist is another man’s 
freedom fighter’.  
 
An issue surfaces when a need arises or a concern is brought to attention, which is usually a 
result of a dispute or concern between two or more parties. For this reason, there can never be 
a simple scenario of having the definition clarified, because of the very nature that the 
question has stemmed from. In this case, trying to obtain an ideal or utopian definition of the 
rule of law is futile, because there will always be a party that would never agree with it. 
People by their very nature have always managed to categorise others by using various, and 
often complex, features they have witnessed. If their views on certain issues are considered 
new and adaptable to situations, then they are regarded as liberals, whereas if they refer to 
traditional ideas they are conservative. What is strange then is how these same people cannot 
agree to a universal concept of the rule of law - especially as the parameters required are 
considerably fewer, and only one category is already known. Despite the building blocks 
being readily available, the problem concerns their application.  
 
Even once the definitions are agreed upon, it then becomes a matter of witnessing who is 
incorporating them and then adding the label to them. Like a jigsaw puzzle, we know what 
the overall picture (label) is; we just need to find the right people who will fit into it. If a 
person was at a particular place, and adopted a route to arrive at their destination, they could 
tell others of it. But others might know different routes for the same journey. Does this mean 
the person is wrong? Or that the others are? How could they all be right when there is only 
one starting and ending point? It is often the method of analysing and interpreting specific 
issues which creates the problems. What could reduce the problem at this stage is 
acknowledging that there are many different ways to answer the same question, but deciding 
upon universally accepted principles which any further investigation would conform to in 
general.  
 
Everyone has a general picture of what the rule of law is, since we are all faced with rules 
in our daily lives, and this has become embedded as an instinct; its effect on our daily 
lives is almost unnoticed. Abiding by speed limits when driving, purchasing a ticket 
before using public transport and respect for others’ rights are common examples of how 
rules are abided by within society. Up to this point, it could be argued that every ordinary 
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person has an innate view of what the notion of the rule of law entails. Once again, the 
ambiguity begins when the analysis and interpretation of it is questioned.  Attempts to define 
it may vary from one context to another, and arguments for one definition or another are 
often attempted. One famous explanation on this subject is provided by Dicey who classified 
the rule of law into three categories: 1) people’s personal interests were not invaded without 
due cause and only where law had been violated and this violation had been established by a 
Court of law; 2) everyone was to be equal in the eye of the law and no one is deemed above 
the law; 3) fundamental rights of people are inherent within the ordinary law.359 This outlook 
provides a general perception of the rule of law, applicable almost in every community, both 
nationally and internationally.    
 
Dicey’s views have been criticised by Jennings on the basis of impracticality, since Jennings 
believes in a degree of inequality that must exist between officials of a State such as 
politicians, ministers or the police and the ordinary people, and a certain degree of power 
needs to be bestowed upon such authorities to perform their roles.360 The fundamental point 
to iterate is that the rule of law is most effective in its non-differentiating between different 
categories of people, that is, a more educated person is not differentiated from a less educated 
person, or the rich are not favoured over the poor. As for Jennings’ reasoning, it is 
comprehensible that an official would have higher authority than the average person, but the 
conduct of the official in executing their duties cannot go beyond the set parameters by the 
rule of law. For example officials cannot be seen to act unjustly or apply inequality amongst 
different people when performing their job and they cannot be seen to be above the law.361  
 
To better understand what constitutes the rule of law, it is relevant to consider the inextricable 
connection between its interrelated sets of code. These include legality and/or reason, 
consistency or uniformity, legitimacy, and justice based on common values or legal validity 
driven from the motives behind the creation of the rule of law within any community. 
Collectively, as integral parts of the rule of law, these codes are interdependent, and must 
work with each other. An analogy is provided by a car, where each part is needed for the 
overall to work, but if any of the parts were to be replaced with something completely 
different, then the overall functionality is lost.  
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361 This point will be further clarified when discussing the integral parts of the rule of law.   
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The constitutive elements of the rule of law will now be analysed individually below. 
 
2.1. Legality  
 
Legality within the context of the rule of law plays a pivotal part in the acceptability of the 
rules. For this condition to be fulfilled, a school of thought has set out to establish the 
characteristics that the rules must possess for them to be regarded as acceptable within the 
context.362 Fuller enumerated eight parameters for legality that must be honoured and 
fulfilled by certain rules to be considered law, as opposed to mere force: ‘general, public, 
prospective, comprehensible, consistent, possible to obey, relatively stable and corresponding 
between the rules and their governance.363 Clearly this gives the rule of law a theoretical 
nature which is more in line with ‘aspiration’ rather than a set of duties.364 This view is 
contradictory to Dworkin’s view that regards legality more as reasoning and interpretation. 
Dworkin considers rationalisation of legality to be justified through legal interpretation aimed 
at ensuring each individual’s right and respect, through former adopted rules deemed to be 
accepted and coherent.365 In his analysis of legal rules, Dworkin argues that rules are ‘all or 
nothing’ standards which provide a conclusive reason for an action. In this regard, valid rules 
cannot come into conflict and when there is a conflict between two rules, one of them cannot 
be valid.366 
 
On a different level, despite the overall acceptance by Raz of the parameters suggested by 
Fuller, there seems to be a disagreement between these two scholars on the degrees to which 
deviation from these parameters can be deemed acceptable.367 Fuller believes in the closeness 
of law and morality, thus for this connection to continue, there can be little deviation from 
these parameters if the link between morality and law is to be preserved. The general 
acceptability by Fuller that his eight parameters of legality naturally achieve morality, has 
been criticised by Summers who draws from the argument that Fuller’s legality parameters 
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are closer to achieving ‘merely ‘oughts’ of efficiency not of morality’.368 As such the 
parameters are valid in achieving what ought to take place, to give everyone the chance to 
abide by the law but does not automatically achieve the morality. Raz alternatively believes 
that conformity with the rule of law is open to variation, since although the ideal of absolute 
conformity might be welcomed, it is not an achievable notion.369 The scholar suggests that 
the rule of law should not be accepted ‘blindly’ and ‘radical’ deviations from the parameters 
can occur, since the rule of law is an ideal set of standards and does not necessary enforce a 
sense of morality; hence the fundamental issue, as assessed by the scholar, is in the values 
promoted by the rule of law which enables accurate assessment of potential deviation from 
rule of law.370 The root of this argument stems from the values underlying any legality, which 
is aimed at conformity with fundamental values such as fairness and protecting individuals’ 
dignity which is the essential concern, and the rule of law is the tool to provide such 
protections through legal rules.  
 
Walters provides another viewpoint, by reflecting on Allan’s work, indicating that legality 
within the rule of law is demonstrated when it is in pursuit of ‘common good’, in line with 
ensuring respect for the rights of individuals.371 Therefore, in his articulation, the rule of law 
is not to be taken as unquestioning obedience of the legislation, but rather as a reason for 
abiding by law. The basis of this reason is due to the commitment by the rule of law to ensure 
pursuit of government strategies without compromising respect for the rights of 
individuals.372 Walters compares the above concept of the rule of law to the approach adopted 
in the common law system, where there is continuous judicial reliance on precedents set by 
the application of accepted general principles, aiming to achieve harmony, consistency, unity 
and coherent reasoning. This leads Walters to categorise the concept in two general forms of 
‘legality as order’ and ‘legality as reason’. The former represents the method by which the 
rules for governance are set, through identifying what the rules are. It also establishes the 
legal terms for a rule to be considered and accepted within the system of the rule of law. This 
could be described as a normative approach. The latter reflects on how the rule of law is 
affirmed through interpretation which is based on consistent, unified and coherent reasoning, 
                                                          
368 Robert S. Summers, Lon L. Fuller, 1984, pp. 36-38. 
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which Dicey appropriately titles as ‘legal turn of mind’, and Rand similarly classifies as 
‘standard of reason’ or ‘artificial reason’.373  
 
The ‘legality as order’ concept suggested that the rule of law should be established as 
descriptive codes dictating how the law must be set out in clear, public, general and eventual 
format, but it must be understood that the legality of these collections of rules carries equal 
importance to the expressive legality of each of the individual codes. In addition to the 
aforementioned aspect, there is an alternative purpose for the rule of law which is to provide 
a sense of normative reasoning. This aspect is somewhat subtle, and rather more implied than 
descriptive, and is not implicit. However, such normative features are not easy to capture in 
written documentation or in a textual format, yet simultaneously, carry an important weight 
in providing the rule of law with the necessary consistency and coherence, and their 
significance must not be overlooked.374 These subtle, implied and significant features of 
legality, which due to their characteristics might not necessarily appear in the written 
constitutional law, form part of the rule of law and, therefore, guide the administrative, 
executive and legislative systems. Thus, as such they must display a sense of legality through 
reason.375 
 
There are three common features in almost all legal rules that can be observed. Firstly 
every law is created for a purpose with reason behind its formulation; secondly the law is 
to serve the community and must not be conceptual in nature; thirdly ‘adjudication’, 
which enables decisions to be made through interpretation of the law, it is open to 
intuitive analysis rather than following specific rules.376 These common features highlight 
how the legal basis for any community is not to set a series of rigid rules, but rather, to 
provide rules based on shared values. These rules in turn have features that are common 
in nature. They must guide the actions of the community towards one direction instead of 
other paths, such as, referring back to the driving example, in guiding drivers towards the 
legal standard of driving. Secondly, the rules are deemed binding on the community and 
this obligation is felt by the community and failure to uphold obligation will have future 
repercussions. Thirdly, the acceptance of the obligation brings with it a change in attitude 
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and behaviour, such as stopping at red traffic lights. Fourthly, the standard provides the 
benchmark against which all actions can be compared for judging the actions of people, 
and the importance of this notion is that the rule was created to guide action, and should 
be regarded as the benchmark for claiming action of others as right or wrong. The 
additional feature that should not be disregarded is that the rule of law everywhere must 
emanate from similar values.377 Equally the rules bring power and obligations; for 
example the statutory rights of each person gives them legal entitlements at the same time 
as imposing obligations, and without this balance it will be difficult to convey the sense 
of obligation.378 This in effect brings about reciprocal balance between rights, duties and 
obligations. 
 
Referring back to the constituent elements of the rule of law, a rule of law is based on reason, 
rather than erroneous assumptions and its aims should be to enhance and promote the values 
of the community. The subjects of a rule of law will, therefore, act in a certain manner or be 
guided in a direction only if there is a reason for that rule.  For the rule of law to be valid for 
applicability it must be consistent and be rooted in similar values, and cannot be self-
contradictory in its purpose or in the obligation it set for the community.  
 
2.2. Consistency, Coherency and Uniformity  
 
To achieve consistency within the framework of the rule of law, the requirement is for its 
rules to be in harmony with the overall common values and principles of its subjects. In other 
words, the rules must not be deemed contradictory with other laws. The definition of 
consistency is better achieved by understanding what inconsistency means and how best to 
avoid this. Consistency in the rule of law is fulfilled by eliminating the potential for 
inconsistent treatment under one rule as well as ensuring that a rule does not permit 
inconsistent treatments relating to any one issue.379 The notion of uniformity and consistency 
in law, mainly in relation to consistent State practice, was discussed in the previous Chapter 
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when analysing the sources of IL. It was acknowledged how practice that is not consistent or 
uniform amongst States cannot be declared as State practice.  
 
Inconsistency in legal rules can arise in three possible cases: 1) ‘Total-total inconsistency’ – 
where rules cannot be applied without absolutely contradicting one another and resulting in 
total incompatibility; 2) ‘Total-partial inconsistency’ – where one of the rules cannot be 
applied due to conflict with another, but one of the rules is able to be applied in all 
circumstances; 3) ‘Partial-partial inconsistency’ – where partial conflicts between the rules 
exist, but there are aspects of the rule where no contradiction is evident.380 When there is a 
conflict between two rules, it is important to assess whether the inconsistency lies between 
older or newer rules. Moreover, the nature and the root of each rule must be identified. In 
other words, it must be established whether the inconsistency is between general rules, or is a 
case of a conflict between general rules and a specific rule. Each of these types of differences 
make it possible to classify the inconsistencies into the correct category as identified above. 
In case of inconsistency or conflict between older and newer rules, the established principle 
of lex posterior derogat legi priori is applicable since this maxim dictates that the newer 
rules supersede older established rules.381 This maxim is embedded both in national and 
international jurisprudence.382 Within IL, the most important reference to this maxim can be 
observed in the VCLT affirming that: ‘When all the parties to the earlier treaty are parties 
also to the later treaty…the earlier treaty applies only to the extent that its provisions are 
compatible with those of the later treaty’.383 Moving onto the second identifying feature of a 
rule, the nature of it depends on the specific or general aspect of the rule. In other words, 
what becomes important is to assess whether the specific (specialist) rule is to override the 
more general rules – a principle known as lex specialis derogat legi generali.384  
 
In ‘total-total inconsistency’ situations, particularly when the inconsistency is due to rules 
within the same level, it would be inconceivable to move away from adopting lex 
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posterior.385 In cases of ‘total-partial inconsistency’, lex posterior is still the superior 
convention to use, but the specific nature and the generality of the rules must be assessed, and 
thus resolving the inconsistency needs to be in conjunction with lex specialis.386 Finally, in 
situations of ‘partial-partial inconsistency’, lex posterior is still applicable but its use cannot 
be unconditionally applied and the intention behind the later rule must be considered since it 
might have been intended that the later rule to work in harmony with the laws already in 
existence.387  
 
The rule of law would always be open to interpretation, so using our analogy of the car, the 
person who has created the design would allow for later updates because they know that a 
number of factors in the future, like new knowledge, could be incorporated to allow new 
[appropriate] modifications. Therefore it is argued here that the engine, for example, could 
always be improved to reach optimum performance, even if it means the original form is 
completely lost. The consistency and uniformity in the rule of law does not eliminate the need 
for judgement since the application of any general rules in specific cases will, undoubtedly, 
require the application of ‘discretion’ by the judicial system.388 The rule of law in this 
situation creates the parameters for the decision makers, but at the same time allowing them 
the discretionary freedom needed to review specific cases. The application of discretion and 
judgement in itself will require consistency to ensure similar specific cases are treated 
consistently and uniformly.389  
 
The inconsistencies in the rules may raise the question of the possible achievement and 
existence of the rule of law, since how can the rule of law exist and provide the necessary 
legal standard if it is not coherent, consistent and determinate?  This is a pitfall for many 
since the role of the rule of law is not to provide a set of dos and don’ts but rather to provide a 
legal framework and standard, based on respected declaratory values shared within the 
community.  Establishing the existence of law, therefore, suggests the possibility of the rule 
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of law, but that is not to say that there are no contradictions existing within law that are 
indeterminate or incoherent.390  
 
2.3. Legitimacy 
 
Another integral factor of the rule of law lies in the notion of legitimacy. This is a multi-
dimensional word that could be used in conjunction with the legitimacy of the government, 
the Courts, or even the legitimacy of any law. It is generally accepted that a government gains 
its legitimacy from respecting and promoting the rights of individuals, particularly in the 
process of creation and legislation and upholding the law.391 Similarly the Courts follow these 
laws to promote and maintain the rule of law and its underpinning values which ultimately 
give rise to the enhancement and promotion of rights of individuals.392 This concept is not 
unique to national law and is equally applicable internationally. In fact, the UN regards the 
promotion and adherence to the rule of law as one of the most fundamental factors that brings 
about peace and stability, together with the protection of HR, at international level.393    
 
Georgiev explores the concept of legitimacy as the bridge between the existence of the rule of 
law and the contradictions that exist in the rules; where legitimacy, when compared to the 
concept of legality, is seen to be more flexible in acceptance of the principle of law as 
opposed to specific law.394 Legality is a fixed singular view of declaring an act as either legal 
or illegal, and thus cannot accept contradictions. Legitimacy, in contrast, having the 
implication of contestability, suggests the notion of something legal which may not yet be 
recognised as fully legal on the grounds of rules and principles.395 Legitimacy, unlike 
legality, addresses what ought to be legal, in a broad sense, as opposed to being merely 
concerned with what is legal or otherwise. This is not to suggest that legitimacy is an 
alternative to legality in the legal arena, since even if an action is legitimate, the decisions on 
its legality are still based on the law.  
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Law-makers or politicians, though, are concerned with legitimacy as part of the legislative 
process for formulation of the law, since legitimacy is the underlying factor for the legality 
and acceptability test of any law. Legitimacy, in this sense, provides an understanding for the 
general principles of the rule of law which is commonly associated with the jus cogens 
rules.396  In addition, legitimacy is concerned with consistency with the general principle of 
law, and unlike legality has a secondary interest with the general principle of law, and its 
interest is raised, for instance, when specific rules do not provide the necessary answer in lex 
specialis situations.397 In this context of legitimacy, the connection between jus cogen rules 
and other rules of IL provide a valuable insight.398 Hence the point that must be iterated is 
how conformity with the legal rules is reliant on the existence of legality with a strong 
presence of legitimacy. 
 
2.4. Justice 
 
The significance of the role of justice, in the context of rule of law, has not only been 
emphasised by the UN Charter,399 but it has also been subject to a debate amongst the 
scholarly community and is a wide subject.400 Justice is a multifaceted concept and 
encompasses broad perspectives. The primary questions that arise are: what does justice in 
the context of the rule of law mean? Is justice the same as equality? Does justice mean that 
everyone is to be deemed equal irrespective of their circumstances, or should circumstances 
be taken into consideration when considering the notion of justice?  
 
A school of thought following Rawls’ views on justice regards the rule of law as the 
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conceptualisation and formulisation of justice in the framework of a legal system.401 In fact, 
Rawls suggests formal justice ‘addresses to rational persons for the purpose of regulating 
their conduct and providing the framework for their cooperation’.402 The rule of law, in 
Rawls’ reasoning, is a set of principles that ‘rational persons’ need to formulate their conduct 
to avoid unnecessary conflicts and contradictions.403 This view is broadly shared by Raz 
where he iterates the aspect of the rule of law which required, ‘that the law should be such 
that people will be able to be guided by it’; therefore for the law to be obeyed, ‘it must be 
capable of guiding the behaviour of its subjects’.404 
 
Despite the natural inclination that justice must mean equality to everyone, the principle of 
justice cannot ignore the circumstances of the individuals, in their obedience to the law. In 
the quest for equality in justice, these circumstances should not and cannot be ignored; 
however, the fundamental aim must be to eliminate the arbitrary nature of assessment of 
these circumstances and to replace this with a more concrete set of rules.405 In broader terms, 
equality is to be identified as treating like with like. To achieve like for like treatment 
consistently, as underpinned by the definition of equality, clearly the conceptual rules of 
evaluation for categorising different circumstances are required.406 The accurate application 
of these rules, which form part of the rule of law, should enable the achievement of justice 
through equality, since their application is binding under the rule of law. The primary aim of 
justice is to suggest a concept upon which the basic structure of society should be based. 
Rawls presents justice as a ‘deontological theory’ relating to the priority of the right over the 
good.407 He suggests that, ‘in a just society the basic liberties are taken for granted and the 
rights secured by justice are not subject to political bargaining or to the calculus of social 
interest’.408  
 
As an example, imagine there are two people working in a vineyard but one is old and the 
other is young. The younger is able to pick more grapes so should he be paid more? 
Alternatively, should the older man work fewer hours for the same wage because of his 
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condition?  The basic concept of justice clearly does not address this without the introduction 
of the notion of equality of like for like comparison. If the working performance for both is 
documented, a very different outcome can be reached from what was initially desired, than by 
simply asking what is ‘due’ or ‘just’ for each of them. To provide yet another perspective, 
suppose both men were treated equally in every respect. Imagine now that the ownership is in 
a shared partnership with another, and so the younger man now works for them. For whatever 
reason, the new employer increases the wage of the young man while the older remains 
unemployed. Is this unjust? If the previous employer had done this then it would be viewed 
as unjust, but because there is another person in charge that is no longer considered. Why is 
this? Although everyone would like the same underlying conditions for living, when going 
into detail for each person, this could vary considerably based on circumstances. 
  
In his attempt at defining his theory of justice, Rawls employs two principles: firstly ‘justice 
as fairness’ driven from the priority of the right over the good, and secondly the relationship 
between the self and its ends. The scholar further introduces his approach as the two elements 
of ‘each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of equal basic 
liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all’; subsequently that ‘social and 
economic inequalities are to be arranged so that are to the greatest benefit of the least 
advantaged and attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair 
equality’.409 These principles are set out in order of priority, which means that the first 
principle must be satisfied before consideration of the second can begin. According to Rawls, 
under ‘lexicographical prioritising: a principle does not come into play until those previous to 
it are either fully met or do not apply’. Consequently, according to these principles of justice, 
the equality of rights to basic liberties must be predominantly fulfilled and satisfied.410 Rawls 
believes in the value of a ‘thought-experiment’, in which individuals are deemed equal and, 
through a logical process, evaluate which principles are acceptable as the basis for a just 
society.411  
 
From another perspective, Ross provides an appropriate definition of ‘just’ and ‘unjust’ by 
suggesting that ‘just’ would have been achieved if decisions made by applying ‘a given set of 
rules’; this is to say a just decision would have been made by adopting and applying the 
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parameters provided by the set of rules in force.412 In legal terms this set of rules is provided 
by the rule of law, following parameters within the rule of law must enhance and uphold 
justice in a just society.   
 
The core of Rawls’ argument focuses on ‘original position’ and ‘the veil of ignorance’; where 
the former’s importance is how the ‘original position’ is defined as the position when fairness 
and justice is achieved,413 and the latter, ‘the veil of ignorance’, is described as bringing about 
acceptability of the elected principles in the ‘original position’ by excluding contingent or 
subjective elements such as cultural, economic or geographical bias.414 In other words, Rawls 
progresses his analysis by defining the principles of justice as universal principles, which can 
apply to any just society at any given time. The scholar’s reasoning is counter-argued by 
Sandel who challenges the basis of Rawls’ notion of ‘original position’ by claiming that this 
immediately classifies people incorrectly without due attention to their specific knowledge or 
awareness of their race, intelligence, age, or position in a society.415 Their ‘ignorance’ does 
not seem to end here, and according to the scholar, people are also unaware of good, their 
values and aims in life; in short, assumed to be under complete ‘ignorance’.416 The scholar’s 
further criticism is that Rawls’ theory leaves little room for motivation of good in achieving 
justice and fairness as opposed to achieving this only in the condition of ‘the veil of 
ignorance’.417  
 
One principle of justice suggested by Rawls is the ‘circumstances of justice’, which is 
characteristically both objective and subjective.418 Rawls suggests that ‘a human society is 
characterised by the circumstances of justice’, opposing the involvement of a notion of 
motivation but rather emphasis is on the importance of ‘original position’. The objective 
circumstances consist, for example, of the moderate scarcity of ‘primary goods’ which are 
‘things it is supposed a rational man wants whatever else he wants’. On the other hand, 
subjective circumstances include the idea that the parties possess differing aims and 
conceptions of good, and each wishes to advance his own interests above those of others.419 
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These circumstances would engage the concept of justice. Their existence leads the principles 
of justice to be chosen to regulate the distribution of such goods. In this situation, 
‘circumstances of justice’ brings about the requirement for justice.  
 
Despite agreeing that ‘circumstances of justice’ ‘prevail in human societies and make human 
co-operation both possible and necessary’, Sandel opposes Rawls’ reasoning since, if it is to 
be assumed that ‘original position’ has a practical basis, then it cannot represent the 
foundation of ‘deontological theory’.420 The reason for this counter-argument stems from the 
description offered for ‘deontological theory’ as the priority of the right over the good, which 
suggests a dependency of good and right. Therefore taking this view into consideration 
practically, one has to accept the existence of certain parameters or conditions in societies at 
specific times, and whenever these conditions are not applicable, the priority of the right is 
open to challenge.421 Sandel’s criticism of Rawls seems to focus on the assumption that 
Rawls’ reasoning does not allow for people’s commitments or attachments, where in reality 
this is not necessarily a conclusive deduction of Rawls’ approach. Sandel’s analysis of 
Rawls’ theory of the ‘person’ does not seem to represent a comprehensive view of the 
scholar’s outlook.  A selective view by Sandel of Rawls’ view has been presented as a whole 
view of Rawls. Furthermore, an additional limitation of Sandel’s view is on the important 
point that Rawls’ approach to the principles of justice is universal principles which suggests 
applicability in any just society. As such, one of the most important features of these 
principles is to ring-fence the available options for the structures of interactions in that 
society. 
 
When the constituent elements of rule of law were discussed earlier, the inextricable 
connection between its interrelated set of codes was mentioned. The inter-link between 
justice and other constituent elements such as consistency, uniformity, reason and legality can 
be observed when analysing the characteristics of justice in the context of the rule of law. For 
justice to be achieved there must be consistency in approach, uniformity in the application of 
circumstance, and sound wisdom and reasoning in evaluation of the characteristics for 
categorisation of circumstances. Justice in this context is an essential ingredient in any legal 
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system, since legality alone will not give the desired outcome, as decisions made based on 
legality alone without inclusion of justice may yield an overall unjust result.  
 
The importance of the role of justice in this respect can also be seen in Banakar’s discussion 
of justice as an ethical form of judgement, where unjust outcome of legal rules cannot be 
deemed valid and a form of morality in the application of judgment on the basis of justice is 
necessary, and as such ‘positive law which produces grossly unjust results is not valid’, 
therefore unjust law is not legitimate law.422 This inter-link between the rule of law and a 
valid law is also observed by Raz where he articulates how validity of law is encompassed in 
the rule of law within any legal system; and how the mere belonging to a legal system does 
not make the rule a valid one. In other words, a legally valid rule is one that brings or 
imposes an obligation which carries normative characteristics.423 Therefore, a legal system 
that produces legitimate, legal, and consistent rules will still fall short of its full requirement 
if its rules lack a consideration of the element of justice. Equally, justice can only be served 
in a system which is based on the rule of law where due respect and importance is placed on 
different elements of the rule of law. Effectively, a mutual and reciprocal relationship 
between justice and rule of law must always exist, since the rule of law without justice loses 
its essence, and retrospectively, in a legal system justice cannot be established without the 
rule of law. For example in an authoritarian environment, where law is dictated by the rule of 
the ruler, justice in its true sense is never achievable, and will forever remain an ideal 
concept. 
 
In short, the constituent elements of the rule of law are individually significant and their 
absolute importance is in the collective functionality and its outcome. Each of these elements 
could be compared to links in a chain where their effective functionality is much stronger 
when they come together. However it must be reiterated that the rule of law is not achievable 
where it does not serve justice in its framework. This analysis has provided an insight into the 
factors that must simultaneously exist within the framework of the rule of law. Therefore, if a 
rule fails to meet one of these integral components of the rule of law, then it will fail to be 
deemed law and falls outside the scope of the rule of law.  
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Placing the outcome of the analysis of the doctrine of the rule of law into international legal 
system, the study now proceeds to examine the role played by the rule of law in IL.  
 
3. The Rule of Law and International Law 
 
Throughout the above analysis, it was suggested how through logic, reasoning and 
subsequent legal institutions, societies have moved towards ensuring their rulers are 
bound by legal frameworks under the rule of law. Chapter Two discussed the role of IL in 
establishing the legal principles and guidelines for States’ conduct, which they are obliged to 
follow, obey and adhere to. It was demonstrated how the establishment of IL rules either 
through treaties or CIL brings about a reciprocal legal system. The treaties provide clear 
guidelines for the conduct of States within the framework of the treaty provisions, the rules 
that must be followed and consequences of a breach in agreements. Moreover, CIL 
demonstrates the extent to which the conduct of one State becomes immediately available to 
others to follow, minimising unfair advantage but more importantly that each State 
acknowledges the advantages of operating in certain manner since others will also behave 
similarly.  
 
The sphere of IL is broad; regulating States and individuals, together with the obligations on 
States for the respect of HR. IL functions to promote a sense of order based on stable and 
uniform rules which are considered to benefit the international community. The reciprocal 
nature of IL requires a reciprocal sense of responsibility and commitment amongst States to 
ensure fairness and justice for others. The importance of this is how reciprocity, tied with the 
rule of law in the context of IL, regulates and deters States from regularly applying their 
every interest and ‘will’. Indeed the UN has declared that ‘the principle of the rule of law 
embedded in the Charter of the United Nations encompasses elements relevant to the conduct 
of State to State relations’.424 There is a general enthusiasm and respect for the rule of law 
in most States where head of States publicly support the rule of law, but the practice and 
application of it is somewhat varied from one to another. In general, Western States are 
perceived as more democratic and conscious of their international standing, and therefore 
more obedient to the rule of law. For instance, George W. Bush stated: ‘America will 
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always stand firm for the non-negotiable demands of human dignity: the rule of 
law…equal justice; and religious tolerance’.425 Each government has a structure which is 
not due to a legal system but more underpinned by its political framework.426 There are 
many reasons for the respect for the rule of law ranging from the respect for democracy 
and liberalism to public or world opinion. Equally the element of peer pressure, how a 
State wishes to be perceived within the international community, and internal factors 
must not be ignored.  
 
The rule of law discussed so far is a general perspective, but the principles play a similar role 
in IL. It is argued that since at national level the discussion is about the ‘rule of law, not 
men’, therefore at international level discussion must focus on the ‘rule of law, not 
States’.427 This might be a reasonable statement but it seems to be in contrast to the 
realistic framework of IL. At a national level the rule of law has an additional aim of 
protecting people from the rulers which is equally echoed at an international level, 
however IL is additionally concerned with protecting people not only from their own 
rulers but also from rulers of other States. The fundamental difference is that national 
constitutions clearly set out the powers entrusted in government, but this is more vaguely 
articulated internationally. Given the nature of how IL rules are formulated and the 
inextricable link that exists between the law and politics, the question is: can IL rules exist 
and be accepted as independent and valid rules?   
 
The above question stresses the challenge that IL rules lack the necessary independence from 
IP. However, even though the rule of law by its very nature suggests objectivity in law, free 
from subjective or arbitrary rules, it is less certain why and how this objectivity should be 
reached.  In fact, it is less clear why this objectivity is necessary on the basis of dependency 
from politics. This definition of the rule of law suggests that it is to be driven from natural 
law, unlike the ‘social’ formation of law which is man-made, and undoubtedly will have an 
inter-link with politics. A more convincing definition of the rule of law could be that it is 
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setting the parameters for ‘arbitrary power’, as opposed to dictating absolute independence or 
distance from State practice or interest.428  
 
Voyiakis and Georgiev,429 in their examination of Koskennini’s work, suggest that less 
restricted and explicit definitions of ‘concreteness’ and ‘normativity’ would equally remove 
the clashes between these two factors, thus allowing for the objectivity of IL as required 
within the definition of the rule of law. A revised definition of ‘concreteness’ would suggest 
that formation of law should be within recognised and set parameters which enable the 
existence of the law to be acknowledged. Similarly, ‘normativity’ would suggest that once 
the law has come into effect, it is not changed through such measures like State ‘will’ or 
practice but instead through set procedures.430 Objectivity of IL is not in its independency 
from IP, but more created by its distinctive features from politics.431 In other words, this 
objectivity could be achieved in the notion of the separate existence of IL from a set of laws 
that is purely driven from State conduct and its politics. Hence the two disciplines can co-
exist when the rules and basis of one discipline do not change upon the changes of the other, 
that is to say, IL as a discipline has its own distinctive features that are not entirely dependent 
upon IP. 
 
Despite the limitations observable in any legal system, it can still be believed that law is a 
necessary and helpful tool in bringing a sense of order within a community, however large or 
small. Its usefulness lies in its distinction to ‘arbitrary’ control and power, as well as the 
parameters defined within law that guide the community. Similarly, the usefulness of the rule 
of law is in creating and establishing the necessary rules. This form of creation of rule of law 
helps in establishing rules, but more importantly in outlining the obligations of future conduct 
with the aim of avoiding unnecessary conflicts.432 The same values and ideals are within IL 
for the wider international community, and even though it cannot, by itself, bring 
international harmony or order, it does act as a powerful force.  
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The above discussion demonstrates the validity, objectivity and the existence of IL, 
differentiated from political values and driven from the conduct and ‘will’ of States. The 
rules of IL are influenced by political views and the conduct of States, but this is not to be 
taken as the only form of law-making within the realm of IL. Once an IL rule is created, it 
exists and stands on its own right, and is no longer just a political view. Although the rule 
may change through State practice or political views, it is nonetheless changed in line with 
the legal parameters set, and not through arbitrary political change. In this sense, IL exists 
and is followed through the binding obligations set for States’ conduct when such obligations 
are accepted and embarked upon.433 Georgiev discusses another argument for the validity of 
IL, which can be observed in how States’ conduct is influenced by IL. The rules cannot be 
deemed unreal if States’ behaviour or conduct is governed by the observation of these rules. 
An important point to note is that governments representing States do change regularly; 
however, the ideals of IL remain unchanged despite changes in political views.434 
Governments change but IL or the rule of law does not. Each State consents to IL rules, 
although some States may want to change, reject or modify certain obligations; this needs a 
prerequisite notion of the acceptance of the existence and validity of IL. Additionally the 
endurance and the continuation of IL rules, despite the changes in the political arena, are 
testament to its stability and independency from arbitrary views; one State’s view cannot 
change the direction of the rules of IL.435  
 
The establishment of the validity and existence of IL rules is not to be taken as assertion for 
its ‘completeness’ or an existence of a set of rules applicable to every circumstance; it is more 
to suggest that there are rules to govern State conduct. In cases where a rule does not exist to 
deal with the issue at hand, then new rules need to be created, and the rule of law provides the 
framework for its creation by regulating political views. Likewise the rule of law is again 
relied upon where there is a need for changes to existing laws, or where contradictions are 
observed.436 There could be a suggestion that the element of ‘consent’ raises the question of 
the nature of IL as a basis of suitable rules. However, all of the rules of IL have come through 
                                                          
433 Supra note 17, pp. 4-6.  
434 Ibid, p. 6.  
435Ibid, pp. 6-7.  
436 Ibid, p. 7.  
119 
 
a legal process to be recognised as sources of IL, and as such satisfy both ‘normative’ and 
‘concreteness’ rules of objectivity.437  
 
There exists a dilemma in the rule of law, where on the one hand there is the requirement to 
provide general rules for a society as applicable to different situations, and on the other hand, 
the more general the rules, the more incoherent they are, and thus open to various 
interpretations.438 This battle of establishing the ‘determinate’ elements within the rules of IL 
is suggested by Franck to be achievable through prohibiting certain conducts as unacceptable, 
thus providing the necessary clarity for unacceptable acts and allowing interpretation of other 
conducts.439 One manner in which IL can evolve is through the adoption and 
conceptualisation of new principles that demonstrate the international community’s evolving 
values. The adoption of newer principles will undoubtedly create a conflict with the existing 
specific laws, and the continuous tension will lead the international community towards an 
evolving view of the rule of law driven from its principles. It is useful to be reminded of the 
well-known Dworkin definition of a principle stressing that principles, unlike rules, do not 
provide ‘all-or-nothing’ actions whereas they carry dimension of weight and importance 
which in case of intersection of principles, these dimensions are used to help resolve 
issues.440 As such principles provide a general framework rather than providing concrete sets 
of actions. IL principles help establish the norms and a legal framework but their application 
can vary dependent on the situation. These principles establish obligations and duties for 
States not in the form of rules but rather as guiding principles for inter-State interactions.  
 
Having established the importance of the rule of law in the context of IL, the next questions 
are: how is it interpreted and applied in light of different circumstances? Where is the 
dividing line between valid and invalid interpretation of the rules in IL? What is the role of 
reciprocity in ensuring valid interpretation of IL? Answering these questions requires an 
examination of how any interpretation of the rules of IL must be based on the recognised 
international norms and obligations referred to below. 
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3.1. Interpretation of Rules in the Context of International Law  
 
The study has examined that it is a requirement for the constituent elements to be collectively 
present and function in the context of the rule of law. Furthermore, it was discussed how the 
rule of law provides the broad principles without distilling into specific laws. The 
international legal system, like any other system, encompasses a set of rules and principles 
that work in conjunction with one another and require interpretation, yet this interpretation 
must take consideration of other rules and norms.441 This means that achieving valid 
interpretation requires determination of which rules and principles are applicable to the 
situation in hand and thus be taken into consideration when reaching a valid interpretation. 
Valid and consistent interpretation is fundamental in ensuring uniformity in the application of 
IL rules and that States’ rights and obligations are not subject to unfairness or contradiction. 
An established framework and principles have been provided for the interpretation of 
international rules. The principles are primarily pacta sunt servanda, the notion of ‘good 
faith’, jus cogens rules, and obligations erga omnes. These principles ensure the context and 
the essence of IL is not lost through obscure interpretation. The first two principles together 
with the role and significance of reciprocity within these principles were explored in previous 
Chapter. In the section below the summary of the first two principles is briefly touched upon, 
however the latter two principles constitute the focus of this section.  
 
The interpretation of IL rules is tasked to the specific international legal bodies.442 In a 
practical sense, varying interpretations are possible, as evident in the Tadic and the 
Nicaragua cases, but the fundamental principles were not lost as part of the interpretation. 
Although different approaches were adopted towards a similar concept, the interpretation 
remained within the established framework. In the Nicaragua case, the ICJ decided that the 
US could not be assumed to have ‘effective control’ of the actions of the Nicaraguan contras, 
even though the US had provided them with weapons, finance and training; the ICTY in the 
Tadic case, however, chose a different interpretative approach, citing that ‘effective control’ 
was too broad a view to be applied when assessing the influence of an external State in the 
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domestic violence of another country.443 Thus, the International Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY) concluded that organising and planning the military actions of another 
State gave the external country the ‘overall control’ which is sufficient to be regarded as an 
armed conflict.444 Such different approaches should not give rise to States taking it upon 
themselves to apply fundamentally different interpretations that are not aligned to the overall 
international interpretation on the subject. This only leads to a distorted picture of the rule of 
law in IL. In this respect and following the theme of ‘good faith’, there is CIL that directs a 
principle that States should not gain from their wrongdoing.445 This statement was clearly 
iterated in the Factory at Chorzow case where the judgement concluded that:  
 
It is… a principle generally accepted…that one Party cannot avail himself of the fact that the other has 
not fulfilled some obligation or has not had recourse to some means of redress, if the former Party has, 
by some illegal act prevented the latter from fulfilling the obligation in question, or from having 
recourse to the tribunal which would have been open to him.446 
 
The ICJ further relied upon this judgement in the case of Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project, 
when analysing the wrongdoings of States and their potential consequences.447 For these 
reasons, the interpretation of IL rules must not be limited to providing erroneous reasons or 
ill-founded justifications provided by some officials or lawyers. 
 
When exploring the role and manifestation of reciprocity in connection with jus cogens rules, 
and obligations erga omnes, it is important to address the nature and level of reciprocity in 
different relations such as bilateral, multilateral and erga omnes relations in line with the 
examining the different obligations set under each type of these relationships. Hence the 
section below examines the bilateral, multilateral and erga omnes relations and the role of 
reciprocity within each type of these relations. Additionally the role and manifestation of 
reciprocity is explored relating to rules that have been created in order to protect fundamental 
values that are universal and commonly shared by the international community.    
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3.2. Pacta Sunt Servanda and Good Faith 
 
In the application of IL, it is a requirement for the international community to interpret IL 
rules effectively, consistently and correctly. On the other hand, the more general the rule of 
law is, the more interpretation is needed for its specific application.448 The application of the 
rule of law requires interpretation, and IL has established guidelines for how this 
interpretation must be carried out. However, one difficulty is the role of States’ ‘consent’ 
in the creation and application of IL. The interpretation guidelines through the principles 
of ‘good faith’ and pacta sunt servanda provide the necessary tools to ensure States do 
not interpret the rules exclusively to their own benefit and interest. The clearest reference 
to valid interpretation of treaty laws is in the VCLT stipulating that ‘Every treaty in force 
is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith’,449 
additionally stating the importance of maintaining the intended purpose of the treaty when 
interpreting by citing that a ‘treaty shall be interpreted in ‘good faith’ in accordance with 
the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light 
of its object and purpose’.450  
 
It is useful to be reminded of the PCIJ statement in the Polish Postal Service in Danzig case 
that, ‘words must be interpreted in the sense which they would normally have in their 
context, unless such interpretation would lead to something unreasonable or absurd’.451 The 
notion of avoiding absurdity in interpretation was first introduced by Vattel, as far back as 
1758. The scholar provided clarity on interpretation that is the foundation for the 
contemporary guidelines, stating that ‘any interpretation that leads to an absurdity should be 
rejected: or, in other words, we cannot give a deed a sense that leads to absurdity, but we 
must interpret it so as to avoid the absurdity’.452 He continues: ‘…we are not in any case to 
presume that it was their intention to establish an absurdity:…therefore, when their 
expressions taken in their proper and ordinary meaning, would lead to absurd consequences, 
it becomes necessary to deviate from that meaning,…to avoid absurdity…’.453 The VCLT has 
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also expressly asserted the importance of relying on ‘supplementary means’ to ensure 
unreasonable or absurd conclusions are not drawn.454 This highlights and reiterates the 
importance of ensuring the essence and intent of the law is not altered in its interpretation and 
application.  
 
3.3. Jus Cogens Rules and Obligations Erga Omnes 
 
No interpretation of IL rules could be considered valid if it is in conflict with jus cogens rules 
and obligations erga omnes. Jus cogens rules and obligations erga omnes are regarded as 
universal norms and/or rights and are internationally recognized and accepted by the 
international community as a whole.  
 
There has been much debate on the nature and type of States obligations, particularly 
focusing reciprocal obligations and those ‘absolute’ non-reciprocal obligations.455 In simple 
terms, these range from obligations created from bilateral and multilateral relations as well as 
those obligations that are owed to the international community as a whole. Obligations erga 
omnes are considered as obligations owed to the international community.456 Obligations 
erga omnes concern all of the international community since States have a vested interest in 
protecting these obligations.457  
 
The ILC has made a distinction between the different responsibilities bestowed upon States 
by treaties and has classified them as:  
 
1) Those that produce ‘reciprocal relationships’; and 
2) ‘More absolute type of obligation’ like humanitarian law or disarmament conventions. 
The significance of this distinction is to highlight the nature of ‘more absolute type of obligation’ in the 
sense that such treaties are less derogable and newer treaties cannot diminish their absolute obligatory 
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nature.458     
 
This distinction is paramount to the analysis of reciprocity since the nature of relations and 
obligations determines whether reciprocity takes a role and creates reciprocal obligations. 
The UNHRC has emphasised that obligations erga omnes has its roots in ‘rules concerning 
the basic rights of the human person’ and by referring to the ICCPR expands this to state that: 
‘there is a United Nations Charter obligation to promote universal respect for, and observance 
of, human rights and fundamental freedoms’.459 On another point, the UN Secretary General 
has declared that these universal rights and values, protected by HR laws, are not time-bound 
or restricted and are ‘intended to apply always and everywhere, in time of peace as well as in 
time of war’.460 Moreover, the UNHRC highlights a treaty signatory State’s legal obligation 
to every other party to fulfil its agreements.461 The protection of ‘individual human beings, 
peoples or even humanity as a whole’ has been given similar weight by the ILC where such 
interests have been regarded as ‘extra-state’ interests that cannot be subjected to breach.462 
The ILC refers to the ICJ’s viewpoint in the Namibia case, where the Court draws from the 
provision in the VCLT Article 60(5) by expressing that the exception to the treaty termination 
right of provisions for ‘protection of the human person contained in treaties of a humanitarian 
character’.463 
 
The obligations erga omnes was strongly supported in the Barcelona Traction case, where 
the ICJ declared that a State has responsibilities towards non-nationals entering its territory 
and has a duty to provide them with legal protection.464 The ICJ noted that where the 
obligations are owed to the international community as a whole, all States have a ‘legal 
interest’ in their protection, given values and rights that are subject to protection, thus to be 
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regarded as ‘obligations erga omnes’.465 The Court regarded rights and obligations falling 
under this category as namely aggression, genocide, slavery, and racial discrimination.466 The 
ICJ examples have heavily been relied upon as ‘useful guidance’ for the current list of 
obligations erga omnes,467 and this list was expanded by the ICJ to include self-determination 
of people in the East Timor case.468  
 
These rights are regarded as universal norms and/or rights that are not based on bilateral or 
multilateral relations and instead are universally recognized and accepted by the international 
community as a whole. Essentially these are obligations owed by all States to the 
international community as a whole and create a universal obligation rather than just 
involving two or selected States only. The Barcelona Traction case has played a pivotal role 
in leading the discussion on obligations erga omnes and is to date a significant base for the 
list of such obligations as well as distinguishing between obligations of States to the 
international community as a whole and those obligations created from bilateral relations.469 
Unlike the common obligations where reaction to a breach in obligations is restricted to the 
injured party, breaches of erga omnes obligations are not only restricted to affected States, 
and non-affected States are equally entitled to react to such violations.470 The endorsement 
for reaction by non-affected States is iterated in Article 48(1b) of the State Responsibility, 
where the ILC, in their commentary, provides for reaction to breach of certain obligations 
impacting the international community as a whole by non-affected States.471 Even though the 
ILC did not refer to the obligations erga omnes directly in the Article, they did however 
indicate that obligations erga omnes are within the essence of the Article.472 
 
Jus cogens rules and obligations erga omnes exist to give clarity to international obligations, 
expectations and protection. The clarity is provided by creating a hierarchal order and 
distinction between peremptory rules and other rules, thus providing a decisive tool for the 
ranking of IL rules to establish the significance of these rules and the obligations imposed by 
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them. As such some rules become peremptory in establishing their adherence as obligatory in 
nature and type. These rules and obligations are not subject to derogation. In addition, jus 
cogens rules and obligations erga omnes further affirm the paramount focus by IL to uphold 
and incorporate the values of the international community and their resolve to protect and 
promote the basic human rights. Examples of rights and obligations falling under erga omnes 
obligations and jus cogens rules, as previously mentioned, include the prohibition of 
aggression, genocide, slavery, and racial discrimination.473 The ILC has drawn a distinction 
between jus cogens rules and obligations erga omnes by affirming that the former has the 
power to override any conflicting rules whereas the latter does not impose an overriding 
character, but each ‘designate the scope of application of the relevant law’.474  
 
The significance of the power of jus cogens rules is referred to in the VCLT stipulating that: 
‘a treaty is void if…it conflicts with peremptory norm of general international law…a 
peremptory norm of general international law is a norm accepted and recognised by the 
international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is 
permitted…’.475 Therefore, the peremptory rules are important for two reasons: firstly, for 
playing a pivotal role in international treaty law and customary law; and secondly, for their 
absolute power which cannot be subjected to derogation under any circumstances.476  
Moreover, as indicated previously, according to the VCLT jus cogens rules cannot be 
superseded through the maxim of lex posterior derogat legi priori. Additionally the VCLT 
adds that: ‘if a new peremptory norm of general international law emerges, any existing 
treaty which is in conflict with that norm becomes void and terminates’.477 In essence, the 
VCLT affirms the role of jus cogens rules as superseding above treaties and this nature 
renders jus cogens to be considered as a rule of customary law too. Jus cogens rules and 
obligations erga omnes were further reinforced and enhanced by the rulings of the ICTY in 
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the case of Prosecutor v. Anto Furundzija.478 The ICTY, having established that the crimes 
committed in this case were torture, further reflected on why the act of torture should not 
have taken place by referring to erga omnes obligations as well as jus cogens rules. The 
ICTY in Prosecutor v. Kupreskic et al. case further emphasised that the absolute and non-
derogable character of obligations does not allow reciprocity to play a role.479 This 
establishes the significance of jus cogens rules being based on a non-reciprocal manner and 
fundamental values. 
 
Introduction of obligations erga omnes and jus cogens rules arguably demonstrate a shift for 
IL away from the more traditional bilateral inter-State relations and instead towards 
contemporary IL by instilling a sense of respect and adherence to universal and common 
shared values.480 This indicates the shift from the more traditional bilateral one on one State 
relations and obligations or even multilateral obligations to a more normative viewpoint for 
universal values and obligations that are owed to the international community as a whole. In 
this respect, the international community in collective form, have a legal interest in the 
fulfillment of these universal obligations (obligations erga omnes) and/or expect compliance 
with preemptory rules (jus cogens rules). This sets a reciprocal overarching responsibility for 
all States to ensure that universal values and obligations are upheld and are not compromised. 
 
In a de-centralised IL system the rules and obligations are fundamentally set through 
bilateral, multilateral agreements and/or CIL. The bilateral agreements almost take a form of 
a contract between two parties encompassing their specific agreements and create a direct 
reciprocal relationship based on equal rights and obligations. Byers makes an interesting 
reference to bilateral relationships and how they are not ‘unidirectional’ but instead include 
an element of ‘quid pro quo’,481 subject to the principle of reciprocity. Multilateral 
agreements, on the other hand, include multiple parties but at times, the true content of some 
multilateral agreements are an aggregation of bilateral agreements which create bilateral and 
reciprocal obligations within a multilateral framework. The Vienna Convention on 
Diplomatic Relations is an example of this. In this context, the agreement is multilateral by 
nature and includes multiple parties but within it, simultaneously bilateral obligations and 
                                                          
478 Supra note 476, paras. 151-156. 
479 The Prosecutor v. Kupreskic et al., (Trial Judgement), IT-95-16-T, International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia (ICTY), 14 January 2000, para. 511. 
480 Ibid, para. 518.  
481 Supra note 4, p. 89.  
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responsibilities are created amongst States. This is what Sicilianos refers to as relations that 
are ‘bilateralizable’ and dominated by reciprocity.482 However, there are multilateral 
agreements that are not ‘bilateralizable’ since the obligations set within them are to benefit 
the international community as a whole which the Genocide Convention is an example,483 
thus such multilateral agreements carry obligations and responsibilities that cannot be limited 
to bilateral obligations. Essentially, parties to the Genocide Convention do not enter this 
agreement in order to stop genocide relating to one another’s citizens but rather these 
conventions aim to instil a code of conduct and obligations and are ‘norm-creating 
conventions’, setting the norms for the international community regardless of protecting the 
citizens of just the parties to the conventions.484 Most commonly, these relate to situations 
where the rights of individuals or common universal rights are under threat,485 for instance in 
the 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention Article 31 or the 1949 Third Geneva Convention Article 
17 where coercion is prohibited as a means of extracting information.486 Therefore, the 
international community has a right to expect compliance with these obligations on 
humanitarian grounds irrespective of the principle of reciprocity. This however does not take 
away the universal responsibility of States and reciprocal commitment, responsibility and 
respect for upholding the rights of individuals and universal rights. 
 
The non-bilateralisable concept of multilateral agreements and obligations erga omnes are 
linked, insofar as, ‘all obligations erga omnes are non-bilateralisable, while the reverse is not 
necessarily true’.487 This is to say that for sure obligations erga omnes cannot be bilateral but 
not every multilateral agreement which is non-bilateralisable necessarily brings about 
obligations erga omnes. This is an important point to note since IL in general is a collection 
of bilateral agreements and inter-relations within a multilateral context and IL operates 
predominantly as a reciprocal legal system. The suggestion above indicates clearly that 
                                                          
482 Linos-Alexander Sicilianos, the Classification of Obligations and the Multilateral Dimension of the Relations 
of International Responsibility, European Journal of International Law, Vol. 13, No. 5, 2002, p. 1133. 
483 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide adopted on 9 December 1948, 
entered into force on 12 January 1951, United Nations - Treaty Series, No. 1021. 
484 Gerald Fitzmaurice, Judicial Innovation: Its Uses and Its Perils, as Exemplified in some of the Works of the 
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Law: Essays in Honour of Lord McNair, 1956, pp. 33-34. 
485 Supra note 236, pp. 6 and 26. 
486 International Committee of the Red Cross, Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War 
(Third Geneva Convention), 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 135, Article 17; and Geneva Convention Relative to the 
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (Fourth Geneva Convention), 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 287, 
Article 31. 
487 René Provost, International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, 2002, p. 125. 
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obligations erga omnes go beyond bilateral relations and imposes obligations on all States 
that are not based on a beyond one-to-one relationship. That is to say obligations erga omnes 
are not restricted to only reciprocal and mutual exchanges of benefits or how one party is 
directly affected but rather expanded to include areas where the international community as a 
whole is owed an obligation even if a State is not directly affected by violations of these 
obligations. HR and IHL are clear examples of such obligations, namely in the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions where High Contracting Parties are not entitled to ‘absolve’ each other of the 
grave breaches of their responsibilities in these conventions.488 As rightly observed by 
Provost, this affirms IHL outlook towards certain obligations as erga omnes and refuting the 
bilateral characteristic of the agreement in this specific area.489      
 
At first glance, it might be concluded that since jus cogens rules and obligations erga omnes 
are aimed to protect the fundamental rights, thus reciprocity cannot play a role in relation to 
such principles and obligations that are protecting HR and Humanitarian aspects of IL. 
Indeed in HR laws there is almost no basis for reciprocity since its aim is to protect the rights 
of those individuals who are not able to, or cannot, reciprocate.490 HR are universal and 
egalitarian legal rights of individuals which encompass moral guarantees for individuals and 
their protection in this context cannot be subject to reciprocity. Certain factors must be taken 
into consideration, firstly that HR laws ultimately aim to protect individuals and do not 
fundamentally relate to inter-State relations but States have an obligation to protect and 
uphold HR of individuals; secondly these rights are applicable to everyone equally and in 
every circumstance.491 This is to say HR laws transcend States’ boundaries and are there to 
protect all individuals including those individuals from States that are not party to the treaty 
or stateless individuals.492 Also HR rules tend to possess unilateral characteristics based on 
                                                          
488 International Committee of the Red Cross, Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the 
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field (First Geneva Convention), 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 31, 
Article 51; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked 
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War (Fourth Geneva Convention), 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 287, Article 148. 
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HR universal norms.493 As such, HR laws aim to protect and uphold fundamental rights under 
several types of obligations, including jus cogens rules applicable in any circumstances so it 
is understandable how reciprocal reactions may not be a basis within HR laws. Therefore, 
States cannot revert to the principle of reciprocity to breach fundamental rights on this 
basis.494 Such legal obligations are non-derogable under any circumstances and cannot be 
avoided on the premise of reciprocal action. For example a State cannot resort to torture or 
genocide acts on reciprocal grounds. Another pertinent evidence of this is in the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions where High Contracting Parties are not entitled to ‘absolve’ each other of the 
grave breaches of their responsibilities in these conventions.495 
   
Additionally the complex nature of how IL rules are created must not be ignored and should 
be taken into consideration before entirely dismissing the role of reciprocity in HR and 
Humanitarian law. The fundamental basis of IL is on ‘will’ and ‘consent’ of States so, one 
could argue that regardless of the rules, an element of reciprocity exists since for any rule to 
be set an element of concessions or give and take in the form of reciprocity must have taken 
place amongst the international community as part of the formulations of the new rule.496 
Indeed, Thirlway suggests that rules under jus cogens or obligations categorised as erga 
omnes should be regarded opinio juris since the creation of such rules or obligations would 
have resulted from overwhelming State practices.497 Therefore reciprocity takes a role in the 
initial formulation of the rules, but the rules themselves are set in such a manner that do not 
allow a great deal of reciprocity in application, interpretation or in their compliance given 
their aim of protecting fundamental rights. The teleology behind such rules are the moral 
aspect of universal human values which requires the protection of the fundamental rights 
where resorting to reciprocity would endanger achievement of the moral need for upholding 
universal norms.  
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As mentioned previously, there is almost no basis for reciprocity in HR laws, but on the other 
hand, reciprocity does play a role in IHL although this appears in varying degree and is not 
always clearly observable. The study of reciprocity in IL requires a careful and delicate 
analysis of identifying how reciprocity manifests itself in IHL and this is the focus of the 
following section.  
 
3.3.1. Reciprocity in International Humanitarian Law 
 
There are many contradictions evident in IHL relating to reciprocity which demonstrates the 
acceptance or rejection of this concept. IHL, otherwise referred to as the law of war or law of 
armed conflict, aims to govern and regulate the conduct of States at war times and it 
encompasses the use of weapons, treatment of prisoners of war (POW) and protection of 
civilians caught up in armed conflict. IHL is founded on the principle of reducing suffering in 
war,498 and this agenda is the foundation for The Hague Conventions,499 and the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions.500 The former Conventions are laws which primarily set about establishing 
rules of war, efforts for disarmament and the rights of neutral parties in a conflict. The rules 
set out under The Hague Conventions were heavily breached during two World Wars which 
led to the innovative work resulting in the adoption of the latter Conventions.  
 
The 1949 Geneva Conventions predominantly concentrate on codification of humanitarian 
aspects of war, broadening the historical law of war beyond international armed conflict to 
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include non-international armed conflicts too.501 This shift towards enhancement of 
humanitarian aspects of war post World War Two is a direct shift towards further emphasis 
on the humanitarian impact of war and its impact on individuals which has resulted in the 
dimming of the role of reciprocity in IHL.502 
 
The reliance or reference to reciprocity can only be applicable in certain areas of IHL but 
reciprocity does not manifest itself in the entire framework of IHL. To understand the reason 
for this, it is important to understand the purpose of IHL and certain rights it aims to protect. 
The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) claims that obligations under IHL on 
all States are not dependent on the notion of reciprocity.503 Common Article 1 of the 1949 
Geneva Conventions requires that the provisions are to be respected ‘in all circumstances’.504 
This view is further reiterated in Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions which 
sets out the ‘minimum’ requirement of protection for other conflicts that are not of 
international nature.505 This is to say, the provisions dictate a set of obligations on the 
member States which are not dependent on reciprocal conduct and deviation of other States 
and cannot be used as justification for breaking the terms of the conventions; similar to what 
was discussed in relation to the protection of jus cogens rules or obligations erga omnes.  
 
Reciprocity is more clearly evident in the Hague-type weapons-restriction treaties since it 
requires States involved to play by the same rules.506 Clausula si omnes which was embedded 
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in the 1906 Hague Convention suggested that obligations are binding on a belligerent only if 
all of the opposing sides are likewise bound by the same obligations.507 This provided States 
with the assurance that their own obligation would be retrospectively in line with the 
opposing party’s obligation and no unfair advantage would be gained by States party to the 
obligations under the Hague Conventions. In the aftermath of World War II and the inability 
of reciprocal obligations to prevent the devastating damages, this clause was abandoned at the 
time of drafting the 1949 Geneva Conventions; yet it is important to note that the 1949 
Geneva Conventions specifically stipulate that entry in a conflict of a non-party to these 
Conventions does not reduce the obligations of the existing parties.508 The main reason for 
this was that all parties were to be bound by the obligations under the new 1949 Geneva 
Conventions and the ability of States to avoid this would have gone against the humanitarian 
nature of these Conventions. The 1949 Geneva Conventions, as the newer Law of War 
treaties, thus have led many to suggest that reciprocity is gradually being discarded due to the 
more humanitarian nature of the conventions.509 This argument stems from the shift 
perceived in the Law of War from reciprocal treatment of an enemy to a more humanitarian 
approach and values enshrined by the international community. Moreover, there are further 
limitations in IL with regards to limiting the use of reprisal or the general use of force 
through disallowing retaliation.510  
 
A distinct feature of the 1949 Geneva Conventions is in their enforcement, where States are 
given the predominant responsibility for enforcing the obligations under the said 
Conventions.511 The conventions distinguish between the different form of breaches by 
classifying acts such as wilful killing, torture or inhumane treatment, intentionally causing 
great suffering or injury, or wilfully depriving POW of their rights to a fair and regular trial 
as ‘grave breaches’.512 This view of the disregard for reciprocity is further seen when 
reflecting on the provisions in IHL particularly when enemy POW are expected to be released 
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at the end of the conflict even if the enemy has not yet released its POW.513 In practical 
examples, though, the release of POW is usually on reciprocal exchange such as POW 
exchange post the Iran-Iraq war.514   
 
At the backdrop of the above apparent disregard for reciprocity in IHL, it is important to 
draw attention to subtle and pertinent examples of reciprocity rooted in the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions and its 1977 Additional Protocols. There is strong yet discrete evidence of 
reciprocity in the classification of individuals protected by the 1949 Geneva Conventions or 
indeed the category of conflict that the Conventions are applicable to.515 Contradictions of 
application of reciprocity start to rise when examining the different provisions under the 1949 
Geneva Conventions and the 1977 Additional Protocols. For instance, the 1977 Additional 
Protocol I states that violation of the rights prohibited by one party does not release the other 
party from their legal obligations.516 However, certain areas of IHL place a great importance 
on reciprocity such as the right to resume ‘hostilities’ in case of a violation of an 
‘armistice’.517 In other areas however, the 1977 Additional Protocol I does not provide 
protection to those classified as ‘unlawful combatant’,518 as an example those who have been 
classified as ‘mercenaries’,519 or have taken up fighting under a white flag.520 Similarly the 
1949 Geneva Conventions do not provide protection to nationals of a State which is not 
bound by the Convention.521 All of these examples suggest a sense of protection based on the 
principle of reciprocity by which non-party nationals or those operating against the decorum 
of correct warfare cannot be seen to benefit from the protection provided by IHL. 
  
Even by evaluating Common Article 3 which leaves little regard for reciprocity or reciprocal 
obligations, it is important to be mindful of what Watts suggests as ‘obligational reciprocity’ 
with regards to the enforcement of this article.522 As convincingly argued by the scholar, 
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Common Article 3 requires international commitment and international enforcement through 
legal channels and international bodies including the international Courts, and as such, would 
the claim of breach in obligation under Common Article 3 by a non-contracting party be 
acceptable in its enforcement?523 Notwithstanding the CIL obligations, analysing the recent 
example of non-international conflicts in Libya or Syria under the terms of the Geneva 
Conventions, would the UK, France and the US’s claim for a breach in the humanitarian 
rights of individuals in those States have easily been refuted by Libya or Syria if those States 
were not party to the Conventions. Further to this point, even though the term ‘armed 
conflict’ has not been clearly defined in IHL, the commentary on the Common Article 3 
provided ‘means of distinguishing a genuine armed conflict from a mere act of banditry’.524 
Within this commentary, a provision for protection of insurgents is dependent on their 
agreement to be bound by the provisions of the Conventions,525 indicating that protection of 
insurgents is dependent on their actions being bound by the provisions of the Convention. 
Therefore once again this point is reflective of the contradictory approach of IHL to 
reciprocity where ‘observational reciprocity’ plays a role in the level of protections that can 
be deemed under IHL.  
 
Additionally, Common Article 2 suggests a strong reference to reciprocity by stipulating that 
the provisions in this Article ‘shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any other armed 
conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties’.526 This 
provision resembles reciprocal obligation which is evident in other treaties where binding 
obligations are limited to States party to an agreement.527 There is however a conflict in this 
Article that is contradictory to the nature of treaties such as the VCLT where the agreement 
can come to an end in the case of a breach, whereas in Common Article 2, obligations 
between contracting parties are not affected upon entry of a non-contracting party. 
Reciprocity in this case surfaces in a different capacity to the discussion on reciprocity in the 
VCLT but nonetheless, the principle of reciprocity in shaping international duties and 
obligation of States remain solid. Hence although on the surface principle of reciprocity is not 
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evident in IHL, deeper analysis of this subject matter indicates the influence of reciprocity on 
its rules and obligations.   
 
It can be argued that there is an incentive for States to accept the provisions since States 
protect their own armed forces and civilians by accepting to reciprocally provide the same 
protection to the enemy. Obedience and acceptance of the 1949 Geneva Conventions 
establishes the duties upon States to protect those captured by them, and in return provides 
them with the rights of expecting and ensuring that armed forces of their own are thus 
protected. Despite the inclination of not wanting to provide protection to enemies, the fear of 
reciprocal ill-treatment of one’s own armed forces is more likely to persuade each State to 
follow and abide by the rules as set out in IHL such as the Geneva Conventions. The 
encouragement in this context is similar to what has induced States to provide political and 
legal immunity to foreign diplomats, which led to the adoption of the Law of Diplomatic 
Relations.528 By doing so, States had the benefit that by providing immunity to foreign 
diplomats, their own diplomats abroad would be reciprocally protected. Even though, as an 
example, in the US Embassy hostages case in Iran, it was seen how the Law of Diplomatic 
Relations was not adhered to; generally this law is abided by the international community. 
Higgins regards strong compliance with international diplomatic immunity to be the result of 
open and transparent reciprocity.529 Franck, in turn, considers that States are willing to 
comply with the diplomatic immunity for long-term advantages of ensuring protection for 
their diplomats, even if immediate advantages are to be foregone.530 Barnhoorn places 
reciprocity as the basis for the arguments presented by the two scholars for the balance of 
interest when States choose to comply with protecting the foreign diplomats in reciprocal 
return of protection for their own diplomats abroad.531  
 
The thesis suggests that there are subtle but concrete examples of reciprocal obligations 
within IHL even if they are more discrete than in other areas of IL. The fundamental point is 
that the issue at hand relates to interests of individuals as it is the case in HR laws or elements 
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of IHL, then reciprocal obligations do not have a place but reciprocity comes into play when 
the interests of States and the treatment of their armed forces are more in focus. In contrast to 
this a challenge in IHL is to establish the role of reciprocity relating to conflicts involving 
belligerents openly targeting civilians or killing their POWs or when the rules governing the 
laws of international armed conflict have been breached during hostilities. This is an 
extensive subject in its own right however, in a nutshell, reciprocating under the umbrella of 
reprisal is not permissible in IHL. This is the view at first glance but further detailed 
observations indicate that belligerent reprisal, as an enforcement measure and in justification 
towards directing the unlawful party to end their actions, is deemed lawful and permissible as 
long as certain established rules and conditions are observed. The specific conditions, 
established as part of Laws of War, relate to the protection of categories of people who must 
not be subjected and targeted by reciprocal reprisal. These conditions were narrowed already 
by the 1949 Geneva Conventions which included a category of people and objects against 
whom reprisal was not permissible but it was also further narrowed by the expansion and 
addition of protected people or objects by the introduction of Additional Protocol I, so that 
indiscriminate attack and engaging in a war that does not distinguish and discriminate 
between civilian and military targets are considered unlawful.532 Specifically any kind of 
reciprocal reprisal must not target or give rise to the abuse of all civilians [Article 51(6)], 
sick, wounded or shipwrecked (Article 20). The fundamental point is to understand that 
reciprocity in the form of belligerent reprisal is permissible but under specific conditions 
whereby consideration is given to ensure that the humanitarian values and protection of the 
rights of victims of the international conflict are preserved and are not abused.  
 
This subject was also tackled by the ICTY in the Kupreskic case when rejecting the claim by 
Croats that their attacks on the Muslim populations were reciprocal since their populations 
was under attack by the Muslims; the ICTY was adamant that such conduct which would 
have resulted in ‘large numbers of civilian casualties’ is against the obligations set by the IHL 
and affirmed the ‘irrelevance of reciprocity’ in relation to obligations that ‘have an absolute 
and non-derogable character’.533 The thesis has also alluded to this line of thought that jus 
cogens rule and obligations erga omnes do not have a reciprocal nature and are not subject to 
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reciprocal obligations. In effect, such rules and obligations are not able to be reduced to a 
bilateral basis since they are to serve the international community as a whole and to protect 
the rights of individuals. However as the analysis of this section has demonstrated, there are 
subtle examples in targeting the States’ interests and treatment of their armed forces that have 
reciprocal obligations within IHL.        
 
Reflecting back on the above discussions examining pacta sunt servanda, ‘good faith’, jus 
cogens rules, and obligations erga omnes, the study has provided an analysis of the principles 
and elements available within IL for valid interpretation of its rules. These operate as 
guidelines within a framework to ensure the object and purpose of IL is not lost. Valid 
interpretation of IL rules is extremely important in order for the true intention of the rules to 
be adhered to. Invalid interpretation of IL rules can have a significant impact on the balance 
of rights and duties of States. The analysis of valid and invalid interpretation of IL and its 
repercussions is examined in the following section as a case study reviewing the actions of 
the Bush Administration in the ‘war on terror’. The case study encompasses many areas of IL 
and demonstrates the struggle of the Bush Administration with valid interpretation of relevant 
IL rules. The case study highlights the practical devastating effects of invalid interpretations. 
 
4. Case Study on Interpretation of the Rules of International Law 
 
In a legal ‘system that is reciprocally generated, issues of interpretation occupy a 
sensitive, central position’.534 In the study of IL, particularly when the legal system is 
used at inter-State level, the aim and importance of the role of reciprocity in the 
interpretation and application of IL rules are primarily to ensure the balance between 
rights and duties of States is maintained through a consistent approach. Once this aim is 
achieved unfair advantage is minimised. A recent example of an interpretation of IL rules, 
causing major uproar, was the US treatment of the detainees held outside the US, namely 
in Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay. This treatment required routine violation of habeas 
corpus and engagement in the extraordinary rendition of these detainees followed by 
                                                          
534 Supra note 40, p. 91; and Jutta Brunnée, Stephen J. Toope, Legitimacy and Legality in International Law: An 
Interactional Account, 2010, p. 25. 
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application of extensive interrogation methods.535 George W. Bush was given legal advice 
on the ‘war on terror’ on ‘how that war was to be fought: its extent, its limits, and its 
rules’.536 The aim of this section is to critically examine the interpretations provided by the 
Administration’s legal advisors. For this to be systematically conducted, the study begins 
by exploring the international legal instruments surrounding torture and cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment (unjust treatment). This is followed by emphasising the 
significance placed in IL for banning such acts particularly relating to the objective of 
protecting human dignity whilst upholding fundamental and universal values. The focus 
will then shift to the interpretation of IL rules by the US on such issues before critically 
assessing the validity of their interpretation within the framework of IL.  
 
4.1. Torture in International Law 
 
The signatories of the UN Charter ‘reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity 
and worth of the human person…’.537 Subsequently these fundamental rights and dignity 
were recognised as the ‘foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world’,538 the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UNDHR) states that, ‘No one shall be subjected to 
torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment’.539 Overall it could be 
observed that the international community not only rejected but also banned torture. 
However, the debates surrounding the definition of acts constituting torture and unjust 
treatment continued. The international legal instruments banning torture are the ICCPR;540 
Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (DAT);541 and the United Nations 
                                                          
535 Habeas corpus writ is defined as ‘a writ employed to bring a person before a court, most frequently to ensure 
that the party’s imprisonment or detention is not illegal’. A petition for habeas corpus is filed for prisoners 
claiming illegal imprisonment as a result of being held without being charged or when due process has not been 
followed, supra note 2, pp. 728-729; Peter Cane, and Joanne Conaghan (eds.), The New Oxford Companion To 
Law, 2008, pp. 515-516; for further information on habeas corpus and its applicability in connection with the 
detainees held in the US prisons namely Guantanamo bay as a result of extraordinary rendition please see the 
following the Cases brought by the detainees against the Bush administration: Rasul v. Bush; Hamdan v. 
Rumsfeld; Boumediene v. Bush; Khaled A. F. Al Odah et al. v. the United States; and Hamdi v. Rumsfeld.  
536 Mark Danner, Torture and Truth, America, Abu Ghraib and the War on Terror, 2005, p. 75. 
537 Supra note 7, Preamble.  
538 Supra note 96, Preamble.  
539 Ibid, Article 5.  
540 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted and opened for signature and ratification on 16 
December 1966 by General Assembly Resolution 2200A(XXI), A/RES/21/2200, entry into force 1976. 
541 Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment was adopted by General Assembly Resolution 3452 (XXX), 30th Session, 
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Convention against Torture (UNCAT).542 The ICCPR states: ‘No one shall be subjected to 
torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment…’.543 The UNHRC,544 set 
up to interpret the Article and definition of torture, did not deem it essential to compose a 
long list of forbidden acts or to ‘establish a sharp distinctions’ between torture and unjust 
treatments.545 In practical terms the UNHRC has simply indicated that both types of acts are 
in violation of Article 7, without stating whether these violations fall within the scope of 
torture or unjust treatment. However, it stated that the following factors need to be considered 
for determining whether acts or treatments fall within the categories of torture or unjust 
treatment, and whether acts or treatments breach Article 7: 
 
 Purpose and severity together with the nature of the acts or treatments;546 
 Surrounding conditions for the treatments with regards to the manner and the length of time that the 
mental or physical pain lasts or continues, as well as the consequences of the treatments on the victim and 
other factors like the victim’s health, age and sex.547  
 
The DAT defines torture as intentional actions causing severe mental or physical pain or 
suffering, upon an individual by or at the instigation of a person acting in a position of public 
official for the intention or purpose of extracting confession and/or elicitation of information 
from him/her or third party, as a form of punishment of an individual for any action they have 
perpetrated or there is a suspicion that they have perpetrated, or intimidation.548 This 
definition by the DAT provided the basis for the UNCAT’s definition of torture; an 
intentional infliction of mental or physical severe pain or suffering upon an individual, caused 
‘by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
9 December 1975, A/RES/3452(XXX). Through this adoption, it is evident that no objection could have been 
raised by any of the member states to the contents in the Declaration and it has been deduced that all the United 
Nations’ member states were in agreement with this definition of torture and unjust treatment. 
542 The United Nations Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, adopted by General Assembly Resolution 39/46, 39th Session, 10 December 1984, A/RES/39/46, 
entered into force in 26 June 1987.  
543 Supra note 540, Article 7. 
544 Supra note 461, para. 2, 26 May 2004; the Committee was formed according to the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights, Article 28. 
545 Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 20 replaces General Comment No. 7 concerning 
prohibition of torture and cruel treatment or punishment (Art. 7), ICCPR, 44th Session, 10 March 1992, para. 4. 
546 Ibid, para. 4. 
547 Human Rights Committee’s analysis of Article 7 interpretation; for further information see joint publication 
by Association for the Prevention of Torture and Centre for Justice and International Law, Torture in 
International Law, A guide to Jurisprudence, 2008, pp. 7-8. 
548 Supra note 541, in Article 1(1) definition of torture excludes actions causing pain or suffering resulting from 
‘inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions to the extent consistent with the Standard Minimum Rules for the 
Treatment of Prisoners’.  
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person acting in an official capacity’.549 Although similar to the definition of torture in the 
DAT, the UNCAT version excludes actions causing pain or suffering that are ‘inherent in or 
incidental to lawful sanctions’.550 The element of purpose or intention that is required for an 
act to be regarded as torture is specified by this Article as: extraction of confession and/or 
elicitation of information from the individual or a third party; as a form of punishment for 
them for any action perpetrated, or even for which the suspicion exists of having been 
perpetrated; for exposing them to coercion and/or intimidation, or for any discriminatory 
grounds. However, Article 1(1) does not provide a specific definition of unjust treatment or 
of what acts would be included at this level. As clearly referred to in Article 16 of the 
UNCAT, there are distinctions made between acts that are to be constituted as torture or 
unjust treatment. Lesser conditions need to be fulfilled for an act to qualify as an unjust 
treatment in comparison to torture. Elements constituting torture can be enumerated and 
reviewed individually as follows: 
 
 Intention for torture 
 Infliction of severe mental and physical pain 
 Reason or purpose for inflicting such pain (prohibited purpose) 
 Consent and agreement as well as being connected to an individual in a public official position or an 
individual/s who act/s in an official capacity. 
 
As is evident in the UNCAT, the preliminary element for an act to constitute torture is the 
role of intention of the torturer. The UNCAT states that a purpose or intention to cause severe 
pain or harm must be evident for an act to be regarded as a torturous act. The second element 
discusses that the severity and the distinction in a traumatic action that causes pain or 
suffering has to reach the level of severe mental or physical pain. The third element is the 
existence of a reason, purpose or aim for inflicting pain and how to clearly measure this in 
defining the acts which fall within the UNCAT’s definition. Similar to other elements, a 
reason, purpose or aim must exist for an act to be defined as torture. This is to say that, as 
precisely discussed by Harper, the specific aim or purpose of a torturer has to be extracting 
information, confession and/or as a form of punishment, or can be based on any 
discriminatory ground.551 The purposes embedded in the UNCAT are often referred to as 
                                                          
549 Ibid, Article 1.  
550 Ibid, Article 1. 
551 Julian Harper, Defining Torture: Bridging the Gap Between Rhetoric and Reality, The Santa Clara Law 
Review, Vol. 49, No. 3, 2009, p. 904. 
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prohibited purposes. To look at this from another angle, a distinction was drawn by Wauters 
between the element of motivation and the purpose or aim of the torturer, indicating that 
motivation for torturous act need not be an important factor in relation to understanding the 
final outcome that was being sought as a result of inflicting severe pain.552 
  
In reflecting on the infliction of pain for discriminatory purposes, Wauters discusses that this 
might be deemed more of a motivation than a purpose, since discrimination might create the 
motivation as opposed to giving the torturer a purpose.553 This view is in contrast to the 
International Tribunals’ judgment, as will be analysed when scrutinising the relevant case-
laws. The fourth element addresses the following two factors: 1) consent and agreement; 2) 
being connected to an individual in the public official position or other individual/s who act/s 
in an official capacity. Even though the factor of ‘public official’ has no specific definition 
within the UNCAT or the other international legal instruments, it can be substantiated to refer 
to any individual whose role is not linked to private bodies; alternatively a person who is 
tasked by governmental bodies must evidently be acting in a public and official role. 
  
There is further obligation on the UN members banning torture and unjust treatment based on 
CIL given jus cogens rules and their non-derogable character as a result of the value of the 
fundamental rights they serve to protect and safeguard; hence absolute obligation is binding 
on all States. In the previously discussed case, Prosecutor v. Anto Furundzija,554 where the 
ICTY emphasises non-derogable obligations, the Court identified three main features relating 
to banning torture in common with protection of HR: 1) The international community’s 
attempt to ban torture has placed an emphasis for States to put in place not only rules to ban 
torture but also to foresee situations that might lead to possible acts of torture whilst 
withdrawing laws that are contrary to banning torture; 2) The international community’s 
attempt towards an absolute ban of torture results in the principle of erga omnes which thus 
constitutes a legal obligation on all States, where every State has a right to demand full 
compliance and taking necessary steps to ban torture; 3) The third feature is how banning 
torture has been elevated and has obtained a jus cogens status. The significance of this 
                                                          
552 Jasper M Wauters, Torture and Related Crimes - A Discussion of the Crimes Before the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Leiden Journal of International Law, Vol. 11, Issue 1, 1998, pp. 
158-159. 
553 Ibid, pp. 161-162. 
554 Supra note 476, paras. 153-156.  
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elevation is that banning torture has become a peremptory or mandatory rule, and is not 
justifiable under any legal circumstances. 
  
4.2. The US Interpretation of International Rules relating to Torture and 
Unjust Treatment 
 
In the aftermath of 9/11 attacks, some key interpretative approaches were adopted by the 
Bush Administration and the legal advisors.555 George W. Bush asked for legal advice on 
‘war on terror’. The fundamental questions were the rights of these detainees together with 
the length of their interrogation for extracting information. The responses came in the form of 
memos, later titled ‘Torture Memos’, comprising the advice offered on the interpretation of 
torture, ultimately adopted by the Department of Justice.556 Bybee offered a definition of 
torture by reflecting on standards of conduct for interrogation under both the UNCAT and 18 
U.S.C. sections 2340-2340A.557 He interpreted that for an act to be classified as torture, the 
act must be of an extreme nature causing, ‘serious physical injury, such as organ failure, 
impairment of bodily function, or even death’, and that any mental injury must be an injury 
that lasts a period of ‘months or even years’.558  
 
Given the reservation placed by the US on the UNCAT, limiting its obligation towards 
banning unjust treatments to what constitutes an illegal act within the US constitution,559 
Bybee reflected on acts deemed illegal under the US Statute. His first deduction was that 
‘cruel, inhuman, or degrading’ treatment is not torture according to the Statute, and besides 
                                                          
555 The fundamental figures in the discussions around the treatment and the status of the suspected detainees 
were Dick Cheney (Vice President to President Bush), John Ashcroft (Attorney General), Jay Scott Bybee 
(Assistant Attorney General), Alberto Gonzales (Chief Counsel to President Bush) and John Yoo (Deputy 
Assistant Attorney General). 
556 Supra note 536, pp. 115-126. 
557 Jay Bybee Memorandum to Alberto Gonzales, US Department of Justice: Office of Counsel to the president, 
Washington, D.C. 20530, 07 February 2002; supra note 536, pp. 96-103; for further information on the 
definition of torture in the United States’ Statute refer to United States Code, Title 18, Chapter 113C, Sections 
2340-2340A. 
558 Jay Bybee Memorandum to Alberto Gonzales, US Department of Justice: Office of Counsel to the president, 
Washington, D.C. 20530, 07 February 2002. 
559 The reservation on the Convention states that: ‘[T]he United States considers itself bound by the obligation 
under Article 16 to prevent ‘cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment’, only insofar as these terms 
means the cruel, unusual and inhumane treatment or punishment prohibited by the Fifth, Eighth and/or 
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution; additionally the United States believed that its 
existing national laws were adequate to cover torture within its own territory and predominantly focused 
on the torture outside their territory, CRS Report for Congress, U.N. Convention Against Torture 
(CAT): Overview and Application to Interrogation Techniques, 25 January 2008 .  
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interpreted ‘possible defenses that would negate any claim that certain interrogation methods 
violate the Statute’.560 Gonzales built on this by suggesting that the unique kind of war facing 
the US created a necessity of self-defense which could justify interrogation techniques 
violating Section 2340 A.561 Yoo’s memo to Gonzales also endorsed Bybee’s interpretation 
of torture.562 Yoo emphasised the intention of those involved to inflict long-term harm 
(severe physical pain or suffering) by reiterating Bybee’s reasoning that ‘the infliction of 
such pain must be the defendant's precise objective’ and this harm must be the result of 
‘predicate acts, such as threatening imminent death, and intend to cause ‘prolonged mental 
harm’.563 Yoo additionally suggested that, ‘international law clearly could not hold the United 
States to an obligation different than that expressed in § 2340’ on the grounds of the 
reservations placed on the UNCAT, as well as the interpretive understanding submitted by 
the US on the UNCAT.564  
 
Since the US considered itself at war, the Administration were aware of a need for 
safeguards to ensure the US would not be in violation of the Geneva Convention relating 
to the treatment of the detainees, irrespective of the interrogation methods applied.  Hence, 
legal advisors additionally addressed the pertinent issue of the detainees’ rights relating to 
the applicability of the Geneva Convention as well as the habeas corpus and their 
extraordinary rendition. The predominant interpretation for this was provided by Gonzales 
and Ashcroft memos where they provided two options for how the detainees should be 
classified as well as the extent to which both options best fulfilled US interests.565 Ashcroft’s 
two options suggested declaring Afghanistan as a failed State, with the interpretation that the 
Geneva Convention protections would not apply to the detainees from Afghanistan, or 
alternatively, the Taliban combatants were to be regarded as ‘unlawful combatants’ which 
meant the 1949 Geneva Convention III would not apply.566 The theme of the memos 
addressed the position of the US, considering advantages and disadvantages of both options 
with regard to the legal position of the US forces. The memos additionally considered the 
                                                          
560 Supra note 558; and supra note 536, pp. 96-103. 
561 Supra note 536, pp. 149-155. 
562 John Yoo Memorandum to Alberto Gonzales Counsel to the president, US Department of Justice: Office of 
Counsel to the president, Washington, D.C. 20530, 01 August 2002, pp. 108 – 113. 
563 Ibid. 
564 Status of the United States of America on Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, United Nations - Treaty Series, Vol. 1465. 
565 Supra note 536, pp. 83-87 and 92-93.  
566 Ibid, pp. 92-93. 
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likelihood of action against the US in the federal Courts in the event of cases that might be 
brought against them, particularly the liability which might be faced by the US.    
 
5. Critical Examination of the US approach in relation to Interpretation 
of the Rules of International Law, Torture and Unjust Treatment 
 
The focus in this section is to critically examine the interpretation of the legal advisors 
advisors and the role of reciprocity in their interpretation. The main focus of the 
interpretations concentrates on: 1) Whether the treatment of the detainees constituted 
torture? 2) Should the detainees be protected by the rules of Geneva Convention? The 
rights and duties of the detainees under the latter, and the status assigned to them could 
determine the parameters for their treatment and protection. Given that the treatment of 
the detainees was the prime concern of the Administration, the study predominantly 
focuses on the manner of the treatment, to assess and question the validity and the 
subjectivity of their approach based on IL rules with particular attention to the principles 
of valid interpretation, in accordance with the notion of ‘good faith’. 
 
5.1. Reservations 
 
The basis for the US’ interpretation has its roots in their reservations on the UNCAT and 
the ICCPR. The nature of their reservations is open to criticism given the fundamental 
purpose of these legal instruments is to prevent torture and unjust treatment. Hence, placing a 
reservation contradictory to this purpose defeats the object and is inconsistent with the spirit 
of the treaty. This view is iterated in the VCLT,567 which took a similar approach adopted by 
the ICJ on the principle of how inserting a reservation on the Genocide Convention 
jeopardises the key purpose of the treaty.568 There are similarities in approaches between 
reservation on the Genocide Convention applicable when assessing the US reservations 
placed on the UNCAT and the ICCPR. This is particularly relevant given the same weight 
placed by the international community on banning acts of aggression and genocide, together 
                                                          
567 Supra note 128, Article 19(C).  
568 Supra note 148, pp. 23-24. 
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with the international efforts to prevent such acts, by classifying them as acts infringing upon 
the fundamental rights.569  
 
The ICJ’s approach to reservation on the Genocide Convention highlights that ‘the principles 
underlying the Convention are principles which are recognized by civilized nations as 
binding on States, even without any conventional obligation’.570 The ICJ was of the opinion 
that such obligations are binding on all States, even without this convention, since the 
principles at stake are recognised by the international community to be undignified, and there 
is an obligation to eradicate such acts. The notion of ‘civilized nation’ and their accepted 
‘general principles’ as sources of IL was discussed previously, and as such the principles 
accepted by the international community, should be disseminated as binding obligations, 
without any specific treaty or convention. In the Bush advisors’ interpretation, there is no 
reference to entitlement of individuals’ fundamental rights, irrespective of their crimes and 
misgivings, despite the stress placed on those rights in the international legal instruments, 
namely, the UN Charter, the ICCPR and the UNCAT. The judgment in Prosecutor v. 
Kupreskic case further emphasised the importance of fundamental rights by proclaiming that, 
‘the defining characteristic of modern international humanitarian law is…the obligation to 
uphold key…body of law regardless of the conduct of enemy combatant’.571 Additionally, the 
legal advisors disregarded the emphasis placed by the UNCAT that: ‘No exceptional 
circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat of war…may be invoked as a 
justification of torture’.572 This brings to light the previous assertion that change in 
circumstances does not always alter the obligations owed by States particularly on obligations 
that are aimed to protect values of the international community.     
 
5.2. Jus Cogens Rules and the Interpretation of the Bush Administration 
 
In the legal team’s reasoning, there is a disregard of peremptory jus cogens rules where no 
reference is made to the legal obligation on the US to respect and abide by these rules 
encompassing an absolute ban on torture. It needs to be stressed that the US is banned from 
torture and unjust treatment on the basis of CIL with its binding values of peremptory rules 
                                                          
569 Supra note 540, Article 4; and supra note 319, para. 34.  
570 Supra note 148, p. 23.  
571 Supra note 479, para 511. 
572 Supra note 542. 
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and their non-derogability characteristics, as was articulated in the ICTY cases of Prosecutor 
v. Anto Furundzija and Kupreskic as discussed earlier.  
 
On a related matter, Osiel supports the US justifications for steps taken in the ‘war on terror’,  
arguing that the peremptory rules of jus cogens do not apply to the US, since they have ‘never 
officially endorsed’ these rules.573 Osiel has not considered that jus cogens rules are neither 
optional, nor do they require the ‘consent’ of States for their applicability. Although the 
scholar’s argument could be driven from the strong reservations, understandings, and 
declarations placed by the US,574 his argument could be challenged in two ways. Firstly, the 
adoption of the ICCPR’s  fundamental provisions and their intent and purpose are the basis of 
CIL that has subsequently become treaty law; insofar as their provisions are to protect the 
fundamental rights, no State can deem itself removed from these obligations. Despite the US 
reservations, it cannot escape CIL nature of the granted protection. Secondly, as was 
discussed in Chapter Two, the formulation of CIL based on custom and opinio juris does not 
require unanimous agreement, and a majority is sufficient for a practice to form CIL.  
 
Jus cogens rules are identified in the category of rules that bring certain legal obligations, 
irrespective of States’ specific ‘consent’, and are deemed superior to jus dispositivum 
rules.575 Shifting back to the ICCPR, supporting the fundamental rights particularly their 
non-derogatory nature as has been awarded to these rights,576 cannot be undermined. 
Therefore, as far as IL is concerned, neither Osiel’s reasoning nor the disregard by the Bush 
Administration can be deemed valid.  
 
5.3. Interpretations of the Definition of Torture and Unjust Treatments 
 
The interpretation of advisors, namely Bybee, for specific intent and definition of acts 
constituting torture and/or unjust treatment in the UNCAT has been subject to much 
                                                          
573 Supra note 198, p. 51. 
574 The United States ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights but placed 
five reservations, five understandings, and four declarations, limiting the scope of applicability of the provisions 
and articles of the Covenant into its domestic legal system. The Senate ratification declared that the Covenant 
Articles are ‘not self-executing’ and as a result no domestic law has been changed, and the United States has 
effectively not accepted any of the Covenant obligations. For detailed information on the reservations, 
understanding and declarations placed see the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 
December 1966, United Nations - Treaty Series, Vol. 999, p. 171 and Vol. 1057, p. 407. 
575 Vladimir Đuro Degan, Sources of International Law, 1997, pp. 227 and 232-234. 
576 Supra note 540, Article 4 cites that the fundamental rights cannot be subject to derogation.  
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criticism.577 The legal advisors have referred to torture and unjust treatment, or to coercive 
interrogation, as two distinctive acts, but have failed to explore detailed analysis of which 
acts constitute torture and which acts constitute unjust treatment. This technical approach is 
flawed so far as limiting the interpretation to suggest that an act is torture when it results in 
death or organ failure with long term effect. The timing and theme that emerges from these 
memos suggest that the interpretations were directed and focused on the detainees already in 
US possession and relating to interrogation practices that were already in place, but with the 
view of exonerating the US of any wrong-doing under IL.  
 
In Yoo’s interpretation, for an act to constitute torture, the severe pain caused must be due to 
prior intention and not as a consequence of factors such as negligence. Clearly not every 
severe pain caused is to be assumed as intention for torture. For instance, as suggested by 
Wauters, a line must be drawn between the elements of negligence and intent to cause harm; 
in other words, if suffering or harm has been inflicted as a result of negligence with no 
specific intention of causing pain, it does not qualify as torture.578 However in the situations 
of the treatment of detainees, where pain was inflicted in interrogation procedure, it is 
difficult to imagine that pain would have been inflicted as a by-product of negligence as 
opposed to intended or planned. The interpretation of the Administration regarding the 
intention of torture is in sharp contrast to the UNCAT definition, and moreover, the US 
military acts were presented by the Administration as unintentional infliction of pain rather 
than application of interrogation methods. 
 
Considering the distinction provided in the UNCAT for torture and other acts, Harper 
critically argues that the UNCAT fails to supply a specific level or an amount in defining the 
level of pain determining ‘severe pain’.579 Continually there is a need for Courts’ 
interpretations of the term ‘severe’,580 thus a vivid account of what constitutes torture and 
unjust treatment is supported by the International Criminal Tribunals’ judgments. The 
                                                          
577 For instance, Philippe Sands, Lawless World: Making and Breaking Global Rules, 2006; Mark Danner, supra 
note 536; David P. Forsythe, The Politics of Prisoner Abuse: The United States and Enemy Prisoners after 9/11, 
2011; Karen, J. Greenberg (ed.), The Torture Debate in America, 2006; and Karen J. Greenberg and Joshua L. 
Dratel (eds.) The Torture Papers: The Road To Abu Ghraib, 2005.  
578 Supra note 552, pp. 158-159. 
579 Supra note 551, p. 898 
580 Ibid, p. 898. 
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International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda,581 (ICTR) in the Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul 
Akayesu case,582 acknowledged the UNCAT in its own judgment since there is a lack of 
definition of torture in the context of IHL. The ICTR reached the consideration that rape is 
regarded as torture when it is ‘inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or 
acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity’, and interprets 
rape as an aggressive act aimed at breaching human dignity.583 The ICTR further cited that 
the rape was employed for ‘such purpose as intimidation, degradation, humiliation, 
punishment, control or destruction of a person’.584 The interpretation of the Administration’s 
advisors shows a disregard to the ICTR’s definition of torture. In other words, the ICTR 
considers an act such as rape as torture, but the Administration’s interpretation only regards 
torture as an act so severe as to result in organ failure or death. Gonzales goes as far as 
suggesting that ‘sensory deprivation techniques’ ‘may amount to cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment…do not produce pain or suffering of the necessary intensity to meet the definition 
of torture’.585  
 
On a related matter, the UNCAT Article 16, looks at the conditions for an act to be regarded 
as unjust treatment as opposed to torture defined in Article 1. The main differences lie in: 1) 
the presence or absence of aim, purpose or intention; and 2) the severity of the level of pain 
inflicted. Similar to issues with Article 1, Article 16 does not provide clear guidance in 
determining the level or amount of ‘severe pain’. A relevant example of unjust treatment is 
evident in the ICTY’s ruling in Prosecutor v. Zejnil Delalic case,586 where father and son, 
Danilo and Miso Kuljanin ‘were forced to slap each other repeatedly’.587 The ICTY ruled that 
this would have caused humiliation when being subjected to ‘serious pain and indignity’. 
This clearly highlights again a major divide between the interpretation of torture and unjust 
treatment by the Administration and by the international Courts. For instance, a lesser act of 
                                                          
581 The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda was established by the Security Council to prosecute the 
individuals responsible for genocide and other serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in 
the territory of Rwanda during 1 January 1994 and 31 December 1994, Resolution 955, 3453rd meeting, 8 
November 1994, S/RES/955. 
582 The Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, (Trial Judgement), ICTR-96-4-T, International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda (ICTR) 02 September 1998. 
583 Ibid, para, 597.  
584 Ibid, para, 597.  
585 CBC News, The Fifth State, Aired on 16 November 2005. 
586 The  Prosecutor v. Zdravko Mucic aka "Pavo", Hazim Delic, Esad Landzo aka "Zenga", Zejnil Delalic (Trial 
Judgement), IT-96-21-T, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), 16 November 
1998, paras. 923, 964, 976 and 998. 
587 Ibid, paras. 1067, 1069-1070. 
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father and son being forced to slap each other is regarded as unjust treatment by the ICTY, 
but the advisors claimed that only extreme severe acts resulting in death or organ failure are 
worthy of consideration as torture. 
 
5.4. Interpretations of the Rights of Detainees under the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions 
 
There are complexities involved when assessing the legal status, rights and duties of Al 
Qaeda and Taliban members. The Administration classified the detainees as ‘unlawful enemy 
combatant’ with no protection granted to them on the basis of the 1949 Geneva Conventions. 
Osiel provides a detailed analysis of justifications in favour of the approach adopted by the 
Administration which were: 1) Common Article 2 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions does not 
apply since the conflict is not between States; 2) most detainees were nationals of States not 
involved as party to the conflict so they were not covered on the ground of their nationality 
under the Fourth 1949 Geneva Convention; 3) Al Qaeda members are ‘unprivileged 
belligerents’ since they use arms without being members of the armed force or military of a 
sovereign State, thus they cannot be considered as POW and claim the rights granted under 
Article 4 of the Third 1949 Geneva Convention; 4) Al Qaeda never accepted and/or applied 
the 1949 Geneva Conventions; 5) similarly Taliban fighters were not POW, having ignored 
the requirements of the provisions in the 1949 Geneva Conventions; 6) the conflict with Al 
Qaeda is not a civil war and is across many nations thus Common Article 3 of the 1949 
Geneva Conventions does not apply to the conflict since it could not be considered as ‘not of 
an international character’.588 Despite the arguments presented, the US Supreme Court in 
Hamdan case589 held the view that the detainees were protected by Common Article 3 of the 
1949 Geneva Conventions, by referring to Article 75 of the 1977 Additional Protocol II.590 
Osiel himself, though, is of the view that the US is not bound by this since they have not 
ratified the 1977 Additional Protocols.591  
 
A counter-argument for the US interpretation can be observed in Sands’ analysis where the 
scholar claims that, under the US Presidential order decrees, all Guantanamo detainees are 
                                                          
588 Supra note 198, p. 52. 
589 Ibid, p. 53. 
590 Ibid, p. 53. 
591 Ibid, p. 53. 
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considered to be ‘unlawful combatants’ given that ‘Al Qaeda detainees are…part of a foreign 
terrorist organization which is not a state and cannot be a party to the Geneva Conventions; 
hence its personnel are not entitled to proper prisoner of war status’; and as to the ‘Taliban 
detainees, they do not qualify for prisoner of war status because they do not meet the 
requirements for lawful combatant status’.592 Consequently, according to the order, the 
detainees have been disqualified from having any rights under IHL.593 Sands provides a 
different viewpoint arguing that if the terrorist suspect is linked to the ‘Taliban’s regular 
armed forces…then he is a combatant, and must be treated as such. Once caught, he is 
entitled to protection under IHL....Even if it is suspected that he has information which may 
assist in the ‘war on terrorism’ there are strict constraints on his interrogation’. In any case, 
Sands argues that under any circumstances the suspect can never be subjected to torture or 
‘treated inhumanely’.594 Alternatively if a suspect is a ‘member of Al-Qaeda who is thought 
to have planned a suicide attack’ should he be considered a ‘combatant or criminal?’ Sands’ 
response is that generally, the suspect is regarded as criminal according to IL, but even in this 
case the ordinary protection of law is applicable, therefore, the suspect cannot be subjected to 
torture or treated inhumanely.595  
 
The focus revolves around whether these detainees are ‘lawful’ or ‘unlawful combatants’, but 
in the meantime there are other fundamental challenges that need to be addressed. Firstly a 
collective mass pre-labelling has taken place for all detainees, encompassing anyone caught 
suspected of involvement in the ‘war on terror’, irrespective of whether they were caught in 
or out of the battlefields. Can this collective labelling apply to everyone captured, including 
those captured in neutral countries such as Indonesia, Germany, Canada and so on?  In fact, is 
it not arbitrary what title is given to the detainees, since even if we assume all of these 
detainees were captured as part of the ‘war on terror’, is it correct to pre-determine their 
status without any trial? From a legal standpoint, is the judicial system not the authority to 
examine the case of each detainee on individual merit before declaring their rightful status? 
Only a tribunal can be the judge of their rightful status and their subsequent rights, and until 
that time they are merely to be regarded as being in protective custody. The 1949 Geneva 
Convention III is very clear on this point: ‘Should any doubt arise as to whether persons, 
                                                          
592 Philippe Sands, Lawless World: Making and Breaking Global Rules, 2006, p. 145. 
593 Ibid, p. 145. 
594 Ibid, p. 208. 
595 Ibid, p. 209. 
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having committed a belligerent act and having fallen into the hands of the enemy…such 
persons shall enjoy the protection of the present Convention until such time as their status has 
been determined by a competent tribunal’.596 The US has not held any such tribunals for the 
detainees, and the president made the call on assigning status onto the detainees even before 
their capture.597  Interestingly, Sands expands his previous criticism by claiming that not only 
is their interpretation in contradiction with IL, it also contradicts the US’s own relevant rules 
which makes it explicit that a doubt arises whenever a captive who has partaken of hostilities 
asserts a right to be a POW.598  
 
Despite every interpretation given for denial of any rights to the detainees, the Nuremberg 
Tribunal judgement relating to ‘captivity’ of prisoners at war times cannot be forgotten or 
ignored. The Judgement made it clear that ‘captivity’ of prisoners must be ‘neither revenge 
nor punishment, but solely protective custody, the only purpose of which is to prevent 
prisoners of war from further participation in war’.599 Therefore until these detainees were 
brought before a tribunal, they should have the protection under the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions and any other interpretation as was made by the US is in breach of IHL. It is 
worth reiterating that until the present time, no tribunal has been set up to assess the rights 
and duties of the detainees regarding their charge or release. 
 
The interpretation of IL by the Bush Administration took a more reciprocal turn when the 
advisors suggested that the US was acting in self-defence following the 9/11 attacks, thus 
allowing them to react reciprocally. Self-defence is a reciprocal right in IL as discussed in the 
following Chapter. The view was based on the argument that the survival of the US was at 
stake, following increased terrorism threats by such groups as Al-Qaeda. This survival risk is 
not to be assumed to be the same as a State’s inherent right to self-defence, which is a legal 
right of every State.600 The conduct of the US, in the wake of 9/11 attacks, was not in self-
                                                          
596 Supra note 508. 
597 David P. Forsythe, The Politics of Prisoner Abuse: The United States and Enemy Prisoners after 9/11, 2011, 
p. 67. 
598 The United States Army's Field Manual provides ‘interim protection’ where there is a doubt on the status of 
the prisoner whilst their status is being reviewed by a ‘competent tribunal’, The United States Army's Field 
Manual No. 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare, Chapter 3 – Prisoners of War, Section I, para. 71, 18 July 1956; 
supra note 592, p. 149. 
599 Judgement of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, The American Journal of International Law, 
Vol. 41, No. 1, 1947, p. 229.   
600 The right to self-defence was discussed previously and will be further discussed in Chapter Four. 
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defence against a nation but was more a case of pushing the parameters for a State’s interest 
in relation to any given issue.  
 
In this critical analysis, the study has examined the different interpretations applied to 
different areas of IL by the Bush Administration. Two important factors are the 
contradictions between the Administration’s interpretations and those of the International 
Courts, as well as the contradictions between those interpretations and the view of the US 
Supreme Court.  In relation to the interpretation of treaties, the Supreme Court states: ‘[I]t is 
our responsibility to give the specific words of the treaty a meaning consistent with the 
shared expectations of the contracting parties’.601 The Administration has contrived a new 
code of law relating to interrogation rules and custody arrangements. The result is to deprive 
the detainees of their legal rights, so keeping them out of Courts, including foreign or 
American, and circumventing IL, and the Administration and all people who are involved in 
the ‘war on terror’ will be exempt from all kinds of responsibility, prosecution and legal 
obligation. It is highly questionable and regrettable that the Bush Administration could stand 
firm behind their interpretation and claim that their approach was consistent with applying IL 
rules and interpreting them in accordance with ‘good faith’. If in their interpretation severe 
interrogation methods are legal what then constitutes illegality? 
 
6. Conclusion  
 
This Chapter provided an interdisciplinary research aiming to bridge IP and IL through the 
rule of law. The study discussed the rule of law as the driving factor of IL establishing a 
dividing line between IL and IP elaborating how IL’s validity, objectivity and existence is 
separated from political views and interests. The important relevance of the discussion on 
the rule of law revolves around the constituting factors of the legal system, and hence it is 
based upon the values and principles of the international community. These principles by 
their very nature are broad and generic, yet concise and clear, as they provide the principal 
guidelines in formulating, interpreting and executing the law. For these principles to carry the 
required merit and legitimacy, they are required to be consistent, coherent, uniform, legal and 
just which were introduced in this study as the constituent elements of the rule of law which 
                                                          
601 Air France, Petitioner v. Valerie Hermien Saks, Supreme Court of the United State, Interpretation of 
Treaties, No. 83-1785, 1985.  
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include legality, consistency, coherency, uniformity, legitimacy, and justice. The constituent 
elements of the rule of law are individually significant and their absolute importance is in 
their collective functionality and its outcome. Each of these elements can be compared to 
links in a chain where their effective functionality is much stronger when inter-linked. If a 
rule fails to meet one of these integral components of the rule of law, then it will fail to be 
deemed law and falls outside the scope of the rule of law. The terminology of the rule of law, 
consequently, suggests the existence of its legally justified rules, based on reasons, and is 
formulated according to valid, fixed and firm norms. These valid rules are not only driven 
from constructive purposes, but also aim to protect rights in different forms. Hence, the rules 
would neither contradict each other, nor be tendentious by their nature. These constitutive 
elements embrace and promote the notion of equality and fairness which become particularly 
important in the study of IL and the role of reciprocity within it. The operation of IL requires 
a reciprocal sense of responsibility and commitment amongst States to ensure equality of 
rights and duties under the umbrella of fairness and justice for all States. Given the 
fundamental role played by States in every aspect of IL, the rule of law together with 
reciprocity, regulate and deters States from frequently applying their every interest and ‘will’ 
and encourage and incentivise them to move within the set parameters.  
 
The rule of law is broad and general since on the one hand it is required to provide general 
rules for a society applicable to different situations, on the other hand, the more general the 
rules, the more incoherent they are, and thus open to various interpretations. The essence of 
the rule of law in the context of IL primarily lies in its interpretation. One of IL’s 
achievements is its flexibility, while limiting the deviation from the specific intent of each 
rule by providing rigid and specific interpretation guidelines. These tools ensure the context 
and the essence of IL is not lost through obscure interpretation. This objective is achieved if 
interpretation is based on reason and true to the original object and purpose of the rules. The 
guidelines are based on jus cogens rules, obligations erga omnes, the principle of pacta sunt 
servanda, and ‘good faith’.  
 
In IL system the rules and obligations are fundamentally set through bilateral, multilateral 
agreements and/or CIL. The study examined the distinctions between the international 
obligations created under different type of relations ranging from bilateral, bilaterlisable 
multilateral, non-bilaterlisable multilateral and erga omnes within multilateral agreements 
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particularly exploring the nature and type of reciprocity within these obligations and 
relations. It was seen how the bilateral agreements almost take a form of a contract between 
two parties encompassing their specific agreements and create a direct reciprocal relationship 
based on equal rights and obligations. Multilateral agreements were examined in light of their 
true nature where at times, content of some multilateral agreements are aggregation of 
bilateral agreements which create bilateral and reciprocal obligations that are not 
‘bilateralizable’ since the obligations set within them are to benefit the international 
community as a whole. Reciprocity is embedded within bilateralisable multilateral 
agreements but where the obligations are absolute and non-derogable, the obligations are 
non-reciprocal. The latter agreements are based upon jus cogens rules and are obligations 
erga omnes which are non-reciprocal since their aim is to protect the fundamental values of 
the international community. HR laws as pertinent examples of non-reciprocal rules were 
looked at, IHL however imposes absolute and non-derogable obligations where they related 
to the protection of individuals but the study demonstrated the subtle yet concrete examples 
of reciprocity within IHL such as the right to resume ‘hostilities’ in case of a violation of an 
‘armistice’ or when violation of the rights prohibited by one party does not release the other 
party from their legal obligations.  
 
The international community has demonstrated its resolve to protect and uphold human 
rights, in particular the fundamental rights which captures the moral aspect of human rights 
and fundamental values which led to the creation of relevant legal rules. The promotion and 
respect for fundamental rights cannot be undermined in pursuit of States’ interests. Jus 
cogens rules and obligations erga omnes stand to give clarity to international obligations, 
expectations and protection, including the prohibition of aggression, genocide, slavery, and 
racial discrimination. States cannot revert to reciprocal reaction to breach fundamental rights 
on this basis. For this purpose, reciprocity takes a step back when looking at the legal 
instruments created for the protection of human rights and human dignity. The principle of 
reciprocity’s attributes is more relevant to balancing equality and interests of States. The 
significance of reciprocity is in its influence and focus on State practice and behaviours 
illustrating how reciprocity is an essential tool in balancing the rights and duties of States by 
encouraging them to perform and fulfil obligations whilst discouraging them from wrong-
doings. 
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The analysis of valid and invalid interpretation of IL and its impacts was examined using a 
case study focusing on the actions and interpretations of the Bush Administration in the ‘war 
on terror’ demonstrating how they struggled with reaching the objective and purpose of the 
relevant IL rules. The reservations placed, and their interpretation, paved the way to fulfil 
their intended purposes. Their approach, disregarding IL rules in the spirit of the guidelines, 
conveys a message that they not only lost all sense and guidance of the required direction by 
the rule of law, but also adopted an opposite commitment to the underlying trend set for 
integral parts of the rule of law. The interpretive approach addressed a pre-arranged and/or 
pre-determined approach which raises the question of whether or not this is a different and 
hegemonic and unilateral approach to the applicability of the certain rules of IL.  
 
This Chapter examined and focused on the rule of law and its relationship with IL to discuss 
that in reciprocal inter-state interactions, the objective of the rule of law is to act as a bridge 
between IP and IL to establish the required stability for the international legal system. The 
study discussed how the rule of law as the driving factor of IL establishes a dividing line 
between IL and IP elaborating how IL’s validity, objectivity and existence is separated from 
political views and interests of States. It was discussed how, despite the direct involvement 
of States in formulation of IL, the parameters of the rule of law may not be changed by 
States based upon their arbitrary ‘will’. IL system allows States to choose their rights and 
obligations, which means an obligation or duty is in force after States have given their 
‘consent’ to accepting such obligation or duty. However if States choose to limit their 
obligations under IL then reciprocity plays a role for the rule of law to protect others with the 
aim of having the same level of obligation in their dealings with that State. Additionally 
reciprocity is the key for creating a balance between rights and obligations since a State will 
have knowledge in the fact that by requesting a right, the same right will be granted to other 
States whilst non-fulfilment of an obligation will also have consequences in a tit-for-tat form. 
It is clear to see how reciprocity can therefore create, protect and maintain equality of 
rights.602 For example when a State places a reservation, the principle of reciprocity limits the 
obligation of other States in relation to the reserving State. Similarly in CIL when a right is 
claimed by one State this right must be made available to all States and others must be able to 
share in the benefit of this right. Therefore in this context the rule of law is preserved when 
                                                          
602 Supra note 4, pp. 89-90. 
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all States have the same level of obligations in their interactions and no unfair advantage can 
be gained by the reserving State.  
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Chapter Four: Reciprocity and Enforcement Mechanisms of 
International Law 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
Having scrutinised the sources of IL and the rule of law underlining these sources, it is 
important to shift the focus to how these laws are to be enforced and how commitment and 
adherence to these rules could be secured. IL like any other legal system is in need of 
enforcement mechanisms, since these mechanisms play an important role in encouraging 
compliance and commitment of its subjects to their duties and obligations to protect the rights 
of its subjects, whilst acting as a deterrence of any non-obedience. Collectively, the 
enforcement mechanisms must be able to deal with issues of non-compliance and serving 
justice to the injured parties effectively and decidedly. The nature and framework of IL is 
such that its enforcement is unlike any national system, which is likely to have a uniform 
judicial system, policing, adherence to law, and finally executors aiming to enforce and 
punish any breach in legal duties. The enforcement of IL in this context includes coercive 
response towards States in breach of international legal rules and obligations. IL does not 
possess such distinct organs in enforcing law at the international arena and, as such, the aim 
of this Chapter is to explore the enforcement mechanisms available under IL, their 
effectiveness and accessibility, together with the consequences of the actions taken under the 
enforcement systems.  
 
The enforcement of international rules is a wide-reaching and fascinating subject and its 
uniqueness has resulted in a challenge to its effectiveness. Due to its non-conventional 
system, IL enforcement has been subject of much criticism and pessimism. The enforcement 
mechanisms of IL could be categorised as centralised and non-centralised, where the former 
includes specific international organs tasked with enforcing IL rules and obligations whereas 
the latter encompasses the options available to States to negate disobedience and encourage 
compliance. One of the aims of IL is to promote non-aggressive and non-confrontational 
actions in response to breach of agreements and obligations. This is based on the IL principle 
of peaceful settlement of disputes as adopted by the international community through 
‘Declaration on Principles of IL concerning Friendly Relation and Co-operation among 
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States…’.603 This resolution together with the UN Charter set the basis for the internationally 
accepted IL principles. The emphasis of this resolution is to ensure disputes are settled 
peacefully by States themselves through processes such as negotiation, mediation, arbitration 
before resorting to the centralised enforcement channels given the horizontal and de-
centralised IL system.  
 
States are encouraged not to lose sight of the ultimate goals of IL for maintaining 
international peace, security and justice; subsequently, efforts must be made to avoid 
escalation of disputes likely to endanger peace and security. For that effect, there are several 
stipulations evident throughout IL which allows a remedial response by the affected party 
without the need to resort to enforcement organs. Reciprocity plays a vital role in bringing 
disputes towards peaceful ends by establishing, creating and maintaining the balance of rights 
and duties between States. The principle of reciprocity and the principle of equality of States 
are powerful principles that help create and maintain the peaceful balance within the 
international community. States have equal rights and duties under IL irrespective of their 
size or power and disputes are minimised if States do not feel a threat to their equality rights. 
Under the principle of reciprocity wrong-doers will be fearful of reciprocal response to their 
efforts at gaining an undue and unfair advantage since injured States will be given the right to 
retaliate reciprocally or respond back to a wrong-doing act. Moreover, disputes are peacefully 
settled if States are able to resort to reciprocal measures to bring about a balance through 
gaining same advantages. More importantly reciprocity plays an important role in 
encouraging a wrong-doing State back to obedience and compliance with IL. As mentioned 
before, reciprocity in this respect operates essentially to influence and impact on State 
practice and behaviours by creating a balance of rights and duties of States by encouraging 
States to perform and fulfil their obligations whilst discouraging them from wrong-doings. 
The absence of a powerful legal authority to enforce IL has placed reciprocity in a pivotal 
position. Hence, the objective of this analysis is to investigate how, and to what extent, IL is 
affected by the intricacies of the enforcement mechanisms which result in the weaknesses and 
limitations of its own system. Using the analysis, this Chapter explores the challenges and 
consequences of this situation, and how the international community has responded and 
continues to respond. This will help explore how these challenges have affected different 
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areas of IL, examining the reasons and circumstances for this whilst exploring the role of 
reciprocity within the enforcement of IL.  
 
One of these stipulations was examined in Chapter Two when discussing the option in the 
VCLT in response to material breach in the agreements. Other strong stipulations are evident 
in the Charter providing the right to self-defence as well as the right to remedial response of 
counter-measure. These two stipulations are discussed in detail in the following section 
before discussing the existing main IL enforcement organs. The enforcement organs mainly 
comprise the power granted to the UNSC, the ICJ, the WTO’s DSB, the International Court 
of Arbitration, the International Tribunal for the Law of Sea, and the International Criminal 
Court (ICC). The focus of the enforcement bodies in this thesis is only on the first three 
enforcement mechanisms since the ICC has a limited jurisdiction,604 and is a controversial 
institution, for instance, over forty States have not yet ratified the ICC Statute,605 the 
International Court of Arbitration deals with disputes on international commerce and business 
only;606 the International Tribunal for the Law of Sea is more limited in its scope than the 
general purpose of this Chapter.607  
 
This study explores various dimensions of the three enforcing organs, particularly the 
significant role played by them in enforcing IL rules, as well as exploring the enforcement 
power bestowed upon each of these organs. The analysis is accompanied by examining the 
UNSC and the ICJ’s relationships and approaches to issues they are tasked to deal with. This 
                                                          
604 The International Criminal Court Statute, Articles 5-21, stipulates its jurisdiction over genocide, crimes 
against humanity and war crimes, limiting the jurisdiction of the Court and only authorising it to examine crimes 
occurring since 1 July 2002; specifically under Article 17(1) of the Statute, the principle of ‘complementarity’ 
indicates that certain Cases will be ‘inadmissible’ even when the Court has jurisdiction over the Cases. Under 
Article 17(1b) a Case will be inadmissible if ‘The Case has been investigated by a State which has jurisdiction 
over it…’, the Statute adopted by the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the 
Establishment of an International Criminal Court on 17 July 1998, came into force 1 July 2002, United Nations - 
Treaty Series, Vol. 2187, No. 38544.  
605 Even though the Rome Statute came into force in 2002, a large number of States as yet have not ratified it. 
Despite a growing number of ratifications/accessions from initial 66 to 122, effectiveness of the operation of the 
International Criminal Court co-operation of more States are needed. For further information please see, 
http://www.iccnow.org/?mod=romesignatures; and http://www.iccnow.org/?mod=romeratification. 
606 The International Court of Arbitration, created in 1923, is an international leading system to resolve 
international commercial and business disputes, the Court supervises arbitration and assists to overcome 
obstacles. ‘It does not itself resolve disputes, a task that is carried out by independent arbitrators. The Court 
makes every effort to ensure that the award is enforceable in national courts if need be, although in practice the 
parties usually comply’.  
607 The International Tribunal for the Law of Sea was established to deal with disputes arising from 
interpretation and application of the Convention on the Law of the Sea which came into force on 16 November 
1994 and was officially inaugurated on 18 October 1996.  
 
161 
 
is followed by examining the relationship between the UNSC’s acts or resolutions and their 
relationship with the rule of law. Placing the analysis of the pillars of the rule of law 
examined in the preceding Chapter, this study proceeds to explore the pillars upon which 
effective legal enforcement mechanisms and organs must work. This study explores the 
legality and inconsistency of the UNSC’s approaches, namely relating to the ‘war on terror’ 
and Arab Spring. By doing so, the study seeks to ascertain the extent to which the 
enforcement mechanisms must act in compliance with the rule of law. Placing the outcome of 
the analysis on the rule of law and its role in negating subjective and arbitrary will of States 
on IL, the study examines the need for conformity with the rule of law and commitment to its 
integral parts as a requirement within the enforcement mechanisms of IL. Given the nature of 
IL system, weaknesses in its enforcement mechanisms places reciprocity in a pivotal position 
where the rights and interests of States can be protected and unfair advantages are to be 
minimised, yet adherence to the rule of law within the context of IL is not compromised. The 
study further poses the question of whether or not there is a unifying enforcing mechanism in 
IL to deter a State from complying. If not, to what extent must and could the UNSC transcend 
the boundaries set by IL?  
 
The sections below begin with some strong examples of non-centralised enforcement 
measures in the form of reciprocal remedial responses available in IL before assessing the 
centralised enforcement mechanisms. 
 
2. Non-centralised Enforcement Measures  
 
2.1. Self-Defence as Remedial Response 
 
IL’s non-centralised enforcement measures aim to encourage States to co-exist by resolving 
conflicts without resorting to violence and escalation of disputes. One of the aims of IL is to 
promote non-aggressive actions in response to breach of agreements and obligations, and 
there is a specific stipulation in the UN Charter that prohibits States from using or threatening 
to use force against another State.608 An exception to this, however, lies in States’ ‘inherent 
right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs…’ as permitted by the 
                                                          
608 Supra note 7, Article 2(4).  
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UN Charter.609 The Persian Gulf War in 1990 is a clear case showing the application of this 
right,610 where self-defence in collective form was used when Kuwait’s sovereignty was 
violated and intervention of the coalition forces was carried out.611 The sovereignty right of 
each State is protected by IL and it is strongly stipulated that the UN should not intervene in 
internal or national matters.612 States have been given protection against aggressors through 
their ‘inherent right’ to self-defence, whilst aggressors lose their claim to sovereignty rights 
in cases of self-defence reactions. An issue however exists with the ambiguity in IL where 
self-defence, non-interference in internal affairs of a State and sovereignty rights of a State 
should take priority.  
 
Self-defence is a strong form of reciprocity which can help maintain peace and co-operation 
as well as ensuring that existing agreements and treaties are adhered to. If a State is attacked 
then its rights are under threat and an imbalance of equality between States’ rights is thus 
created. The ‘inherent right’ to self-defence is a major reciprocal right that allows the 
restoration of the equality of rights and it is particularly important in order to minimise unfair 
advantages sought by the aggressor. Nonetheless there are restrictive measures stipulated in 
IL for self-defence by the injured State. Considering the UN Charter prohibits the use of force 
by States, under what situations can States resort to armed force in the name of self-defence? 
In this case, a State resorting to use of force is required to notify the UNSC that it has been 
the victim of an armed attack.613 However, there is ambiguity about what constitutes an 
armed attack as well as the level of force which can be used to act in self-defence. This is 
where the obligation on States to interpret treaties in ‘good faith’, and to avoid possible 
abuses, is essential when interpreting Article 51 of the UN Charter.614 
 
The interference into a State’s sovereignty under the doctrine of self-defence is justifiable on 
the basis of the sovereignty right of the attacked State. Sovereignty of a State is not only 
                                                          
609 Ibid, Article 51.  
610 Security Council Resolution 678, Iraq-Kuwait, recalling its resolutions 660 of 02 August 1990, 661 of 06 
August 1990, 662 of 09 August 1990, 664 of 18 August 1990, 665 of 25 August 1990, 666 of 13 September 
1990, 667 of 16 September 1990, 669 of 24 September 1990, 670 of 25 September 1990, 674 of 29 October 
1990, and 677 of 28 November 1990, 2963rd meeting, 29 November 1990, S/RES/67wq8, effectively in the 
Persian Gulf War the use of United States Armed Forces was authorised pursuant to United Nations’ collective 
self-defence actions.  
611 Ibid.  
612 Supra note 7, Article 2(7) refers to non-intervention into a State’s internal affair but Article 51 stipulates the 
‘inherent right’ of States to self-defence.  
613 Supra note 7, Article 51. 
614 Supra note 128, Article 31(1).  
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about the territorial legitimate ruling but also about the rightful autonomy of a State to feel 
protected from external interferences into its internal affairs together with its territories and 
borders.615 Upon taking action to attack another State, in effect a State can be considered as 
giving up its sovereignty right of absolute protection from other States since the injured State 
is authorised under IL to act reciprocally in self-defence. Although Article 51 clearly affirms 
the inherent right to self-defence when an armed attack has occurred, the legality of self-
defence is not limited to reciprocal self-defence following an armed attack, and in some cases 
is broadened in scope to include anticipatory, pre-emptive, interceptive, preventive, or 
collective self-defence and the parameters for legality of such actions is the subject of much 
scholarly debates.616 Each of these forms of self-defence will be discussed later on in this 
section. 
 
The Nicaragua case ruling helped clarify somewhat the uncertainty that existed around the 
use of force and the right to self-defence by identifying the limitations of what constitutes an 
armed attack, as well as the rights existing in customary and treaty law for self-defence.617 
The ICJ emphasised that the use of force is prohibited in CIL since States are required to co-
operate according to the Resolution concerning Friendly Relation.618 However, the ICJ’s 
ruling maintained that the general rule of the prohibition of the use of force is subject to 
certain exceptions such as the right granted by the UN Charter for self-defence.619 This is to 
say that, under Article 51 of the UN Charter, when an armed attack takes place, under the 
right to self-defence an injured State has a right to retaliate but must report to the UNSC 
immediately. The ICJ in the Nicaragua case deemed it necessary to identify the conditions 
necessary for the deployment of force in self-defence, citing that the ‘criteria of necessity and 
proportionality’ must be met in any military reaction.620 The required conditions of 
proportionality and necessity in the legitimate right to self-defence were already established 
                                                          
615 Mohammed Ayoob, Humanitarian Intervention and State Sovereignty, The International Journal of Human 
Rights, Vol. 6, No. 1, 2002, p. 82.  
616 Supra note 90, pp. 731-741; Jörg Kammerhofer, Uncertainties of the law on Self-Defence in the United 
Nations Charter, Netherlands Yearbook of International Law, Vol. 35, 2004, pp. 143-204; Niaz A. Shah, Self-
defence, Anticipatory Self-defence and Pre-emption: International Law’s Response to Terrorism, Journal of 
Conflict & Security Law, Vol. 12,  No. 1, 2007; D. W. Greig, Self-Defence and the Security Council: What does 
Article 51 Require?, International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 40, Issue. 2, 1991, pp. 366-402; supra 
note 98, pp. 1137-1147; and Christine Gray, The Use of Force and the International Legal Order, (ed.) Malcom 
D. Evans, International Law, 2010 pp. 625-638. 
617 Supra note 266, paras. 176 and 187-201.  
618 Supra note 174. 
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as CIL rule.621 This view was shared by the ILC which considered that restraint must be 
applied in international armed conflicts as well as fulfilment of ‘the requirements of the 
proportionality and of necessity inherent in the notion of self-defence’.622 This is to ensure 
that the rights of States are not impacted through arbitrary reliance on self-defence where the 
balance between action of one State and the reaction of the other are excessive, 
disproportionate and/or unnecessary. The ILC reiterated the right to self-defence in an armed 
attack as an exception to Article 2(4) of the UN Charter,623 concluding that self-defence is not 
wrongful as long as it is conducted within the limitations provided by IL.624 Thus legality of 
self-defence is reliant on the existence of a proportionate response to the initial act and 
certain key answers need to be obtained in order to assess the proportionality, namely 
whether the initial act was lawful and whether the response is proportional to the initial act.625  
 
The aim of the conditions for necessity and proportionality is to disallow States to use 
unnecessary force in the name of self-defence or military counter-measure against other 
States. By reflecting on both the ICJ and the ILC conclusions, Franck examines how neither 
of these organs specified the manner in which an injured State can retaliate; additionally he 
suggests that an attack to be in a similar manner (such as choice of weapon or exact number 
of casualties) is not essential but the context should be paramount in assessing the legality of 
any reaction.626 To advance his argument, the scholar refers to Professor Ago who affirmed 
that when ‘a State suffers a series of successive and different acts of armed attack from 
another State, the requirement of proportionality will certainly not mean that the victim State 
is not free to undertake a single armed action on a much larger scale to put an end to this 
escalating succession of attacks’.627  
 
In Chapter One, it was discussed how the value of the return gift should be in line with the 
original that has been received, and introduced two types of equivalence, ‘tit for tat’ and ‘tat 
for tat’, where the former is about an identical exchange in value but not in type whereas the 
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latter is an identical exchange in both type and value. Applying this concept to self-defence, 
similarities in approach can be observed, as to why the notions of proportionality and even 
necessity play a role when assessing the use of armed force in self-defence. Ago’s statement 
is plausible but the main issue facing the international community is the difficulty in 
assessing the right measure and response in equal reciprocal manner to fulfil the requirement 
of necessity and proportionality in practice. The balance between State’s rights and 
obligations in relation to the use of self-defence requires that a like for like response is 
provided in order not to violate the right of any party as in the context of self-defence actions. 
Given the nature of IL and in the absence of an authority to determine an appropriate level of 
self-defence actions by States, the notion of proportionality and necessity in an armed attack 
against a State is evidence of the principle of reciprocity guiding States towards appropriate 
actions, as opposed to excessive responses.      
 
A report of the UN Secretary General’s panel emphasised that the language adopted in 
Article 51 of the UN Charter is restricted, however, the interpretation of the statement in this 
Article must not limit self-defence to an actual attack and it should not go as far as allowing 
preventative self-defence for non-imminent attacks.628 The concept of self-defence excludes 
the other potential forms of self-defence which are based on punitive or disciplinary 
intentions which are generally considered as a form of unlawful armed reprisal.629 
Anticipatory self-defence can be argued as permissible and its legality is rooted in the CIL 
rules, long existing before the introduction of the UN Charter, based on expected, anticipated 
and imminent armed attack but caution must be used to assess the imminent attack and the 
response must be responsibly measured.630 Pre-emptive self-defence is the use of force to 
diffuse situations where, if they were to be left un-responded, it would result in a grave cost 
to the victim State.631 The Caroline case provides some useful tests for the assessment of 
legality of pre-emptive self-defence by referring to the necessity of self-defence in situations 
where instant and overwhelming action is necessary and there is no time for deliberation or 
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seeking alternatives measures.632 Therefore, the issue of timing and overwhelming need for 
action are necessary for this form of self-defence to be considered legal. Interceptive self-
defence is an armed response where actions taken are in response to unavoidable attack, 
meaning that an attack is on its way and the victim State is aiming to intercept the attack.633 
Preventative self-defence is described as where a State chooses to engage in armed attack in 
order to prevent a future attack on itself, and the difference between preventative and 
anticipatory self-defence lies in where self-defence in former cases will take place prior to an 
attack whereas in the latter case, anticipatory self-defence will take place when an armed 
attack is imminent and seeking alternative actions are detrimental for the victim State.634 
These forms of responses require appropriate consideration under IL guidelines where the 
specific aim is to use the principle of reciprocity in order to minimise an imbalance on the 
rights and duties of States and that interests of States are not at risk. This is particularly 
significant given the current level of technology and availability of weapons of mass 
destruction. Self-defence in all of the categories are at first glance similar, however, there are 
subtle differences that require closer inspection to assess the legality of such actions. The 
most important challenge for legality, in this concept, arises from the perceived threat, the 
imminent possibility of an attack or the intention of the attacking State. That is to say, in 
anticipatory self-defence, there is a clear claim of the imminent foreseeable threat as opposed 
to pre-emptive self-defence where armed attack could be one of the available options to be 
considered.635 Preventative self-defence is controversial and it is difficult to accept any legal 
status for the right to preventative self-defence. 
 
Interceptive self-defence can further be distinguished from anticipatory in situations where 
the threat is unavoidable, and as such the imminent danger cannot be ignored. It is suggested 
that this form of self-defence is deemed legal both under CIL as well as governed by the UN 
Charter when there is sufficient evidence of an imminent attack.636 Once again since there is 
little guideline as to the acceptable and appropriate evidence for what constitutes an imminent 
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and/or unavoidable threat, there is a degree of flexibility for States to apply their own 
interpretation of the facts. The assessment must be based on reason and within the parameters 
discussed above which are aimed at protecting the right of States as opposed to gaining any 
unfair advantage through an attack. Anticipatory, pre-emptive and interceptive forms of self-
defence are legal as long as there is an appropriate assessment of the belief and the factors 
that make use of force necessary and there are careful considerations and evaluations before 
engaging in the employment of force. In assessing the legality of self-defence, it is important 
to make a distinction between different motives for self-defence, in the sense that whether 
self-defence takes place whilst the victim State is still under attack, if the State is acting to 
prevent an attack, or the victim is acting in response to a recent attack which has ceased, and 
finally whether the self-defence is taking place in order to punish and/or deter any future 
attacks. 
 
Collective self-defence was already discussed above in relation to the Persian Gulf War. The 
legality of this type of self-defence is less of a debate given that it is directly referred to in 
Article 51 of the UN Charter, however in practical terms, it is less certain whether actions 
could be interpreted as collective self-defence. The right of collective self-defence comes into 
effect where at least one State is ‘entitled to take action by way of individual self-defence’.637 
Additionally the ICJ in the Nicaragua case provided further clarity by indicating that two 
conditions must be fulfilled for satisfying the legality of collective self-defence, firstly the 
victim State must declare itself as a victim and request assistance, and secondly that the 
attack requiring self-defence must be an armed attack.638  
 
When assessing the role of proportionality and necessity in self-defence, it is useful to 
understand what these elements mean in this context. Whilst necessity refers to the need for 
the use and level of force in the response to an armed attack, proportionality is concerned 
with the degree of the response in self-defence with regards to the threat being posed by the 
armed attack. That is to say proportionality cannot be limited to the proportional level of use 
of force as was applied in the initial armed attack since this might not allow the recovery of 
the sovereignty and territorial rights of the victim States. A good example is provided by 
Greenwood that a part of a victim State’s territory might easily and without major force be 
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seized by an enemy but its recovery might require a much greater force by the victim State in 
order to recover back its territory and to ‘reverse the effects of the armed attack’.639   
 
A distinction must be made between the notion of proportionality when assessing the need 
and the form of response prior to the response to an attack (jus ad bellum) as opposed to the 
notion of proportionality once an armed attack has occurred (jus in bello). It may be argued 
that the element of necessity plays a greater role in self-defence since it is used to assess the 
need to respond by use of force, however the element of proportionality is also important 
when assessing the form and extent of the response. Laws of War provide the parameters for 
how a war must be conducted and what proportional measures are to be taken. The 
proportionality of force, prohibition of specific weapons and protection of people or targets 
stipulated in the Laws of War are still in force and apply to all parties equally, hence the party 
acting in self-defence is not exempt from these rules. On the other hand, it is less clear what 
level of proportionality in response must be applied when assessing how to engage in self-
defence irrespective of the form of self-defence in question. 
 
When assessing proportionality in self-defence the main questions are: What is the right level 
of proportionality in response to an armed attack? What level of force must be used? Can 
additional steps, besides a responsive attack, be taken to prevent future attacks from the same 
aggressor? The effectiveness and legitimacy of proportionality is justifiable in the legitimate 
ends being sought as well as in the relative force and measure of the response to the initial 
attack. Kretzmer engages in an interesting debate regarding proportionality in relation to self-
defence by highlighting that the first issue to assess is to ‘define’ the legitimate ends when 
engaging in use of force relating to self-defence and it is essential to assess whether the level 
of force used in self-defence was necessary to meet the legitimate ends.640 Therefore, the ends 
being sought in self-defence are important factors in the assessment of the proportionality in 
the use of force. The conditions of proportionality cannot be considered as fulfilled if the 
result, after the use of force, is disproportionate when compared to the initial suffering of the 
victim State. For example, the victim State had lost part of its territory but after acting in self-
defence it captures its own land back and also occupy part of the aggressor’s territory. 
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Clearly the use of relative and equal force as a direct response to an attack can leave little to 
challenge in terms of proportionality but the testing and measurement of proportionality in 
the use of force when motives are more linked to reducing the strength of an aggressor, or 
when the attack has ceased, or is anticipatory, can be much more difficult. Essentially 
proportionality and necessity play a vital role in assessing the legality of a pre-emptive, 
interceptive or anticipatory self-defence. However, the challenge is to apply proportionality 
to the level of force being used since there is no direct relative measurement of the 
appropriate force given prior to an attack taking place.641  
 
The element of intent or aim in the use of force in self-defence is also an extremely important 
factor since there is direct link between the appropriate level of force used and testing for 
proportionate use of force. The legitimacy of the aim is likely to directly indicate the lawful 
necessity and proportionality of the force used. One needs to take into consideration the 
intentions, reasons, necessity, the proportionality and the timing of the use of force, which is 
to say whether the attack has been initiated before the response, armed self-defence takes 
place during an attack or soon after an attack, or in effect as a preventative measure in case of 
an attack not in the imminent future. Greenwood convincingly argues for the importance of 
establishing the timing of the original attack for which self-defence actions are being taken by 
arguing that the timing of an attack could be deemed to start with the intended attack by the 
aggressor, challenging the correct timing of the attack by the Japanese on Pearl Harbour to 
when the Japanese Fleet left Japan or when the aircrafts launched the attack.642 It should be 
noted that this is just an example to be used on evaluating the timing of an attack, rather than 
taking into considerations the reasons for the attack. It is not correct to apply a one rule fits 
all judgement on the legal status for all different forms of self-defence since all these factors 
play a vital role in assessing and evaluating the necessary testing for the legality and 
legitimacy of the use of force in self-defence, particularly prior to having been subjected to an 
attack.  
 
The recent example of the West’s approach towards the uranium enrichment of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran (IRI), suggests that an armed attack against IRI might be an option. This 
stems from the view that if IRI were to achieve nuclear power this could be a threat to 
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international peace and as such could give rise to anticipatory or pre-emptive self-defence. 
The legal justification of such an attack, if it were to take place, would need to be carefully 
examined in the view that the intention of the West is to prevent IRI from becoming a nuclear 
threat, then careful assessment must be made with regards to how close is IRI to produce 
nuclear weapon. Is this threat imminent? Can other forms of non-forceful measures be taken 
before resorting to use of force? What is the mode and type of attack likely to be? Will the 
West apply a bigger force than necessary to deter IRI from becoming a threat or to defuse the 
tension? It could be argued that the West is taking the necessary non-forceful actions to deter 
IRI from becoming a nuclear threat and is considering the option of an armed attack very 
carefully. The absence of any of these factors would have a bearing on the legal status of the 
self-defence actions. The attack on Afghanistan is a less controversial example even if neither 
Afghan forces nor Afghan civilians were involved in the US 9/11 attacks, yet the attack on 
Afghanistan was presumed legal by the US since those responsible for the US attacks were 
assumed to have received training or to be operating from Afghanistan, involving the 
international responsibility of the State.643 This was further supported by the fact that the US 
has always regarded pre-emptive self-defence as justifiable and legal. George W. Bush’s post 
9/11 declarations and attacks, which are known as ‘the Bush Doctrine’, may create some 
concern about what is legal self-defence as opposed to a State’s unilateral or hegemonic 
approach to this notion. Other controversial examples of actions taken under the claim of pre-
emptive self-defence were the attack on civilian Iranian Airbus by the US naval ship USS 
Vincennes in 1988,644 or the action by Israel in 1967 on its Arab neighbours.645  
 
In the study of reciprocity in the context of the right to self-defence, it is not relevant whether 
self-defence is in the individual, collective, pre-emptive or anticipatory forms since 
reciprocity operates to create and maintain the balance between States’ rights and interests. 
Reciprocal response in the form of self-defence is permissive in IL either in an individual or 
collective form, however appropriate assessment must be made prior to reciprocal response to 
                                                          
643 For further information on the concept of Pre-emptive self-defence relating to this subject see 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/; Ersun N. Kurtulus, The Notion of a ‘Pre-Emptive War:’ the Six Day War 
Revisited, Middle East Journal, Vol. 61, No. 2, 2007, p. 220; Christine Gray, The US National Security Strategy 
and the New ‘Bush Doctrine’ on Preemptive Self-defense, Chinese Journal of International Law, Vol. 1, No. 2, 
2002, pp. 437-448; and Christine Gray, The Use of Force and the International Legal Order, (ed.) Malcom D. 
Evans, International Law, 2010 pp. 629-630. 
644 Christine Gray, The Use of Force and the International Legal Order, (ed.) Malcom D. Evans, International 
Law, 2010, p. 628. 
645 Ersun N. Kurtulus, The Notion of a ‘Pre-Emptive War:’ the Six Day War Revisited, Middle East Journal, 
Vol. 61, No. 2, 2007, p. 220. 
171 
 
ensure that the collective form of self-defence meets with the ICJ’s consideration. This is to 
say that when a State is faced with an act of aggression, it considers itself as a victim, thus 
requiring support from the rest of the international community in response to aggression in 
the form of armed attack.  
 
IL seeks to promote non-violence and peaceful co-existence but there is also a need to protect 
sovereign States, their rights to non-intervention and from attack by other States. As such the 
‘inherent right’ to self-defence as a form of reciprocity, provides a sense of balance and 
protection to States, whilst acting as a deterrent for States choosing to attack others with the 
fear of reciprocal reaction in response to their aggressive actions.  
 
2.2. Counter-Measures as Remedial Response  
 
The ‘remedial’ approach to non-compliance has provided States with certain rights to 
counter-measure towards breaching or non-complying States. Traditionally States resorted to 
war as a first step in dispute settlement but contemporary IL aims to promote non-violence 
and peaceful dispute as embedded in the UN Charter.646 IL allows the right to different 
methods of reciprocal counter-measure which should lead States to regard war as the last 
resort once other methods of dispute settlements have been exhausted. The international 
community’s resolve is particularly evident in the Declaration on Principles of International 
Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation, where it clearly stipulates that ‘States 
have a duty to refrain from acts of reprisal involving the use of force’ as well as that every 
State “shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means”.647 This is not to say that 
wars have been eliminated, rather it can be observed that the international community is 
employing peaceful reciprocal counter-measure and delaying or avoiding war when possible.   
 
Counter-measure is defined as ‘non-forcible measures taken by an injured State in response 
to a breach of international law in order to secure the end of the breach and, if necessary, 
reparation’.648 In simple terms, it is a tool to bring to an end the breach and secure 
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compliance. This is part of the work undertaken by the ILC as part of their work on the 
Articles on State Responsibility.649 Reading Professor Crawford’s observations, it is obvious 
the sensitivity and the challenged facing them in finalising the Articles on counter-
measure.650 Counter-measure is a replacement for the previous term ‘reprisal’, no longer in 
use, as it is associated with the term used describing belligerent reprisals involving the use of 
force.651 In the Air Service Agreement case, the Court discusses that ‘counter-measures 
involves the great risk of giving rise...to a further reaction, thereby causing an escalation 
which will lead to a worsening of the conflict. Counter-measures therefore should be a wager 
on the wisdom, not on the weakness of the other party. They should be used with a spirit of 
great moderation’.652 Since the time of that case, the term counter-measure has come to refer 
to reciprocal response to wrong-doers without the use of force.653  
 
The ILC has defined counter-measure as ‘a reaction to…a specific kind of internationally 
wrongful act’, continuing to cite that this reaction is a form of ‘self-help’ or ‘self-
protection’.654 The ILC recognised the need for counter-measures in IL given its 
‘decentralized system’ ‘by which injured states may seek to vindicate their rights and to 
restore the legal relationship with the responsible state which has been ruptured by the 
internationally wrongful act’.655 It is important to note that such actions on their own without 
prior wrongdoing by another State would be deemed illegal but could only be considered 
legal if and when they are in reciprocal response to a previous breach of existing 
obligations.656 It must also be noted that as emphasised by the ICJ in the Nicaragua case a 
victim State is entitled to proportionate counter-measure response but those options are not 
made available to other States, on the basis of collective counter-measure, who may feel their 
interests are indirectly at risk.657 Even though controls must be applied in accordance with the 
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principle of non-intervention when assessing a wrongful action, there are available reciprocal 
measures within permissible IL rules to regain the imbalance created by the wrongful act. 
 
There are many aspects regarding legal counter-measures discussed in this section, but one 
point to note is that IL aims to provide the opportunity for States to regain their balance of 
rights and interests through the principle of reciprocity which is a useful tool for this balance. 
This is a clear emphasis on the role of reciprocity in stabilising a balance of rights between 
States in cases of wrongful acts, given the absence of a centralised powerful legal 
enforcement of IL. It is worth noting that counter-measures are different from the termination 
of treaties permissible in the VCLT in response to a breach of treaty obligation, discussed 
before. However, resorting to counter-measure by States must be within the fundamental 
legal parameters as set out by IL. For instance the UK saw a self-help claim rejected by the 
ICJ in the Corfu case since their responsive action was in direct violation of the sovereignty 
right of Albania.658  
 
Counter-measure has broadened the level of judgment that States can apply towards 
responding a wrongful action without resorting to the use of force. This has in effect 
increased the number of potential enforcers of IL. States are able to assess and apply their 
own judgement as to whether there has been a breach in IL and resort to non-forcible 
remedial options in response to a wrong-doer. The significance of the permissibility of 
counter-measure is to lower the escalation of disputes which can harm the international peace 
and security. A similar line of thought can be seen in the separate opinion of Judge Simma in 
the Oil Platforms case where permissible counter-measures are described as ‘designed to 
eliminate...the threat or harm’.659  
 
The ICJ made a direct reference to the legality of counter-measures in the landmark 
Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project case whilst referencing to previous ICJ cases.660 The 
judgment cited that counter-measures are indeed a justifiable response once set conditions are 
met, where firstly ‘it must be taken in response to a previous international wrongful act…and 
must be directed against that state’, secondly ‘the injured state’ must ask the wrongful State 
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to ‘discontinue or to make reparation for it’; and also that the purpose of the counter-measure 
‘must be to induce the wrongdoing state to comply with its obligations…and that the measure 
must therefore be reversible’.661 The Court then continued to exert its view that ‘effects of a 
countermeasure must be commensurate with the injury suffered, taking account of the rights 
in question’,662 thus bringing about the fundamental notion of proportionality in the 
assessment of the legality of counter-measure. The Court held the view that actions taken by 
Slovakia in response to Hungary not fulfilling their agreement and discontinuing the work on 
the project was not proportional and thus rendered the counter-measure response as 
unlawful.663 This was in spite of the Court’s view that Hungary’s initial action was unlawful; 
however, it did also reach the conclusion that Slovakia’s response fell short of the 
proportionality measures necessary to qualify their response as legal counter-measure.664  
 
The ICJ judgment addressing the legality of counter-measure has a direct impact on the work 
of the ILC in their final draft of Articles on State Responsibility. This is particularly evident 
in Articles 51 and 52 of State Responsibility which reiterates the Court’s view by stating that 
‘Countermeasures must be commensurate with the injury suffered, taking into account the 
gravity of the internationally wrongful act and the rights in question’, as well as setting the 
conditions that must exist prior to resorting to counter-measure.665 An important point to note 
is the way the ILC explores the objective and the limitations of counter-measure in Article 
49. Following the path of the ICJ ruling once again, the ILC sets three objectives for counter-
measure, firstly that counter-measure must be taken against the responsible State ‘to induce 
that State to comply with its obligations’, secondly it places a time-frame limitation for 
counter-measure only so long as non-performance persists, and thirdly counter-measure must 
be such that it allows ‘resumption of performance of the obligations’.666 This codification of 
counter-measure by the ILC strongly demonstrates that counter-measure is reciprocal 
response to a wrong-doing but instead of only acting as the balance of interests; it must also 
go towards encouraging compliance with IL obligations and duties.667 The focus is very much 
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on counter-measure as an incentivising tool for compliance rather than punishment for 
wrong-doings, and as such if it is to be effective placing a timeline becomes essential.  
 
It is suggested that the ICJ’s comments on appropriate legal countermeasure, later adopted by 
the ILC, was made in order to place limitation on the States taking actions in counter-measure 
in response to acts deemed by them as unlawful.668 This potentially stemmed from fear of 
abuse which seems to have also been echoed in the ILC and Sixth Committee debate on 
counter-measure as part of the work in drafting Articles on State Responsibility.669 In this 
respect, some ILC members felt the need that ‘a compulsory dispute settlement mechanism 
was necessary’ since there was the possibility of abuse relating to counter-measure.670 
Although this group’s view did not make it into the final draft, it shows how many people and 
groups were uneasy and fearful of the abuse of the conditions required for counter-measure in 
response to a deemed wrongful act. The ILC, however, made attempts at negating the 
possible abuse of counter-measure in Article 51 of the Articles on State Responsibility by 
turning the language surrounding on the requirement of the proportionality of counter-
measure to a positive form in order to minimise the ‘latitude’ available for abuse.671 The 
Article uses the language that ‘Countermeasures must be commensurate with the injury 
suffered’ which is more in line with the ICJ ruling in the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project case, 
rather different to the negative form that was expressed in Air Service Agreement Case where 
the tribunal’s ruling was judged on the basis of whether the actions were not 
disproportionate.672   
 
The ILC has provided different forms of responses under the umbrella of legal counter-
measure to a wrongful act which include sanctions, retorsions, and reprisals. Sanction is not a 
term used in the UN Charter but is taken to be what is described within it as a non-forcible 
‘measures’ available to the UNSC;673 and as such can be defined as ‘consequences of an 
[internationally] wrongful act, unfavourable to the offender…’.674 In this respect, sanctions 
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96, No. 4, 2002, p. 821. 
669 James Crawford,The International Law Commission's Articles on State Responsibility, Introduction, Text and 
Commentaries, 2002, p. 48.  
670 Supra note 467, p. 23. 
671 Ibid, p. 135. 
672 Supra note 652, para. 83; and supra note 668, p. 821. 
673 Supra note 7, Chapter VII.  
674 Supra note 197, para. 14. 
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are not unilateral actions of a State against another in response to a wrongful act, but actions 
of an international body in response to potential breaches in peace and security. By their very 
nature they are not an exact tit-for-tat reciprocal measure but they are nonetheless reciprocal 
in nature since they are aimed at bringing the wrong-doing State back towards abiding and 
complying with their obligations. This suggests that sanctions are a form of enforcement for 
international obligations in a precise top-down authoritative and coercive manner and are 
considered illegal if applied by a State against another State in a unilateral manner.675 
Examples of the UNSC sanctions are discussed later in this Chapter, namely sanctions against 
IRI, Libya and Iraq.  
 
Retorsion, otherwise referred to as retaliation, has been described as hostile, yet lawful, 
reaction to a previous international wrongful act.676 It is negative reciprocal response to a 
wrong-doing within IL. The ILC suggests that responsive acts under retorsion aim to deprive 
the wrong-doing State from an advantage,677 in which acts such as breaks in diplomatic 
relationships, reductions in economic support or stricter immigration or visa restrictions are 
seen as examples of such responses.678 Cassese highlights that the response can only be 
deemed legal if it is in response to a breach of an international obligation or to a previously 
unfriendly act by another State, bearing in mind also that the response must not violate IL, 
must be proportionate and the unfriendly response must be stopped once the wrong-doing 
State has stopped its unfriendly actions.679 Cassese’s explanation of retorsion is seen by other 
scholars to include such punishing and damaging responses that are above what the ILC 
would have intended as lawful counter-measure to induce States to abide by their legal 
obligation.680 Practical application of such actions is the expulsion of Iranian diplomats, in 
2011, by the UK in response to the attack on the British Embassy in IRI. 
 
Reprisal is referred to as a ‘reaction to an internationally wrongful act by an injured party 
against the offending State’ and it is often associated to reactions involving the use of 
force.681 The major distinction between reprisal and retorsion is that reprisals are illegal 
                                                          
675 Nigel White and Ademola Abass, Countermeasures and Sanctions, (ed.) Malcom D. Evans, International 
Law, 2010, pp. 548-550. 
676 Supra note 197, paras. 16-17.  
677 Ibid, para. 17.  
678 Supra note 236, p. 244; and supra note 98, p. 1128.  
679 Supra note 236, p. 244. 
680 Supra note 675, p. 538. 
681 Supra note 197, paras. 24-25.  
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actions used in response to an unlawful act whereas retorsion is legal responsive actions.682 
Reprisal will only be deemed legal as counter-measure if it excludes the use of force.  
 
Despite the disagreement relating to the legality of different permissible forms of counter-
measure,683 by a State toward a wrongful act, for instance retorsion or suspension of treaty 
obligations, a common factor in all of these reactions is nonetheless a measured reciprocal 
response to a wrongful act in proportional measures. This follows the principle of peaceful 
dispute settlement discussed earlier, where the non-centralised enforcement system of IL 
provides for reciprocal responsive measures not only to encourage fulfilment of obligations 
but also bringing back wrong-doers to compliance. 
 
It must be noted that features of any coercive counter-measure either as a reprisal or 
termination of obligations are in violation of the rules of IL, and they only become legal once 
strict criterion, discussed above, are fulfilled. In this respect, what becomes an important 
factor when examining counter-measure and the ILC’s work is that reciprocity of some 
responsive form is identified as an ‘action consisting of non-performance by the injured State 
of obligations under the same rule as that breached by the internationally wrongful act, or a 
rule directly connected there with’.684 This is essentially irrespective of the form of reaction 
to an international wrongful act or the terminology assigned to it. 
 
For the purpose of providing an analysis of the subject, and to avoid jumping into specialised 
exploration, the present work begins by providing a concise general insight before proceeding 
to explore the centralised enforcement of IL, limited to the workings of ICJ, UNSC and the 
WTO’s DSB, starting with the ICJ. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
682 Supra note 98, pp. 1129-1130. 
683 Supra note 675, pp. 537-538; supra note 98, pp. 1128-1146; supra note 236, pp. 239-244. 
684 Supra note 197, paras. 28-29.  
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3. Centralised Enforcement Measures  
 
3.1. The International Court of Justice 
 
The ICJ is considered as the principal judicial institution of IL,685 authorised to oversee and 
review cases of dispute arising between States.686 The jurisdiction of the ICJ is twofold: 
firstly it decides on cases submitted by States known as ‘jurisdiction in contentious cases’, 
and secondly, it provides legal advice to the various organs of the UN known as ‘advisory 
jurisdiction’.687 The ICJ Statute refers to the notion of jurisdiction in ‘contentious cases’ by 
outlining the basis for the jurisdiction of the ICJ relating to the cases in question.688 The ICJ 
has jurisdiction over the parties who have accepted its jurisdiction, but also provides States 
the ability to withdraw from accepting jurisdiction on a voluntary rather than a compulsory 
basis,689 or on the basis of reciprocity in return for other States’ acceptance of the ICJ 
jurisdiction, or for a finite period of time.690 Nigeria is an example which uses reciprocity in 
accepting the Court’s jurisdiction.691 This means that Nigeria has accepted the ICJ’s 
jurisdiction as long as another State party to a dispute has accepted the Court’s jurisdiction.  
 
Therefore, the principle of reciprocity can limit the Court’s jurisdiction. In reciprocal 
acceptance cases of the ICJ jurisdiction, this notion of reciprocity in the ICJ’s function 
indicates that States are able to bring a dispute to the ICJ as long as they themselves have 
given consent to the jurisdiction of the ICJ. The ICJ’s jurisdiction upholds the consensual 
nature of IL and compulsory jurisdiction of the Court could violate the importance of consent 
in IL framework.  
 
                                                          
685 Supra note 7, Introductory Notes and Article 92; and supra note 8, Article 1. 
686 Supra note 8, Article 1; and supra note 7, Chapter XIV.  
687 Supra note 8, Articles 36 and 65; and supra note 7, Articles 96. The authority bestowed upon the 
International Court of Justice allows the General Assembly or the Security Council to request the Court to 
give an advisory opinion on any legal question. However, other organs of the United Nations and specialized 
agencies may also request advisory opinions of the Court on legal questions within the scope of their 
activities as authorized by the General Assembly. 
688 Supra note 8, Article 36.  
689 Ibid, Article 36 (2).  
690 Ibid, Article 36 (3).  
691 Nigeria accepted the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice ‘as compulsory ipso facto and without 
special agreement, in relation to any other State accepting the same obligation, that is to say, on condition of 
reciprocity’, and this became evident in Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria, 
Cameroon v. Nigeria, ICJ Reports, 1998, para. 41. 
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The ICJ, however, has the authority to decide on any challenge upon its jurisdiction in any 
case. The ICJ has resorted to many options when evaluating the ‘consent’ of a State with 
regards to evidence of its jurisdiction, namely in the Corfu case, the Court decided on its 
jurisdiction by referring to communication between the plaintiff and the defendant, and 
particularly the response from the defendant suggesting the acceptance of the ICJ’s 
jurisdiction.692 Similarly, in Qatar v. Bahrain case, the ICJ relied on the minutes of a meeting 
between the States to ascertain its jurisdiction.693 Although there are different routes available 
for the ICJ to establish its jurisdiction, the ability of States to choose optional acceptance of 
the jurisdiction places limitations on the effectiveness of the ICJ as a powerful authority in 
international disputes. 
  
Some States have chosen to accept compulsory jurisdiction, namely the US from 1945 to 
1986, when it used Article 36(2) of the Statute to withdraw its agreement to the ICJ’s 
compulsory jurisdiction, moving towards acceptance only on a case by case basis.694 The US 
move was made after the Nicaragua case, where the ICJ ruled against the US by stating that 
the US secret operation in Nicaragua was against IL.695 The US’s original compulsory 
acceptance could be presumed as an attempt to encourage others to accept the ICJ’s 
jurisdiction; however, the US Connally reservation, limiting the Court’s jurisdiction to review 
matters involving the US domestic jurisdiction, brought a sense of distrust to the acceptance 
of the ICJ’s compulsory jurisdiction.696 The controversy surrounding this reservation stems 
from the words suggested by Senator Connally, as amendment to the reservation, stating that 
limitation of the ICJ jurisdiction involving the US domestic jurisdiction would be ‘as 
determined by the United States of America’.697 This reservation effectively gave the US 
control over the matters it would deem to be within the authority of the ICJ involving the US. 
In other words, the US acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction can be perceived more on the 
surface than a candid submission to the ICJ’s authority.   
 
                                                          
692 Supra note 274, 1949, p.25.  
693 Case Concerning Maritime delimitation and Territorial Questions, Qatar v. Bahrain, ICJ Reports, 1994. 
694 Supra note 266. 
695 Ibid.  
696 Franck & Lehrman, Messianism and Chauvinism in America's Commitment to Peace through Law referred 
to in Anthony D'Amato, The United States Should Accept, by a New Declaration, the General Compulsory 
Jurisdiction of the World Court, The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 80, No. 2, 1986, p. 331. 
697 Proceedings of the House of Delegates, American Bar Association Journal, 1960, Vol. 46, No. 11, p. 1233. 
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Even when States have accepted the jurisdiction in general, there have been cases to date 
where States have disputed the jurisdiction in addressing the specific contention, for instance, 
the US challenged the ICJ’s jurisdiction in the Nicaragua case on several basis, initially 
questioning the jurisdiction of the Court on the basis of reciprocal acceptance of the 
declarations made by Nicaragua and the US respectively with regards to the Court’s 
jurisdiction; and also on the basis that Nicaragua had not pursued the ‘regional arrangement’ 
exhaustively prior to bringing the case, and as such the ICJ should not deal with this case 
prior to complete follow through established regional processes. The Court rejected the US 
argument for pursuit of the ‘regional arrangement’ since there is no suggestion in the UN 
Charter that any regional processes must be followed prior to a case being brought to the 
ICJ.698 The challenge made by the US on rejecting the jurisdiction of the Court in relation to 
the relevant case based on reciprocity was an interesting point. The Court firstly rejected the 
US claim that Nicaragua had not accepted the Court’s jurisdiction based on estoppel and then 
moved to assess the relevance of the 1984 notification to the Secretary General. 699 Nicaragua 
challenged the applicability of this notification given a clause in the original 1946 declaration 
by the US on accepting the ICJ’s jurisdiction which included a six months’ notice for any 
modification. The US claimed that, on the basis of reciprocity, since Nicaragua had not 
included such provisions in its own declaration when accepting the jurisdiction of the Court, 
then Nicaragua had not accepted ‘the same obligation’ as the US, and therefore the six 
months’ notice was not applicable in the case between Nicaragua and the US. The Court 
rejected this argument by citing that the US, of its own will, had stipulated the six months’ 
notice, thus entering into a commitment and so reciprocity could not be used to ‘excuse 
departure’ from the US’ own limitations included in its declaration irrespective of what was 
included in other States’ declarations.700  
 
The ICJ referred to its reasoning in Interhandel case that a State can use reciprocity to limit 
its own obligation based on the limitations provided by the other party but it cannot rely upon 
a restriction that has not been included by the other party.701 The US additionally contested 
the ICJ’s ability to rule on the applicability of self-defence in the Nicaragua case on the 
                                                          
698 Supra note 266, paras. 102-108.  
699 Supra note 266, paras. 48-52. 
700 Ibid, paras. 52-63. 
701 Ibid, para. 62; and Interhandel case, Switzerland vs. United States of America, Preliminary Objections, ICJ 
Report, 1959, p. 23. 
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grounds that this task must be undertaken by the UNSC.702 These examples are reflective of 
the limitations and obstacles placed upon the ICJ in executing its judiciary responsibility and 
delivering its remit more effectively.  
 
On a related point, further limitation of the ICJ’s authority can be seen in States’ refusal to 
appear before the Court. The ICJ Statute has provided provisions for the likelihood of this 
situation in its Article 53 and although it states that non-appearance can lead to the other 
party asking for the ruling in their favour, before doing so some conditions must be fulfilled, 
least of all for the Court to be satisfied that the claim is ‘well founded in fact and law’.703 In 
this regard, the Statute has included provisions that should help limit the blockage faced by 
the Court in relation to non-appearing parties. In a practical sense, faced with non-
appearance, the ICJ has iterated its need to satisfy itself of the validity of the claim and all 
related legal issues as per its Statute, whilst taking ‘special care’ to include the viewpoint of 
the absent party in its judgement.704 Instances of these are: Iceland in the Fisheries case,705 
France in the Nuclear Test case,706 IRI in the Tehran Hostages case,707 Turkey in the Aegean 
Sea Continental Shelf case.708 Even though none of these refusals were on the grounds of the 
question of jurisdiction, they have nonetheless highlighted a weakness in the ICJ’s overruling 
authority to demand the presence of States. Ability of States not to attend the formal ICJ 
procedure despite the prior acceptance of its jurisdiction brings a sense of a weakened 
authority and the formality that an international judicial body must possess. In this respect, an 
interesting observation concerns the benefits to be gained by the refusing States from this 
non-obedience.  
 
Schachter provides an adequate view on possible advantages for the ‘non-appearing State’ 
where the gain could be summarised as firstly moving the burden of proof more stringently 
onto the State bringing the case. Secondly, by their non-participation, they would not be 
                                                          
702 Supra note 266, paras. 102-108.  
703 Supra note 8, Article 53 
704 Supra note 8, Article 53; and United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v. Iceland, Fisheries 
Jurisdiction Case, ICJ Reports, 1974, pp. 3-4 and para. 17.  
705 United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v. Iceland, Fisheries Jurisdiction Case, ICJ Reports, 
1974, pp. 3-4 and para. 17.  
706 Supra note 182, para, 15. 
707 The United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran Case, The United States of America v. Iran, ICJ 
Reports, 1980, p. 3, and para. 33.  
708 Aegean Sea Continental Shelf Case, Greece v. Turkey, ICJ Reports, 1978, para. 15. 
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bound by the ICJ’s judgement.709 In essence, if the Court has to fulfil the conditions as stated 
in the ICJ Statute and satisfy itself of the lawful and factual basis of the claim then the non-
appearing party is not present to provide any information or evidence to further incriminate 
itself. Effectively Schachter indicates that the advantage of not participating in the 
proceedings reduces the non-appearing party’s accountability and the need to abide by the 
ICJ’s authority as a judicial organ. This is in contrast with the domestic legal systems where a 
defendant could not simply refuse to participate in a legal proceeding; and also in an extreme 
case if they were to refuse to participate, there is nothing that indicates towards the other 
party asking for the judgement to be ruled in its favour as in the case in Article 53 of the ICJ 
Statute.710 Practically, in the Fisheries case where Iceland did not participate in the Court, the 
ICJ stated that the view of the absent party must be taken into consideration in their 
judgment,711 so non-participation not only saved the State from the burden of answering the 
Court but also provided protection by the ICJ where its circumstances were taken into 
consideration throughout the proceedings.712  
 
In cases of non-compliance with the ICJ’s decisions, there are enforcement measures 
available to the Court but these options depend on each situation. In cases when the parties 
involved do not provide the necessary evidence, it is in the power of the Court to presume 
that the evidence would result in disadvantage for the party withholding the evidence.713 Even 
though Reisman and Sandifer suggest that adverse advantage must be felt by the withholding 
party,714 practically the Court declared that no adverse effect should be drawn from non-
disclosure of materials.715 Similarly, the ICJ is authorised to ‘require previous compliance 
with the terms of the judgment before it admits proceedings in revision’.716 This is effectively 
a form of sanction,717 where the ICJ can encourage non-complying States towards abiding by 
its judgements rather than choosing non-abiding paths. Additionally, the ICJ has resorted to 
                                                          
709 Supra note 328, p. 231. 
710 Ibid, p. 230. 
711 Supra note 705, paras. 17-18.  
712 Supra note 328, p. 231. 
713 Supra note 8, according to Article 49 of the International Court of Justice’s Statute, the Court must formally 
note the refusal of presenting any specific document or information requested. For further discussion see 
Sandifer’s argument suggesting that the Court can presume adverse impact of the evidence for the refusing 
party, Durward V. Sandifer, Evidence Before International Tribunals, 1975, p. 460.  
714 William Michael Reisman, Nullity and Revision: The Review and Enforcement of International Judgements 
and Awards, 1971, p. 603; and Durward V. Sandifer, Evidence Before International Tribunals, 1975, p. 460.   
715 Supra note 274, p. 32.   
716 Supra note 8, Article 61(3).  
717 Supra note 328, p. 230. 
183 
 
the use of non-compliance of its interim measures as merit for its adverse judgment, as was 
observed in the Tehran Hostages case, where IRI’s defiance of carrying out the ICJ’s interim 
measures was used as merit in the judgment against IRI.718 These are valid tools available to 
the ICJ but arguably they are relatively weak to be effective for the ICJ as the principal 
judicial organ of IL.  
 
The ICJ’s judgment is final and not open to appeal, however in cases of non-compliance the 
injured party can take their case to the UNSC where recommendations can be made or 
decisions taken upon actions to enforce the ICJ’s judgement.719 This is not to be taken as the 
ability of the UNSC to hear appeals for the Court’s decisions, but rather as additional 
enforcement of the original judgment. Non-compliance with the ICJ’s judgement can be 
observed in Iceland in the Fisheries case,720 Albania in the Corfu case,721 and IRI in the 
Tehran Hostages case,722 where the decisions of the Court was not followed through. Using 
the Corfu case specifically, the ICJ calculated adequate compensation payable to the UK for 
damages to a Royal Navy vessel.723 The ICJ was not able to enforce its own judgement by 
ensuring Albania’s payment for the set damages, and indeed the compensation was not paid 
until the 1990s.724 Yet again, these examples demonstrate the Court’s inability to enforce its 
judgement as effectively as possible and/or be able to limit States from applying loopholes 
for escaping their duties and obligations. Considering the weakness explored where the 
disputing parties comply with the ICJ decisions in a non-uniform and inconsistent basis, the 
question is: If States are able to apply selective choice to upholding international legal 
obligations and duties, what are the other tools available to encourage compliance and 
commitment to these obligations?  
 
In addition to dealing with contentious cases, the ICJ has additional responsibility to provide 
advisory opinions.725 The ICJ’s advisory opinions are a useful form of providing insight into 
                                                          
718 Supra note 707, paras. 75 and 92.   
719 Supra note 7, Article 94.  
720 Supra note 705, para. 3.  
721 Supra note 274, pp. 23-25; for further discussion see Oscar Schachter, The Enforcement of International 
Judicial and Arbitral Decisions, The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 54, No. 1, 1960, pp. 1-2. 
722 Supra note 707, p. 3 and para. 75.  
723 Supra note 274, pp. 24-26.  
724 Laurence W. Maher, Half Light Between War and Peace: Herbert Vere Evatt, The Rule of International Law, 
and the Corfu Channel Case, Australian Journal of Legal History, Vol. 9, No. 1, 2005, section IX.   
725 Supra note 8, Article 65; and supra note 7, Articles 96; The International Court of Justice is tasked to provide 
an advisory opinion to the United Nations Security Council or the United Nations General Assembly or other 
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valid and appropriate interpretation of IL indicating the importance of the relationship 
between interpretation and reciprocity in IL. This is another area where the UNSC and the 
ICJ come into contact. The advisory opinion is important for the UNSC since it is a political 
body enforcing IL. The ICJ’s advisory opinion can be valuable for such a non-legal yet 
political body seeking legal advice, thus the opinion provided can act as an independent legal 
viewpoint not diluted by political interests. It is worth noting that, in contrast to the 
contentious cases, the ICJ’s advisory opinion is not binding, and is a form of legal advice or 
counsel.726 Examples of the advisory opinions provided by the ICJ can be observed in the 
Interpretation of Peace Treaties case, where the ICJ provided interpretation for the peace 
agreement between the States of Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania,727 or the Reservation to the 
Genocide Convention case.728 More recent cases have been, for example, the Wall Opinion, 
discussed later in this Chapter.  
 
The ICJ judgements whether in contentious cases or advisory opinions, such as Nicaragua 
case, North Sea Continental Shelf cases, the Genocide case, or the Reparation case have had 
significant influences on IL and its development.729 The rulings have also at times led to a 
specific treaty or CIL. The most pertinent example of this is the establishment of the 1958 
Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone which followed the 
prominent case of Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries.730 As such the legal interpretation applied by 
the judges, as experts in their field, is of immense value to IL’s progressive development, and 
evidence shows their significance in application of international rules. Although the ICJ is a 
legal organ and it can play a fundamental role in interpretation and application of IL, its 
advisory opinion is not requested frequently on all relevant matters. This is a debateable 
weakness since the decisions taken by non-legal organs such as the UNSC are not 
consistently reviewed by the ICJ for legal reasoning. The relationship between the UNSC and 
the ICJ constitutes the basis of discussion in following sections where issues surrounding the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
organization authorised by the United Nations General Assembly upon request, an analysis of the advisory 
opinion will be provided in the following section.   
726 Supra note 117, p. 289. 
727 Supra note 445.  
728 Supra note 148. 
729 Supra note 90, p. 20; supra note 117, p. 51; and supra note 98, pp. 109-110. 
730 Supra note 231, p. 143, The International Court of Justice declared ‘that the method employed for the 
delimitation of the fisheries zone by the Royal Norwegian Decree…is not contrary to international law’; and 
supra note 98, p. 110.  
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legality of the UNSC resolutions. However, prior to this, it is important to gain a full 
understanding of the UNSC’s workings and powers. 
 
3.2. The UN Security Council 
 
3.2.1. The Power of the UN Security Council 
 
The UNSC has been granted a special role and responsibility for achieving the UN key 
objective of maintaining peace and security,731 as well as the authority to ascertain what 
constitute as the threats to such objectives.732 From the outset it was decided that the UNSC 
should be a relatively small group to facilitate and enable more rapid decision making or 
actions especially when an urgent matter arise.733 For any decision at least nine votes must 
be secured and must include ‘the concurring votes of the permanent members’.734 The 
members, however, have the right to abstain from voting, but the strict interpretation of 
Article 27 of the UN Charter suggests that on important matters requiring a decision, votes 
of the P-5 must be secured, and other non-permanent members can choose to abstain. This 
effectively gives a veto power to each permanent member where their acceptance plays a 
key role in passing resolutions.735 However, in some cases, as the UNSC records shows, in 
practice the P-5 have abstained from voting which is different to their veto right.736 For 
instance, Russia and China chose to abstain from the voting on resolution 1973 for the ‘no 
fly zone’ in Libya preferring not to veto which would obstruct the passing of the 
resolution.737 Similarly, in the issue of the independent State of Palestine, the UK and France 
have indicated that they are likely to abstain when the case is brought before the UNSC.738 
The purpose of veto power and the issues surrounding this are explored later in this Chapter. 
                                                          
731 Supra note 7, Article 24. 
732 Ibid, Article 39 states that ‘The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, 
breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be 
taken…to maintain or restore international peace and security’. 
733 Security Council comprises of ten revolving members with two years tenure, and five permanent members 
who are China, France, the United Kingdom of Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America, 
Russia.  
734 Supra note 7, Article 27(3).  
735 Ibid, Article 27(3).  
736 Richard Hiscocks, The Security Council: A study in Adolescence, 1973, p. 89. 
737 Security Council Resolution 1973, 6498th meeting, 17 March 2011, S/RES/1973; Under the resolution the 
Security Council has authorised ‘Member States, acting nationally or through regional organizations or 
arrangements, to take all necessary measures to protect civilians under threat of attack in the country’. 
738 UK and France vow to halt Palestinian United Nations’s bid, The Independent News, Catrina Stewart, 05 
November 2011. 
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The powers granted to the UNSC by the UN Charter are: 
 
 maintain international peace and security,  
 to address any issues which could result in an international conflict,  
 to provide recommendation for conflict resolution,  
 to identify any threat to peace and recommend actions,  
 to pass resolutions for sanctions by the UN members,  
 to resort to use of force against ‘an aggressor’,  
 to make recommendations on the appointment of UN Secretary-General by General Assembly, and  
 to appoint the judges of the ICJ in conjunction with the Assembly.739 
 
The responsibility bestowed obliges the UNSC to ‘act in accordance with the Purposes and 
Principles of the United Nations’.740 In assisting the UNSC, their decisions have been 
outlined as binding upon all member States.741 This essentially gives the UNSC legislative 
rights where the decisions reached by them create legally binding obligations. The binding 
nature of the UNSC resolutions is different to the nature of the GA resolutions that are 
considered ‘soft law’ and as such have a non-binding nature.742 Moreover, there exists a 
contrast between the UNSC binding decisions and the nature of IL in general where ‘will’ 
and ‘consent’ of States play an important role in the creation and acceptance of obligations. 
This emanates from the fact that a prerequisite condition for becoming a UN member is to 
accept the UN Charter, and as such indirectly accepting the special role of the UNSC.743 In 
this context, the initial acceptance of the UN Charter is also the acceptance of the ‘judgment’ 
by the UN and its trust on the UNSC and their empowerment. Observing this from a different 
angle, no objection or negotiations of the ‘consent’ of States is permissible in relation to the 
UNSC, and the organ’s ‘judgment’ is binding and not open to challenge or appeal. 
 
The UNSC is empowered to examine and establish whether the State’s practice constitutes a 
                                                          
739 Supra note 7, Chapter VII.  
740 Ibid, Article 24(2).  
741 Ibid, Article 25.  
742 Apart from specific resolutions of General Assembly which create binding obligations on the United 
Nations’ members and organs, according to Article 17 of the Charter, other resolutions do not create binding 
obligation. Hence, these resolutions are recommendatory. However, according to the Charter Chapter VII, the 
Security Council’s resolution creates a legally binding obligation on a targeted State if the resolution is adopted 
as a result of an ‘Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression’. 
743 Supra note 7, Article 4 states that ‘Membership in the United Nations is open to all other peace-loving states 
which accept the obligations contained in the present Charter and, in the judgment of the Organization, are able 
and willing to carry out these obligations’.  
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‘threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression’,744 which carries no limitations 
or restrictions, authorising the UNSC to decide upon the actions necessary. The UN Charter 
has outlined several choices for the UNSC, namely their authority to impose sanctions as a 
method of exerting pressure on a targeted State.745 The UN Charter indicates that the UNSC 
will strive to resolve issues without the use of force but stipulating how in some situations, 
the use of force may be unavoidable.746 The nature of such sanctions varies, but the most 
effective and common ones adopted are characteristically economic and political. An 
example of economic sanctions are those declared against IRI firstly in 2006, and later 
extended by imposing further sanctions.747 The UNSC approach towards the IRI’s Uranium 
enrichment programme and its potential effect on international peace has been to impose 
economic sanctions in response to the regime’s refusal to halt their enrichment programmes.  
 
Similarly, an example of a military resolution was the UNSC authorising the use of force for 
the protection of civilians in Libya.748 The UNSC reacted to a State’s non-compliance with IL 
rules and obligations for the violation of HR and IHL. Another example of military sanctions 
is evidenced in those imposed against Iraq in 1990s following their invasion of Kuwait.749 
These examples illustrate how the scope and sphere of the UNSC has been broadened over 
the years from international disputes concerning States to include national civil wars; 
effectively the threat to international peace and security has been expanded to encompass 
national concerns.750 Further to this point, the UNSC has exercised power in setting up ad 
hoc tribunals to prosecute those responsible for war crimes,751 of which ICTR and ICTY are 
two prominent examples.752 Initial issues were more focused on international threats 
impacting upon the international community, but cases relating to civil wars in Rwanda, 
Kosovo, former Yugoslavia and more recently the uprising in Libya demonstrate an 
expansion in the UNSC’s sphere. 
                                                          
744 Ibid, Article 39.  
745 Ibid, Article 41.  
746 Ibid, Articles 40-42.  
747 Security Council Resolution 1835, Non-proliferation, reaffirming its resolutions 1696 of 31 July 2006, 1737 
of 23 December 2006, 1747 of 24 March 2007, and 1803 of 3 March 2008, 5984th meeting, 27 September 2008, 
S/RES/1835.  
748 Supra note 737.  
749 Supra note 610. 
750 Supra note 98, p. 1267. 
751 Ibid, p. 1267. 
752 Instances of how the International Tribunals addressed war crimes concerning issues such as torture and 
unjust treatments in former Yugoslavia and Rwanda were examined in Chapter Two; for further information 
please see supra note 476. 
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When analysing the different options adopted by the UNSC, their main approach is either 
sanctions or the use of force; aimed to incentivise States to choose co-operation and continue 
their commitment to international rules and obligations. The UNSC’s approach is based on a 
response to wrongdoers, for example where North Korea conducted nuclear testing,753 and 
the UNSC imposed sanctions aimed at encouraging North Korea to terminate its nuclear 
weapons program and any further testing.754 Another example is the UNSC’s reaction in 1990 
to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, resulting in the Persian Gulf War and liberating Kuwait. The 
UNSC continued to exert economic, military and diplomatic constraints and pressures 
through sanctions that had a crippling effect.755 The widespread concern of the international 
community on the impact of the sanctions on the civilians resulted in resolutions creating the 
‘Oil-for-Food Programme’ which meant that Iraq’s oil was sold for food rations or tokens.756  
 
There is a debate as to how successful these sanctions have been at resolving issues as well as 
bringing the non-compliant States towards compliance. Equally, have these actions been able 
to provide a remedy and act as future deterrence? What are the consequences of such actions? 
The continued sanctions and constraints placed on Iraq had a devastating effect on civilians 
and less impact on the government. The UNSC approach soon turned into actions such as 
regime change and facilitating the possession of Iraq’s natural assets without absolute consent 
of the nation, and needless to say the vast humanitarian suffering that came with the slow 
drainage of Iraq and its people.757 These issues need detailed analysis, addressed later in this 
Chapter when examining the legality and the risks associated with the UNSC’s actions and 
decisions. Further power of the UNSC lies in the appointment of the ICJ judges when these 
                                                          
753 Executive director of the Centre for Korean-American Peace in Tokyo, Kim Myong-chol, stated that the test 
is considered to be a reminder that North Korea ‘is going it alone as a nuclear power’; North Korea further 
claimed that ‘we are not going to worry about sanctions. If they sanction us, we will become more powerful. 
Sanctions never help America; they are counter-productive…we don't care about America and what they say’, 
the Guardian News, World News, 25 May 2009. 
754 Security Council Resolution 1874, Non-proliferation/Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, recalling its 
resolutions, including 825 (1993), 1540 (2004), 1695 (2006), and, in particular 1718 (2006), 6141st meeting, 12 
June 2009, S/RES/1874.  
755 Security Council Resolution 687, Iraq-Kuwait, 2981st meeting, 3 April 1991, S/RES/687; and William 
Michael Reisman, The Constitutional Crisis in the United Nations, The American Journal of International Law, 
Vol. 87, No. 1, 1993, p. 85. 
756 Security Council Resolution 706, Iraq-Kuwait, 3004th meeting, 15 August 1991, S/RES/706; Resolution 712, 
Iraq, 3008th meeting, 19 September 1991, S/RES/712; and Resolution 986, on authorization to permit the import 
of petroleum and petroleum products originating in Iraq, as a temporary measure to provide for humanitarian 
needs of the Iraqi people, 3519th meeting, 14 April 1995, S/RES/986. For further information on the United 
Nations Oil for Food Programme see: http://www.un.org/depts/oip/background/index.html. 
757 William Michael Reisman, The Constitutional Crisis in the United Nations, The American Journal of 
International Law, Vol. 87, No. 1, 1993, p. 85. 
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are based upon the recommendations of the UNSC.758 This is reflective of a strong inter-link 
between the UNSC and the ICJ.759 Interestingly, given that the UNSC is an important organ 
of the UN, its further power is in its influence in the appointment of the UN Secretary-
General.760 The influence of the UNSC in the appointment of such high ranking members of 
key international bodies/institutions brings about a sense of control and management for such 
important organs. Independence of organs such as the ICJ is of great importance when the 
UNSC has absolute power, not only as a law-making body but also as an executive body of 
the UN.761  
 
3.2.2. The Role and Power of the Permanent Members of the Security Council   
 
One of the issues with the UNSC is in its formation and particularly with respect to power 
bestowed on its P-5, as victorious powers of the World War II. Even though every State is 
deemed to have equal rights in IL,762 the UN Charter has however, created an element of 
inequality by granting more rights to the P-5. In addition to their permanent seat, there is a 
greater distinction which lies in their veto right. The use of veto does not need an explanation 
and all it needs is to exercise the veto.763 Although, there have been attempts to curtail the use 
of veto rights and, as a minimum, requiring the P-5 to provide a written reason for their 
veto.764  
 
The teleology of the veto rights lies in establishing a balance of power amongst major States 
and to create ‘equilibrium’ in inter-State relations.765 The importance of this is in ensuring a 
                                                          
758 Security Council appoints the International Court of Justice’s judges as specified in the International Court of 
Justice Statute, a responsibility shared with General Assembly based on the list provided by the Secretary-
General; supra note 8, Article 4-19, particularly Article 4 and 7. 
759 The inter-link between the two main enforcing bodies will be discussed later in this Chapter. 
760 Supra note 7, Articles 97; The United Nation Secretary-General is regarded as the representative of the 
international community. 
761 For further information of ‘quasi-judicial’ powers of the Security Council see Oscar Schachter, The Quasi-
Judicial Role of the Security Council and General Assembly, The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 
58, No. 4, 1964, particularly p. 960; and Tae Jin Kahng, Law, Politics, and the Security Council: an Inquiry Into 
the Handling of Legal Questions Involved in International Disputes and Situations, 1969, p. 227. 
762 Supra note 7, Article 2(1) explicitly declares that ‘The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign 
equality of all its Members’. 
763 Sydney D. Bailey and Sam Daws, The Procedure of the UN Security Council, 1998, p. 228.  
764 General Assembly Report of the Open-ended Working Group on the Question of Equitable Representation 
on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council and Other Matters related to the Security Council, 
A/56/47, 56th Session, 2002, pp. 8-9. 
765 Anjali V. Patil, The UN Veto in World Affairs 1946-1990: A Complete Record and Case Histories of the 
Security Council’s Veto, 1992, p. 458. 
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balance of interests in a political organ, since the pursuit of self-gain and supremacy was a 
major issue. The veto right was established for the major powers to provide each with the 
ability to decide what assignments they would participate in; and more importantly to 
safeguard their interests by ensuring that the decisions of others would not automatically 
affect or result in their disadvantage.766 Their veto right was also a way of ensuring that there 
were no negative repercussions on each of the major powers resulting from decisions taken 
by other P-5 members.767 It is important to recall that circumstances leading to the 
establishment of the UN and the UNSC in the aftermath of the two World Wars, particularly 
soon after World War II.768 Thus, the veto was introduced to ensure that no action would be 
taken which did not have the absolute co-operation of the P-5, effectively bringing about the 
co-operation of the powers towards maintaining peace and security.769 This is a way of 
creating a sense of collective security, discussed in Chapter Five when examining co-
operation.  
 
There have been continuous debates on the P-5 veto right and its accompanying power.770 
How have these rights affected international legal and/or political relations? Scholars have 
raised concerns on the role of politics in use of veto, for instance Shaw maintains that the 
interpretation of a threat to international peace and the consequential actions by the UNSC, in 
practice, is dependent on the ‘circumstances of the case’ as well as the relationships of the P-
5 with the State in question.771 Essentially, practical review of the UNSC actions and 
decisions corroborates this view as well, in light of the vote/action on each permanent 
member’s interests. This issue will become more apparent when examining inconsistency of 
the P-5’s conduct later in this Chapter. 
    
                                                          
766 Ibid, pp. 11 and 13.  
767 Supra note 757, p. 98. 
768 Supra note 7, The Charter’s preamble refers to the scourge of the two world wars and their devastating 
consequences. It was very important to ensure the international community would not find itself at the grip of 
another devastating war.  
769 Supra note 765, p. 13 and 458; Bailey and Daws, provide a slightly different angle on the exercise of veto by 
essentially suggesting that veto is ‘the failure of the Council to adopt a resolution due to the negative vote of one 
or more permanent members’ even though the other non-permanent members have voted in favour of the 
resolution, supra note 763, pp. 227-228. 
770 Supra note 757, 1993; Bardo Fassbender, Uncertain Steps into a Post‐Cold War World: The 
Role and Functioning of the UN Security Council after a Decade of Measures against Iraq, European Journal of 
International Law, Vol. 13, No. 1, 2002; Barry O'Neill, Power and Satisfaction in the United Nations Security 
Council, The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 40, No. 2, 1996; and Erik Voeten, The Political Origins of the 
UN Security Council's Ability to Legitimize the Use of Force, International Organization, Vol. 59, No. 3, 2005. 
771 Supra note 98, pp. 1236-1237. 
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The important factor to consider is whether it was ever originally intended by the 
international community to assign such authority and power, so that the P-5 would decide the 
direction of the international community? Has the UNSC always been successful in achieving 
its goals as embedded in the UN Charter? Can reciprocity play a role in the application of the 
veto rights amongst the P-5? Reisman reflects on the latter point by referring to the Cold War 
period where the reciprocal use of veto rights by States had effectively limited the operation 
of the UNSC.772 The use of veto during that period had reached such a scale as to threaten the 
UNSC’s ability to deliver its task.773 This led to concern in the GA given the constant state of 
SC’s deadlock resulting from reciprocal Russia (former USSR) and the US veto use. Thus the 
UNSC rendered itself ineffective to take control of threats to international peace and security. 
As a result, GA’s ‘Uniting for Peace’ resolution was adopted on the grounds that if the UNSC 
is the primary body of maintaining peace, then the GA is the secondary body for addressing 
threat to international peace.774 Even though this was hailed as a breakthrough at that time for 
increasing GA’s power, in practice there were obstacles that would not allow the use of this 
resolution. Firstly the UN Charter indicates that any issue concerning international peace and 
security must be brought to the UNSC’s attention,775 and the possibility of any action 
impacting peace and security without the UNSC deliberation is debatable. Secondly, the 
GA’s resolution called for collective security with the use of force but there was dispute as to 
the authority of GA to call for use of force since this authority lies with the UNSC.776 In 
short, as Shaw convincingly argues, the optimism surrounding the ‘Uniting for Peace’ 
resolution has been fruitless, given the significant impractical ability to use this resolution by 
the GA in resolving conflicts or maintaining international peace or security, and this power 
continues to remain firmly in the UNSC’s domain.777 
 
Although there has been on-going use of veto since the end of Cold War, the use of veto has 
been comparatively less on a tit-for-tat policy, as opposed to the protection of the P-5’s 
                                                          
772 Supra note 757, pp. 83-84. 
773 Ibid, p. 84. 
774 The resolution was in the event of the Security Council’s inability to execute its responsibility in maintaining 
international peace and security in light of the use of veto rights, General Assembly Resolution 377(V), Uniting 
for Peace, 5th Session, 3 November 1950, A/RES/377(V)AA. 
775 Supra note 7, Article 11.  
776 Supra note 98, p. 1272. 
777 Supra note 757, p. 1273. 
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rights.778 For example the US has exercised the most number of vetoes since the end of the 
Cold War,779 as opposed to Russia exercising the higher number during the Cold War.780 It is 
naive to comprehend this statistic as a pure coincidence, but rather a demonstration of the 
shift in world power. Furthermore appropriateness of the veto use must be aimed at global 
interest rather than calculated actions based on the evaluation of self-interest which is not 
always the case as can be seen in the recent UNSC debates on Syria. The emphasis on why 
the international community’s interests must take priority over self-interest is rooted in the 
tasks and responsibility bestowed to function as enforcing body of IL. It is also important to 
recall that the great powers in the UNSC are to act in representation for international peace 
and security and that the basis of their elevation to the permanent membership status was 
primarily to enhance mainly international co-operation of the great powers.  
 
There has been some argument in favour of the veto right, namely Patil argues that the veto 
right has helped protect smaller nations that might otherwise be subject to conflicts by 
aggressors.781 Even though Patil’s argument can be theoretically reasonable at times, in 
practice, the UNSC efforts do not always reach the desired objective and conclusion of 
maintaining peace. The current Syrian case is an instance of this where the approach adopted 
by China and Russia was to veto the United Nations resolution against Syria resulting in the 
loss of over a hundred thousand civilian lives.782 Although more of the P-5 co-operations can 
                                                          
778 Instances of veto exercises is seen in the US veto on the re-appointment of Boutrus Boutros-Ghali as 
Secretary-General of the United Nations, 1996, on the ground of his failure to implement necessary reforms to 
the United Nations, Security Council Report, Special Research Report: Appointment of a new Secretary-
General, 16 February 2006, available at: http://www.securitycouncilreport.org; and the United States veto on 
Israel expropriation of land in east Jerusalem and also  further forty two vetoes by the United States in support 
of Israel. In the latter example, it is seen how the veto use is rooted in political interest rather than taking a co-
operative approach to establish international peace and security, the Amercian Association for Palestine Equal 
Rights, available at: 
http://www.aaper.org/site/c.quIXL8MPJpE/b.3813077/k.9D93/UN_Security_Council_Resolutions_supporting_
Palestinian_human_rights.htm. 
779 There has been a dramatic shift in the numbers of the US vetoes since the end of the Cold War. 
Prior to this the USSR had been the main user of the veto power, for further information please see 
Global Policy Forum, Changing  Patterns in the Use of the Veto in the Security Council, available 
at: http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/102/32810.html  
780 There has been a dramatic shift in the numbers of the US vetoes since the end of the Cold War. Prior to this 
the USSR had been the main user of the veto power, for further information please see Global Policy Forum, 
Changing  Patterns in the Use of the Veto in the Security Council, available at: 
http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/102/32810.html.  
781 Supra note 765, p. 458. 
782 The uprising in Syria is reported to have resulted in over hundred thousand loss of civilian lives, a large 
number which is adequate to warrant a Security Council condemnation through resolutions, BBC News, Syria 
death toll now above 100,000, say UN chief Ban, 25 July 2013, at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-
east-23455760; The approach adopted by China and Russia was to veto the United Nations resolution against 
Syria claiming that the ‘threat of sanctions will not bring peace’, UN News Centre, Syria: Ban voices deep 
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be observed compared to the Cold War era, this new era raises concern for the UNSC, 
particularly the P-5, decision-making processes and the scope of their authority that could not 
be fathomed at the inception of the UNSC.783 A change in the UNSC approach is in the 
Persian Gulf War where the P-5 provided declarations and interpretations of IL – inconsistent 
and contrary to the existing requirements regarding the limited guidelines for interpretation of 
the UN Charter provisions.784 For example, under resolution 687, the UNSC declared Iraq ‘is 
liable under international law for any direct loss, damage’.785 The legality of this resolution 
was questioned by other UN members, particularly Iraq as the suffering party, but also other 
States, namely Yemen, had reservations on how the resolution contradictorily exceeded the 
UNSC’s mandate.786 The concerns predominantly related to reparations of the damages and 
the losses suffered by Kuwait, as well as the demarcation of the boundaries of both Kuwait 
and Iraq.787 The Yemen’s concerns followed this, since in the past the UNSC would not be 
involved in such matters which were more in the ICJ’s domain.788 Upon the passing of the 
resolution, the US who voted favourably on the resolution, claimed: 
 
The circumstances that are before us are unique in the history of the United Nations, and this 
resolution is tailored exclusively to these circumstances…Certainly, the United States does not seek, 
nor will it support a new role for the Security Council as the body that determines international 
boundaries.789                  
 
The actions and decisions around the Gulf War indicate that ‘circumstances’ resulted in the 
provisions of Chapter VII to be ‘reaffirmed, neglected and then, on the contrary, surpassed’ 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
regret after Security Council fails to agree on resolution, 4 February 2012, available at: 
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=41144&Cr=Syria&Cr1=; Similar uprising in Libya was 
inconsistently and more aggressively dealt with by the Security Council, where UK and France lobbied for 
international support for ‘no fly zone’ in Libya and the eventual downfall of Gaddafi regime. Similarly the 
uprising in Iran back in 2009 did neither result in any actions by the Security Council nor did it receive adequate 
international attention.  
783 Steven R. Ratner, The Security Council and International Law, (ed.) David M. Malone, The UN Security 
Council: From the Cold War to the 21st Century, 2004; supra note 757; and Paul W. Kahn, Lessons for 
International Law from the Gulf War, Faculty Scholarship Series, 1993, Paper 335. 
784 Steven R. Ratner, The Security Council and International Law, (ed.) David M. Malone, The UN Security 
Council: From the Cold War to the 21st Century, 2004, p. 594. 
785 Security Council Resolution 687, Iraq-Kuwait, 2981st meeting, 3 April 1991, S/RES/687. 
786 Security Council Provisional Verbatim Record, 2981st meeting, 3 April 1991, S/PV.2981; and Mohammed 
Bedjaoui, The New World Order and the Security Council: Testing the Legality of its Acts, 1994, p. 41. 
787 Supra note 757, p. 85. 
788 Security Council Provisional Verbatim Record, 2981st meeting, 3 April 1991, S/PV.2981; and Mohammed 
Bedjaoui, The New World Order and the Security Council: Testing the Legality of its Acts, 1994, pp. 41- 42. 
789 Security Council Provisional Verbatim Record, 2981st meeting, 3 April 1991, S/PV.2981; and Mohammed 
Bedjaoui, The New World Order and the Security Council: Testing the Legality of its Acts, 1994, pp. 41- 42. 
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by the UNSC.790 Prior to the Gulf War, resolutions were targeting Iraq to evacuate Kuwait 
on the provisions and authority bestowed upon the UNSC.791 Similarly Judge Bedjaoui, 
expanding Dupuy’s examination of the Persian Gulf War, believes that resolution 678, 
authorising the use of every necessary means to ensure enactment of resolution 660, is 
inconsistent with the provisions of the UN Charter, particularly Article 42, thus suggesting 
that the essence of this resolution neglects the provisions of the UN Charter.792 Finally, 
following the end of the Persian Gulf War, resolution 687 provided the conditions for peace 
which once again were surpassing the UN Charter provisions raising again questions on the 
legality of the resolution.  
 
Back in 1993, Reisman had predicted the uneasiness that would follow the Persian Gulf War 
and the precedence that would be set for the UNSC’s future conduct, particularly by the P-
5.793 Since then, there have been many conflicts and decisions taken, claiming to be for the 
greater good; enhancement of international peace and security. However in recent decades 
there have been obvious inconsistencies in the UNSC approach towards the urgency and 
necessity of action. The most obvious controversial examples are failure to act in time for 
the genocide in Rwanda (1994),794 the Kosovo war (Conflict that started in 1998),795 Iraq 
war (2003), and the Syrian uprising (started in 2011).796 In these cases the inconsistency and 
                                                          
790 Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Droit International Public, 1993, pp. 424-425  
791 Supra note 7, Article 41 states that ‘The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of 
armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United 
Nations to apply such measures’; an example of a resolution reflecting on Article 41 is seen in resolution 678 in 
Security Council Resolution 678, supra note 610. 
792 Mohammed Bedjaoui, The New World Order and the Security Council: Testing the Legality of its Acts, 1994, 
p. 43. 
793 Supra note 757, p. 85. 
794 Security Council Resolution 872, Rwanda, 3288th meeting, 5 October 1993, S/RES/872. 
795 Security Council Resolution 1244, on the situation relating Kosovo, 4011th meeting, 10 June 1999, 
S/RES/1244; The United Nations has been trying to resolve the conflict for two years, however, the news 
indicates the NATO countries’ reluctance to put an immediate end to the war for which the news was criticised 
for its inaccuracy. It is important to be mindful of the controversy surrounding Kosovo war due to the objection 
raised by China and Russia throughout the process of dealing with this Case. In other words, the Forces 
intervened without the Security Council resolution and as a result it was considered an illegal intervention, the 
New York Times, Kosovo Conflict, 2007, available at:  
http://www.nytimes.com/packages/html/world/20071209_KOSOVO_FEATURE/; for further information see 
the Economist Divided rule: The European Union runs into roadblocks in its plans for Kosovo, 29 May 2008, 
available at: http://www.economist.com/node/11460102; also BBC Wold Service, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/iplayer/console/p007z15k. 
796 Although the United Nation Security Council passed a resolution on destruction of Syria of chemical 
weapons, this approach does not provide an immediate solution to stop the atrocities taking place in the State. 
Security Council Resolution 2118, Requires Scheduled Destruction of Syria’s Chemical weapons, 7038th 
meeting, 27 September 2013, S/RES/2118. The uprising in Syria is reported to have resulted in the loss of over a 
hundred thousand civilian lives, a huge number which is adequate to warrant a Security Council condemnation 
through resolutions, BBC News, Syria death toll now above 100,000, says UN chief Ban, 25 July 2013, 
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lack of uniformity in the UNSC’s approaches and responses became evident. In Rwanda the 
response was too late, meaning that the UNSC did not intervene in time to stop the genocide 
and its consequent effect has been that the international community is left with a sense of 
regret.797 As mentioned above, after the end of the Cold War, there was a shift in the number 
of the US vetoes attributed to the increase in their power. This has resulted in an increasing 
concern about their hegemonic approach, where the US’s unilateral acts are threatening 
long-term stability and international peace and security. The most pertinent example is the 
Iraq War in 2003, where the US and the UK engaged in use of force against Iraq amidst 
international controversy. A similar hegemonic approach was in the Afghanistan War, 
without UNSC authorisation, and its threat to go to war with Iraq, in case of non-cooperation 
by the UN, which not only endangers international peace but also goes towards discrediting 
IL and its counterparts in the UNSC.798 George W. Bush’s comment: ‘We will work with the 
UN Security Council for the necessary resolutions’,799 warning that the US would act 
unilaterally if the UN failed to co-operate, or the words of a senior US official claiming that 
‘we don't need the Security Council’ are further examples.800 This view that the US will ‘go 
it alone’ was correctly anticipated by Reisman, when assessing the increase in the US global 
power and the UNSC after the end of the Cold War.801  
 
The UNSC was thrown into turmoil in response to the US pressure that Iraq was in ‘material 
breach’ of the previous resolutions, resulting in resolution 1441, in 2002, warning Iraq of a 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-23455760; The approach adopted by China and 
Russia was to veto the United Nations resolution against Syria claiming that the ‘threat of sanctions will not 
bring peace’, UN News Centre, Syria: Ban voices deep regret after Security Council fails to agree on resolution, 
4 February 2012, available at: http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=41144&Cr=Syria&Cr1=; 
Similar uprising in Libya was inconsistently and more aggressively dealt with by the Security Council, where 
UK and France lobbied for international support for ‘no fly zone’ in Libya and the eventual downfall of Gaddafi 
regime. Similarly the uprising in Iran back in 2009 did neither result in any actions by the Security Council nor 
did it receive adequate international attention.  
797 This regret is seen in the Kofi Annan’s statement indicating that Rwanda Genocide ‘must leave us always 
with a sense of bitter regret and abiding sorrow’, Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s remarks at the Memorial 
Conference on the Rwanda Genocide, organized by the Governments of Canada and Rwanda in New York, 26 
March 2004, Press Release SG/SM/9223/AFR/870HQ/631; Similarly US former President Clinton has 
repeatedly spoken about his personal regret of delay in actions in Rwanda, the Boston Globe News, 10 
December, 2007. 
798 Michael J. Glennon, Why the Security Council Failed, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 82, No. 3, 2003, pp. 17-18. 
799 Further to this point, the President stated that ‘We created the United Nations Security Council, so that, 
unlike the League of Nations, our deliberations would be more than talk, our resolutions would be more than 
wishes’, The White House, US President George W. Bush at General Assembly, 12 September 2002, available 
at: http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/09/20020912-1.html 
800 For further information see the Telegraph News, Julian Coman and David Wastel, ‘We don't need 
permission’,10 November 2002. 
801 Supra note 757, p. 97. 
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‘series of consequences’ if failing to disarm.802 The subsequent events following this 
resolution resulted in the war in Iraq and divided the P-5 as they were no longer able to co-
operate in their response to the disarmament of Iraq.803 Disagreements and non-cooperation 
was observed, with France and Russia refusing to permit the use of force against Iraq, with 
China following their reluctance soon after, and the UK’s efforts in bringing about a 
compromise was failing rapidly.804 The US was concerned at this deadlock with reference to 
the view that the UNSC would be seen as unable to deal with Iraq and its alleged weapons of 
mass destruction (WMD) and George W. Bush claimed that the UNSC was likely to ‘fade 
into history as an ineffective, irrelevant debating society’.805 The legality of this war 
stemmed from a combination of deemed non-compliance of the previous UNSC resolutions, 
together with the alleged threat of Iraq’s pursuit of WMD.806  
 
The Iraq War took place with the US citing that disarmament was no longer the only 
objective for them and they were now also pursuing regime change.807 As time has shown, 
no WMD were found and the legality of the US and the UK attack in Iraq remains the most 
controversial issue to date.808 The absence of clear collective UNSC backing has jeopardised 
not only the reputation of the US and the UK, but also has gone towards weakening the 
UNSC and the UN as a whole. This has been a long time coming, since the US became a 
unipolar force in the international arena, and particularly the threat by the US to unilaterally 
involve itself in issues needing to be addressed under the umbrella of IL and the UN, as the 
organization representing the international community. The initial approach adopted by the 
US in relation to Syria and their alleged chemical weapon attack is a prominent and most 
recent example of this unilateral responsiveness. Given the role of the US and the other four 
                                                          
802 Security Council Resolution 1441, The situation between Iraq and Kuwait, recalling all its previous relevant 
resolutions, in particular its resolutions 661 of 6 August 1990, 678 of 29 November 1990, 686 of 2 March 1991, 
687 of 3 April 1991, 688 of 5 April 1991, 707 of 15 August 1991, 715 of 11 October 1991, 986 of 14 April 
1995, and 1284 of 17 December 1999, 4644th meeting, 8 November 2002, S/RES/1441; also supra note 798, p. 
17. 
803 Supra note 798, pp. 17-18. 
804 Ibid, p. 18. 
805 CNN News, Security Council's Dilemma on Enforcement, 13 February 2003.  
806 Supra note 98, pp. 1255-1256. 
807 The National Security Archive, Declassified Documents Show Bush Administration Diverting Attention and 
Resources to Iraq Less than Two Months after Launch of Afghanistan War, 22 September 2010, available at: 
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB326/index.htm; also for further information please see Mail 
Online News, Simon Walters, Iraq Inquiry bombshell: Secret letter to reveal new Blair war lies, 29 November 
2009. 
808 Dan Sarooshi, The United Nations and the Development of Collective Security: The Delegation by the UN 
Security Council of Its Chapter VII Powers, 1999, p. 174; supra note 98, p. 1256; and The Guardian, News, 17 
and 18 March 2003. 
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permanent members in enforcing IL in the realm of the UNSC, when any member openly 
defies the basis of international peace and security, it can only result in international 
instability and insecurity, as evident through various examples, most obviously the ever 
increasing insurgencies in Afghanistan, and Iraq Wars and the increase in radical Islamic 
fundamentalism.  
 
It is important for the US to consider its role as a decision-maker and determinant member 
of international legal enforcement mechanism, hence it must commit to its rules rather than 
permitting itself to circumvent IL, and utilise the loopholes existing in its enforcement in 
pursuit of individualistic objectives. Therefore, the validity of the enforcement mechanism 
of IL has come under scrutiny and placed IL at great disadvantage by having to justify its 
place. One consequence of this can be seen in escalating crises and instability in the world. 
Therefore when looking at the P-5 approaches to these cases, what comes to the picture is 
how the UNSC’s credibility has been damaged through their inconsistent actions and 
decisions.  
 
3.3. The connection between the ICJ and the UNSC 
 
There are numerous inter-connections between the ICJ and the UNSC in their enforcement 
efforts. In the above sections, the distinct forms and features of these two organs were 
discussed but as a reiteration, it is useful to emphasise that the ICJ is predominantly a legal 
organ whereas the UNSC is a more political organ, empowered to maintain peace and 
security. Examination of the connection between these two organs highlights further 
weaknesses in the enforcement of IL which has placed reciprocity in the pivotal position as 
an alternative enforcement mechanism.    
 
As was discussed previously, the ICJ faces limitations in enforcing its own decisions since 
its Statute dos not make any reference to enforcement of the ICJ judgment. In cases of non-
compliance, States look to the UNSC to enforce the Court’s judgment.809 The prominent 
example of this is in the Nicaragua case, where the US was accused of breaching IL by not 
                                                          
809 The Security Council’s empowerment for enforcing the Court’s judgments emanates from the Charter stating 
that ‘If any party to a case fails to perform the obligations incumbent upon it under a judgment rendered by the 
Court, the other party may have recourse to the Security Council, which may… make recommendations or 
decide upon measures to be taken to give effect to the judgment’, supra note 7, Articles 94(2). 
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following through with the ICJ ruling and the case was accordingly taken to the UNSC. The 
resolution put forward for the US non-compliance went through several rounds of voting, 
finally vetoed by the US, resulting in the resolution not being adopted.810 Following 
Nicaragua’s failing attempt, it resorted to taking the case to the GA. Despite a general 
agreement amongst the international community for the US to accept the ICJ’s judgment, the 
GA was powerless to do any more than request the US’s full compliance.811 This example is 
reflective of instances rendering the ICJ less powerful than would be ordinarily expected, 
where one of the P-5 can go against its judgment and absolutely disregard its international 
obligations. The difference in this situation was how the UNSC was able to reduce the 
effectiveness of the ICJ ruling despite wide claim for recognition of the judgment by the 
international community.  
 
As mentioned, the ICJ can be asked to provide advisory opinion on legal matters particularly 
the consistent legal interpretation of the provisions in the UN Charter, but its interpretations 
are not restricted to just advisory opinions. An example of this interpretation is in the ICJ 
ruling in the Nicaragua case where the provisions for the right to self-defence were 
interpreted.812 The ICJ’s advisory role was further cemented by the GA resolution 
171(II)(A).813 The recommendations of this resolution were derived from the need for 
correct and valid interpretation for the UN Charter in line with ‘recognized principles of 
international law’, and the expert legal knowledge that resides in the ICJ as principal judicial 
organ of the UN.814 However, as discussed, the ICJ’s role for providing advisory opinion has 
not been sufficiently sought for numerous reasons.  
 
The demonstrative example is the case of ‘Indonesian Question’,815 where Belgium 
proposed a draft resolution for seeking the ICJ’s advisory opinion on the competence of the 
                                                          
810 Security Council Provisional Verbatim Record, 2718th meeting, 28 October 1986, S/PV.2718, p. 40. 
811 General Assembly Resolution 41/31 (Plenary Session), Judgment of the International Court of Justice of 27 
June 1986 concerning military and paramilitary activities in and against Nicaragua, 53rd Session, 03 November 
1986, A/RES/41/31.    
812 Supra note 266, para, 200.  
813 General Assembly Resolution 171(II), Need for greater use by the United Nations and its organs of the 
International Court of Justice, 2nd Session, 14 November 1947, A/RES/171(II). 
814 Ibid. 
815 In the dispute between the Netherland and Indonesia during the colonization era, 1947, the Netherland had 
challenged the Security Council’s involvement in their dispute on the grounds of the nature of the issue which 
was claimed by the Dutch to be a domestic issue hence according to the Article 2(7) of the Charter of the United 
Nations was outside the scope of international intervention. 
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UNSC in the dispute between the Netherlands and Indonesia.816 The responses and debate 
on the Belgium proposal provide a dim view of the working relationship between the UNSC 
and the ICJ, or the respect the UNSC has or portrays for their advisory opinion. Similarly the 
UNSC pays less attention to the ICJ’s legal expertise than it deserved. The first 
disheartening response came from the Polish representative who declared that, ‘the question 
of competence in the case of the Indonesian question was not a legal one. It was a political 
question which could be decided only by the Council’.817 Similarly, the Australian 
representative dismissed the need to seek the ICJ’s opinion, by suggesting that: 
 
If we decide on every occasion to refer a question to the International Court before we decide to take 
any action whatever, the result would be that we would never take any action.818 
      
This line of thinking was followed by the Chinese representative who was equally reluctant 
to ask the ICJ’s opinion, arguing that: 
 
A legal opinion rendered to the Council might turn out to be a very tight strait-jacket…If we put on 
this strait-jacket, we may find it very inconvenient when we attempt to face the problems of a world 
which is changing very rapidly.819    
 
As can be convincingly argued, the idea behind the recommendation of seeking the ICJ’s 
advice was not to refer every case but to bring about a sense of uniformity in the application 
of IL.820 It is concerning that the Chinese representative suggested that the UNSC should be 
left unguarded and free to pursue its own course. The view that ICJ recommendations are to 
limit the UNSC sphere of movement or its discretionary powers is alarming, especially from 
a P-5 member. This view disregards the usefulness, or at times necessity, for uniformity and 
legality in interpretation and applicability of IL. Another perspective is the UNSC 
representatives opposing the Belgian proposal were loath to submit themselves and/or the 
UNSC’s authority to an external organ, preferring to maintain their own autonomy and 
                                                          
816 The Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council, 1946-1951, Case 9.88, The Indonesian Question (II), 
1947, pp. 454, 466-467, available at: http://www.un.org/en/sc/repertoire/46-51/46-51_12.pdf.   
817 Ibid, p. 467.  
818 Ibid, p. 467. 
819 Ibid, p. 467.  
820 Supra note 792, pp. 16-17, Bedjaoui argues that it was accepted originally that each international organ can 
interpret the Charter themselves in their daily activities; however, the important questions that require legal 
assessment and expertise are to be referred to the Court. The Security Council by now has had adequate 
experience to identify the strengths of its expertise as well as its weaknesses that require the legal-based 
analytical advisory opinion. 
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power in their decision making.821  
 
It is useful to look at a similar issue that arose when Yugoslavia, in the Anglo-Iranian Oil 
Company case, was not satisfied with France’s suggestion of delaying the UNSC decision 
till after the ICJ ruling on the same subject; fearing that such proposal reduces the UNSC’s 
competency indicating a dependency on another organ.822 This argument is baseless since 
the UN Charter itself offers the UNSC the grounds for referring to the ICJ, where this is an 
available option, not a requirement, and it will have no impact on UNSC’s competency.823 It 
is incorrect to assume that upon exercising this option, the UNSC becomes a subordinate 
body. Contrarily, it is the UNSC asking for an advisory opinion rather than being challenged 
or imposed upon.824 As a matter of law the importance of seeking advice is that a political 
body needs to confer with a legal body when reaching legal decisions, least of all to ensure 
the decisions are complying with the requirements of IL as embedded in the integral parts of 
the rule of law. 
 
The discussion above on the power and influence of the UNSC particularly the P-5 setting 
out the binding obligations and duties upon States demonstrates the extent to which the 
enforcement of IL can be influenced by a political organ such as the UNSC. This influence is 
alarming when it can be observed that a political organ is more influential in affecting 
international legal obligations and its enforcement to a higher degree than the ICJ as a 
judiciary organ. In fact the decisions reached by the ICJ and the UNSC are both legally 
obligatory, however, looking at these comparatively, the ICJ decisions create only legally 
binding obligations on the disputants, while the UNSC decisions encompass a wider legally 
binding scope, including all UN members. The ICJ has maintained a limited sphere by 
assessing only the legal aspects of any dispute; however, the same cannot be said of the 
UNSC, when the UNSC has intervened in wide-ranging legal aspects of disputes. Cases such 
as the Aegean Sea Continental Shelf and the Nicaragua are examples of such intervention.825 
In the former case, the ICJ identified the political nature of the dispute but on closer 
                                                          
821 Ibid, pp. 19-20. 
822 Anglo-Iranian Oil Company Case, The United Kingdom of Great Britain v. Iran, ICJ Reports, 1952, the 
Government of Iran raised its objection on the basis of lack of jurisdiction; for further information please see 
supra note 792, pp. 19-20. 
823 Supra note 792, p. 20. 
824 Ibid, p. 20. 
825 Supra note 708; and supra note 266.  
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investigation, the ICJ rejected Turkey’s claim that the case was purely political, and the Court 
assessed the case purely on the legal matters surrounding the dispute.826 In the latter case, 
however, the US as one of the P-5 disregarded the legal position of the case as judged by the 
ICJ, and used its veto right ignoring the legal obligation set by the ICJ.827 Furthermore, the 
international community’s overwhelming view on this case as was demonstrated by their GA 
votes was also disregarded. The international community reiterated and requested the US to 
uphold its regard for IL which includes absolute compliance with the binding decision of the 
ICJ, but this has been of no effect.  
 
The UNSC actions, in the above cases, have had intended and unintended consequences in IR 
and IL, at times relating to the enforcement of judicial decisions. It also casts a shadow of 
doubt on the true representation of the international community in the UNSC and the correct 
use of veto for maintaining and promoting international peace and security. This is to say, the 
regard for equality of States and their equal representative and quest for justice as the core 
basis of IL has been undermined. Hence, the strength and the power of the enforcement 
mechanisms have been affected and continue to be affected. It is worth reiterating that the 
US, as an example, has continued its approach to the present time where it is confirmed that 
the US will use its veto right in following the Palestine request for admission to the UN as a 
member State. The Palestinian request has received the international community’s backing 
where there was a standing ovation in the GA following the formal request. 
 
3.4. Issues with International Law Enforcement through the Security 
Council and the International Court of Justice 
 
The enforcement mechanisms discussed so far highlight the weaknesses and limitations faced 
by IL for the enforcement of its rules. The power and strength bestowed upon the UNSC 
were observed, and the following analysis assesses the concerns surrounding this power and 
its impact on enforcement of IL. The issues are multifaceted and encompass issues with 1) 
Equality and democratic representation in international disputes settlements; 2) Compliance 
and commitment of States to IL or the obligations set for them; 3) Risks to international 
peace and security. The issues with the centralised enforcement mechanisms further highlight 
                                                          
826 Supra note 708, pp. 12-13.  
827 Supra note 810, p. 40. 
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the necessity of the non-centralised enforcement mechanism of IL and the role of reciprocity 
within this form of enforcement. 
 
3.4.1. Equality and Democratic Representation in International Disputes Settlements 
 
Compared to the UNSC, the GA power is minimal although it includes a greater 
representation of member States. The UNSC resolutions are legally binding whereas the GA 
resolutions are considered as ‘soft law’. More than half a century after the UN’s creation, it is 
difficult to fully digest how the power granted to its political organ, the UNSC, can be a 
democratic distribution of power. The UN has had to admit that the world does not regard the 
UNSC as a truly democratic representation of the international community, and reform must 
take place.828 This non-democratic representation is further skewed by inequality within the 
UNSC, where the P-5 holds veto rights, and their buy-in is necessary for any issue brought to 
them.829 In theory, veto rights can be useful in bringing about co-operation and uniformity in 
the decisions taken by the P-5. However, has this been achieved in practical cases? Given the 
political nature of the UNSC, can the decisions and actions taken by the UNSC disregard 
potential individualistic decisions and exclude the personal interest of the UNSC members, 
particularly the P-5, for the benefit of the international community as a whole? The 
significance of this is in the role of the UNSC as an enforcement mechanism of IL and it is 
reasonable for the international community to have a level of expectation for neutrality in 
evaluation of the overall benefit in the UNSC decision making process. Although, steps have 
been taken to address this problem through the necessary reform for a better representation,830 
this effort has not so far been successful.   
 
The following sections examines why the urgency in this reform is needed as a short-term 
solution, and how the UNSC decisions and its impacts can create negative consequences on 
international peace and security, notwithstanding the damage to the UN’s credibility. There 
exists a fundamental discrepancy in the UN Charter indicating the ‘equal rights’ of States and 
later outlining the limited composition of the UNSC, particularly empowerment of the P-5.831 
                                                          
828 General Assembly Resolution 300, Strengthening of the United Nations: an agenda for further change, 57th 
Session, 20 December 2002, A/RES/57/300.  
829 Jost Delbruck, The Role of the United Nations in Dealing with Global Problems, Indiana Journal of Global 
Legal Studies, Vol. 4, No.2, 1997, p. 283. 
830 Supra note 828, para. 20.  
831 Supra note 7, Articles 1.  
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The contrast between the aim for inclusiveness and equality in theory, and the exclusivity of 
the UNSC decisions has a paramount impact on IL. The biggest damage is where a 
permanent member can veto a resolution and go against the will of others. This issue was 
highlighted in two recent cases, firstly surrounding the US threatening to use its veto right 
against the establishment of an independent State of Palestine,832 and secondly China and 
Russia using their veto right against the UNSC resolution against Syria.833 In both cases the 
majority of the international community was in support of the resolutions, but the threat of a 
veto meant that the final outcome may not have been based on the general consensus of the 
international community.834  
 
A similar approach can be seen in the extent to which the US political will on the issue of 
Israel and Palestine has influenced the course of IL through vetoing a case between these two 
States forty two times.835 The US systematically fails to consider its role in the UNSC to act 
in capacity of an enforcing body of IL and to maintain international peace. There would be 
immense rewards if the US would play a more constructive role and adopt a more problem-
solving approach. The issue of Israel/Palestine is considered to be of vital importance by the 
ICJ, the UNSC and the GA since it is a major contributor to international peace and security. 
On the one hand, Palestinians have support from the Arab World and Islamic countries; and 
on the other hand, Israel has the support of most Western countries. Additionally, the Islamist 
groups, such as Hamas or Hezbollah, believe that in the conflict, Palestinian rights are being 
abused, as well as relying on this persecution as a way of increasing expansion of their belief 
system. Therefore, this important approach, for instance, towards the recognition of Palestine 
could be pivotal in building co-operation in the future which will go towards prolonging 
international peace and security. Chapter Five addresses what the necessary steps are in 
                                                          
832 Middle East Monitor, Dana Halawa, A Palestinian-American view of the US veto, 30 September 2011; and 
Voice of America News, André de Nesnera, Possible US Veto Against Palestinian Statehood Bid at UN 
Debated, 21 September 2011. 
833 Security Council 6627th Meeting, Security Council Fails to Adopt Draft Resolutions Condemning Syria’s 
Crackdown on Anti-Government Protestors, 04 October 2011, SC/10403.  
834 Syria has received a condemnation for the treatment of protestors for reform, and similarly Mahmood Abbas 
received standing ovation following his speech requesting the consideration for independent State of Palestine. 
835 When looking at Israel and Palestine case, it is disappointing to observe that 42 Security Council resolutions 
on the same subject have been vetoed unilaterally by the United States since 10 Sept 1972; more importantly, in 
July 2004, illegality of the construction of the Wall in the occupied Palestinian Territory was approved by 
advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice, for further information on this subject see: the United 
Nations Resolutions Concerning Israel/Palestine, American Association for Palestine Equal Rights, available at: 
http://www.aaper.org/site/c.quIXL8MPJpE/b.3813077/k.9D93/UN_Security_Council_Resolutions_supporting_
Palestinian_human_rights.htm; and Wall Opinion Case, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in 
the Occupied Palestinian Territory, ICJ Reports, Advisory Opinion, 2004.  
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achieving international co-operation as a prerequisite for international peace and security. 
These steps will help determine how the loss viewed by Israel in the short-term is 
overpowered by the future long-term gains in this mutually beneficial deal when viewing the 
value of establishing a long lasting peace, and minimising escalating threats to international 
security. 
 
3.4.2. Compliance and Commitment of States to International Law or the Obligations   
Set for States 
 
IL is based on the ground of compliance by States and their commitment for upholding their 
duties and obligations. As iterated in this study, the formulation, the compliance and 
enforcement of IL relied heavily on the ‘will’ and ‘consent’ of States. As such it has been 
presumed that by taking States into consideration in every aspect of the legal system, the 
commitment of the main players can be relied upon. A previous example used was comparing 
the domestic and IL, where in a national legal system, the jurisdiction of a Court cannot be 
undermined or questioned without repercussions, whereas in IL, the jurisdiction of the ICJ is 
not compulsory, but determinable and open to challenge by States. It is therefore plausible to 
expect commitment from States in the legal system where they have a self-determining right 
to their obligations and duties, together with such authority as to challenge the jurisdiction of 
its judiciary organ. This is to say that, treaty formulation, ability to place reservations, the 
role of States in formulations of CIL, and the unequivocal acceptance of the UN Charter 
duties and obligations, together with the absolute necessity of ‘consent’ at every turn places a 
responsibility upon States to give due respect and consideration to the importance of their 
commitment to the agreed duties and obligations under the IL.  
 
The limitations of IL enforcement have impacted the extent to which States are willing to 
abide by their obligations. This is coupled with inequality perceived between the stronger 
States, the P-5, and others, which provides an escape route for non-compliance. The 
imbalance has fuelled a dimmer view of IL than it deserves, as well as a stronger tendency 
for States to follow their political agenda rather than their commitment. Hence, if the UNSC 
approaches are influenced by political motivations, where does that leave the 
international community and IL enforcement mechanism?   
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Disregard for IL is not exclusive to undemocratic and authoritarian States. There is 
convincing evidence of disregard by some of the P-5 in cases referred to the UNSC such as 
China’s support in ‘fuelling war in Darfur’,836 France arming Libyan rebels,837 the US 
willingness to go to Iraq in 2003 without the UNSC backing or absolute clarity on the legality 
of the war,838 or the case analysed in Chapter Three regarding the US treatment of detainees. 
This level of disregard or unilateral approach towards IL by its guardians and enforcers 
leaves little room for expecting others to have a high regard for the rule of law and IL. Hence, 
despite the anticipation of commitment of States to IL, the political elements intervene in the 
level of commitment that would otherwise be expected. 
 
3.4.3. Risks to International Peace and Security 
 
On reflecting back to the main role of the UNSC, it is important to consider the 
stipulation that the UNSC ‘in discharging these duties…shall act in accordance with the 
Purposes and Principles of the United Nations’.839 This suggests that the UNSC must hold 
the UN purpose and principle forefront in their approach. A feature of the UNSC 
resolutions, discussed before, is in their binding obligations that are created following a law-
making process. At the next stage, the resolutions create the basis of an enforcing instrument 
for IL. Hence, the UNSC’s acts and resolutions must be based on the integral parts of the 
rule of law, justice, consistency, uniformity, and legality, which are reflective of the UN 
purposes and principles. This stance helps clarify how, for justice to be achieved, there must 
be consistency in approach, uniformity in the application of circumstance, and sound 
wisdom and reasoning in evaluation of the characteristics for categorisation of 
circumstances. That is to say, the decisions of the UNSC are internationally accepted and 
                                                          
836 Despite the international embargo for the United Nations members taking measures to ensure they do not 
provide militarily assistance in the conflict in Darfur, BBC found evidence that China has been in breach of this 
embargo by assisting Sudan military, BBC News, World News, Hilary Andersson, China ‘is fuelling war in 
Darfur’, 13 July 2008. 
837 African Union criticised and condemned France for arming Libyan rebel groups on the ground that it put the 
region at risk. John Laughland, the director of studies at the Institute of Democracy and Cooperation was also 
critical of France’s actions, available at: http://www.idc-europe.org/en/The-Institute-of-Democracy-and-
Cooperation; also see RT Russian News, 30 June 2011; and BBC News, World News, Libya: AU condemns French 
arms drop to rebels, 30 June 2011. 
838 Further information on this subject see supra note 798; illegality of the war in Iraq on the basis of 
international law was stressed by Scholars Ulf Bernitz, Nicolas Espejo-Yaksic, Agnes Hurwitz, Vaughan Lowe, 
Ben Saul, Katja Ziegler, James Crawford, Susan Marks, Roger O'Keefe, Christine Chinkin, Gerry Simpson, 
Deborah Cass, Matthew Craven, Philippe Sands, Ralph Wilde, Pierre-Marie Dupuy in an article, the Guardian, 
War Would be Illegal, 7 March 2003.  
839 Supra note 7, Articles 24(2).  
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valid, if and when the UNSC has fulfilled its tasks and responsibilities in line with the 
requirements of the rule of law. If not, to what extent must and could the UNSC transcend its 
set boundaries?  
 
Kelsen suggested that the UNSC’s conducts under Article 39, in assessing the measures in 
response to potential threat to peace, are taken in response to ‘maintain or restore peace’ as 
opposed to restoring or enforcing the law.840 He believed that although the UNSC’s 
empowerment must be based on the UN purpose and principles of which justice and IL are 
paramount, the UNSC however is not limited to IL. That is to say, the UNSC is empowered 
to take steps for maintaining peace and security through justice even if it is not ‘in 
conformity’ with IL.841 This viewpoint is startling as it suggests that the UNSC is granted an 
empowerment to establish peace and security at any cost, even if it transcends the rules of IL. 
Judge Bedjaoui provides a coherent and strong counter-argument when stressing how the 
UNSC is not excused from the boundaries of IL which includes, within it, the provisions of 
the UN Charter.842 This counter-argument revolves around important primary factors of IL. 
Firstly, IL, particularly the provisions of the UN Charter, must be respected and not be 
breached by any UN organ; secondly, the UNSC cannot disregard the rules of IL formulated 
and consented to by States for any reason; thirdly, in cases of the UNSC facing a gap in IL, 
the legality of the UNSC actions creates an obligation on them not to act against the rules of 
IL.843 Additionally, in developing his argument, Bedjaoui refers to Dupuy’s observation on 
how States create international organizations that in turn provide legal rules for the operations 
of the organizations; however all international organizations’ rules must be subject to IL.844 It 
is difficult to see how the UNSC can deem itself above the rules of IL but simultaneously be 
its main enforcer. In this line of thought, surely it is more plausible to accept Bedjaoui’s 
reasoning that the sphere of the UNSC operation is limited to the framework of IL.    
 
The above discussion makes the assessment of legality of the UNSC decisions paramount 
when discussing their duties for upholding and enforcing IL. One of the most important 
assessments of legality is in the correct interpretation of the UN Charter provisions, 
essentially, the factors that must be present when the UNSC decides on potential risks to 
                                                          
840 Hans Kelsen, The Law of the United Nations: A Critical Analysis of its Fundamental, 2000, p. 294. 
841 Ibid, p. 295. 
842 Supra note 792, pp. 32-36. 
843 Ibid, pp. 32-36. 
844 Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Droit International Public, 1992, p. 127; and supra note 792, p. 33. 
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international peace and security. The UN Charter has authorised international organs to 
interpret its provisions in the sphere of their control and parameters. Even though there is no 
requirement for one body to adopt the interpretation of others, however, the ability of any 
organ’s ability has an effect on IL. This might be an unintended effect, but as Schachter has 
convincingly argued:  
 
When an organ applies a Charter principle or any other rule of law to a particular set of facts, it is 
asserting, as a matter of logic, a new rule of a more specific character. This is a law-creative act, 
even though the members of the organ maintain (as they often do) that their decision is confined to 
the specific facts and they do not intend to establish a precedent.845 
 
As discussed earlier in this work, this raises a concern when legal interpretation of a political 
body, the UNSC, can set legal principles and precedents for other UN organs, particularly the 
ICJ, the principal judicial organ. Such concerns lead the study to argue for a need for the 
establishment of an overarching judicial review body that could overview the legality of the 
decisions and actions of all UN bodies in line with IL and the rule of law.  
 
Judge Lachs refers to the ICJ as a ‘guardian of legality’ for the international community,846 
however the ICJ is limited in its advisory opinion so long as there is no request placed upon it 
to provide any interpretation, and also its advice is non-binding. However, suggested 
overarching judicial body must be enabled to perform regular legal reviews. Additionally, the 
parameters for this body must only not be limited to maintaining peace and security, but must 
expand to encompass all areas of IL, if it is to be able to take a complete view of the 
implication of the decisions of one body upon the others. In other words this organ must not 
contradict other rules of IL when interpreting and dealing with a point at hand. This also 
helps towards serving global justice from an overall viewpoint without limitations to peace 
and security. One of the main issues with the UNSC decisions is the perception that there are 
inconsistencies in their approach towards subjects endangering international peace or with 
non-complying States. It has often been concluded that political and domestic pressures play 
a vital role in the P-5 decisions.  
 
                                                          
845 Oscar Schachter, The Quasi-Judicial Role of the Security Council and the General Assembly, The American 
Journal of International Law, Vol. 58, No. 4, 1964, particularly p. 960. 
846 Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention arising from the Aerial 
Incident at Lockerbie, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United States of America, Request for the Indication of 
Provisional Measures, ICJ Reports, Separate Opinion of Judge Lachs, 1992, p. 138.  
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Over the years, since the establishment of the UN and its organs, there have been indications 
that politics play a more prominent role in UNSC decisions than a purely legal ground. 
Amongst a large number of politically driven resolutions,847 the Libya case, following the 
Lockerbie incident, provides a prominent example, where resolution 731 obliged States to 
assist with efforts for the extradition of two accused Libyan nationals.848 The validity and 
legality of such mandate was brought under question, particularly since the extradition was 
deemed a legal matter and must be dealt with through legal channels.849 This approach was 
generally perceived by Libya as a purely political decision sponsored by the US and the UK. 
As a result, Libya took the case to the ICJ, claiming that Libya had fully complied with its 
obligations under the applicable 1971 Montreal Convention and hence requested provisional 
measures for its interim protection.850 Even though the US and the UK counter-claimed on 
the grounds of jurisdiction of the Court, the ICJ finally refuted this and set about to examine 
the case.851 Subsequently, soon after the close of the hearing, the UNSC passed resolution 
748 requesting the ICJ not to provide any ‘provisional measures’, so as not to be in conflict 
with the UNSC.852 This action by the UNSC has been described by many to change the 
natural course of the ICJ decision-making, placing a great conflict between these two 
organs.853  
 
                                                          
847 Namely, the United States use of veto against Israel and Palestine Case for 42 times and the US invasion in 
Iraq and Kosovo.  
848 Security Council Resolution 731, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 3033rd meeting, 21 January 1992, S/RES/731. 
849 The challenge was made by the representative of Sudan, Iran, the League of Arab States and Libya, Security 
Council Provisional Verbatim Record, 3033th meeting, 21 January 1992, S/PV.3033. 
850 Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention arising from the Aerial 
Incident at Lockerbie, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United States of America, ICJ Reports, 1998, paras. 33-35; 
Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention arising from the Aerial Incident 
at Lockerbie, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United States of America, Request for the Indication of Provisional 
Measures, ICJ Reports, paras. 7-8, Montreal Convention Article 14(1) states ‘Any dispute between two or more 
Contracting States concerning the interpretation or application of this Convention which cannot be settled 
through negotiation, shall…be submitted to arbitration.  If within six months from the date of the request for 
arbitration the Parties are unable to agree on the organization of the arbitration, any one of those Parties may 
refer the dispute to the International Court of Justice by request in conformity with the Statute of the Court’, 
International Civil Aviation Organization, Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety 
of Civil Aviation, adopted on 23 September 1971, 974 UNTS 177. 
851 Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention arising from the Aerial 
Incident at Lockerbie, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United States of America, ICJ Reports, 1998, paras. 37-38; 
and Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention arising from the Aerial 
Incident at Lockerbie, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United Kingdom, ICJ Reports, 1998, paras. 37-39. 
852 Security Council Resolution 748, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 3063rd meeting, 31 March 1992, S/RES/748.  
853 Mohammed Bedjaoui, The New World Order and the Security Council: Testing the Legality of its Acts, 1994, 
pp. 46-47; David Schweigman, The Authority of the Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter: Legal Limits and the Role of the International Court of Justice, 2001, pp. 257-258; and Vera 
Gowlland-Debbas, Security council Enforcement Actions and Issues of State Responsibility, International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 43, Issue. 1, 1994, p. 55. 
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Franck convincingly argues how these forced the ICJ to comply with a political organ’s 
decision on a situation that required a legal opinion.854 The ICJ was placed under great 
restriction by the UNSC when deciding upon a legal matter which was in its domain and 
expertise; and had to conclude that even though Libya may have had legal rights under the 
1971 Montreal Convention, but its legal obligation under the UN Charter meant that the 
UNSC resolutions override other obligations and must be adhered to.855 Judge Lachs 
articulated that the ICJ is duty bound by IL to respect the UNSC,856 and as such the Court 
could not disregard the UNSC resolutions.857 Although the Judge was also quick to disclaim 
suggestions that the ICJ judgement is to be taken as ‘abdication of its powers’,858 but this 
situation undoubtedly caused discomfort. It is hard to see how a political organ’s ability to 
override a situation by silencing a judiciary organ will not have an impact on its ability to 
protect and enforce IL. Also equally important is the issue of both organs’ ability to review 
and assess a case simultaneously.  
 
Comparing this to national legal systems, enforcement bodies are not empowered to deal 
with the same case that is being examined in another Court prior to the cessation of that 
case, known as res judicata as well as Estoppel;859 however, the same restrictions do not 
seem to apply to the ICJ and the UNSC, as this case demonstrates. This issue had risen 
before in the case of United States v. Iran, where IRI contested the case on the grounds that 
this matter was already before the UNSC, but the ICJ rejected this claim as viable and 
continued to assess the case.860 Judge Alvarez in the Anglo-Iranian Oil case viewed that the 
UNSC has the right to intervene and overtake a case that it deems a threat to international 
                                                          
854 Thomas M. Franck, The ‘Powers of Appreciation’: Who Is the Ultimate Guardian of UN Legality?, The 
American Journal of International Law, Vol. 86, No. 3, 1992, p. 521. 
855 Supra note 7, Article 25 and 103.  
856 Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention arising from the Aerial 
Incident at Lockerbie, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United States of America, Request for the Indication of 
Provisional Measures, ICJ Reports, Separate Opinion of Judge Lachs, p. 138. 
857 Supra note 757, pp. 87-88. 
858 Supra note 856.  
859 This is known as res judicata as well as Estoppel. The former is recognised in both civil law and common 
law referring to situations where a dispute cannot be claimed again either in the same Court or in any other 
Court. In effect the doctrine of res judicata will be used to preclude the dispute being put forward for 
reconsideration. The latter refers to situations being barred from re-litigation, supra note 2, pp. 589-590 and 
1336-1137. 
860 The ground for this claim was that the Court should not decline to resolve legal issues comprising aspects of 
political disputes because ‘it would impose a far-reaching and unwarranted restriction upon the role of the Court 
in the peaceful solution of international disputes’, supra note 707, paras. 39-40; and Krzysztof Skubiszewski, 
the International Court of Justice and the Security Council, (eds.) Vaughan Lowe and Malgosia Fitzmaurice, 
Fifty Years of the International Court of Justice: Essays in Honour of Sir Robert Jennings, 2007, p. 610. 
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peace, indicating that the UNSC can directly intervene and limit the Court’s jurisdiction in a 
case under the ICJ’s review.861 Judge Alvarez’s view was challenged by Judge 
Weeramantry, in the Libya case, on the grounds that even though the UNSC ‘has primary 
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security … is not sufficient to 
give it exclusive competence over these matters’, referring to Rosenne’s argument for non-
exclusivity of UNSC’s competence.862 In practice, however, the ICJ found itself closer to 
Judge Alvarez’s view in the Libya case, when it was not able to address the case on the 
grounds of obligations set by the UNSC.863 Upon closer inspection, Judge Alvarez’s view is 
questionable and does not seem correct that the UNSC as enforcing body is able to 
contradict the judiciary organ of IL.    
 
Based on evidence, it must be noted that there do not seem to be any jurisdictional issues 
between the ICJ and the UNSC prior to the end of Cold War, where any restrictions were 
shown to be placed on the ICJ for the Court to follow its legal course and to deliver its 
judgment.864 To sharpen the conflict between the two international enforcing bodies let us 
assess a similar situation which arose a few years later where the ICJ contradicted the legal 
interpretation of right to self-defence by the UNSC. Soon after the 9/11 attack, the UNSC 
interpreted that the ‘war on terror’ was effectively self-defence and therefore permissible 
under the UN Charter.865 In this respect, an important point to note is that the ‘war on terror’ 
was not against a particular State or its armed force, rather it was targeting non-State actors, 
otherwise referred to as belligerents. The legality of the UNSC resolutions, 1368 and 1373, 
and the subsequent attack on Afghanistan following these resolutions have been the subject 
of contradictory debates.866 The questions revolved around the issue of whether self-defence 
                                                          
861 Anglo-Iranian Oil Company Case, The United Kingdom of Great Britain v. Iran, ICJ Reports, Dissenting 
Opinion of Judge Alvarez, 1952, p. 134. 
862 Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention arising from the Aerial 
Incident at Lockerbie, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United States of America, Request for the Indication of 
Provisional Measures, ICJ Reports, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Weeramantry, p. 166; and Shabtai Rosenne, 
The Law and Practice of the International Court, 1985, p. 73. 
863 Krzysztof Skubiszewski, The International Court of Justice and the Security Council, (eds.) Vaughan Lowe 
and Malgosia Fitzmaurice, Fifty Years of the International Court of Justice:  Essays in Honour of Sir Robert 
Jennings, 2007, p. 622. 
864 Ibid, p. 610. 
865 Security Council Resolution 1373, Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts, 4385th 
meeting, 28 September 2001, S/RES/1373, the Security Council reaffirmed ‘the inherent right of individual or 
collective self-defence as recognized by the Charter of the United Nations as reiterated in resolution 1368’. 
866 Thomas M. Franck, Terrorism and the Right of Self-Defense, The American Journal of International Law, 
Vol. 95, No. 4, 2001; Symposium, The United States and International Law-The  Effects of U.S. Predominance 
on the Foundations of International Law, Gottingen, 25-27 October 2001, available at: 
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in the UN Charter is permissible in response to non-State actors, as of the Taliban and Al-
Qaeda example. The interpretation adopted by the UNSC was that ‘inherent right’ to self-
defence is permissible, but this interpretation was indirectly challenged by the ICJ a few 
years later. 
 
The ICJ’s advisory opinion sought in the Wall Opinion in 2004 brought the issue to the 
surface relating to the legal interpretations of the UN Charter, where Israel relied on the 
UNSC interpretation of self-defence to defend the legality of building a wall to protect itself 
in its self-defence from Palestinian attacks. The ICJ concluded against the applicability of 
self-defence and hence Israel could not rely upon this notion.867 Furthermore, the ICJ 
reiterated the rights of the Palestinians and Israel’s obligation to uphold its international 
legal obligation.868 The ICJ opinion dismissed the earlier UNSC interpretation of 
permissibility of self-defence for non-State actors, concluding that the right of self-defence 
is applicable only when a State finds itself attacked by another State.869 The ICJ’s view was 
contradicted by Judge Buergenthal declaring that the UN Charter, ‘in affirming the inherent 
right of self-defence, does not make its exercise dependent upon an armed attack by another 
State’,870 and the Judge refers to Franck’s reasoning that this inherent right ‘is expressly 
accorded in response to ‘an armed attack’ and not to any particular kind of attacker’.871 
Franck claims that the UNSC resolutions cannot ‘legally’ give the right to exercise of self-
defence since this is an inherent right for the injured party already established in the UN 
Charter.872 The ICJ did not reach the same conclusion as either the UNSC or the one 
proposed by Franck, and has subsequently stirred its relationship with the UNSC.  Since the 
UNSC resolution is binding in this case and the ICJ’s advisory opinion is non-binding, in 
this situation, the UNSC’s interpretation is the overruling one, even though this is arguably a 
legal matter and the ICJ’s view should hold a higher authority. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2674629; and Wall Opinion Case,  Legal Consequences of the Construction of a 
Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, ICJ Reports, Advisory Opinion, Judge Buergenthal opinion, 2004.  
867 Wall Opinion Case, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 
ICJ Reports, Advisory Opinion, 2004, para. 138.  
868 Ibid, paras. 137-140, 142, 143, 145, 149 and 150; Israel’s obligations were outlined by the Court to 
encompass the Palestinian’s rights on the grounds of self-determination and its obligations under international 
human rights law and humanitarian law, obligation erga omnes, as well as State responsibility for internationally 
wrongful act.  
869 Ibid, para. 139.  
870 Ibid, Judge Buergenthal opinion, p. 110. 
871 Thomas M. Franck, Terrorism and the Right of Self-Defense, The American Journal of International Law, 
Vol. 95, No. 4, 2001, p. 840. 
872 Ibid, p. 840. 
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On a related subject, when the evidence of US torture-related issues came to light, no 
condemnation or action were taken by the UNSC, and let us recall the interpretation 
provided in the US torture memos indicating that as non-State actors there would be no 
protection for these individuals under IL. However, the UNSC was comfortable to reaffirm 
that self-defence under the UN Charter would provide protection from the same non-State 
actors. Could this be taken as selective interpretation of IL by a political organ whose area of 
expertise is not in legal interpretation? Are these not indicative of why and how the 
interpretation of all, if not, most important legal issues must be referred to an international 
judiciary body, able to interpret legal issues coherently, consistently and uniformly under the 
umbrella of justice as embedded in IL. 
 
3.5. International Trade Dispute Settlement  
 
As previously mentioned, the working of IL is such that it encourages co-operation and 
compliance with its rules and obligations but in case of non-compliance, it aims to provide 
the reciprocal opportunity for States to regain their balance of rights and interests. This is 
strongly evident in international trade system which is governed by the WTO. The WTO is an 
international organization which deals with the rules and regulations of international trade 
based on the WTO agreements, aimed primarily to help producers of goods and services, 
exporters, and importers conduct their business.873 In other words, its primary objective is to 
ensure that international trade ‘flows as smoothly, predictably and freely as possible’.874 The 
WTO rules and agreements are a branch of IL and as such are under the umbrella of the 
VCLT. The notion of ‘good faith’, discussed earlier, plays a vital role in the agreements and 
rules of the WTO specifically in relation to the dispute settlement processes and procedures 
which are discussed later in this study. In particular, ‘good faith’ is specified in Article 3(10) 
of dispute settlement rules stating that ‘all Members will engage in these procedures in ‘good 
faith’ in an effort to resolve the dispute’,875 as well as under Article 4(3) of dispute settlement 
rules stating that ‘members…shall enter into consultations in good faith’.876 As will become 
                                                          
873 World Trade Organisation, established in 01 January1995 as the successor to the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade, and created by: Uruguay Round negotiations (1986-94).  
874 Ibid. 
875 World Trade Organisation, Annex 2 - Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of 
Disputes, Article 3. 
876 Ibid, Article 4; for more information see Andrew D. Mitchell, Legal Disputes in WTO Disputes, 2008, 
pp.121-123.  
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evident, ‘good faith’ plays a fundamental role in ensuring the obligations of the WTO are 
abided by, since the principle of reciprocity in the framework of the WTO allows for States to 
claim the same advantage as the breaching State.  
 
The negotiation as well as decision-making process in the WTO is unlike most other 
organizations in the fact that consensus and unanimity of all member States play a vital role 
in its operation, demonstrating how important these are in international trading.877 The 
success in achieving unanimity is directly linked to reciprocity and the benefit deemed by 
each State since trade liberalisation which leads to the lowering of barriers for foreign 
products is likely to have political damage, and States need to achieve a reciprocal advantage 
in their negotiations.878 This creates the uniqueness of the negotiation process where in fact 
every member must be in agreement unlike other organizations or institutions where either 
the majority or a selected board are the decision-makers. The focal point to note is that the 
need for unanimity and consensus discussed above create reciprocal duties and obligations 
amongst the WTO member States. As appropriately stated by Herrmann-Pillath, in an ever-
changing structure like the WTO, reciprocity is comparable and/or equivalent to unanimity 
given the concept of an individual State's ‘consent’ in accepting the rules at the point of 
joining the WTO, or in the ongoing negotiations on world trade agreements.879    
 
The WTO membership emphasises the general notion of reciprocity by stating that 
‘membership means a balance of rights and obligations’ and that with the privileges of 
membership a commitment is required by each member to abide by the membership rules and 
to allow others to access their markets. New countries wanting to join the WTO must be 
mindful of their reciprocal obligations and duties, since membership is granted only when all 
entry requirements for their admission are fulfilled and of which reciprocity is an important 
factor.880 Reciprocity is believed to be one of the most important underlying principles of 
                                                          
877 For further information please see World Trade Organisation, Understanding the WTO: The Organisation, 
available at: http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org1_e.htm.  
878 Bernard M. Hoekman, The WTO: Functions and Basic Principles, (eds.) Bernard M. Hoekman, Aaditya 
Mattoo, Philip English, Development, Trade, and the WTO: a Handbook, Part 1, 2002, p. 43.  
879 Carsten Herrmann-Pillath, Reciprocity and the Hidden Constitution of World Trade, Constitutional Political 
Economy, 2006, p. 144. 
880 For further information please see World Trade Organization, Membership, Alliances and Bureaucracy, 
available at: http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org3_e.htm. 
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international trade,881 and the reason for trade liberalisation.882 More precisely, the principle 
of reciprocity is viewed by many scholars to be the underlying driver and the motivational 
force behind the creation of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the 
WTO as the international trade organizations.883 In fact, a clear statement referring to 
reciprocity is in the GATT’s preamble itself, addressing an objective for countries to be 
‘entering into reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements directed to the substantial 
reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade and to eliminations of discriminatory treatment 
in international trade relations’.884  
 
Before embarking on understanding the dispute settlement process in the international trade 
system, it is important to examine the role of reciprocity in the workings of the WTO which 
is the underlying factor for the WTO dispute settlement. The most prominent features of 
reciprocity in multilateral world trade are in the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) status awarded 
to each member as well as the National Treatment protection (NT) covering intellectual 
property rights discussed below. 
 
3.5.1. Most Favoured Nation 
 
The MFN clause is embedded in the rules of the WTO which require member States to treat 
all members equally irrespective of their wealth or power with no discrimination between 
them.885 The idea is that any time a market is opened up or a trade barrier is lifted all member 
States, unconditionally and without discrimination or prejudice, can benefit from this. The 
importance of the MFN is very clearly stipulated in the WTO and indeed in Article 1 of the 
GATT which refers to the non-discriminatory nature of trade between member States by 
declaring that ‘…any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted by any contracting 
                                                          
881 Jonathan Crystal, Bargaining in the Negotiations over Liberalizing Trade in Services: Power, Reciprocity and 
Learning, Review of International Political Economy, Vol. 10, No. 3, 2003, p. 552.  
882 Thomas Alexander Zimmermann, Negotiating the Review of the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding, 
2006, p. 35.  
883 Joseph Michael Finger and L. Alan Winters, Reciprocity in the WTO, (eds.) Bernard M. Hoekman, Aaditya 
Mattoo, Philip English, Development, Trade, and the WTO: a Handbook, Part 1, 2002, p. 50; supra note 879, p. 
136; also Robert O. Keohane, Reciprocity in International Relations, International Organization, Vol. 40, No. 1, 
1986, p.1; also Robert W. Staiger, The World Trade Organization, (eds.) Steven N. Durlauf and Lawrence E 
Blume, New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 2008.  
884 World Trade Organization: Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organisation, signed 15 
April 1994, entered into force 01 January 1995, Preamble. 
885 World Trade Organization, Understanding The WTO: BASICS: Principles of the Trading System, Most-
Favoured-Nation. 
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party to any product originating in or destined for any other country shall be accorded 
immediately and unconditionally to the like product originating in or destined for the 
territories of all other contracting parties’.886  
 
Scholars, namely Parisi, Ghei, and Herman-Pillath, have accredited the existence of 
reciprocity in international trade to the assertion of the MFN and the non-discrimination 
feature in the structure of the WTO.887 Parisi and Ghei have persuasively articulated this 
when assessing the effect of the MFN on trade liberalisation by suggesting that prisoner’s 
dilemma situations in international trade are limited and the dominant strategy of States 
which stands in the way of lowering trade barriers are removed by the assertion of the MFN 
and non-discrimination in the WTO/GATT.888 This argument demonstrates how reciprocity 
has been put to use to lower the imbalance that might be created between the parties. Also the 
assertion of such clauses places the future negotiations at a higher level without the need for 
repetitive discussion for trade negotiations. That is to say, certain balancing of rights is 
already pertained through the membership and thus negotiations will always start from a 
higher stance. A WTO member is secure in the knowledge that by bestowing the MFN status 
on their fellow trade partners, equivalent advantages are reciprocated in relation to the trading 
partners’ markets, trade barriers, etc. The value of the MFN is different for specific countries; 
for example smaller countries benefit from the MFN by avoiding entering negotiation with 
larger countries and suffering as result of high tariffs bestowed on them by larger 
countries.889 
 
3.5.2. National Treatment 
 
The second feature of reciprocity within the WTO is in the protection granted to foreign 
products, services, copyrights, patents, and trademarks, where member States are required to 
treat foreign products and services and so on in an equal manner to domestic products and 
services, once the product, service or items covered by intellectual property have entered into 
                                                          
886 World Trade Organization, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, signed April 1947, entered into force 
01 January 1948, Article I. 
887 Supra note 879, p. 145; supra note 1, pp. 112-113. 
888 Supra note 1, p. 112.    
889 For further information see Madanmohan Ghosh, Carlo Perroni and John Whalley, The Value of MFN 
Treatment to Developing Countries, 1999, p. 5, available at: 
http://economics.uwo.ca/econref/WorkingPapers/researchreports/wp1999/wp9907.pdf. 
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their market.890 The NT rules are covered in Article 3 of the GATT stating that, ‘…internal 
taxes and other internal charges, and laws, regulations and requirements affecting the internal 
sale…should not be applied to imported or domestic products so as to afford protection to 
domestic production’.891  
 
As with the MFN status, the NT rules provide each member with the assurance that their 
products and services are protected and not subjected to unequal national tax or additional 
charges; each member agrees to protect the products, services or items covered by intellectual 
property rights. In Article 3(1) of the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPS) which specifically deals with intellectual property, it states that ‘Each Member shall 
accord to the nationals of other Members treatment no less favourable than that it accords to 
its own nationals with regard to the protection of intellectual property’.892 Furthermore, 
reciprocity of this nature is observed in the Berne Convention where all member States are 
obliged to recognise the copyright of the works by other nationals to the same level as would 
be provided to national works.893 The significance of reciprocity in the protection of 
intellectual property rights has come a long way to its contemporary form. A requirement has 
been for States relations to move away from the viewpoint of sovereignty and territory to a 
more collective view of protection of rights at a global level.894 Hence, this could have only 
been achieved by shifting towards a non-discriminatory basis instead of silo of each territorial 
or national law.     
 
Parisi and Ghei convincingly argue that the conditions eliminating discrimination in trade 
within the WTO diminish the prisoner’s dilemma situation that States might find themselves 
                                                          
890 For further information please see World Trade Organization, Principles of Trading System: National 
Treatment, available at: http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact2_e.htm 
891 Supra note 886, Article 3(I).  
892 Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Article 3(1), The TRIPS Agreement is Annex 1C of 
the Marrakesh Agreement. 
893 World Intellectual Property Organization, Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic 
Works, accepted 09 September 1886, Article 1 and 2; according to the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property (TRIPS Agreement), the principles of national treatment, automatic protection and 
independence of protection also bind those World Trade Organization Members which are not party to the 
Berne Convention. In addition, the TRIPS Agreement imposes an obligation of ‘most-favored-nation treatment’, 
under which advantages accorded by a World Trade Organisation Member to the nationals of any other country 
must also be accorded to the nationals of all Members. It must also be noted that the possibility of delayed 
application of the TRIPS Agreement does not apply to national treatment and most-favoured obligations, for 
further information please see http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/berne/summary_berne.html. 
894 Catherine Seville and Joe McMahon, Intellectual Property, The International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly, 2001, Vol. 50, Issue. 3, p. 714.  
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in, where a State has reduced its price barriers but other trading partners have not.895 This 
view is shared by Staiger who argues that reciprocity in international trade, as set out in the 
WTO, helps eliminate 'terms-of-trade manipulation' issues by States and reciprocity 
constraints within the rules of the WTO which create a ‘fixed-terms-of-trade rule to which 
mutual tariff changes must conform’.896  
 
The WTO aims to eliminate trade barriers and to promote non-discriminatory protection of 
products and services of members, but only to the extent in which foreign suppliers are not 
treated unfavourably in comparison to national suppliers. These conditions only impose 
obligations on States to treat foreign products and services in line with how national suppliers 
are treated. The form of reciprocity granted by the NT eliminates discrimination amongst 
national and foreign supplies and to ensure fair trading competition. The role of reciprocity in 
this context should not be confused with providing the goods and services, etc., with exactly 
the same treatment as their originating country. That is to say, the taxes levied in the France 
on French products and services, for instance, are to be replicated when entering the UK 
market. This form of reciprocity would make the administration of importing virtually 
impossible especially for States such as the UK which are major importers. Instead the role of 
reciprocity with the NT rule is to eliminate discrimination and reciprocity, ensuring that 
goods entering a foreign market would not be treated differently and can fairly compete with 
one another. 
 
3.5.3. Trade Dispute Settlement Process 
 
In instances of international trade disputes where breaches of the WTO conditions or 
agreements have occurred, the WTO is empowered to deal with and settle such disputes. The 
WTO has a unique dispute settlement system which is aimed at enforcing the WTO rules and 
to bring about stability, predictability and security in world trade.897 Similarly the 
consultation process for the dispute settlement system helps protect reciprocity between the 
WTO members.898 Reciprocity is evident in the dispute settlement process where an injured 
                                                          
895 Supra note 1, p. 112.   
896 Robert W. Staiger, The World Trade Organization, (eds.) Steven N. Durlauf and Lawrence E Blume, New 
Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 2008.  
897 For further information please see World Trade Organisation, Understanding the WTO: Settling Dispute, 
available at: http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/disp1_e.htm. 
898 Supra note 882, p. 42.  
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State is able to make a claim and receive compensation for the losses suffered as a result of 
another member's non-obedience to the agreement. A dispute between members occurs when 
a State is considered by others to adopt strategies or actions which are in breach of the WTO 
agreements or obligations,899 effectively leading it to gain an unfair advantage over other 
member States.  
 
The WTO dispute settlement system constitutes detailed rules and procedures clearly outlined 
in annex 2 of the WTO agreement,900 and these rules are believed to be ‘vital for enforcing 
the rules’.901 The DSB is set up and empowered to deal with the WTO disputes.902 The DSB 
has been given authority for many responsibilities but the most important one relating to the 
focus of this research is how it is able to authorise ‘suspension of concessions and other 
obligations’ as well as authorising retaliation in cases of non-obedience.903 When a dispute 
arises, the first step is for the involved States to enter consultation and dialogue to settle their 
dispute themselves.904 This is resulting from the ‘horizontal’ system of IL without the 
hierarchal enforcement authority. Failing the consultation process, the following stage is for 
the victim to request establishment of a panel to address and assess the complaint.905 The 
final report of the panel constitutes the ruling of DSB, unless there is a consensus rejection or 
if a party decides to appeal against the panel findings.906  
 
There are some underlying factors in the WTO dispute settlement process that are 
comparable to the ILC workings on counter-measures and the ICJ ruling in Gabcikovo-
Nagymaros Project Case relating to resolution of the disputes or the validity and legality of 
the response to breach in agreements. For instance, both the ICJ and the ILC have given three 
necessary rules for legal counter-measure which are that the response must be against the 
responsible State, that the responsible State must be given the opportunity to correct the non-
compliance by discontinuing or making reparations, and that the response must have a time-
frame to have the ability to be reversible so that the response can cease in case of the 
                                                          
899 Ibid, p. 42.  
900 Supra note 875. 
901 For further information please see supra note 897.  
902 Supra note 875, Article 2.  
903 Ibid, Article 2. 
904 Ibid, Article 4. 
905 Ibid, Article 6.  
906 Ibid, Article 16.  
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continuation of agreements and compliance.907 As discussed before all of these conditions are 
to allow reciprocal response to the injured State whilst inducing the responsible State to 
return and comply with the original agreement.  Similar trend in WTO dispute settlement is 
visible when evaluating the rules and procedures governing the settlement of disputes. 
Similarly the WTO dispute settlement calls for States to work together constructively to 
resolve their issues as part of the consultation process prior to reverting to panels set up by 
the DSB.908 States are obligated to ‘enter into consultations in good faith’ and similarly this 
was also iterated in the ICJ ruling that the two States must engage in negotiations in ‘good 
faith’ in dispute resolution in the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project Case.909 The relevance and 
importance of this observation is that, as previously discussed, the prerequisite of ‘good faith’ 
in treaty laws provides the basis for the application of reciprocity, particularly, where the 
terms of treaties provide the withholding or retraction of the obligation upon the breach of the 
other party.910 This notion enhances respect and fairness whilst instilling the obligation on 
States to abide by the spirit intended by the treaty or their agreements and avoid gaining 
unfair advantage. 
 
Additionally the dispute settlement process calls for ‘the suspension of concessions or other 
obligations shall be temporary and shall only be applied until such time as the measure found 
to be inconsistent with a covered agreement has been removed’,911 suggesting similar trend as 
the issues addressed by the ILC and the ICJ relating to the counter-measure response is 
applicable so far as the duration of the non-fulfilment of obligation or the unlawful act. This 
is once again illustrative of the point raised earlier that IL, through the use of reciprocity, 
attempts to minimise unfair advantage and bring about the balance of rights and obligations 
whilst promoting and encouraging compliance. However despite a need for punishment of 
disobedience, this punishment should not be so severe as to disallow the reversibility or 
cessation of the punishable response.  
 
The principle of reciprocity manifests itself in the WTO dispute settlement system by 
allowing different forms of retaliation in case of a breach of agreements. If the panel finds 
that there is a breach in the WTO rules and agreements, the DSB then grants the victim 
                                                          
907 Supra note 186, paras. 83-87; and supra note 467, p. 129. 
908 Supra note 875, Article 4; Also for further information please see supra note 897. 
909 Supra note 186, paras. 141-145.  
910 Supra note 133, p. 320.  
911 Supra note 875, Article 22(8). 
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compensation or suspension of concessions.912 The dispute settlement process described in 
this Chapter is an overview of the complex process involved in resolving disputes between 
members; however a more detailed review of the dispute settlement process is outside the 
scope and aim of this Chapter. It is important to reiterate how the WTO envisaged the 
essential requirement for reciprocal retaliation to ensure that rules and obligations would be 
honoured and fulfilled, particularly, authorising retaliation by the victimised State through the 
empowerment of the DSB in cases of breaches in trade agreements.  
 
Demonstrating the aforementioned analysis of the reciprocal retaliation can be better 
understood through examining the following high profile cases where retaliation has been 
warranted for a breach of agreements. In the beef hormone dispute,913 the US and Canada 
took the European Communities to the DSB for the ban imposed on meat and meat products 
treated with hormones.914 The DSB reached the conclusion that the annual losses suffered by 
the US and Canada were US$ 116.8 million and CAD$ 11.3 million respectively and thus, 
the victims were authorised in retaliation to ‘the suspension of concessions’ to the European 
Communities for their losses.915 In the Banana War case,916 where a complaint was filed by 
the US against the European Communities for the breach in the GATT agreements relating to 
the ‘regime’ adopted by them for the import, sale and distribution of bananas.917 The 
European Communities was found to be in violation of agreements and the US was granted 
the suspension of concessions to the value of $191.4 million.918 The role of reciprocity in the 
right to retaliate against a breach in international trade agreements can be observed and the 
significance it brings to compensate the victim for any unfair advantage other States may 
have attempted to gain. 
 
As previously mentioned this dispute settlement system is set to bring about co-operation and 
ensuring members adhere to the WTO rules and agreements through reciprocal retaliation. 
                                                          
912 Ibid, Article 22.   
913 EC-Hormones Case, United States of America and Canada v. European Communities, WTO Dispute 
Settlement, DS26 and DS48, 1999. 
914 Ibid. 
915 Ibid. 
916 EC-Banana III Case, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, United States of America v. European 
Communities, WTO Dispute Settlement, DS27, 1999. 
917 Ibid.  
918 Ibid. 
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This point is well demonstrated in the case of US-Upland Cotton,919 where Brazil took a 
claim against the US for their ‘domestic support’ of the upland cotton industry.920 Following 
the lengthy dispute settlement process, the DSB authorised Brazil to suspend ‘concessions or 
other obligations’ to the US.921 Although Brazil was awarded compensation against the US, it 
however chose to engage in a discussion with the US to reach ‘a mutually satisfactory 
solution’ resulting in an agreement with the US in August 2010 and until this ‘Framework for 
Mutually Agreed Solution’ is in place Brazil will not exercise their authorized retaliation.922 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
In this Chapter the enforcement mechanisms of IL in the forms of centralised and non-
centralised were discussed. The centralised forms of enforcement comprise of many 
institutions and organs but this Chapter predominantly focused and analysed the workings of 
the ICJ, the UNSC and the WTO dispute settlement body. Non-centralised forms of 
enforcement operate predominantly as remedial actions in the form of self-defence and 
counter measure. The absence of an overarching enforcement body in IL, the weaknesses of 
the centralised forms of enforcement, as well as attempts to promote responses to breaches of 
agreements and obligations in non-aggressive and non-confrontational forms have given non-
centralised form of enforcement a prominent role in IL. Fundamentally, these options have 
been made available to States in order to negate disobedience and encourage compliance 
without the need to resort to the UN organs for dispute settlements.  
 
Therefore, the absence of an overarching legislator or enforcing mechanism in IL places 
reciprocity as an important alternative enforcement mechanism where non-compliance or 
disobedience can be met by direct or indirect remedial legal reactions through available 
options in IL to injured States in the form of self-defence or counter-measure. These options 
have a twofold effect, where firstly they protect the injured State against any loss that may be 
suffered from non-compliance of other States by restoring the balance of rights and duties; as 
well as encouraging and maximising the commitment of States to fulfil their individual and 
collective responsibilities. The tit-for-tat policy view of reciprocity in IL allows for a wrong-
                                                          
919 US-Upland Cotton Case, Brazil v. United States of America, WTO Dispute Settlement, DS267, 2009. 
920 Ibid.   
921 Ibid. 
922 Ibid. 
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doing State to be punished but the punishment is not so severe as to never induce long-term 
co-operation.923 Even in cases of self-defence, where its legality is dependent on necessity 
and proportionate reciprocal response, then it is arguable that the use of force is only a 
‘remedial’ approach and reciprocal reaction to a violation of IL, and the other State was 
aware of the consequences of its initial actions. The important point to note is that these 
remedial reactions, particularly available options under counter-measure, discourage the use 
of force as much as possible and the aim is to resolve dispute through peaceful means. In the 
cases where there is a need for the use of force in self-defence, IL encourages the two 
elements of proportionality and necessity to be strongly considered and satisfied. Taking into 
consideration the issue that in IL States are not just its subjects, but they are also the 
formulators of its rules as well as to a great extent its enforcers, particularly where they can 
act in self-defence or adopt counter-measure responses without resorting to a legal process. 
 
This study challenges the validity and appropriateness of the use of reciprocity in this context 
as an alternative enforcement mechanism where States can self-judge and self-determine their 
response or reaction to other States without the need to follow specific legal or judicial 
channels for resolving disputes. Obviously the need for reciprocity as an alternative 
enforcement of IL is rooted in the nature of IL but interestingly, this does not seem to be the 
case with the European Union, as an example of a smaller group of States, where any 
response to a dispute needs to go through legal channels and be referred to the European 
Courts. The importance of this approach by the European Union is to restrict self-judgement, 
self-determination and inconsistent interpretations of rules, and by doing so the fundamentals 
of the rule of law and IL such as legality, legitimacy and justice will be fulfilled and applied 
uniformly. 
 
The examination of centralised enforcements makes evident the lack of uniformity and 
consistency in the collective approach towards enforcing IL and the rule of law, particularly 
relating to the legal interpretations. The decisions reached by the ICJ and the UNSC are both 
legally obligatory but the decisions taken by the UNSC carry legally binding obligations on 
everyone, whereas ICJ judgements create legally binding obligations only on the disputants, 
moreover the ICJ advisory opinions have non-binding effects at all. This inequality of power 
between the principal judicial organ (the ICJ) and a political organ (the UNSC) has not only 
                                                          
923 Supra note 198, p. 71. 
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weakened the ICJ, but has also placed the UNSC with excessive powers to rule on both legal 
and political issues. This has placed IL at significant disadvantages, and has not been entirely 
helpful in maintaining international peace and security.  
 
The most common penalising UNSC approach is to impose sanctions whilst providing no 
detailed reasoning for their objectives and the intended results of such sanctions. It is not 
simply enough for the UNSC to say that they are imposing sanctions, without any additional 
detail behind the intentions and objectives of such approaches. This is contrary to the 
workings and rulings of the ICJ where detailed reports are produced upon the reasoning 
behind their actions and decisions, for example even when they have no jurisdiction over the 
case at hand. Taking the Iraq and IRI cases as examples, the UNSC must have provided 
reasoning as to what are the aims of sanctions; is the aim to secure further compliance, to 
reduce the threat to peace and security, or is there a political agenda such as regime change 
behind their efforts? Reflecting back on the course of the UNSC actions towards Iraq post-
Kuwait invasion, it was seen how the approach moved from collective self-defence to the 
exertion of crippling economic, military and diplomatic sanctions with the ultimate aim of 
regime change, 924 resulting in the death of many ordinary Iraqi civilians.  
 
It is difficult to assume that peace and security can be achieved through violence, aggression 
and war.925 The aggressive attitude guides the decision-makers to follow coercive approaches 
to achieve their goals. Irrespective of reasons surrounding a coercive action, it directs the 
international community towards aggressive projects that were initiated for securing peace; 
let alone when political agenda is the driving factor behind these decisions. A reason for this 
could be in the P-5’s engagement in the arms industry/trade, and why the international 
community witnesses the significant market share of the arms industry belonging to the P-
5.926 It is also important to consider that the international community is aware that, 
                                                          
924 Supra note 785; and supra note 757, p. 85. 
925 A reason why neither democracy nor peace and security can be established through violence is in the fact that 
democracy is a process more like a learning progress requiring education and other factors to have the highest 
respect for its democratic values such as justice, for this reason a community must be ready to have democracy. 
926 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Reports, SIPRI military expenditure data for 2010; 
Amnesty International Report on Arms Trade of Major United Nations Powers, 20 July 2010; and Amnesty 
International Report, Arms Trade: UK and other states failing to control arms transfers, 19 July 2010; for further 
information relating to this subject and the role of five major United Nations Powers see IPS News, Thalif Deen, 
UN’s Big Five Facilitate Arms Transfers to Rights Violators, 19 July 2010.  
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‘Hezbollah has more weapons than many European armies’.927 The same applies to the 
Taliban and Al-Qaeda where they have been able to gain access to weapons to fight against 
the NATO-led security forces in Afghanistan for over ten years.928 By also reviewing the 
recent Libyan and Syrian uprising, it is worrying for the international community to witness 
how the rebel groups were empowered and supported in response to resolving violations of 
HR, which is a legal matter. How can the arming of rebels be perceived as being in line with 
IL, the purpose of the UN, and the promotion of international peace? The risk in this case is 
how other rebel groups are likely to be encouraged across the globe, to seek more power and 
support.  
 
The other concern discussed in this work is on the question of legality of the UNSC’s conduct 
and their approach towards IL. It is established how any issue requiring the attention of the 
UNSC must be in line with IL. This is a point from which no deviation or circumvention 
must be permissible. The steps provided for achieving this are set out in the UN Charter, 
where compliance of the UNSC with the rule of law is a requirement.929 Commitment of the 
UNSC to the rule of law must therefore be in line with consistency, legality, justice, 
legitimacy. This work has provided many examples where the UNSC’s decisions have 
arguably fallen short of these requirements. The effect of this on the international community 
is felt through the increase in conflicts, continuing violations of HR, the international 
community’s exhaustion with loss of lives, as well as the imbalance created in the world. It 
is, hence, reasonable for the international community to be concerned about the ill-founded 
approach towards restoring and maintaining international peace. This is because: 
 
A) A political body decides legal decisions as the enforcing body of IL, as well as the power 
attributed to the P-5 and their privileged veto rights. This has illustrated an inequality in 
representation of the international community and the role and strength of five States above 
all other UN members. This stems mainly from their veto power and attempts to reform this 
                                                          
927 BBC News, Hezbollah: Terrorist organisation or liberation movement?, Owen Bennett-Jones, 11 October 
2011. 
928 Major General Michael Flynn, Director of Intelligence for International Security Assistance Force in 
Afghanistan admitted that ‘The Taliban retains required partnerships to sustain support, fuel legitimacy and 
bolster capacity’, ISAF Report, State of the Insurgency, Trends, Intentions and Objectives, 22 December 2009, 
p. 14.  
929 Supra note 29, the United Nations states that ‘Promoting the rule of law at the national and international 
levels is at the heart of the United Nations’ mission… The principle of the rule of law embedded in the Charter 
of the United Nations encompasses elements relevant to the conduct of State to State relations. The main United 
Nations organs, including the General Assembly and the Security Council, have essential roles in this regard’. 
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have so far been unsuccessful. Additionally, the P-5 has demonstrated reluctance to seek 
legal advice and work with the ICJ to resolve legal matters on a regular basis. 
 
B) IL is open to interpretation but this must be applied within the set parameters previously 
discussed. For instance, when reviewing the UNSC’s decisions in the recent Syrian and 
Libyan cases relating to the violation of HR, extensive inconsistency or injustice can be 
observed. In both cases, there is a similarity on the violation of HR but the question remains 
why a different approach has been adopted by the UNSC for similar grounds and similar 
timeframe? Was this inconsistency due to any differentiation in the nature of the violation? 
What is the measure for assessing HR violations? Moreover, what are the criteria for 
judgement in these cases? What considerations need to be provided for a reasoned decision? 
Applying inconsistency in their decisions inevitably leads to a loss of credibility and trust and 
challenges its underlying motives.  
 
It is arguable that challenging the legality of the decisions and actions of the UNSC might 
damage its credibility and provide a non-complying State with an escape route away from its 
obligations, additionally reducing the ability of the UNSC to maintain peace and security.930 
Even though this might be reasonable, in the legal domain, one cannot accord unquestionable 
power to one organ in fear of the minority that might use this as an excuse for non-
compliance and non-cooperation.  
 
C) Following the examples of Syria and Libya, and taking into consideration the human 
rights record of Russia and China nationally,931 as well as the recent US engagement in 
torture-related conduct, is it appropriate for them to judge HR violation? It seems 
inappropriate for them to use their veto rights in passing adequate punishment and/or 
determining how the international community must react to violations of HR. The use of veto 
                                                          
930 Supra note 757.  
931 For instance see Amnesty International report, China and the United States of America are amongst the 
'Countries with the highest death penalty rates, in the World, Amnesty International, Annual Report 2007-2012, 
at: http://www.amnesty.org/, and for the detailed statistic on this subject please see: the guardian, Death penalty 
statistics, country by country, at: http://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2011/mar/29/death-penalty-
countries-world, for further examples on this please see, Amnesty International report, China Human Rights; 
Chinese Nobel Peace Prize winner, Liu Xiaobo (human rights activist) has received 11years sentence despite the 
bestowed award, BBC news, Michael Bristow, One year on: Nobel winner Liu Xiaobo still in jail ,7 October 2011; and 
2009 Human Rights Report on Russia, U.S Department of State, Diplomacy in Action, Bureau of Democracy, 
Human Rights, and Labor, 11 March 2010. 
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by Russia and China in support of Syria brings about, once again, the question of the 
appropriateness of the veto right. Russia and China chose not to veto the Libya ‘no fly zone’ 
and instead they chose to abstain which means they applied different approaches to these two 
situations. Even though these situations had some similarities in nature, the relation of these 
two P-5 members with Libya or Syria were different to begin with which undoubtedly would 
have influenced the decision to support, abstain or veto against other P-5 decisions. It was 
seen how swiftly actions were taken in relation to Libya but response to Syria was much 
slower and did not include an international action to stop human rights violations. The 
UNSC’s approaches in the Libyan and Syrian cases could be attributed to the reciprocal 
relations of the P-5 members with other States and among themselves in the application of 
their veto rights. Lobbying behind the scenes plays a role in the decision-making process and 
the reciprocal give and take between P-5 members is a significant influence towards the final 
decision taken by each member. Recent use of veto rights was questionable when no veto was 
used against Libya ‘no fly zone’, yet veto rights were exercised in the Syrian case; this 
demonstrates an inconsistent approach to very similar situations and brings into question the 
legality and uniformity of actions.  
 
These examples show how the use of veto rights failed to meet the constitutive elements of 
the rule of law. Additionally a P-5 member will take into consideration its position and 
standing in the international community and with its counterparts prior to applying a veto 
right. For example review of the history of the use of veto rights shows that on the one hand, 
Britain and France have refrained from applying their veto power in general, but on the 
other, the use of veto by Russia and the US have been high. This suggests that Britain and 
France may not wish to be perceived by the international community as blocking collective 
UNSC action whereas the US and Russia have a more individualistic approach towards their 
interests. All in all, non-uniform and inconsistent approaches are evident in the use of Veto 
by the P-5 members. It could be deducted that even if the international community could one 
day reform the veto power of the P-5, for IL to have a uniform and effective enforcement 
mechanism, there must be an overriding legal (judicial) authority to deal with all international 
legal related cases. 
 
Although this is a difficult shift in approach that the UNSC should be accountable to an 
international legal body in performing its tasks, however, it is a requirement for IL 
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enforcement to have a legal organ to monitor the UNSC’s decisions. This is not to be taken as 
diminishing the authority of the UNSC but more as a hierarchical necessity for reducing 
injustice and minimising the influence of politics and interest of the States in legal situations. 
This hierarchy has additional benefit in the sense that it provides greater transparency and 
opportunity for review of a case from multiple legal aspects as it stands in national legal 
systems. The current structure lacking an overriding authority or monitoring for the UNSC 
undermines IL. Therefore, without a significant change in the system, the cycle repeats itself. 
Any reform in the current format could be helpful but it would not provide a remedy to the 
issues in question. Of course, considering the important role played by ‘will’ and ‘consent’ of 
States in the formulation of international rules which has an inextricable link to politics, this 
has a long way to go.  
 
The above example of an overarching judiciary review body in the international arena is a 
far-reaching objective in the current climate. The reasons for this have become evident 
throughout the thesis which are: 1) the importance of ‘will’ and ‘consent’ of States in 
formulation and interpretation of obligations set upon them, 2) the inextricable link between 
the political and legal issues dealt with by the UN bodies, least of all the ICJ and the UNSC, 
3) the time-line surrounding the legal review - for example where an organ such as the UNSC 
may need to take urgent actions and post-action deliberation of the legality of the action 
would render itself redundant, 4) many scholars have argued that maintenance of peace is the 
main key for the UN, so the UNSC’s decisions take priority over other organs.932  
 
IL should not be based on idealist approaches and views, acting obliviously to any reality of 
IR. The reality dictates that there is an unbalanced distribution of power and control in the 
world,933 thus IL must operate within the existing framework if it is to maintain its legitimacy 
and applicability. As it is, the international community and IL face an unequal distribution of 
power, not only in the UNSC members’ veto rights, but also in their economic, military and 
political strength. Faced with all these constraints, one would expect international agreements 
to be disregarded as a higher level than is being witnessed, however IL and the international 
                                                          
932 Eugene V. Rostow, Disputes Involving the Inherent Right of Self-Defense, (ed.) Lori Fisler Damrosch, The 
International Court of Justice at a Crossroads, 1987, p. 270; supra note 861, p. 134; also see supra note 840, p. 
295 where Kelsen’s comment that the Security Council is empowered to take steps for the maintaining peace 
and security through justice even if it is not ‘in conformity’ with international law thus granting the Security 
Council with special powers. 
933 Supra note 757, p. 97. 
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community are reliant on other factors outside the mainstream enforcement to bring about 
obedience to international obligations. Encountering these constraints as well as the absence 
of an overpowering enforcing body, the international community and IL have found 
themselves reliant most importantly on the principle of reciprocity, as a creator of balance 
between the interests and actions of States. The remainder of the thesis, particularly the 
following Chapter demonstrates how the conduct of States has been reduced away from 
pursuit of self-interest as a result of the reliance on the principle of reciprocity.   
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Chapter Five: Reciprocity and Co-operation between States in the 
Context of International Law and International Relations 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Having examined the role of reciprocity in IL, this Chapter examines co-operation and non-
co-operation as forms of reciprocity. The emphasis is firstly on the necessary factors that 
States must satisfy in complying with IL; secondly, on those factors that facilitate co-
operation between States and the reasons that States choose to co-operate. For instance, what 
is the role of co-operation in achieving and maintaining international peace and security as a 
fundamental goal of IL? This leads the study to seek the answers to the following questions: 
1) what is the role of IL in bringing about co-operation among States? 2) how does 
reciprocity take a role in inducing States to co-operate? 3) what are the advantages and 
disadvantages of co-operation? 4) why do States choose to deviate from co-operative 
objectives? To answer these questions, important factors in bringing about a co-operative 
environment, and obstacles facing the international community are scrutinised.  
 
The Chapter begins by reviewing the definition of co-operation, and continues to analyse the 
evolution of co-operation through changes in IR and closer dependency of States on one 
another. Given the inextricable link between IL and politics in IR, the Chapter continues to 
assess the role of co-operation in each of these disciplines. Further to this point, the study 
focuses on the different schools of thought in exploring the study of IL and IR together with 
their consequences on co-operation. This analysis enables this work to tackle the above 
questions relating to the reasons for States’ co-operation, and their benefits and drawbacks for 
States leading to specific barriers for co-operation. These analyses lead the study to explore 
the importance of co-operation for States involved in bringing about long-term advantages in 
politics, economic gains, peace, security and stability, based on the lessons learnt throughout 
the evolution of international co-operation. The important factors for achieving and 
maintaining long-term co-operation are examined. How can non-co-operation be minimised? 
Will long-term co-operation be achieved through the threat of negative reciprocity?  
 
This Chapter identifies the measures required for ‘increased co-operation’ as a strategy in 
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reducing negative reciprocity in IR. In doing so, it is suggested that through the advancement 
of technology and the ability to easily access up-to-date information, the nature of 
interactions between States have changed and therefore the strategy of battle and 
confrontation need to change. It is observed how the incentive for co-operation between 
States can help develop a multilateral benefit for all parties involved as well as those who are 
not directly involved. It is in the collective interest for such strategies to develop in a 
framework and action through relationship-building between States. Hence the source-control 
dominant mechanism is a co-operative strategy which is beneficial for parties involved even 
when a State does not wish to co-operate. This is to say, lack of co-operation is 
characteristically powerless to assist or support the development of source-led solutions or 
solutions geared to manage the huge costs of such strategies even for stronger States in the 
long run. 
 
2. What is International Co-operation? 
 
Similar to reciprocity, co-operation carries many meanings and is open to various 
interpretations in the international arena. Co-operation in simple terms is defined as ‘an 
association of individuals who join together for a common benefit’; more specifically, in IL it 
is defined as ‘the voluntary coordinated action of two or more countries occurring under a 
legal regime and serving a specific objective’.934 The messages that could be deducted from 
these definitions are that 1) a group of entities have come together by choice, 2) with 
representation from different interests and/or viewpoints, but 3) have chosen to unite in 
pursuit of a common goal. 
 
The important point to consider in international co-operation is the difference in State 
interests and needs, but despite the differences between immediate needs States are 
compelled to co-operate with one another because it is in their long-term interest to do so. For 
instance, Keohane suggests that co-operation is achieved when actions of different States or 
institutions come together in unity through negotiation, which Lindblom has defined as 
‘policy coordination’,935 for which he provides the following framework: 
 
                                                          
934 Supra note 2, p.359.  
935 Supra note 24, p. 51.  
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A set of decisions is coordinated if adjustments have been made in them, such that the adverse 
consequences of any one decision for other decisions are to a degree and in some frequency avoided, 
reduced, or counter balanced or overweighed.936 
 
In this context, each State or organization moves away from its original position through 
negotiation or bargaining to reach a common and coordinated policy; or as eloquently 
phrased by Keohane ‘intergovernmental cooperation takes place when the policies actually 
followed by one government are regarded by its partners as facilitating realization of their 
own objectives, as the result of a process of policy coordination’.937 The principle of 
reciprocity will undoubtedly play a role in the negotiation and bargaining between States to 
gain ‘policy coordination’ since inter-State negotiations will include a degree of equalising 
gains and advantages in the light of the various interests of each State.     
 
Co-operation should not be confused with harmony since harmony is only achievable when 
policies of each party are flexible in allowing the fulfillment of other parties’ interests 
without the need for co-operation or negotiation.938 Taking into consideration that each State 
is driven in pursuit of self-interest, particularly in the absence of centrally governing authority 
in IL or IR, harmony is not achievable, or as recognised by Waltz ‘in anarchy there is no 
automatic harmony’.939 Hence, what further distinguishes harmony from co-operation is the 
‘automatic’ fulfillment of other parties’ interest without a need for shift in policy either by 
co-operative attempt or through bargaining and negotiation. In attempts at negotiation, if 
States are not willing to change their policies then ‘discord’, as identified by Keohane, and 
referred to in this thesis as non-cooperation, will arise.940 Furthermore, co-operation does not 
mean a state of unconditional agreements. Keohane concludes that, the mere existence of 
conflict between States brings them into a sphere of international attempts at breaking away 
from conflict into a state of co-operation and without the existence of conflict and differences 
there would not be a need to shift or to coordinate policies.941 The important factor therefore, 
is in the negotiation and bargaining of these conflicts, to coordinate the policies (co-
operation) or inability to coordinate the policies. 
                                                          
936 Charles E. Lindblom, The Intelligence of Democracy: Decision Making Through Mutual Adjustment, 1965, 
p. 227. 
937 Supra note 24, pp. 18 and 51-52. 
938 Ibid, pp. 18 and 51-52. 
939 Kenneth Neal Waltz, Man, the State, and War: a Theoretical Analysis, 2001, pp. 159-160 and 182.  
940 Supra note 24, pp. 18 and 51-52. 
941 Ibid, pp. 18 and 51-52, pp. 53-54. 
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In Chapter Four, it was observed how the principle of reciprocity acts as an enforcement 
mechanism for obedience to international legal obligations due to available reciprocal 
responses, and thus abiding by international legal obligation is an incentive for States in order 
to avoid negative reciprocal action. Similarly, States might choose to co-operate not in 
pursuit of common interests but instead in avoidance of negative impact through non-co-
operation. Stein refers to this form of co-operation as arising ‘to avoid losses’, and identifies 
it as an option when facing difficult or limited choices.942 In such situations, rational States 
are likely to choose the least costly option, as discussed later in this Chapter. 
          
3. Evolution of Co-operation 
 
In Chapter One, it was discussed briefly how the international community has gone through a 
historical process of achieving peace through adopting a more collective view towards 
security and co-operation on commonly shared values among States. In this Chapter, this 
evolution is discussed in depth with a particular view of the lessons learnt during the last few 
centuries that have been instrumental to the creation of IL in its contemporary form. The 
main reason for gaining a deeper understanding of the origins and evolution of co-
operation lies in the fact that, by studying the nature and the consequences of co-
operation, the Chapter distils the role of co-operation in the structure of world order.  
 
It is important to reiterate that co-operation is in effect a form of positive reciprocity. 
Throughout this thesis, it is seen how reciprocity can take positive and negative forms. Co-
operation within the international community is certainly one of the strongest forms of 
reciprocity, where States with different self-interests aim to come together and achieve a 
balance of interests. Achieving this, in turn, is gained by negotiation, bargaining and inducing 
other States to come towards common goals by negative or positive means where reciprocity 
plays an important role.  
 
Peace and security of every State is paramount to them and they will adopt certain strategies 
to maximise and ensure its short-term and long-term security. Following the growth in inter-
State relations and dependency as well as technological advancement, particularly over the 
                                                          
942 Janice Gross Stein, International Co-operation and Loss Avoidance: Framing the Problem, (eds.) Janice 
Gross Stein and Louis W. Pauly, Choosing to Co-operate: How States Avoid Loss, 1993, p. 4. 
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last century, States have had better access to each other but simultaneously the threat of 
attack using more advanced technology has been raised. States’ former concerns were about 
marking their borders, but gradually they moved towards the notion that peace can only be 
achieved collectively. Obvious examples of such cases in history are the ambitions of rulers 
such as Napoleon and Hitler or instances of the Cold War. Each of these instances brought 
about a gradual structural change for the international community towards acting more as a 
collective co-operative force.  
 
The existence of co-operation at international level is due to collective and significant efforts 
that have been made throughout the long process of the change in inter-State relations. There 
have been many attempts and examples in the history of the world where States have 
endeavoured to build international co-operation having recognised the importance of a shift 
from narrow self-interest to a more co-operational approach. These include the attempts to 
achieve co-operation through Collective Security as in the Concert of Europe (1815), League 
of Nations (1919), and the current form of the United Nations (1945) and contemporary IL. 
Before analysing these international attempts individually, it is important to firstly gain an 
understanding of the doctrine of Collective Security since this helps to gain a better insight 
into the steps taken towards the Concert of Europe.   
 
3.1. Collective Security  
 
The idea of a collective decision-making method as a co-operational approach manifested 
itself in the form of ‘Collective Security’. This is best described as a concept which ‘purports 
to provide security for all states, by the actions of all states, against all states that might 
challenge the existing order by the arbitrary unleashing of their power’.943 Prior to the theory 
of Collective Security, States relied only on military strength as a deterrent measure against 
wars, rather than collective co-operation.944 This shows that the proponents of the theory set 
about a fundamental change in a co-operative framework in inter-State relations.  
 
                                                          
943 Inis L. Claude Jr., Swords into Plowshares: The Problem and Progress of International Organization, 1984, 
p. 247. 
944 Ibid, p. 245. 
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There are prerequisites in ensuring Collective Security can be achieved and maintained. The 
key elements that must be fulfilled consist of certainty, utility, and universality.945 The 
element of certainty is that the collective force of all States involved must meet the potential 
aggressive State. Thus, States that are members of such groups are required to unite against 
any potential aggressions. Needless to say the unification of States under this doctrine should 
not be conditional if it is to provide the necessary features for Collective Security. The second 
element, utility, relies on collective reciprocity, which requires that any act by any potential 
aggressor must be reciprocated by all other member States, using ‘as many of the tools of 
international politics as are available to them’.946 This requires States to use any means 
available, ranging from diplomatic efforts, economic sanctions and even resorting to military 
force, if needed, in order to mitigate any act of aggression. This could also be in the form of 
options such as counter-measure or sanctions to respond collectively to an aggressor. The last 
element, universality, indicates that a Collective Security organization would, to ensure 
deterrence against aggression, start by eliminating aggression by its own member States. 
Therefore, any such organization would attempt to increase the membership for the shared 
vision of Collective Security to become the norm in the world. This certainly was behind the 
creation of the League of Nations and its attempts at bringing about peace and co-
operation.947  
 
Scholars have suggested a need for certain conditions to be fulfilled for Collective Security to 
be functional.948 Firstly, the power must be distributed amongst many States rather than a 
select few, so that no State is too strong as to be able to or willing to resist collective 
punishment;949 secondly, it is important for States to share a common view and interests to be 
able to protect the ‘status quo’ as opposed to fighting for individualist goals.950 In other 
words, the aim must be to protect multilateral goals and to avoid taking only unilateral 
benefits into consideration. Bouchard is critical of the notion of ‘Collective Security’, 
particularly as is established within the UN and involving a collective approach by States in 
cases of a breach of peace, since collective response can build a limited conflict into a general 
                                                          
945 Justin Morris and Hilaire McCoubrey, Regional Peacekeeping in the Post-Cold War Era, 2000, p. 4. 
946 Ibid, pp. 3-5. 
947 Andrew Bennett and Joseph Lepgold, Reinventing Collective Security after the Cold War and Gulf Conflict, 
Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 108, No. 2, 1993, pp. 213-214. 
948 Inis L. Claude Jr., Power and International Relations, 1962, p. 195; and supra note 943, p. 256. 
949 Inis L. Claude Jr., Power and International Relations, 1962, p. 195; and supra note 943, p. 256. 
950 Inis L. Claude Jr., Power and International Relations, 1962, p. 195; and supra note 943, p. 256; and supra 
note 947, p. 217.  
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war that involves many States.951 The scholar’s view might hold true in relation to certain 
situations like the neutral positions held by Sweden and Switzerland in both World Wars; 
however, in case that their neutrality had been compromised, the international community 
would not have risen to their support given that they chose to remain neutral whilst the rest of 
the world was in the grip of fierce destruction.   
 
3.2. Concert of Europe  
 
The Concert of Europe (Concert) brought about a strong belief that peace across Europe 
could only be achieved through Collective Security and co-operation between States. The 
Concert was formed in the aftermath of the Napoleonic wars leading up to Napoleon’s final 
defeat at the battle of Waterloo in 1815.952 Once Napoleon was defeated by the major 
European powers, including Britain, Russia, Prussia, Austria, and eventually France, they 
sought to ensure that such hegemonic adventures would not be repeated. Other States apart 
from Britain also wanted to ensure that the revolutionary visions which were contrary to 
monarchist views would not gather momentum.953 This effort is seen as the most successful 
and long lasting attempt at Collective Security.954 
 
The format of the Concert was not based on a formal structure and instead upon regular 
communication on subject-matters related to all parties involved.955 The Concert provided a 
novel process of engaging with international partners whereby the previous bilateral approach 
moved towards a newer format of multilateral IR.956 The formation of the Concert stemmed 
from the notion of Collective Security but States soon recognised additional benefits from 
their multilateral relations. The Concert provided national leaders with the belief that the best 
available strategy to maximise their gains was through co-operation.957 This led to the 
thinking that was behind the creation of the UN and the emphasis for the co-operation in 
securing peace through a collective approach. Small variation from co-operation could be 
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tolerated by the Concert members given the ‘margin of safety’ but major defections could be 
costly and likely to result in a conflict which would once again destabilise Europe.958  
 
As iterated by Jervis, repeated plays bring each State towards co-operation in the expectation 
that the others do the same.959 Booth and Wheeler developed this argument by addressing the 
importance of reciprocity in the Concert, which created co-operation between them. The 
promise of long-term co-operation incentivised States to relinquish their short-term advantage 
as a result of the expected reciprocal co-operation.960 Jervis articulated that this should not be 
taken as a change of identity or interest by States but rather a change in a longer-term view of 
gains and advantages.961 Collective decision-making practices resulting from these efforts 
could therefore be regarded as a form of co-operation between European States to maximise 
their advantages. In light of this argument, Hinsley argued that the acknowledgement by the 
European major powers of belonging to a wider community provided the advantages and 
responsibilities that would follow from such ‘rights and duties’.962  
 
The co-operative nature of relations between the great powers of Europe eventually came to 
an end with the Crimean War. The Russians’ decision to intervene in Ottoman territory and 
Britain’s actions to oppose such interventions led to a conflict and reduction in restraint in 
defection from the Concert norms.963 Mearsheimer argued that historical co-operation 
between great powers of Europe was more related to the need to re-establish their strength 
following the wars during Napoleon’s reign, and the period of restraint demonstrated by the 
great powers through the Concert’s norms provided them with the opportunity to do so.964 In 
other words, the restraints demonstrated during the Concert were more related to their self-
interest at that time and as soon as it was no longer to their best advantage, the status of co-
operation between them disappeared.  
 
The Concert ended by departing from the idea of Collective Security when taking into 
account the necessary elements embedded in the notion of Collective Security. The element 
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of universality was always absent since only the major powers in Europe were involved in its 
creation and in its continuing conferences or congresses such as that of 1832 in London. 
Clearly from a practical perspective as well as the vision that any threat to security would 
have been driven by these major powers, it can be seen why only a few countries in Europe 
were part of the Concert; however this is inconsistent with the theory of Collective Security. 
Inclusion of a wider group would have eliminated any threat from a new rising power. A 
present day example of this is in the emergence of China and India as rising powers and how 
the West’s acknowledgement of this and the West’s approach towards them has been one of 
inclusion in decision-making and negotiations rather than exclusion, for instance having a 
seat in the UNSC.   
 
The differences between the visions held by Britain as opposed to other States, particularly 
Russia, as to what was the main objective of the Concert brought about the absence of 
certainty as another element. Russia’s vision was partly to ensure that revolutionary visions, 
which were contrary to monarchist views, would not gather momentum. This had never 
received support from other members and was never the aim of the Concert as seen by 
Britain. This difference in vision was therefore undoubtedly inconsistent with the element of 
certainty that was necessary for the concept of Collective Security.  
 
Even though all elements necessary in Collective Security are not observed in the Concert, 
the existence of the Concert acted as a collective discouragement of any acts of aggression 
for a long period. It changed the dynamics of inter-State relations where individual States did 
not purely pursue individualistic self-interests and applied restraint with the view of longer 
term advantages. Given the nature of the Concert, involving only the great powers of Europe, 
co-operation and Collective Security were always going to be short-term achievements since 
they were missing, in an absolute sense, the certainty, utility, and universality conditions 
necessary for long-term stability. Once the restraints were abandoned with the Crimean War, 
self-interest rather than a collective outlook can be observed in relation to the decline of 
Austria, as Russia further expanded into Balkan territory. Under a Collective Security regime, 
the actions of Russia would have been severely opposed by other members. However since 
this movement resulted in the decline of Austria, which was to the advantages of other States 
such as France and Prussia, no strong opposition was shown against Russia by these States.  
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The Treaty of Paris in 1856 saw the end of the Crimean War where the victorious allies set 
out the terms for peace that dealt a big blow to Russia and its power and territories.965 The 
vision of co-operation amongst States once again was enhanced by the creation of the Inter-
Parliamentary Union in 1899 with the particular aim of increasing peace and co-operation.966 
However the world saw itself not long after in the deadly conflict of World War I with 
casualties of more than eight and a half million.967 Despite the efforts towards maintaining 
peace and co-operation between States, World War I broke out amongst the world great 
powers and finally ended with the Paris Peace Conference in 1919.968 The terms of the peace 
were outlined in several treaties, with the Treaty of Versailles as the most important one, 
outlining the aim ‘to promote international cooperation and to achieve peace and security’.969 
These steps, hence, paved the way for the establishment of the League of Nations.  
 
3.3. League of Nations 
 
The origins and evolution of co-operation in an international legal framework owe their 
existence to the League of Nations which was set up in 1919, at the end of World War I.970  
The League of Nations as an international organization played a significant role in the 
advancement of IL. Its aim was to promote co-operation at international level with the 
advantage of gaining international peace and security between States. Gaining this objective 
through co-operation was primarily deemed an important achievement to put an end to 
wars.971 Thus, the Covenant of the League of Nations was created with binding obligations on 
its members.972 The membership of the League of Nations required that a nation ‘guarantees 
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of its sincere intention to observe its international obligations, and shall accept such 
regulations as may be prescribed by the League in regard to its military, naval and air forces 
and armaments’.973  
 
Despite its success in creating a legal framework at international level and important steps 
taken, the weakness of the League is made very clear by its failure to live up to its aim of 
putting an end to war, considering Europe and the world turning to the conflict of World War 
II which in turn led to the creation of the UN.974 What is important to emphasise when 
comparing the concept of Collective Security in the League of Nations and the UN is that the 
League did not provide for States to have to take part or contribute to a ‘joint force’ 
commanded and under the responsibility of the League.   
 
4. Co-operation in International Law 
 
The world found itself in the grip of World War II, another devastating war which lasted till 
1945. Following this, the urgency of structured IR emerged with the aim of regulating and 
developing States’ relations. The creation of the UN was the pivotal step taken towards this 
goal. The UN was established to ‘save succeeding generations from scourge of war’, ‘to 
reaffirm faith in the fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person’ 
and ‘to promote social progress and better standards of life’.975 Contemporary IL has taken its 
existing shape following the creation of the UN.  
 
The concept of co-operation is one of the most important factors for States in complying with 
IL and acting in a co-operative manner towards peace and security. Undoubtedly IL has 
played an important role in leading the interaction of States through relationship-building and 
co-operation. An underlying point is that the doctrine of co-operation in a legal framework 
owes its existence to the UN Charter and the UNDHR as cornerstones of IL, in creating a 
uniform systematic approach towards the concept of co-operation.976 In other words, IL is a 
central legal framework for promoting this concept by highlighting it as one of the purposes 
and pillars of the organization. The UN Charter provides the UN purpose as ‘to maintain 
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international peace and security’, ‘to develop friendly relations among nations’ and ‘to 
achieve international co-operation in solving international problems’.977 These principles are 
inter-related and connected since peace and security cannot be attained without creating and 
maintaining friendly relations which are achievable through co-operation between States.  
 
In IL, equal weight is also given to the potential consequences of non-co-operation by States, 
as seen in the recognition of the ‘inherent’ right to self-defence against an aggressor.978 Thus 
the focus of this study is to reflect on the reasons why co-operation is emphasised in the legal 
framework. Article 13 of the UN Charter states: ‘the General Assembly shall initiate studies 
and make recommendations for the purpose of: ... encouraging the progressive development 
of international law and its codification...’.979 Subsequently, the GA passed a resolution to 
establish a committee consisting of a group of legal experts.980 This group, the ILC, prepares 
recommendations for the purpose of advancing IL through co-operation.981 Under the UN 
Charter rules, States are obliged to co-operate with each other and the UN, as emphasised by 
the Charter: ‘All members pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in co-operation 
with the Organisation…’.982  
 
It is important to note that, simultaneous to the substantial steps taken by the UN towards 
establishment of organizations such as the WTO, the idea of creating regional organizations 
has strengthened the UN approach to the concept of co-operation, as exemplified by the 
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). The price and level of output of 
each petroleum exporting country is set as per the joint agreement of OPEC, and so each 
member stands to gain from co-operating and abiding by the OPEC agreement.983  
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This section identified the role and importance of co-operation in IL. The focus of the 
Chapter shifts to provide a deeper analysis of the concept of co-operation in IR and its 
relationship with IL. 
 
5. Co-operation in International Relations and its Relationship with 
International Law 
 
The factors creating an inextricable connection between IL and IP have been previously 
explored in this thesis.984 The field of IR provides connections between these two disciplines. 
States, through lawyers, policy-makers, law-makers, judicial bodies and politicians seek to 
set out, implement, interpret, study and apply international rules, therefore, the study of IL 
would inevitably be incomplete without taking into consideration the influence of these 
disciplines on each other.985  
 
This Chapter discussed the most important condition required for States to co-operate which 
is the existence of a peaceful environment rather than war. For this reason, it is important for 
the analysis of co-operation to examine peaceful conditions from multiple angles. Further to 
this point, it was seen in the analysis of the evolution of co-operation how there has been a 
change in inter-State relations with a fundamental transformation in their interdependence. 
States’ dependency on one another has paved the way for greater need to seek co-operation 
since significant matters such as their security, environmental and trade growth can no longer 
be achieved without international co-operation. In this section, the different viewpoints in IR 
are introduced, to gain a better understanding of the positive or negative consequences of the 
various forms of inter-State relations. Particularly the study seeks to assess the role and 
influence of IL and international institutions on inter-State relations and international co-
operation. Additionally, the study analyses the effect and impact of reciprocity in maintaining 
and incentivising States towards co-operation.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
particular aims are to secure fair and stable prices for petroleum producers; an efficient, economic and regular 
supply of petroleum to consuming nations; and a fair return on capital to those investing in the industry.  
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985 Anne-Marie Slaughter, International Law in a World of Liberal States, European Journal of International 
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There are numerous schools of thought in the study of IR but in this section the study focuses 
on the following approaches which are more related to the aim of this Chapter primarily 
focusing on the behaviour of States towards co-operation.    
 
5.1. Liberalism v. Realism 
 
These two schools of thought are extremely different in their perspective and do not share 
many common factors. The foundations of each of their belief systems are entirely divergent. 
Doyle defines liberalism as:  
 
A distinct ideology and set of institutions that has shaped the perceptions of and capacities for 
foreign relations of political societies that range from social welfare or social democratic to laissez 
faire.986  
 
Liberalists regard the primary actors to be the individuals whereas the realists regard States to 
be the dominant players in IR, furthermore, realists believe that States are in pursuit of 
maximisation of their gains and this belief is identically shared amongst the players.987 
Liberalists, on the other hand, regard that States act differently in line with their national 
policies, government systems or trade structures. The liberalist’s argument stems from the 
notion of States’ ‘will’ and ‘consent’ in IL, expecting States to hold different views and act 
according to their domestic preferences guided by organizations and individuals.988 The 
differences between the views held by realist and liberalist does not end here. The realists 
regard States as the only decision-makers, but the liberalists hold that ‘State-society relations’ 
are significant, in the sense that the main players in the international arena are such 
individuals, organizations, institutions and groups that exert pressure on States’ 
governments.989  
 
Thus, this contrast in view regarding the primary players in IR leads to another fundamental 
distinction between these two schools of thought, where realists view State power as the most 
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important objective of States,990 as opposed to the liberalist view that governments are 
representative of individuals or groups within States. Simultaneously, this difference of 
vision lends itself to the general view that, according to realism, States are unlikely to act in 
co-operation if it is not in pursuit of greater power or in their interest but under liberalism 
State policies are more in line with the societies’ common values,991 which are more driven 
towards compliance and co-ordination.  
 
Hobbes, a traditional realist, suggested that the root of conflict lies in three principles: 
‘competition’, ‘diffidence’ and/or ‘glory’, retrospectively driven from pursuit of gains, 
protection due to insecurity for their safety, and expansion of glorious status or reputation.992 
By contrast Kant, renowned liberal scholar, introduced liberalism as an approach by which to 
withdraw from the Hobbesian view of international system, and to work towards ‘perpetual 
peace’ which the scholar suggests is attainable through a liberal international system both 
domestically and internationally.993 Kant viewed three ‘Definitive Articles’ as the 
prerequisite for lasting peace: firstly, ‘The civil constitution of every state should be 
republican’, secondly, the ‘law of nations shall be founded on a federation of free states’, and 
thirdly, ‘The law of world citizenship shall be limited to conditions of universal 
hospitality’.994 It follows from these three points that a national legal system based upon 
democratic values, and universal respect for the right of foreigners not to be treated as 
enemies, are essential. Liberal States are those who engage in promoting and applying 
democratic values. Western States are examples of such States.995 Non-democratic States 
such as Egypt, Syria or Libya involved in the Arab Spring of recent times did not promote or 
live by liberal values and are likely to be drawn into conflict.  
 
The world has developed and changed since Kant’s time, but his vision for the conditions 
necessary for achieving and maintaining peace is still valid. The six Preliminary Articles 
introduced by Kant in Perpetual Peace, are regarded as the prerequisite conditions for 
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engagement of States in co-operative relationships in pursuit of peace before the international 
system can be established on the basis of the Definitive Articles discussed earlier.996 Kant’s 
work has been subjected to analysis and interpretation amongst scholars including Hinsley, 
Doyle, Rummel, Meyers, Tesón and Burley.997 One of the most visionary aspects of Kant’s 
approach was his suggestion of the interconnection between domestic law of a nation and its 
arbitrary government and aggressive action internationally.998 This liberalist view suggests 
that, for international peace to be created and preserved, first and foremost the domestic law 
must be amended to protect and support freedom of individuals. The reason for this is deeply 
rooted in liberalism’s view of the importance of individuals and institutions above a State and 
as such the rights of individuals must overrule the national interest. Liberalists, including 
Kant, believe that by instigating institutions and processes of ensuring freedom for 
individuals, co-operation, peace and stability will be ensured. Realists, in contrast, argue that 
in the absence of an overarching ultimate power in the international legal system that can 
reasonably control the rights of individuals, IL and IR should focus predominantly on States’ 
interests rather than individuals.999  
 
Tesón challenges the realist view by asking ‘Why is it that national interest persists over and 
above changes in the actual interests of the citizens’?1000 Why indeed? If a State is to serve 
and protect the nation then why and how would their interests be contrary to the interest of 
States? In answering the question, Tesón has reiterated Kant’s reasoning for securing 
international peace through domestic freedom by emphasising that citizens of States are not 
likely to encourage war, since they have to live with the consequences and scourges of 
war.1001 As such a liberal State’s government, which is democratically elected and a true 
representation of its citizens, is likely to follow the interests of its individuals; thus working 
towards resolving conflicts through co-operation and peaceful means. In addition, Kant’s 
                                                          
996 Supra note 993; and supra note 953, p.69.   
997 Supra note 953; supra note 986; Rudolph J. Rummel, Libertarianism and International Violence, The Journal 
of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 27, No. 1, 1983; Fernando R. Tesón, The Kantian Theory of International Law, 
Columbia Law Review, Vol. 92, No. 1, 1992; and Anne-Marie Burley, Law among Liberal States: Liberal 
Internationalism and the Act of State Doctrine, Columbia Law Review, Vol. 92, No. 8, 1992. 
998 Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Essay, (trans.) Mary Campbell Smith, 1903, pp. 120-136; 
Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace and Other Essays on Politics, History, and Morals: A Philosophical Essay, 
(trans.) Ted Humphrey, 1983, pp. 117-118; and Fernando R. Tesón, The Kantian Theory of International Law, 
Columbia Law Review, Vol. 92, No. 1, 1992, p. 61. 
999 Fernando R. Tesón, The Kantian Theory of International Law, Columbia Law Review, Vol. 92, No. 1, 1992, 
p. 73. 
1000 Ibid, p. 73. 
1001 Supra note 999, pp. 73-74 
245 
 
vision is that a stronger possibility exists for an increase in the level of understanding of right 
and wrong in liberal States, giving rise to stronger leaning towards accepting co-operation 
and peace as opposed to engaging in war.1002 A more pertinent point, however, is that the 
separation of different authorities and institutions in decision-making processes gives rise to 
more debates and dialogues before States engage in war.1003  
 
According to liberal IR theory, the nature of each State’s national policies and its decision-
makers determines their stance towards the rule of law and particularly IL.1004 Followers of 
this school of thought, thus, believe that more democratic and liberal States are likely to co-
exist peacefully and abide by IL.1005 Likewise, liberal States are believed to promote a sense 
of respect nationally and internationally, paving the way for co-operation and mutual gains 
through the trust and respect created.1006 The realists’ viewpoint, on the other hand, regarding 
the anarchic international system, brings about a sense of volatility which requires States to 
always be prepared for conflict,1007 as well as an environment that is outside the realm of 
mutual trust and respect. Even realists have been unable to deny the existence of peace 
amongst liberal States, irrespective of their explanation for peace amongst liberals being less 
to do with similarity of regimes and more related to motivational factors for States to co-
operate and diffuse war.1008 Realists’ beliefs stem from the Hobbesian view of the anarchy 
and insecure state of IL and IR, as discussed before, where States are independent, sovereign 
authorities in pursuit of their interests. Under such outlook, combined with the absence of a 
central, overseeing and unified authority, war and conflict is a plausible outcome that can 
bring States closer to their goals.  
 
The linkage between internal freedom and external peace has been resonated not only by 
Kant’s work, but also in more recent work on liberalism, peace and co-operation amongst 
                                                          
1002 Roger J. Sullivan, Immanuel Kant's Moral Theory, 1989, p. 258.  
1003 Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Essay, (trans.) Mary Campbell Smith, 1903, pp. 122-
128; also Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace and Other Essays on Politics, History, and Morals: A Philosophical 
Essay, (trans.) Ted Humphrey, 1983, p. 114; and supra note 986, p. 228. 
1004 William C. Bradford, In the Minds of Men: A Theory of Compliance with the Laws of War, Bepress Legal 
Series, paper 290, 2004, p. 9.  
1005 Ibid, p. 9; and supra note 985, p. 504.  
1006 Supra note 986, p. 213. 
1007 Supra note 985, p. 508.  
1008 Supra note 986, p. 218. 
246 
 
States.1009 There are similarities in the scholars’ views that liberal States do not engage in 
war, but there are variations in their reasoning on why that has been the case. Meyers is not 
absolutely convinced by the assertion of the inter-link between internal freedoms and external 
peace; his concern is that liberal States do not in ‘straightforward’ manner place the actions 
of the government into the hands of the majority of citizens, and what is more, individuals are 
not fully informed and may be deceived in the actions that best represents their interests.1010 
Meyers’ viewpoint is vigorously objected to by Tesón who finds the argument far reaching, 
sceptical and more importantly missing the concept introduced by Kant that world peace will 
only be achieved through like-minded democratic and liberal States.1011  
 
One important point to note is that liberalism plays a pivotal role in contemporary IL and the 
international rule of law, particularly in the UN Charter where liberalism is promoted through 
international equality, non-intervention, non-discriminatory rights and acceptance/tolerance 
of diversity amongst nations.1012 The international community has established institutions 
such as the UN to help promote co-operation. This is based on the neo-liberal institutionalism 
which is a strand of liberalism discussed earlier. Institutions such as the UN or the WTO have 
facilitated States to reciprocate in cases of defection or for dispute settlements, and 
undoubtedly, as an incentive for States to co-operate and abide by their obligations. Keohane 
has established that, in non-hegemonic inter-State relations, the international institutions play 
a fundamental role in bringing about an atmosphere of co-operation.1013 Stein further supports 
the role of institutions in promoting co-operation since they are able to reduce uncertainties, 
thus minimising the costs associated with obtaining knowledge on the intentions of other 
States. The scholar also claims that international institutions increase durability of strategies 
given that each government is usually more short-lived than institutions such as the UN or the 
WTO.1014 Keohane equally credits the institutions with providing a basis for co-operation on 
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247 
 
similar grounds, but with the emphasis on their role in bringing about agreements that would 
otherwise be more difficult to achieve.1015  
 
Any international organization is likely to be founded on principle or a Statute outlining its 
own parameters but equally is likely to set out standards of conduct for States.1016 Similarly 
the mode of monitoring obedience to the set standards and possible remedial actions in cases 
of defection, based on reciprocity, is able to provide long term co-operation and compliance 
with these standards, whilst respecting the ‘consent’ of States and allowing States to pursue 
their ‘will’ and interest. 1017 This is particularly relevant given the nature of anarchy that 
exists in the international system. Blum asserts that multilateralism can lead States towards 
co-operation by providing a ground for incentives for co-operation and obedience, together 
with reducing the threat of deviation which should be ‘overcoming collective action 
problem’.1018 The scholar has credited this to a ‘looser’ and ‘decentralized’ form of 
enforcement mechanism through principles such as reciprocity.1019 It is easy to concur with 
this view, particularly when reflecting back on the analysis of reciprocity in the UN Charter 
and the VCLT. In fact, the principle of reciprocity has been accredited with achieving co-
operation and being an integral component in the neo-liberal institutionalism approach.1020 
Reciprocity does not require common interests and goals in all cases and it is functional in 
cases of limited common interest. 
 
5.2. Unilateralism v. Multilateralism 
 
Up to this point, it has been observed that the evolution of IL and IR, together with the need 
for stronger co-operation between States, has shifted the approach of the international 
community towards working in conjunction with one another rather than preserving their 
narrow self-interest. Thus, there has been a general shift from unilateralism to 
multilateralism. Under unilateralism, States did not have the need to engage with one another; 
however, reasons such as technological advances and environmental concern as well as 
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collective peace, for instance, have led the international community towards multilateralism. 
This shift has been a significant move for States, since it indicates a move from 
individualism, independence and flexibility towards a more rigid and inter-connected system. 
Interestingly, the opponents of multilateralism are not restricted to authoritarian States who 
wish to maintain autonomy and control, but amongst liberal States there are those, such as the 
US, which oppose an absolute move towards multilateralism. The opponents in the US 
believe that multilateralism is only partially useful, when it addresses unification of issues 
such as military or economic, and they maintain that further advances towards multilateralism 
must be curtailed, to avoid restrictions on the US conduct or limitations on the power of 
decision-making to a more international organization.1021 In effect, they wish to benefit from 
gains on issues where multilateralism can be beneficial but not to wholly submit to 
multilateralism in issues where there is no specific or obvious gain.       
 
Nevertheless the doctrine of multilateralism is a goal in contemporary IL which encourages 
States to come together and protect the fundamental values of the international community 
with a collective approach.1022 The international rule of law is indeed viewed as the collection 
of such beliefs and values of the international community and is the pillar upon which other 
aspirations such as peace, harmony, growth and co-operation can be built.1023 The UN has in 
fact outlined enhancement of multilateralism as an underlying condition for reinforcing 
international rule of law.1024  It can clearly be argued that the vision for contemporary IL 
from the outset stems from multilateralism with the protection of States’ sovereignty and 
‘consent’. Contemporary IL has seen a rise in multilateral treaties and a move away from 
bilateral treaty format, namely the establishment of the WTO which brings international trade 
to a multinational level rather than trade agreements between a small number of States. 
However, the unilateralists would choose to restrict their obligations by inserting 
reservations, to maintain more individualistic autonomy.1025 The benefits of multilateralism 
have been unequivocally argued by Blum who indicates that for IL to gain universality, it 
must pose a sense of multilateralism.1026 Multilateral treaties bring a sense of collective 
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internationalism by encompassing a wider range of States within a treaty and thus the rights, 
obligations and duties set out within the treaty include a larger group. 
 
The advantages and disadvantages of multilateralism and unilateralism have been debated 
amongst the scholarly community. Multilateralism has been championed amongst the legal 
scholars as the future of an international system supported by the international organizations 
and institutes that are assigned to resolve conflicts and disputes.1027 International legal 
scholars have been divided in their views on this subject since the unified international 
response to a problem under multilateralism might be legal, but it can have devastating long-
term effects on the international community and/or individuals. In contrast the unilateral 
action of one State towards an issue by imposing its ‘will’ or belief is equally flawed. The 
example provided by Alvarez is appropriate where he refers to international sanctions against 
Libya following the Lockerbie terrorist act and the implication of the UNSC actions in the 
aftermath of the Persian Gulf War. Regardless of one’s view on sanctions against Libya or 
Iraq, there is no question about the devastation caused to the civilians in those countries that 
were the ultimate sufferers of the international community’s multilateral actions.1028 Another 
example as was discussed previously relates to the US involvement in torture-related issues 
in the name of law, which has a profound consequence for the international community.  
 
The debates on appropriateness of unilateralism or multilateralism have taken many forms, 
encompassing debates concerning the US withholding of the UN funding,1029 the US non-
ratification of the Ottawa Treaty,1030 and the appropriateness and legality of unilateral action 
in the form of humanitarian interventions.1031 Analysing the issue of the US withholding of 
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the UN funding, Cardenas regards such actions by the US to be a direct suggestion of its 
unilateral approach and a break away from multilateralism,1032 let alone a breach of the US 
treaty obligations under the UN Charter.1033 Gerson, on the other hand, considers the US to 
honour its multilateral obligations but further suggests that as the world power, the US is 
faced with the dilemma of being forced towards ‘cavalier’ acts of unilateralism.1034 This 
concept of delimiting international obligations and allowing unilateralism by the US is what 
Hathaway has correctly termed as ‘American Exceptionalism’.1035 Gerson leads us to believe 
that the US unilateral approach has been for the pursuit of good; yet Alvarez, despite agreeing 
with certain portions of Gerson’s argument, is of the view that not all unilateral approaches 
by the US have been positive and does not regard the US as seeing itself bound by 
multilateral obligations as set out in the UN Charter.1036  
 
The formulation of contemporary IL is rooted in multilateralism and the promotion of co-
operation. The principles such as balancing of rights, duties and obligations are aimed at 
bringing about a sense of harmony between States, where one is not deemed above the other. 
This is visible when the rules of the WTO membership as the MFN and the NT principles 
were discussed in Chapter Four. In recent decades, this inclination towards multilateralism in 
IL has resulted in escalating concerns around weakening of the notion of State sovereignty 
and the power of States. The emergence of McDougal’s policy-oriented approach to IL,1037 as 
well as the end of the Cold War, has led Hathaway to be suspicious of the move by world 
powers, particularly the US to rid themselves of multilateral obligations and to move towards 
a more unilateral approach.1038  
 
Moving to another aspect of the debates on unilateralism and multilateralism, which is the 
appropriateness of approach in humanitarian issues, Reisman argues that certain unilateral 
humanitarian interventions are legal in situations where the multilateral international 
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institutions are not able to respond ‘collectively’.1039 This view, as deducted by Hathaway, is 
driven from a policy-oriented approach to IL, which suggests that more modern factors 
outside its traditionalist sources are to be considered in formulation of IL, namely inter-
governmental organizations, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and even the 
media.1040 Reisman views that ‘all actors, who assess, retrospectively or prospectively, the 
lawfulness of international actions and whose consequent reactions shape the flow of events, 
now constitute, in sum, the international legal decision process’.1041 Essentially Reisman’s 
reasoning suggests that unilateralist acts which would result in States, such as the US, using 
force on the grounds of humanitarian interventions are legal, despite those actions being in 
direct contrast with the UN Charter Article 2(4). This view of the legality of such unilateral 
action is ardently counter-argued by many scholars namely Alvarez, Hathaway, Chesterman, 
Boutros-Ghali, and Mandel.1042 Chesterman regards such unilateral actions to be deviations 
from multilateral institutions and warns us of the effect on the ability to bring IR, particularly 
the conduct of international super-powers, under the rule of law.1043 Equally Boutros-Ghali, 
former UN Security General, and Mandel, by referring to the US unilateral intervention in 
Kosovo in 1990s, discuss the role and impact of such illegal unilateral approach, without the 
UN authorisation, and in violation of the UN Charter, and its consequent effect in 
undermining multilateralism efforts by the UN.1044 As cited by the former UN Security 
General ‘my responsibility was to promote multilateralism; the emerging U.S. policy was 
unilateralism with multilateralism providing a fig leaf as needed’.1045  
 
Similarly Reisman’s claim does not seem to take into consideration the principle of 
reciprocity where the unilateral actions by the US can result in a reciprocal response, 
authorised as legal self-defence, by the attacked party. Furthermore, Reisman’s suggestion 
jeopardises the fundamental notion of State sovereignty if the power of legality is to be 
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determined by NGOs and/or media. It raises the question that if the ‘will’ of such new actors 
is to be included in the formulation of IL, then where does this leave the notion of ‘will’ and 
‘consent’ of States in the formulation, application and enforcement of IL? Throughout, this 
thesis has examined the role played by States in IL, particularly how IL is founded on their 
‘will’ and ‘consent’. Their ‘consent’ brings about a sense of accountability and obligation 
upon States, and as referred to by Hathaway, the policy-oriented approach to IL and 
encompassing other non-State actors in the legitimacy of unilateral action will undoubtedly 
affect the duties and obligation recognised by States.1046  
 
The sources of IL were looked at in Chapter Two, and as D’Amato suggests there are no 
‘mysterious’ other sources; as discussed before, IL is guided from the practice adopted by 
States.1047 Hathaway relies on D’Amato’s view and appropriately argues that adoption of a 
policy-oriented approach to IL creates a trend towards a ‘non-democratic’ approach.1048 
Indeed, the ‘will’ of the democratically elected governments can be deemed as representation 
of the ‘will’ of the nation, but if the ‘will’ of such actors such as NGOs and the media, which 
are not democratically elected, are to be taken into consideration then this trend cannot be 
taken as a move towards the aim of the international community and the goals of the 
international legal system. In fact, Hathaway develops this argument further by suggesting 
that adopting a different interpretation of the policy-oriented approach to IL will enable 
States to break away from the norms and rules of contemporary IL since the final justification 
of legality of an action can be the ‘will’ of the media or NGOs.1049 This opens the door for 
States to act unilaterally towards an international issue that would otherwise require 
multilateral action. Taking a situation such as the use of force into consideration, the media 
calling upon the world to attack a totalitarian State could be considered legal but under the 
strict interpretation of contemporary IL, strict guidelines must be followed in order to attack 
and take up arms against another State legally.1050  
 
The fundamental questions that come to mind are: where would the unilateral actions of a 
State lead the international community? How would such unilateral actions promote co-
operation, democracy and democratic values in the international arena? Hathaway suggests 
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that Reisman’s reasoning above provides a justification for unilateral actions by world 
powers, most dominantly the US since the end of the Cold War.1051 On a similar perspective, 
Scheffer holds the view that the US has an obligation and is called upon to maintain world 
peace and security and ‘this is a reality in the international system’.1052 This might be a 
situation in which the international system might find itself but surely it was not the intention 
or the vision of the international community when such liberal and multilateral organizations 
as the UN were formed.  
 
Unfortunately regardless of all the efforts and the good intention of the international 
community, and despite claims made by Alvarez that international lawyers ‘worship at the 
shrine of global institutions like the UN’,1053 there have been inadequacies and 
disappointments with the UN.1054 Hence, under this view, the US unilateral actions have at 
times been justified as necessary since multilateral organizations such as the UN are not 
adequate to deal with the issues concerned in specific cases.1055 Examples of this were 
unilateral action in Kosovo without the UNSC backing, and the invasion of Iraq without the 
full agreement of other UNSC members. This unilateralist action by powerful States, namely 
the US, has damaged the efforts of the international community towards multilateralism, and 
as argued by Ramphal, the US’s ‘recent behaviour has served actually to weaken the structure 
of multilateralism, including the United Nations itself’.1056 This poses the dilemma of chicken 
and egg where the question is: did the weakness of the position of the institutions such as the 
UN result from the unilateral actions of the US or was the US attracted towards deviation 
from multilateralism as a result of inadequacies within internationalism. Alternative views 
exist, such as that the US ‘is known as the foremost bearer of the ideology of human 
rights’,1057 or as claimed by Anderson that the unilateral actions by the US are never ‘merely 
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one of power’ but more related to ‘moral and political legitimacy.1058 However, the phrase 
used by Malanczuk is very appropriate that ‘what is good for the goose must be also good for 
the gander’ in relation to the US unilateral actions.1059 Therefore, can the US assume an 
exceptionalist and/or unilateral approach to the rule of law and IL, though at the same time 
expect all other States to be law-abiding?       
   
5.3. Functionalism and Neo-functionalism 
  
One important element that needs to be considered in the study of co-operation is that there 
has been a movement towards the growth of multilateralism by establishment of institutions 
and organizations that promote and maintain co-operation. Integration between States became 
the new pathway to stability and peace, through functionalism, which led to the creation of 
such international organizations as the UN and the WTO. Following the discussion above on 
realism and liberalism, functionalism is another school of thought in which States and non-
State actors focus on multilateralism based on common interests and goals. This approach is 
more akin to liberalism and differs from realism insofar as the interests of more than just 
States are taken into consideration. It recognises that there are other groups concerned and 
has greater focus on peace than on control by power.1060 International integration under 
functionalism is formulated and based on Mitrany’s work seeking the origins of world 
integration in ‘low’ politics areas such as economic and trade concerns.1061 This emanates 
from the fact that States value their sovereignty and are more likely to begin co-operation in 
common areas rather than give up full control over all matters. In this regards, a group of 
States take a collective identity whilst maintaining their individual sovereignty and control. 
Functionalism thus became the foundation upon which the UN based international 
organizations were set up and operated.1062  
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However, functionalism did not provide the framework for establishment of a global 
authorisation on one side, but also provided limited scope for institutions to govern and 
manage functional relations between States. This is where neo-functionalism was able to 
assist by regenerating and reintroducing the notion of co-operation but at a more regional 
level rather than on a global basis. One of the most important features of neo-functionalism 
lies in the concept of ‘spillover’, where the concept suggests that once co-operation and 
integration have been introduced in one area, there is a domino effect and there will be an 
increased momentum towards more integration.1063 This is a strong notion which suggests 
that, co-ordinated and common approach in one area can have a strong influence in the 
international policies, for example the concept of common market requires common, co-
ordinated and unified policies which can then strongly influence the economic and trade 
relations between States. 
 
This framework has been attributed to the notion that integration is more favoured when 
problems are minimised through a more collective approach rather than singular efforts, and 
even those that once opposed integration feel the pressure for co-operation and shift their 
views when realising the gains that could be obtained from more integration.1064 This could 
particularly be effective through pressures exerted (whether political or peer-pressure) from 
an established central organisation. This could lead towards a sense of co-operation and 
alliance between member States and through integration in one area further integration can be 
created or enhanced. An obvious example of this is the European Union with the vision that 
regional integration would enhance co-operation and bring a better sense of synergy in 
States’ relations. This new allegiance to the European Union and greater co-operation 
between member States is made possible without the expectation that each State should give 
up its individual national identity. Needless to say, not every vision for the formation and 
integration across Europe has gone smoothly; every objective has not been achieved as well 
as intended. In particular the concept of ‘spillover’ that was envisaged was met with some 
pushback from certain States concerned with loss of autonomy and independence.1065   
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6. Why do States Co-operate? What are the Benefits and Drawback of Co-
operation for States? 
 
There is an argument that as the world is becoming more global in its interactions, there is a 
greater need for international rules, and greater co-operation is needed to deal with 
international issues. It has been observed how issues such as global security, global trade and 
the fight against terrorism are only some of the concerns facing the international community. 
In dealing with these issues, the international community has a high incentive to co-operate in 
minimising the negative impact of these concerns. The main challenge is to ensure the on-
going co-operation of all States and to minimise the inducement to defect from full co-
operation. This is essentially achieved by means of ensuring States do not find themselves in 
prisoners’ dilemma situations by limiting the cause to defect, as discussed further below, 
when analysing the barriers of co-operation. Suffice to say that one of the ways of minimising 
defection and incentivising co-operation is through multilateralism and collective 
collaboration by States.1066  
 
Throughout this thesis the importance of sovereignty, ‘will’ and ‘consent’ of States have been 
discussed. It has also been discussed how benefits and advantages of long-term peace and 
stability require truly global multilateral co-operation, and this in turn demands a certain 
element of compromise. Therefore, the obvious questions to ask are: why do States co-
operate? Is there an obligation on them to do so? What are the reasons leading them towards 
non-co-operation? What are the advantages and disadvantages of co-operation for States? 
 
It was seen when analysing the evolution of co-operation in this Chapter how the 
international community has gone through a globalisation leading to an evolution in State 
interaction, and this has required the progress in IL into its contemporary form. As such the 
international community has gained an insight that a singular, independent view is no longer 
a feasible mode of operation, hence interdependencies are increasingly required. The increase 
in the interdependencies of the international community thus needs an international legal 
system. Within the realm of IL, influenced by reciprocity, States are able to more easily co-
operate since the ability of placing a reservation and the reciprocal equivalent obligation that 
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is placed on the non-reserving States, as an example, increases the incentive of co-operation. 
The incentive to co-operate is well observed by Abbott stressing that States have the 
willingness to co-operate but also have a need to preserve their independence so as to:  
 
Structure of the interaction, the incentives perceived by other states, and the compliance of others 
with their obligations will be crucial to international cooperation. . . .States will be reluctant to enter 
into agreements without clearly defined mechanisms for the ongoing production of reasonably 
timely and reliable information on these matters. Such mechanisms . . . may determine the success 
of an agreement in practice.1067  
 
This incentive is twofold. Firstly States can be part of the overall treaty but only provide 
‘consent’ with the provisions they feel compelled to accept, and secondly States are likely to 
commit and abide by their obligations or duties since they have been privy to the negotiations 
and have provided their ‘consent’ to the parameters of their obligations. There are a great deal 
of common interests and aims between States, thus co-operation can provide numerous 
benefits that has not yet even been attempted let alone fulfilled, such as synergy in 
technological advancement, military operations and international trade.    
 
In the preceding Chapter, it was observed how reciprocity acts as an enforcement mechanism 
for obedience to international legal obligations due to available reciprocal responses; thus 
abiding by these obligations is an incentive for States to avoid negative reciprocal action. 
Similarly, States might choose to co-operate not in pursuit of common interests but instead 
negative impact through non-co-operation. Reciprocity has indeed been credited for the peace 
that was maintained during the Concert of Europe for as long as it existed.1068 Stein refers to 
this form of co-operation, ‘to avoid losses’, and identifies this as an option for States when 
facing difficult or limited choices.1069 In such situations, rational States are likely to choose 
the least costly option. The cost of non-co-operation is not merely financial since any conflict 
is likely to result in loss of lives. A sovereign State is entrusted with protecting its citizens 
and as such a rational State will evaluate the consequences carefully in line with its 
obligations and duties, and will work towards peace.1070 This can be observed in Hobbes’ 
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view that there is a duty and obligation upon sovereigns to work towards ‘the reasons of 
peace’.1071   
 
The international community has established institutions such as the UN to help promote co-
operation. This is based on the neo-liberal institutionalism which is a strand of liberalism 
discussed earlier where international institutions such as the UN or the WTO have relied 
upon reciprocity in cases of defection and/or dispute settlements and inevitably have 
incentivised States to co-operate and abide by their obligations. Blum’s assertion that 
multilateralism can lead States towards co-operation holds true since ‘looser’ and 
‘decentralized’ form of enforcement mechanism through reciprocity provides incentives for 
co-operation and reduces possible deviation.1072 This has been evident throughout this thesis 
particularly through the analysis of reciprocity in the UN Charter and the VCLT. There are 
many theories offered as to how reciprocity brings about international co-operation between 
States, but the most prominent reasons for this can be understood as, 1) induced balance of 
rights and duties, 2) fear of reciprocal action and its consequent losses, and 3) the ability 
under IL for a collective international response.  
 
The first explanation, induced balance of right and duties, was discussed in this thesis in 
relation to IL and reciprocity. The example of placing a reservation was discussed and how it 
exempts the non-reserving State from the same duty foregone by the reserving State. This 
form of reciprocity will bring about a sense of co-operation since States are able to be part of 
the general agreement without the fear of undue and unfair obligations when other 
contracting members are able to exclude themselves from the same obligations. Equally each 
State is able to provide ‘consent’ only to the relevant parts of the agreement in line with their 
policies, which in turn helps to promote multilateralism since the barrier for non-participation 
to the agreement is diminished.  
 
The second explanation is the ability of States to legally reciprocate a non-co-operative action 
ranging from loss of reputation, loss of credibility in future agreement negotiation, sanctions 
or severe losses in an armed attack resulting from self-defence. All of these examples are 
reciprocal legal counter-measures or self-defence available in IL. As discussed earlier, when 
                                                          
1071 Thomas Hobbes, De Cive: The English Version, (ed.) Howard Warrender, pp. 95-99, also Thomas Hobbes, 
De Cive, The English Works of Thomas Hobbes, 1841, (ed.),Vol. 2, pp. 166-167. 
1072 Supra note 1018, p. 356.  
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States are faced with difficult challenges, they might choose to co-operate not due to the 
available gains but more in relation to avoiding losses. There are numerous examples of 
where States have had to co-operate despite their genuine ‘will’, such as in the Cuban Missile 
Crisis, or during Egyptian pursuit of relations with Israel in 1970s, where non-cooperation 
would have resulted in severe losses.  
 
Under the third parameter, the availability of collective reciprocal international approach, IL 
has offered a further means of working towards stability. The UN Charter clearly poses an 
obligation on States to protect the ‘inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an 
armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations…’.1073 The Persian Gulf War 
was referred to previously as a reciprocal example of international collective approach. 
Goldstein and Pevehouse provide an interesting debate on the importance of the role played 
by an external (outside) power’s ability for reciprocity in a situation of non-co-operation 
between conflicting States.1074 The scholars reflect on a regional (neighbouring) conflict 
between Serbia and Bosnia and the possibility of further co-operation with the introduction of 
a ‘triangular’ co-operation scheme, but the core of their argument is applicable to a wider 
scale and other forms of international co-operation in cases of international conflicts. In such 
situations, reciprocity is not restricted just to the conflicting States and the international 
community, insofar as allowed by IL in line with the doctrine of counter-measure and 
proportionality.1075        
 
The discussions on reciprocity refers to situations requiring specific or diffuse reciprocity, as 
defined by Keohane, where specific reciprocity refers to situations in which equally valued 
items are exchanged between counterparts in a limited and specified manner, with any rights 
or obligations clearly defined.1076 Diffuse reciprocity, on the other hand, relates to situations 
where there are more ambiguities in the actions of partners involved or where series of events 
are less restricted to standardise acceptable practices. There are common features that can be 
defined and identified in both specific and diffuse reciprocity. The concept of reciprocity in 
any situation can be described as having the elements of contingency and equivalence.1077 If a 
                                                          
1073 Supra note 7, Article 51.  
1074 Supra note 1020, pp. 515-516 and 528. 
1075 For further information please see Chapter Four.  
1076 Robert O. Keohane, Reciprocity in International Relations, International Organization, Vol. 40, No. 1, 
1986, p. 4. 
1077 Ibid, pp. 5-6. 
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relationship does not benefit from some form of acceptable equivalent return, it cannot be 
deemed to be a reciprocal relationship. Using the two types of reciprocity situations 
previously identified, specific reciprocity arises in situations where specific equivalent return 
between specific partners are balanced, but diffuse reciprocity situations deem to bring about 
general balance for the overall group. The importance and instances of equivalence are 
evidenced more in IR or trade. For instance, even though GATT does not define reciprocity, 
its director-general referred to reciprocity as ‘the equivalence of concession’.1078 It is difficult 
to calculate an exact equivalent exchange value of expectation and obligations between States 
given the differences in their strengths, sizes or abilities, but the reciprocal actions create a 
mutual benefit.1079 
 
7. What are the Barriers of International Co-operation and how can Co-
operation be Further Achieved? 
 
Each of the attempts at securing co-operation and collective security has been subject to 
difficulties. In particular it has been difficult to achieve co-operation for a long duration due 
to focus on self-interest rather than collective interest and gains. To provide an analysis of 
how to achieve and maintain co-operation, it is important for the study to firstly identify the 
barriers of co-operation before proceeding to explore how to overcome these barriers. An 
analysis of the barriers of co-operation is provided by Booth and Wheeler who identify 
concisely six important obstacles for achieving co-operation as: 1) Rational Egoism; 2) 
Future Uncertainty; 3) Ambiguous Symbolism; 4) Ideological Fundamentalism; 5) Great 
Power Irresponsibility; and 6) Communication.1080 The international community must 
overcome the tendencies believed by realism to divert world relations towards conflict and 
away from co-operation. Notwithstanding the general difficulties in securing international co-
operation, if the international community is to succeed in its efforts, it is then important for 
them to overcome these barriers.  
 
                                                          
1078 Ibid, p. 7. 
1079 Ibid, pp. 7-8. 
1080 Supra note 953, pp. 131-136. 
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Jervis, by referring to Meuller, suggested that co-operation is difficult to achieve without 
‘shared values’, ‘identification with the other’ and equally important the ‘moral force’.1081 
Building on this belief, Booth and Wheeler go further by suggesting that sustainable and/or 
long-term co-operation will not be achieved through the stagnant notion of identities.1082 In 
effect, overcoming the barrier of ‘rational egoism’ would require shared common values and 
identities and importantly the moral values must drive States towards co-operation. Looking 
back at the Concert of Europe and its demise, British and Russian values and motives were 
no longer shared, which led to the Crimean War.1083  
 
The second barrier introduced, refers to how ‘long-term effectiveness’ of any co-operative 
plan is fundamental to its success. Thus reducing the ‘future uncertainty’ would result in a 
State never being made to feel vulnerable or uncertain of the future of co-operation; any 
uncertainty undoubtedly leads to protective attempts against the co-operative status and 
towards damaging the co-operation between States involved.1084 The Cold War provides a 
useful example of how misinterpretation or perception of the co-operation led to mistrust 
between the US and the Soviet Union, where the US continued to be able to advance its 
military capabilities which in turn was viewed by the Kremlin as breaking the terms of co-
operation and which eventually led to the fall of the détente; ‘ambiguous symbolism’ thus 
indicates the emphasis that must be placed on the necessity of understanding the clear terms 
of any co-operation to achieve a sustainable co-operative framework.1085 Booth and Wheeler 
believe that international co-operation has been undermined as a result of the US 
Administration’s view that the internal characteristics of States constitute their external 
actions.1086 An example given by the scholars is the view held by the Bush Administration 
that the threat to world peace is from ‘rogue states’. President Bush went as far as labelling 
three countries as an ‘Axis of Evil’. However despite attempting to stop these countries from 
achieving nuclear ambitions, the Bush Administration was not opposing India to acquire 
nuclear arms.1087 This demonstrates the Bush Administration’s contrasting approach towards 
different States based on their ‘ideological fundamentalism’. 
                                                          
1081 Supra note 952, p. 348. 
1082 Supra note 953, p. 131. 
1083 Ibid, 131-132. 
1084 Ibid, p. 132. 
1085 Ibid; and Henry A. Kissinger, White House Years, 1979, p. 203, 211-212. 
1086 Supra note 953, pp. 133-134. 
1087 Frederick Kempe, The New Atomic Age Requires New Non Proliferation Strategy, Wall Street Journal, 
2006, available at: http://www.gees.org/documentos/Documen-01286.pdf. 
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The use of double standards in the international arena leaves the great powers open to be 
challenged; and ‘great power irresponsibility’ brings a sense of uncertainty in co-operation 
efforts. Bull discusses how the world was justified in having grave concerns with regards to 
the irresponsibility of the US and the Soviet Union as the two superpowers of the 1970s with 
their individual nuclear ambitions.1088 In the world today where we are faced with only one 
superpower, a similar double standard was observed in the Bush Administration’s policy and 
approach to nuclear power, particularly its approach towards the use of nuclear power by the 
‘rogue states’ who might then possess weapons of mass destruction; so the role being played 
by the great powers and their responsibility towards international co-operation must not be 
discounted.1089  
 
As with any other form of harmony and co-existence, ‘communication’ is a key factor for 
achieving co-operation amongst States. For a long duration of the Concert of Europe, as an 
example, communication was open and constructive which helped to eliminate 
uncertainty.1090 As communication became more difficult, with the perception of the increase 
in ‘egoistic strategic calculations’ by the different governments a period of increasing 
uncertainty arose regarding the intention of each State, and moved Britain and Russia towards 
the Crimean War.1091 Similarly, in the Cold War, an attempt at creating co-operation between 
Russia and the US started from open and continuous dialogue resulting in understanding and 
appreciating each other’s requirements, in the co-operation known as détente.1092  
 
The above points provide a useful and concise summary of the factors required for co-
operation to be achieved, but to overcome these barriers Kant’s approach towards peace and 
co-operation provide a useful guideline. It was discussed earlier how liberals believe in the 
impact of internal liberal government and an external co-operation and peace. Analysis have 
shown that liberal States do not engage in conflict with each other, but this is not to be taken 
to mean that they never engage in conflicts, as there is evidence of liberal States engaging in 
                                                          
1088 Hedley Bull, The Great Irresponsibles? The United States, the Soviet Union, and World Order, International 
Journal, Vol. 35, No. 3, 1980, pp. 437-447.  
1089 Supra note 953, pp. 134-135. 
1090 Louise Richardson, The Concert of Europe, (eds.) Helga Haftendorn, Robert O. Keohane, Celeste A. 
Wallender, Imperfect Unions: Security Institutions Over Time and Space, 1999, pp. 52-54; Robert Jervis, From 
Balance to Concert: A Study of International Security Cooperation, World Politics, Vol. 38, No. 1, 1985, pp. 73-
75.  
1091 Supra note 953, p. 135. 
1092 Ibid, pp. 131-136.  
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conflict with non-liberal States.1093 There is, therefore, a vast difference between interactions 
of liberal States with one another or with non-liberal States. The difference is in the relations 
and conduct of liberal and non-liberal States. Burley argues that this is not coincidental but 
rather is driven from the specific economic and political characteristics of liberal States.1094 
Rummel takes a slightly different approach and argues that liberal States, through the 
influence of their citizens, democratically elected governments and free press, are less prone 
to conflict and are more peace-seeking, therefore would not eagerly engage in war type 
conflicts.1095 The views of Burley and Rummel are counter-argued by Chan who does not 
believe the liberal States to be ‘pacific’ or inherent peace-seekers but actually as prone to 
conflict as non-liberals but just not with other liberal States.1096 In effect, the argument for 
non-conflict between liberal States relies more on restraint shown on the basis of mutual 
economic and political interconnection rather than pacific nature of liberal States. This is 
evident when one reflects back on the number of wars the US as a liberal State has been 
involved in as opposed to a less liberal State such as China. Even though the US has not 
waged war on another liberal State, it has nonetheless been engaged in almost every major 
conflict of the last 50-60 years.  
 
There has been an increase in the number of liberal States in the last centuries, 1097 but, 
despite this, Doyle argues that the creation of ‘zone of peace’ and ‘zone of cooperation’ has 
been limited to liberal States and has failed in providing a guideline for non-liberal States. 1098 
This theme of peace between liberal States is an affirmation of Kant’s theory that a condition 
for international peace is through liberalisation of States.1099 Kant was critical of resorts to 
war and clearly stated that ‘reason absolutely condemns war as a means of determining the 
right and makes seeking the state of peace a matter of unmitigated duty’;1100 and in his vision 
                                                          
1093 Anne-Marie Burley, Law among Liberal States: Liberal Internationalism and the Act of State Doctrine, 
Columbia Law Review, Vol. 92, No. 8, 1992, p. 1909; and supra note 986, pp. 213, 217 and 225. 
1094 Anne-Marie Burley, Law among Liberal States: Liberal Internationalism and the Act of State Doctrine, 
Columbia Law Review, Vol. 92, No. 8, 1992, p. 1916. 
1095 Rudolph J. Rummel, Libertarianism and International Violence, The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 27, 
No. 1, 1983, p.28. 
1096 Steve Chan, Mirror, Mirror on the Wall... Are the Freer Countries More Pacific?, The Journal of Conflict 
Resolution, Vol. 28, No. 4, 1984, pp. 641-644; and supra note 1094, p. 1909. 
1097 Supra note 986, p. 323. 
1098 Ibid, p. 323. 
1099 Supra note 993, p. 437; and supra note 999, p. 55. 
1100 Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Essay, (trans.) Mary Campbell Smith, 1903, pp. 123 and 
132-135, also Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace and Other Essays on Politics, History, and Morals: A 
Philosophical Essay, (trans.) Ted Humphrey, 1983, p. 116. 
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the prominent aim of IL is in establishing lasting peace.1101 This purpose for IL and 
international legal institutions was reverberated several centuries later in the UN Charter 
emphasising that ‘The Purposes of the United Nations are: To maintain international peace 
and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and 
removal of threats to the peace…’.1102 The challenge therefore is for IL to strengthen the 
basis for international co-operation.  
 
To approach this challenge, it is imperative to understand and appreciate the nature of IR for 
its anarchist environment. The Hobbesian view of the state of nature in world affairs holds 
true as much today as it did when published. There is a need for an overruling external force 
to guide and rule States’ relations and the international legal system. International affairs are 
driven and influenced by States and it is their ‘will’ and ‘interest’ that govern inter-State 
relations. Caution must be applied and one should not jump to the conclusion that individuals 
never play a role in IR since the increase in democratic States indicates a greater role played 
by State citizens in democratically expressing their interests. Equally, even amongst the 
liberal States, the degree of democracy, undoubtedly, varies and the ‘will’ of individuals may 
not be carried out at every turn.  
 
Realists would have us believe that States only pursue gains and power, and thus are not 
likely to be persuaded towards co-operation if it is not going to end in their additional gain. 
Realists additionally regard the main player to be States and individuals to be secondary 
players. If the inter-State relation in the world today is following the realists’ view, then how 
can one account for the increase in the quest for democracy, freedom and liberal values 
internationally. In fact, the pro-democracy Arab Spring, as a recent example, is a 
representation of individuals in States expressing their wish and taking a more direct 
approach in how their will and interest is to be represented. Alternatively, is it to be 
automatically assumed that States’ relations are directed according to liberalism?  
 
Kant’s ultimate vision for liberalist State interaction and IL is an ideal one and the 
international community has not yet reached that stage in their relations. The scholar had the 
vision that the world would become more liberal but the road to this state of liberalism will 
                                                          
1101 Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Essay, (trans.) Mary Campbell Smith, 1903, p. 21.  
1102 Supra note 7, Articles 1(1).  
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not be a steady one. As inter-State relations stand today, the liberalists do not provide an 
absolute view of State relations. A modified approach of liberalism, neo-liberalism, where 
States are considered to be in pursuit of gain but only their own ‘absolute’ gains, also does 
not fully explain the policies and practices of States. Realism and neo-liberalism are not 
oblivious to barriers for co-operation but view these barriers somewhat differently. For both 
schools of thought, defection or derailing from agreements is a strong possibility but 
liberalists regard this defection to arise from the balance of absolute gains, and hence suggest 
that international institutions can help overcome this barrier and enable States to work 
together.1103 The most obvious example of this is the WTO.  
 
Realists, on the other hand, recognise defection or derailing as a barrier, but with an 
additional barrier which is driven from the realists’ concern not only with absolute gains but 
also relative gain of other States.1104 In other words, realists consider co-operation to be 
hindered if a State regards another to be gaining more from the co-operation. The view of 
realists is associated with the notion of insecurity they feel, the security dilemma,1105 driven 
from their belief that in an anarchic condition of IR, national security of States is at risk since 
every State is in pursuit of maximisation of their gains and power.1106 Liberalists do not give 
due consideration to the security dilemma in which States might find themselves, presuming 
that the effect of anarchy has less impact on IR compared to States’ pursuit of co-operation 
for absolute gains. Having said this, the realists’ perspective and emphasis on conflict to 
overcome the security dilemma is also not helpful in securing co-operation and lasting peace. 
Doyle refers to this fear when he suggests: 
 
‘Specific wars … arise from fear as a state seeking to avoid a surprise attack decides to attack first; 
from competitive emulation as states lacking an imposed international hierarchy of prestige struggle 
to establish their place; and from straightforward conflicts of interest that escalate into war because 
                                                          
1103 Joseph M. Grieco, Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal 
Institutionalism, International Organization, Vol. 42, No. 3, 1988, p. 487. 
1104 Ibid, p. 487. 
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power of other’, John H. Herz, Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma, World Politics, Vol. 2, No. 
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1106 Supra note 953, p. 12. 
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there is no global sovereign to prevent states from adopting that ultimate form of conflict 
resolution’.1107  
 
Realists thus suggest that States are not naturally inclined to co-operate which is a view 
contradicted by liberalists. In such a situation, the powerful principle of reciprocity plays a 
vital role in leading to co-operation amongst the most unlikely players. For States to achieve 
co-operation in their relations, IL must provide the co-operative framework for States’ 
conduct and approach. Unlike IP and IR, however, IL does not distinguish between different 
sovereignties as members of the international community and all members are deemed equal 
until such time that a dispute or disobedience of IL has occurred.1108 Equally the legal status 
of States is not influenced by their political, military or economic positions. This form of 
non-discriminatory and equality of States is certainly not the case in their inter-State 
relations. A common factor though is in their shared value of independence and non-
intervention.1109  
 
In this thesis it has been examined how the reciprocity in different areas of IL acts as a tool 
for incentivising and ensuring that States comply and abide by their duties and obligations. 
Through reciprocity, States are encouraged to co-operate and maintain the balance between 
rights and duties since any non-co-operation is likely to result in reciprocal reaction. 
Reciprocity, hence, acts as deterrence for disobedience and non-cooperation. This form of co-
operation, known as ‘liberal internationalism’,1110 is driven from upholding international 
values and objectives. An example of this is in the discussion in Chapter Four, where in cases 
of deviation from its obligation and duties, State’s sovereignty might be compromised and IL 
permits States to reciprocate. This legal intervention is permissible for example through the 
means of obligations erga omnes or collective self-defence. One of the suggestions of ‘liberal 
internationalism’ is that establishing multinational organizations helps towards co-operation 
by limiting the powerful States from pursuing their political interests and influencing IR.1111 
In practical terms, organizations such as the UN or the WTO are prominent examples of 
organizations that have primarily liberal foundations. The opponents of this view, the realists, 
                                                          
1107 Supra note 986, p. 219. 
1108 Supra note 1094, p. 1909.   
1109 Supra note 986, p. 213. 
1110 Brian Cowen, Challenges to Liberal Internationalism, Irish Studies in International Affairs, Vol. 12, 2001, 
pp. 1-5. 
1111 Ibid, pp. 2-5. 
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however claim that IR is still driven from factors such as political power and strength in 
economy, military and diplomacy.1112 
 
There is an unquestionable increase in the number of liberal States and there is greater 
striving towards co-operation. There are undoubtedly obstacles for achieving co-operation 
even for States that are moving towards co-operation, and thus the fundamental issue facing 
the international community is to stimulate an international environment where factors for 
war are lowered and co-operation is encouraged. IL as well as an increase in international 
institutions helps towards that goal and, as discussed, the principle of reciprocity helps reduce 
the fear of defection or derailing from international agreement, obligations and duties. Co-
operation and peace will not be achieved without commitment to obedience of agreements 
and IL. As with any legal system the enforcement mechanism for legal obligations and duties 
plays an important role in enhancing commitment and deterrence of disobedience.1113     
 
Booth and Wheeler, amongst other scholars, have provided factors that can render growth in 
co-operation between States, which the study now discusses. The factors suggested are 
summarised below: 
  
1) De-ideologising conflict –The end of the Cold War is a recent prominent example 
of détente between two States and its end was possible once both the US and the 
Soviet Union moved away from the ideological labelling of each other. For example, 
Reagan had previously labelled the Soviet Union as an ‘evil empire’ but on his visit to 
Moscow when asked about this previous label he aptly responded ‘that was another 
time, another era’; 
 
2) An alternative logic of uncertainty – The steps taken by both the US and the Soviet 
Union to bring about an end to the Cold War and the subsequent evolution of NATO, 
and NATO-Russian relations, demonstrate a vision of common security by States 
involved. The need to co-operate was accepted, to bring about common security 
through an element of trust as opposed to the arms race option that was pursued 
throughout the Cold War;  
                                                          
1112 This was discussed in Chapter Four when discussing the effectiveness and influential nature of the 
permanent members of the Security Council in enforcing international law. 
1113 For further information on enforcement mechanism of international legal system refer to Chapter Four. 
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3) Importance of personalities – The end of the Cold War has been attributed to the 
vision and the roles played by the leaders, and their agents, of both superpowers. Both 
leaders, Reagan and Gorbachev, demonstrated their willingness and ability to shift 
from their original standpoint when confronted with co-operative opponents. Equally 
the relationship between Clinton and Yeltsin paved the way for the expansion of 
NATO into NATO-Russian relations;  
       
      4) Security dilemma sensibility – Gorbachev and Reagan were able to express their 
joint fear and risk of an arms race and devastating consequences of any 
misinterpretation of action by either side. Independently they felt the importance of 
the need to disseminate an element of trust necessary to bring about co-operation in 
order to eliminate the risk of nuclear war; 
        
       5) Transparent defensiveness – For effective co-operation, it is important to be able to 
distinguish the difference between offensive and defensive actions, in particular in the 
area of military expansion and accessibility. The aim is to encourage and enhance 
reciprocity by reassuring the other party of your intent, which is associated with the 
notion of ‘costly signalling’. The main issue always is the correct action in line with 
the intent at the same time as preserving military enigma. The challenge is in ensuring 
that a signal is not so little as to be disregarded by the other side and not so large as to 
limit States and put them at risk. This risk factor is seen and argued by military staff 
as being the reason that any such signalling and co-operation requires a ‘margin of 
safety’. A good example of this was in the latter years of the Cold War where the 
Soviet Union sent such signals to the US in relation to the Soviet military intent, with 
safety in the knowledge that such signals would not be taken advantage of by the US. 
        
       6) Values and identities – Shared values help towards achieving co-operation, as 
previously suggested by referring to Jervis’ view of the importance of moral force and 
the requirement of similar identity to maintain co-operation. As mentioned previously, 
the leaders of both the US and the Soviet Union showed a shift in their view towards 
their historical adversaries where Reagan almost retracted his previous labelling of the 
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Soviet Union as an ‘evil empire’ and began to move towards common ideals of 
collective security through co-operation.1114 
 
The factors suggested by Booth and Wheeler, are useful consideration for co-operation but 
they are more relevant to situations when States have reached the understanding that the best 
route is co-operation. The more important factors that need to be considered are how to 
pacify States and to encourage them to co-operate. As Kant envisaged,1115 the path to co-
operation and peace is not likely to be steady and without obstacles, but since there is 
evidence of peace being reached more often amongst liberal States and there are benefits 
from this co-operation and peaceful co-existence, then the challenge for the international 
community is how to encourage those States that are not naturally and inherently co-
operative towards a state of co-operation.     
  
8. Conclusion 
 
In this Chapter, co-operation and its importance to world peace and security was examined. 
Peaceful co-existence is the concern of all States and as such the international community has 
been striving to reach a peaceful co-existence throughout the evolution of inter-State actions 
and inter-State dependency. This ideology was behind the creation of the international 
institutions such as the UN or the WTO at international level, and the European Union at 
regional level, and the evolution of contemporary IL. The principles that are considered in IL, 
relating to IR, clearly articulate that measures are adopted to limit the conflicts between 
States which consequently promote security, world peace, HR, and economic growth.  
 
The doctrine of co-operation between States has been considered as being more geared to 
prevention rather than cure. However, we observe how co-operation between States, world 
peace and international security are damaged or undermined as a result of unilateral actions 
and subsequent non-co-operative response to the unilateralism. The incentive for co-
operation between States helps develop a liberal internationalism, with multilateral benefits 
for all parties including others who are not directly involved. It is in the collective interest for 
such strategies to develop in a framework and action through relationship-building between 
                                                          
1114 Supra note 953, pp. 165-170. 
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States. Hence the source-control dominant mechanism is a co-operative approach, which is 
beneficial for parties involved even when a State does not wish to co-operate.  
 
IL has played an important role in leading the interaction of States through relationship-
building and co-operation. The thesis has shown the extent to which IL has been inextricably 
connected with IP, and both disciplines are argued to be driven from the ‘will’ and ‘interest’ 
of States. The unilateral actions, mostly adopted by the US, demonstrates that the result is not 
only the consequent escalating crisis in the world, but also the approach has been powerless 
to assist or support the development of source-led solutions for the international community.  
 
Further to this point, the hegemonic approach has left the international community (including 
the world powers themselves) with huge costs and burdens to carry. The question to ask is:  
why the US, a State which claims to be democratic and governed by rule of law, does not 
always comply with international rules, norms and obligations, and has taken steps to 
circumvent these through unilateral actions. The interrelated factor of the unilateral US 
actions in IR analysed in this study, shows that when a superpower, the US, would easily 
circumvent international rules to fulfil its own interests, it becomes easier for the others to 
follow suit. In other words, looking at the US hegemonic approach where disobedience of 
international treaties and deviation from international rules has become their common 
practice, the negative reciprocity as a licence is given to others to act in a similar manner, or 
at least prefer not to co-operate. The reason for this is that in a reciprocal system of IL 
commitment to its rules play a pivotal role for States and they are required to honour 
international agreements and rules rather than undermining them. In this respect, an 
important point to note is that the element of commitment to IL has become a primary issue 
since IL has issues with its own enforcement mechanisms.1116 Hence, co-operation in IL 
system is a prerequisite to achieve its goals. Looking at the consequence of deviation from 
international rules on the one hand, and increasing instability around the world, on the other 
hand, shows that it is a mistake of superpowers to give the opportunity to States to be un-
cooperative,1117 or to provide them with easy escape routes.  
                                                          
1116 The necessity of State commitment has been examined throughout this thesis. 
1117 Imposing sanction against a State by the Security Council is an example of this situation. The outcome of 
imposing sanction differs from one State to another. In some cases, the final outcome of the sanction is 
successful. But, it should not be applied against the targeted States similarly. For example, the Security Council 
particularly the United States believed that they could achieve their goals by isolating the Islamic Republic of 
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Through the advancement of technology and the ability to easily access up-to-date 
information, the nature of interactions has changed and therefore to win this, the strategy of 
battle and confrontation need to change. We observe how the incentive for co-operation 
between States can help develop a multilateral benefit for all parties including others who are 
not directly involved. It is in the collective interest for such strategies to develop in a 
framework and action through relationship-building between States. Even though the notion 
of co-operation and its importance is outlined by some scholars namely Booth and Wheeler, 
there is limited suggestion as to how co-operation is to be achieved in the world today 
considering the escalating crisis. It is the belief of this thesis that therefore, an alternative 
solution to overcome the above discussed international issues is to ‘increase co-operation’. 
This is to say that, as a preventative measure, instead of choosing a strategy to isolate a non-
co-operative State,1118 superpowers should ‘increase co-operation’ even where a State is not 
willing to co-operate. It should be reiterated that this approach should be adopted for 
prevention of a crisis rather than curing after it has escalated.  
 
The debates around the state of IR amongst liberalists and realists as discussed in this 
Chapter, allow us to understand the barriers facing the international community. The route to 
lasting peace is through co-operation and therefore, for peace and security of the international 
community, every effort in minimising the barriers to co-operation must be made. Liberalism 
provides a useful approach towards achieving peace and Kant’s visionary work has passed 
the test of time. Doyle articulates how the world is moving towards democracy and liberalism 
by addressing the increase in the number of liberal States. Furthermore, evidence indicates 
that war between liberal States has been a rare occurrence. This evidence is uncontested and 
even realists have been unable to provide a convincing counter-argument for this.  
 
This leaves the international community with a dilemma since realists’ view does hold true in 
certain aspects of IR. For example, from the fear of States in their security dilemma, the 
international community has reached the foresight that international co-operation has 
advantages, most of all economic gains. Liberalism, however, provides useful insight to IR 
but is more far-reaching and ideal than the current inter-State relations. For example as 
Grieco has acknowledged, IR since World War II have been more aligned to realist thinking 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Iran through imposing sanctions. However, the evidence shows that they faced with unintended consequences. 
For example, not only Iran is not weakened but also, it has gained more power.    
1118 This was discussed in Chapter Four when analysing the Security Council’s resolutions. 
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but simultaneously liberal institutionalism and international co-operation was not 
dismantled.1119 The obvious reason is that the international community understands that there 
are lessons to be learnt from both schools of thought. Liberalism may not be fully achieved at 
the present time but its teachings on co-operation towards peace, and the ability of 
international institutions such as the UN or the WTO in increasing obedience to agreements, 
have been influential.  
 
IL and international institutions have paved the way for the above vision and as the 
discussion has suggested, the fundamental role of reciprocity has been pivotal for bringing 
about the forum for more States to be party to treaties and agreements, not withholding the 
role played in balancing rights and duties of States. Equally important is the reciprocal ability 
towards States pursuing additional gains or advantages. The best example of this is in the role 
of reciprocity in the VCLT in relation to the reservations. As aptly cited by Slaughter, it is 
common for negotiations and agreements between liberal States to be conducted in ‘an 
atmosphere of mutual trust’ which would assist in the enforcement and compliance of such 
agreements, and as such ‘this mode of enforcement contrasts with the traditional ‘horizontal’ 
mode involving State responsibility, reciprocity, and countermeasures’.1120 IL strives to 
increase the commitment of States to their obligations and duties through the principle of 
reciprocity and a possibility of counter-measure against defectors.                   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1119 Supra note 1103, p. 485, 409-491. 
1120 Supra note 985, p. 532.  
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Final Conclusions 
 
The thesis set out to explore how reciprocity manifests itself in different areas of IL, and to 
ask if reciprocity is a foundation of IL, or whether IL creates reciprocity. In addressing this 
central research question the study examined both IL and reciprocity in order to evaluate the 
role and nature of the latter within the former. The study of the role and significance of 
reciprocity in IL is fascinating in the sense that the study explores how IL shapes the 
international community’s actions and interactions of States and how, in turn, these actions 
and interactions shape IL. The significance of the role of the principle of reciprocity in IL is 
not only in operating as an incentivising tool for States to abide by their obligations, but also 
is in its multiple functions for creating stability, co-operation, mutual dependency, continuity, 
legitimate expectation, equality of rights, and coherency, whilst also creating, supporting and 
maintaining the balance between interests, rights and duties of States. Reciprocity as a 
principle in the framework of IL is a standard whose establishment and observance brings 
about equality and fairness between the rights and duties of States, thereby acting to preserve 
justice and fairness without addressing them directly. Reciprocity aims to protect and 
safeguard the rights but also to establish equality and balance between the rights and duties of 
States. The principle of reciprocity establishes a set of guidelines and parameters for the 
fulfilment of duties, imposing obligations and responsibilities in order to establish mutual 
exchange of advantages and disadvantages between States.  
 
Contemporary IL unites the international community through a legal framework. The creation 
of the UN was a concerted international effort for pursuing justice, peace and security, as 
well as promoting respect for the obligations and duties of States. IL possesses a unique 
consensual and voluntary nature, where its rules are not imposed upon States but generated 
by them through their ‘consent’. IL’s nature is highly derived from two important principles 
which are based on sovereignty and equality of rights of States. This has led to the 
uniqueness of IL where States are the law-makers, law-breakers, and at times law-enforcers. 
In such legal system the rule of law ensures that the rules are durable and not arbitrary or 
subjective to the ‘will’ and interests of States. More importantly, this is where reciprocity 
plays a fundamental role within IL and works towards limiting it from being consumed by the 
pursuit of self-interest of States whilst preserving inter-State relations from chaos. The 
effectiveness of such international legal system, which is set to regulate inter-State relations, 
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must therefore encompass and include equality of rights amongst its subjects, an element of 
give and take amongst its subjects, and an element of bilateral and reciprocal obligation in a 
tit-for-tat format.  
 
The analysis of reciprocity within the context of sociology and anthropology provided an 
insight into how people tend to reward kindness with kindness whilst retaliating against 
unkindness. The rightness and wrongness of responses or behaviours are assessed in line with 
the social, moral and value system of individuals/communities, whilst taking the cost-benefit 
analysis into consideration. The protection of equality and cost-benefit determines the value 
of return of a gift or kindness to be in equal measure. When this is coupled with the principle 
of utility, the moral aspect is thus taken into consideration where right action leads to benefit 
and wrong action leads to pain. States, similar to individuals, in general are willing to accept 
obligations and duties that are within a reciprocal framework, in the sense that others would 
consider themselves similarly obligated. Similar to the social or anthropological analysis of 
human inter-actions, this form of reciprocal framework tends to provide a form of rules that 
are based on and promote stability, longevity, fairness and justice in inter-relations that would 
otherwise be under jeopardy. When applying rationale for engaging in an action or in reacting 
to an action, States reflect similar mind-sets for protection of their interests, and anticipation 
of their obligations. In the world today, States co-operate not just because they are 
considerate or that they are friendly towards each other rather for the reason that they need 
and depend on each other. Hence, there is an increased interdependency of States which is 
heightening the importance of States inter-relations for their operations and growth. 
Retrospectively, this growth is vitally dependent on a sense of stability built upon 
international peace and co-operation. This interdependence brings about greater interactions 
and has contributed to the creation of reciprocal inter-State relations. Reciprocity encourages 
States to take a long-term view of their interactions and co-operation in their relations and not 
jeopardise the long-term gain with short-sightedness.   
 
Reciprocity is a double-edged sword. On the one side, it is a main tool for limiting States’ 
actions, abstaining from wrongful acts and abiding by their obligations, and on the other side, 
it is a tool for establishing the right to act in response to previous act, either in positive 
(namely diplomatic immunities) or in negative forms (for instance self-defence through the 
use of force). Additionally reciprocity helps by incentivising and encouraging long-term 
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commitment and obedience whilst limiting States’ obligations only on a reciprocal level, 
hence safeguarding States’ benefits or interests. States cannot attempt to impose duties and 
obligations on others without incurring some reciprocal obligations and duties themselves. 
The principle of reciprocity in IL has many functions, least of all, it confines the rights being 
claimed by States since the same rights will be made available to all States. Equally it 
influences how States go about proclaiming their rights and responding to the rights claimed 
by others. Reciprocity in this respect essentially influences and focuses on State practice and 
behaviours, in the sense that, the presence of reciprocity is a strong tool to encourage and 
incentivise States towards taking other aspects into consideration than just pursuing their 
unilateral or individualistic self-interest. Reciprocity, linked together with the principle of 
equality of rights, essentially brings about a sense of fairness and balance in State interactions 
where States benefit from similar rights and have similar obligations. The principles of 
equality and reciprocity play a pivotal role in safeguarding the impact of States’ wealth or 
power from interfering with their equality of rights.  
 
Significance and the manifestation of reciprocity in different areas of IL demonstrated how 
the balance of interest, rights and duties of States are created, supported and maintained as to 
minimise unfair advantages gained. This research demonstrated how IL operates under a 
reciprocal framework but the manifestation of reciprocity varies in different areas and in 
different contexts. For example in CIL, a State’s practice is regulated by reciprocity since 
States are careful to ensure conduct chosen by them would not be detrimental if reciprocated. 
This will limit ambitious self-gain and unfair advantages in CIL which is one of the most 
flexible areas of IL and not centrally governed or regulated. In treaty law it follows a similar 
theme, in relation to the right of States to place reservations, where reciprocity plays a 
significant role by sharing the benefit from reduced obligations and limiting any advantages 
sought by reserving State since reciprocity restricts the duty of other States towards reserving 
State in a reciprocal manner.  
 
Treaties have the most obvious manifestation of reciprocity given the bilateral nature of 
treaty law within multilateral inter-State relations. Reciprocity plays a role in this area of IL 
from the early outset. States begin at the very early stages of negotiations and discussions on 
agreeing the treaties that need to be drafted and what provisions are to be contained within 
them, as well as in the signing and/or ratification stage of a treaty. An example of this is in 
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the ILC workings on drafting the Articles of State Responsibility and the debates that took 
place in order to conclude the final draft. Reciprocity further manifests itself when States are 
building consensus amongst the international community for signing and ratification of 
treaties. Once a rule has come into effect, there are further reciprocal entitlements available to 
States in response to non-fulfilment or breach of agreements. Similarly the ‘remedial’ 
features of reciprocity manifest themselves in the right to adopt counter-measures, in the form 
of ‘self-help’ or ‘self-protection’.1121 A more pertinent example of the ‘remedial’ features of 
reciprocity is in ‘inherent right’ to self-defence within the UN Charter. Alternatively, in a 
more positive light reciprocal respect, as referred to in diplomatic immunity, is an 
incentivising tool for States to abide by their obligations and safeguard their own overseas 
diplomats. Similar theme is evident in the working of the WTO. The WTO sets its primary 
objective as aiming to establish and maintain the balance and equality amongst its members. 
Its framework is based upon establishing a basis upon which one State cannot benefit through 
deviating away from their membership agreements, thus highlighting reliance on principle of 
reciprocity. Accordingly, in cases of disputes, the injured party can turn to a well-established 
‘remedial’ dispute settlement process and achieve compensation for any losses suffered.  
 
The above examples show the clear manifestation of reciprocity but reciprocity takes 
different forms as the IL rules crystallise. Many IL rules and obligations are set through 
lobbying, reciprocal dialogues and negotiations between States thus rendering reciprocity as 
an important aspect in the early stages of IL rule-making. A strong example of this was seen 
in the efforts relating to treaties connected to environmental concerns as well as in the general 
progressive and development of IL. At the negotiation stage reciprocity takes a more 
encouraging role in order to bring as many people on board with the new legal rules that are 
being requested or created; and once the rules are created, reciprocity thus takes an 
incentivising role to create adherence to IL. The significance of reciprocity in IL continues 
after rules have been created since IL operates, in general, as a reciprocal system, in the sense 
that it aims to set equal and corresponding obligations for States and operates through an 
underlying power to continuously encourage States away from pursuing their interests and 
incentivise them towards abiding by their obligations. This is done by reducing the limit of 
the obligation of a State if the other party has chosen to limit its own obligation and/or by 
permitting the injured States to reciprocate against wrong-doers or those who seek to gain an 
                                                          
1121 Supra note 197, para. 10.   
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undue and unfair advantage. Within the primary sources of IL, particularly treaty law and 
CIL, reciprocity plays an integral part when the law is dealing with inter-State relational 
aspects of IL. The thesis has examined the extent to which reciprocity plays a role in the 
creation of the law and continues to manifest itself in the interpretation, application, 
adjudication, operation and enforcement of IL, particularly in non-centralised form of 
enforcement. Reciprocity within IL system, plays a significant underlying role to encourage 
adherence to IL rules as well as incentivising States to fulfil their obligations. However, this 
encouraging and incentivising role functions in parallel with maintaining the balance between 
interests and rights of States.  
 
The role of reciprocity in IL is pertinently visible through the guidelines provided to States 
through principles such as pacta sunt servanda and ‘good faith’. The presence of the role of 
reciprocity in IL is in itself a strong deterrent for breaching IL rules. The role of reciprocity 
could be further argued as an essential component of the de-centralised system of IL in an 
absence of overarching legal authority which can formulate, adjudicate or address all legal 
disputes. In the uniqueness of IL system, deterrent factors play a significant, if not 
fundamental role in enforcement of IL. This deterrent role of reciprocity both in law-making 
and within IL rules themselves is a strong positive form of reciprocity which helps restrict 
States’ conduct away from individualistic approaches and enhance co-operation and peaceful 
co-existence.   
  
The vital point of observation is that reciprocity in IL has many applications. This application 
is varied and is largely dependent on the type of norms or values that are being protected and 
the type of relationship that is being governed. Additionally there is an underlying theme 
within IL that promotes collective responsibility, commitment and reciprocal respect to the 
rights of others. The contemporary IL has evolved from bilateral obligations covering limited 
subjects towards a more multilateral context. The rules of IL cover a vast range of inter-State 
relation rules, namely Law of Diplomatic Relations or the VCLT to the general commitment 
of States, to uphold the international communities’ values and norms. For instance, the rules 
protecting jus cogens rules and obligations erga omnes. The principle of reciprocity is 
characteristically more relevant to balancing equality of rights without directly addressing the 
morality and justness of the reciprocal reaction. This suggests that HR laws and IHL do not 
possess reciprocity since their aim is to protect the international communities’ fundamental 
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values and norms and therefore cannot be based on any reciprocal relationship. Equally 
obligations erga omnes are non-bilateralisable, clearly suggesting that these obligations and 
jus cogens rules cannot be reduced to bilateral relations and impose obligations that are 
beyond one-to-one relation, thus are not restricted to only reciprocal and mutual exchanges of 
benefits. States cannot revert to the principle of reciprocity to breach fundamental rights on 
this ground. Therefore, as a significant element, jus cogens rules and obligations erga omnes 
do not have a reciprocal foundation in IL. 
 
Treaties such as Law of Diplomatic Relations are set to govern inter-State relations and are 
by their very nature bilateral agreements or multilateral agreements that are bilateralisable. 
The important point to note is that HR laws and humanitarian aspects of IHL are 
unidirectional, unilateral and are not open to being subject to bilateralisable obligations.  HR 
laws or humanitarian aspects of IHL such as the Genocide Convention or sections of the 1949 
Geneva Convention protecting the rights of individuals are regarded as norm-creating rules 
aiming to create obligations by instilling a sense of values and norms within the international 
community. The distinctions between these two categories are that the former is an agreement 
set to govern the inter-State relations and agreements, and the latter are declarations by States 
to uphold and protect the rights of individuals and citizens.1122 HR laws are norms established 
for the relationship between States and their own citizens and stipulations among States are 
for the protection of individuals, and humanitarian aspects of IHL are adopted to protect the 
rights of individuals or those people set to be protected at the time of war.1123 For instance, 
parties to the Genocide Convention do not enter into this agreement in order to stop genocide 
in relation to one another’s citizens but rather these conventions aim to instil a code of 
conduct and obligations on States and are ‘norm-creating conventions’ in nature, setting the 
norms for the international community regardless of protecting the citizens of just the parties 
to the conventions.  
                                                          
1122 International Law Commission, Report of the International Law Commission on the working of its Forty-
Ninth Session, A/CN.4/483, 1998, para. 69; Curtis Bradley and Jack L. Goldsmith, Treaties, Human Rights, and 
Conditional Consent, Chicago Public Law and Legal Working Paper, No. 10, 2000, pp. 2-3, at, 
http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract_id= 224298; and Francesco Parisi and Catherine Sevcenko, Treaty 
Reservations and the Economics of Article 21(1) of the Vienna Convention, Berkeley Journal of International 
Law, Vol. 21, Issue, 1, 2003, pp. 20-21.  
1123 International Law Commission, Report of the International Law Commission on the working of its Forty-
Ninth Session, A/CN.4/483, 1998, para. 69; Curtis Bradley and Jack L. Goldsmith, Treaties, Human Rights, and 
Conditional Consent, Chicago Public Law and Legal Working Paper, No. 10, 2000, pp. 2-3, at, 
http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract_id= 224298; and Francesco Parisi and Catherine Sevcenko, Treaty 
Reservations and the Economics of Article 21(1) of the Vienna Convention, Berkeley Journal of International 
Law, Vol. 21, Issue, 1, 2003, pp. 20-21.  
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For this purpose, reciprocity takes a step back when looking at the application of the legal 
instruments created for the protection of human rights and human dignity. However, 
reciprocity does play a role in some aspects of IHL where it relates to bilateralisable 
obligations within it,1124 set for the protection of the interests of States and the treatment of 
their armed forces. Additionally, reciprocity is evident in the interplay at the times of the 
creation of HR laws or humanitarian aspects of IHL in the form of negotiation for the 
promotion, creation of such rules and/or in its enforcement through peer-pressure or strong 
reaction by the international community such as sanctions.1125 Those who do not observe or 
respect the fundamental values of the international community are often isolated or shunned 
as a form of punishment. IL acts to promote the fundamental values of the international 
community and to create a universal sense of respect and responsibility towards the 
protection of such norms. Essentially in an ideal legal system where the protection of 
individuals is paramount to the values of the international community and every State 
endeavours to protect and uphold these values, reciprocity should play no role in any aspect 
of HR laws or IHL. However, despite the continued development in this area of IL through 
the advancement of IHL and HR laws, unfortunately there is still reliance on reciprocity, least 
of all, as part of the formulation and enforcement of such rules as well as where the interests 
of States play a role.    
 
The importance of reciprocity is further relied upon given the weaknesses identified in its 
centralised enforcement processes and in the absence of an overarching or a powerful legal 
enforcing mechanism, and the reliance upon the commitment of States to fulfil their 
individual and collective responsibilities. Reciprocity is effectively relied upon as an 
alternative enforcement mechanism in IL, where reciprocity plays a vital role in response to 
non-obedience, or a wrong-doer. The tit-for-tat policy view of reciprocity in IL, where a State 
can be retaliated against or be punished if and when it has deviated from co-operation is 
essential for the international community. Its significance lies in the fact that even though 
there are permissible reciprocal reactions available, the punishment is not so severe as to 
never induce long-term co-operation.1126 Even in cases of self-defence, where its legality is 
                                                          
1124 An example of this can be seen in the right to resume ‘hostilities’ in case of a violation of an ‘armistice’, 
International Conferences (The Hague), Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on 
Land and Its Annex: Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 18 October 1907, Article 
40. 
1125 Supra note 487, pp. 132-133. 
1126 Supra note 198, p. 71. 
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dependent on necessity and proportionate reciprocal response, then it is arguable that the use 
of force is only a ‘remedial’ approach and reciprocal reaction to a violation of IL, and the 
attacking State was aware of the consequences of its own initial actions. Therefore, IL 
permits reciprocal reaction to States as a right in cases where there is a breach and violation 
of IL rules and agreements. For instance, where States’ sovereignty rights is under attack they 
have a right to remedial counter-measures or right to self-defence in IL. The vital point to 
note is that this right exists only in the form of a response and is applicable when an action 
has been taken or there are strong anticipation of harmful actions which might be detrimental 
to the rights of States, as is the case for instance with anticipatory, pre-emptive, interceptive, 
preventive self-defence.  
 
IL plays an important role in promoting international co-operation, particularly through 
reciprocity where observing legal obligations can avoid reciprocal responses as well as 
establishing a sense of balance between States’ interests. The legal equality of States helps in 
safeguarding the possible imbalances and differences that inherently exist between States, 
working towards a sense of harmony and co-operation. In the international arena, no State 
wishes to give up its authority to another or to forego its ability to restrict its international 
legal obligations. On the other hand, the international community has evolved in its 
understanding for the importance of co-operation as the cornerstone of achieving long-term 
international peace and security. Here lies the dilemma between these two needs and 
requirements. As it stands, IL is facing limitations and weaknesses for enforcement of its 
rules in the absence of a legal and compulsory enforcing authority; however States require 
long-term stability and co-operation. Accordingly there is a requirement for additional forms 
of encouragement to increase commitment and obedience of States to international duties and 
obligations. These limitations and dilemmas in IL and IR must have been identified from the 
outset of the inception of contemporary IL. The need to achieve long-term stability and co-
operation without States losing their control or to submit to a higher international authority 
required a delicate balance to be created and maintained. This is where the principle of 
reciprocity plays a significant role and bridges the gap between creating stability and co-
operation together with maintaining States’ control and safeguarding their interests.  
 
Attempts made so far at securing peace, have not only been unsuccessful in establishing 
international peace and security, but arguably have led to an increase in international tension. 
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Thus the international community keeps failing itself. Despite the existence of the theoretical 
knowledge, the belief of wishing and seeking co-operation, the failure of the international 
community surfaces in its approach and mind-set. Hegemony and arbitrary rule is not 
eliminated and still exists. Political peer-pressure within the international community leads to 
inconsistent approaches and at times even towards disregard for IL. A recent example of this 
can be seen in the political approaches to Syria as well as the US and the EU sanctions 
against IRI. This is the main reason why international peace, security and co-operation are 
not yet achieved. It is the recommendation of this thesis that the international community 
needs to enter a new stage of co-operation since previous attempts at establishing 
international peace and security keep failing. Hence, long-term international peace and 
security is achievable only through increased co-operation even with those States who wish 
to isolate themselves. The increased co-operation is in the collective interest for the 
international community to develop a framework and action through relationship-building. 
Despite this negative outlook on international peace and co-operation, it must be concluded 
that reciprocity as a principle has played and continues to play a fundamental role in IL, and 
without it the international community would be facing graver calamities.  
 
Answering the central research question is fascinating, particularly taking into consideration 
the outcome of this research relating to the role and significance of reciprocity in different 
areas of IL. Reciprocity plays two distinct roles in IL: one is its role as an underlying 
principle of IL, and the other, is a right of States to a remedial reaction towards an action in 
order to bring about a continuing sense of balance between their rights and duties. States have 
the right to limit their obligations and duties but through the principle of reciprocity the same 
right must be granted to others. Also States have a right to react to breaches in their 
agreements and action can be taken in response to an action. This coupled with its role as 
facilitating the compliance and obedience of States to their international duties and 
obligations bringing about a reciprocal right to react legally to wrong-doing States as well as 
preserving any unfair advantage sought by any State. All of these cases show that the role of 
reciprocity in IL is fundamental to inter-State relations for the governing of their interactions. 
In IL, instances of reciprocity strongly present themselves relationally between States, 
namely in international treaty law, CIL in so far relating to inter-State relations, dispute 
settlements between States like the WTO agreements, remedial actions in the form of 
enforcement of IL, as well as taking a role in supporting the principle of equality of rights of 
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States by minimising self-gain and balancing their rights and duties. Reciprocity does not 
play a role in the application of HR laws and humanitarian aspects of IHL since the nature of 
obligations bestowed in these rules are more in the form of ‘unilateral declaration of States’ 
addressing the relationship between States and their own citizens or citizens of other States 
rather than regulating reciprocal ‘contractual agreements’ aimed at inter-State relations.1127 
The establishment of HR laws and humanitarian aspects of IHL are not supposed to produce 
particular advantages for States in their interactions with each other but instead they create 
obligations that are supposed to endorse ‘elementary principles of morality’ shared by, and 
for the benefit of, the international community.1128 The intended purpose of these types of 
agreements must be preserved and should not be subject to forms of contractual agreement 
where the balance between rights and duties of States is the predominant aim.1129 This is 
where a clear distinction can be made between contractual and norm-creating treaties with 
their specific nature and type of obligations. 
 
It is therefore the conclusion of this thesis that reciprocity is not a legal or foundational 
principle of IL since it does not encompass an integral part of all aspects of IL and does not 
play a role in all IL decisions and actions. Unlike the rule of law, reciprocity does not 
necessarily exist as a requirement for deciding all international cases and when deciding on 
legality of actions under all international situations and circumstances. In IL, there are legal 
international actions and obligations which are not reciprocal or do not allow reciprocity to 
take a role. Reciprocity is an underlying principle of IL in relation to obligations and rules 
governing and regulating inter-State relations. 
  
This discussion generates two challenging questions as to whether reciprocity plays a role as 
a source of IL as well as how reciprocity fits in with models for the sources of IL. Reciprocity 
could be defined as a social source of IL when IL establishes relations at inter-State level. 
When addressing a model for the sources of IL, the legal positivism conception and structure 
of sources of law opens up an interesting debate for this study. Examining reciprocity within 
its origin in sociology and anthropology led the thesis to discuss how reciprocity functions as 
a social scientific concept which following Malinowski and other social anthropologists who 
                                                          
1127 Supra note 148, p. 23; and Francesco Parisi and Catherine Sevcenko , Berkeley Journal of International Law, 
Volume 21, Issue 1, 2003, pp. 2 and 20. 
1128 This was also seen in the International Court of Justice reasoning in their advisory opinion relating to 
reservations to the Genocide Convention, Genocide Case, supra note 148, p. 23.  
1129 Supra note 148, p. 23. 
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developed reciprocity, as a primarily functionalistic notion with limited explanatory scope. 
This underlines the importance of a key point that reciprocity is characteristically about 
social functions and not about normative validity of relationships. Subsequently, it does not 
properly fit into the model of legal positivism. In fact, it challenges the legal 
positivist concept of sources of law demonstrating that legality requires social infrastructures 
which are socially constructed. These social infrastructures are not legal but they are socio-
political and economic in character and makeup. We could not talk about the role and 
function of reciprocity and remain firmly grounded within legal positivism. This brings the 
debate into the key point that reciprocity, as a social source of IL, takes us beyond the limited 
sphere of legality (or positive law) as defined by legal positivism.   
 
When IL defines relations at inter-State level reciprocity operates as a decisive and 
underlying principle of IL, and could be considered a social source of IL in contrast to the 
formal legal sources. Reciprocity takes a step back when States assume obligations that have 
a unilateral dimension rather than a bilateral or multilateral dimension, since there is no 
requirement for reciprocity in unidirectional or unilateral obligations or duties. Reciprocity is 
therefore neither a foundation nor a consequence of IL since it is embedded as an underlying 
principle in the international legal system to better control and deter self-interests and unfair 
advantage by bringing a sense of balance in inter-State relations. Reciprocity is vitally 
important to creating a legal balance between States’ rights and duties in the international 
community that includes actors with varying levels of strengths, be it from military, 
economic, political, technological advancement, natural resources and so on. Reciprocity 
could not be considered a foundational principle of IL since not all IL obligations result from 
contractual relationships but its significance in IL as the balancing factor in inter-State 
relations cannot be underestimated or challenged.  
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